New confrontations
International Viewpoint 29 September 1986
BOLIVIA viously thought that these increases were derisory.
In the same month of July, the political temperature of the country rose sharply following the anti-drug between the government operation mounted by the Bolivian
United States army together with troops, who raided clandestine cocaine installations. The presence of the US and the miners troops provoked strong reactions. It was seen as an infringement of national sovereignty, if not as a prelude to the installation of foreign mili-
THE BOLIVIAN working class, most notably the miners who have historically been its vanguard, have energetically resisted attacks made over the last few months by the government of Victor Paz
Estenssoro, helped along by American imperialism and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The most recent of these attacks took place this summer, culminating in the government's plan to restructure the nationalized mining industry, formalized eventually by decree on August 26. Under this plan, most mines will be closed or privatized. Over seven thousand miners have already been sacked and the jobs of thousands more are threatened.
LIVIO MAITAN
It is too early to make a definitive assessment of recent events, in particular results of because the negotiations between the government and the Bolivian Mineworkers' Confederation
(FSTMB)
still not are known. But it is clear that the strug gles of the Bolivian masses are unfolding in more and more difficult conditions.
In July 1985 President Paz Estenfollowing ssoro came to power fraudulent elections and an agreement between his party, the Historical Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR-H) and Hugo Banzer's
Alliance
Democratic
Nationalist
(ADN).
(1)
Immediately after these elections,
Paz
Estenssoro decreed a new package of measures which enforced those adopted by the previous government. (2) He imposed a wage freeze, abolished state subsidies on basic goods and authorized a "free' floating of the against the US dollar. This peso was a new blow for the standard of living of the masses, which had alfallen considerably for some ready years. (3)
Initially, Estenssoro's policies had a measure of success, especially in respect of the rate of inflation which was more or less diminished.
But this was an ephemeral result. Already,
1985, inflation began in December to climb again although it stayed below previous levels. Robert Gisbert, the finance minister, put forward a plan for an inflation rate of 36 per cent for 1986, which was to go hand in hand with a three per cent rise in
20 the Gross National Product (GNP). However, the indicators of a new recession were already apparent in the first quarter of 1986 and the rate of inflation reached 50 per cent in June. Previously, the IMF had fixed a ceiling of 85 per cent for the developments January 1985, the Bolivian Labour Confederation led a general strike to protest against the economic and social policies of the government. Two months later it was the turn of the teachers, who were on strike for more than a month. Their situation illustrates the living conditions of Bolivian workers. At the time of the strike, the teachers wage was around 30 million pesos a month, close to the minimum wage, and their demand was for 120 million pesos. (4) After the struggle had broken out, the government was willing to give the teachers a 100 per cent rise, recognizing by this token that they could not live on their existing wages. As far as the miners are concerned, they receive an average wage of less than 60 million pesos a month. A leader of the COB, Walter Delgadillo, calculates that they need double this simply to be able to live.
In July, President Estenssoro decided to put an end to the wages freeze. He announced that the monthly minimum wage would be increased from 30 to 40 million pesos, with 33 per cent rises in the public sector. Given that prices had already risen about 30 per cent, the COB obtary bases in the country. There were protests supported by the trade unions. These involved mainly peasants who cultivate cocaine and who would be forced to give it up without any guarantee of an alternative source of income.
Towards the end of July, 21,000 miners began a strike. This was the start of a new wave of workers' struggles. On August 1, workers went on strike in the mining city of Oruro and in Potosi, including workers from the national airline company, LAB, and from the universities. At three days notice, the COB called a 48-hour general strike in solidarity with the miners for August 21 and 22.
Previously, on July 25, there had been a significant test of political forces when the COB had organized a referendum on two questions. Ninety-five per cent of the respondents were for the suspension of the payment of the external debt and against the government's tax reform — a generalized ten per cent value-added tax (VAT), which particularly hit the poor. The government, not at all appreciative of this initiative by the union confederation, denounced it as a fraud. (5)
1. The MR-H is one of the parties to come out of the MNR. which was brought to power by the 1952 revolttion, and whose principal historic leader is Paz Estenssoro. The previous government was led by Hernan Siles Suazo, another historic leader of the MR. Today, Suazo is the head of the MNR-I (MNRLeft).
Hugo Banzer, leader of the ADN, took power in a military coup 1971 and remained in power until 1978.
2. On the situation under the previous government of Siles Suazo (1982-85), see in particular the following articles: "A new stage opens" Livio Maitan, 'International No. 48, March 12, 1984; "The test of the March general strike", by Andre Dubois, IV' No. 74, April 22, 1985.
3. According to estimates in the international press the income per head in Bolivia fell 30 per cent between 1980 and 1985. (See 'Latin America Regional Reports Andean' RA 86-01). This article has drawn mainly from this source, and from Latin America Weekly Report.
4. In July 1986, one US dollar equalled 1.9 million pesos. It will probably be at least equivalent to 2.3 million pesos by the end of this year.
5. According to some estimates, and a half million people participated in the referendum ('Le Monde, August 30, 1986). But 'Latin America Weekly Report (86-30, August 7, 1986), gave the much lower figure of 300,000.
