International Viewpoint 29 September 1986
SOUTH AFRICA
For example Village in East London,
Duncan
Residents' the
Association suffered a disruption of
Mass movement resists its work going all the way down to its street committees, after the arrest of 200 to 300 of its members.
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For its part, the the state of emergency workers' union (CCAWUSA), member of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), had several of its leaders and members questioned and jailed. This went so far that in Pretoria and Johannesburg
FOLLOWING CLASHES between demonstrators and the repressive forces of the regime, a general strike was called in Soweto on
September 4. It was a notable success, being described as the biggest action of this sort in the township since the student uprising of
1976, which initiated the new upsurge of the Black masses in South
Africa.
The Soweto general strike had a major impact on economic activity in Johannesburg, reducing trading activity by 27 per cent and work in the manufacturing industry by 38 per cent. This protest illustrates the reactivation of the anti-apartheid movement and the breadth of the resistance to the repressive measures instituted by the state of emergency. The following article aims to draw an initial balance sheet of the mass movement under the state of emergency.
TONY ROUX after the establish-
Three months ment of the state of emergency of
June 12, it is hard, because of the censorship, to get an exact picture of the extent of the arrests. In mid-
August the South African government published a list of 8,500 names of people jailed for at least 30 days.
Nonetheless, this figure does not released include people already or those subsequently arrested, nor those who had not yet served a full month in detention at the time the list was drawn up.
What appear to be the most realistic estimates put the number of people jailed at one time or another since June 12 at between 12,000 and
14,000.
Studies done by independent institutes, even on the basis of incomplete lists, made it possible to get a better idea of the extent of the wave of repression. At the end of July, after seven weeks of the state of emergency, the tempo of arrests had reached one every seven minutes, or 200 a day.
On the basis of a study focused on
4,000 names, a group of researchers at Witwatersrand University showed that a third of these arrests involved people with a known political affiliation. And of those, three quarters belonged to community, political or associations educational that were mainly affiliated to the United Democratic Front.
In all, 139 township community associations have been targeted by the repression. The Transvaal region suffered the worst. An independent study group, the Labour Monitoring Group, put forward the figure in late July of 2,700 trade-union members and 320 trade-union leaders arrested.
Youth account for about 25 per cent of those imprisoned. It is estimated, people under the age of 16 have been jailed because of the state of emergency. A lot of them are between 12 and 15. more sweeping than the one carried out at the time of the state of emergency decreed on July 23, 1985, and suspended on March 7, 1986, which led to the arrest of about 8,000 people. In the first month of the recent state of emergency, arrested topped the number arrested in the first month of the 1985 crackdown by 60 percent. thus in its own way acknowledged the movement considerably over these last years and rooted itself in the workplaces the townships. In order to make a significant impact on this movement, the repression has to strike still deeper.
Consequently, the wave of arrests reached out to the rank-and-file activists of the civic associations, political organizations and unions, with the objective of striking deep enough into the mass movement to paralyze it.
rank-and-file unionists had to take over the union headquarters directly in order to maintain a centralized functioning of the unions in these government has just dealt it, the mass anti-apartheid movement steamroller of the state of emergency. It remains vigorous and active and is reorganizing. In the first place, a part of the leaders and key members of the organizations, with the benefit of the experience of being arrested in the previous state of emergency, managed to escape the police raids and go underground. Second, after an initial disarray and surprise, the activist networks regrouped in forms suited to the new situation. systematically on its members to take the places of the leaders and shop stewards arrested and to mobilize to maintain the union's work in the COSATU's demands
COSATU put forward several demands to that end, calling for the release of jailed union leaders and activists; for the right to refuse night work, without having to take a cut in wages, if it were considered dangerous because of the curfew; for the right for shop stewards' access to the means of communication (telephones, telex) in the factories for union activity; the right to two hours a week for i union meetings during working hours and so on.
COSATU's journal, the first issue of which came out in August, wrote in this connection: "The bosses' leaders from FCI and ASSOCOM [the two major employers' associations] have in general agreed to these demands. Many unions have taken them up and have won some, or all, of the demands." (1)
So, for example, the CCAWUSA workers, who went on strike spon-
"COSATU, issue no. 1, August 1986, p. 2. [For details of the launch of this journal see 'International Viewpoint' No. 104, September 15, 1986).
3
International Viewpoint 29 September 1986
Street scene in South Africa (DR) taneously to protest against the arrest of their leaders, succeeded in winning important partial victories for such objectives. In Johannesburg, one of these workers explained, "We negotiated with during time off to run the union. About 10 companies agreed to give two shop stewards at the union office. The bosses paid us for one week and the union for the other. After two weeks up some of us got permission to carry on. Others have joined us later. Next week we have to go back." (2) forced its capacity to resist the bigattack it has faced important growth in membership
To cite only a few examples, the metalworkers' union (MAWU) ran a drive that brought in in the first six months. Today MAWU has 50,000 members. ship of the National Union of Miners (NUM) also increased by 80,000 in seven months, reaching the figure of 180.000.
COSATU's journal described the present situation of the confederation as follows:
"The police have wide powers to interfere with our organisation. This has meant some breakdown in communication nationally and regionally. But COSATU lives on and grows each day. In all the major industries membership has grown very fast since the formation of COSATU Membership in the metal industry has increased by 30%; in the shops by 50%; in the mines by 80%. Unions in the food and chemical industries have gained over