International Viewpoint 29 September 1986
In this context Paz Estenssoro's government announced a radical refor the mining heralding fresh the working class. A decree issued on August 26 announced that the head office of the nationalized Bolivian Mining Company (COMIBOL) would
The Matilde zine mine and the Corocoro tin mine in La Paz to be closed down for good. Nine other mines were to be sold into private ownership and vate cooperatives. However, these (San Jose, Huanuni, Unificado and Tasna) had already possible target for closure. The workforce would be reduced by half, so between 12,000 and 13,000 workers were to lose their jobs and consequently their homes. In the eight months prior to August, there had already been between 7,000 and 8,000 redundancies. New test of strength
A new test of strength began. The miners had already organized a 150mile march from Oruro to La Paz beginning on August 21, to protest against the massive number of redunpart, often accompanied by their families and by other workers and students who marched with
On August 26, 40 miles outside of the capital, La Paz, the marchers were stopped by the army. Under the pretext of an imaginary threat of insurrection, the government opted for open repression. The march leaders were arrested, and the rest of the marchers rounded up and dispersed in atrocious weather conditions, without medicines, money or food. another moving chapter to be inscrib. ed on the record of the Bolivian working class, already one of the glorious in the world.
The government proclaimed a state of seige on August 28, and proceeded to arrest labour, political and church leaders in La Paz and five other cities. Around 200 were removed to remote regions of the country. At the same time, La Paz airport was occupied by airforce units and the university prevent students becoming centrally in the resistance, as they have in the past.
The day afterwards - August 29 - the COB called a 24-hour general strike in protest at the imposition of the state of siege, which saw the participation of large numbers of factory and building workers. Big demonstrations were held in several towns. For example, in Cochabamba -a town of 280,000 inhabitants -15,000 people marched on September
However, the miners could not prolong their resistance. On August 29 the fighting stopped because of the government's preoccupation with opening negotiations with The miners were returned to home towns from La Paz in army government slowed down the pace of the measures that they intended to impose, and even reduced them in
But it is undeniable that the miners and the working class have suffered a new setback.
The government's plan, insofar as it is realizable, will mean a deepening of current efforts to restructure the Bolivian economy. The mining sector, traditionally the backbone of the economy, has been in decline for following developments in the world market, and also because of the more and more obsolete nature of Bolivia's producapparatus. Now this crisis has reached a point of no return.
To give an idea of the extent of the problem, in 1980 the price of one pound of tin was 7.6 US dollars, while today it is less than three dollars. At the same time, the value of exports fell from 650 to 120 million US dollars. Production decreased six-fold compared to its 1976 level, and, in 1985, COMIBOL lost 250 US dollars.
If this collapse of the mining sector and the steady slide of the GNP for some years did not bring about a complete disintegration in the country, it was because of the existence of what is called the "informal sector".
Behind this euphemism is hidden the reality of the cultivation, processing and trade in cocaine, which statistics concerning Bolivia should be economy). This is even more true is, by definition, underground and therefore the figures concerning it cannot be guaranteed to be accurate.
sources coincide in their estimate that drug exports will bring in around 600 million this year (some say nearly a thousand million), while the value exports will only be 400 million dollars. The cocaine trade, therefore, accounts for 50 per cent of Bolivia's Gross National Product.
It is evident that such an economic evolution has serious consequences on a social level at a time when the traditional economy is in a state of free. fall. Peasants realize that it is more advantageous cocaine than other agricultural pro-
For workers, condemned to unemployment, they often have no other recourse but to attempt to integrate into the informal economy, lucky can change their lives. Some miners who work processing cocaine in one night can earn half the monthly wages they would get in the mines. (7)
As has already been said, it is not possible yet to draw a balance sheet of recent events in Bolivia, at least between the unions and the governthough the government will not make an about-turn.
The mineworkers' confederation, the FSTMB, even before this recent crisis, had put forward an alternative plan for the mines composed essentially of the following points: the maintenance of jobs at the level of March 31, 1986 (i.e. 23,370 workers); a 42 per cent reduction in workers' social benefits; a 15 per cent or so decrease in spending on energy; a 50 per cent reduction in technical services and in work contracted out to companies outside of COMIBOL;
reduction in general expenses; and a 20 per cent reduction office of COMIBOL in La Paz. This is evidently a strictly defensive plan whose eventual implementation would bring about no qualitiative changes
The developments of the last two months and the blows suffered by the miners risk having very serious reperworkers' movement. The Latin American workers' movement may also pay
This is why solidarity with Bolivian workers must once again be at the top of the agenda.
On the decline of the traditional economy and the growth of the informal economy see - in addition to the sources already cited articles in *Le Monde, August 30, 1986, and 'L'Unita, August 29, 1986.
The informal economy also had a blow last July following the military operation against drug-trafficking. It was reported that the price of a "carga" (50 kilos) of cocaine fell 75 per cent, and that 150,000 producers were without means of support. (See 'El Pais, July 30, 1986). But there is no information to contradict the view that this trend, although strong, is only conjunctural.
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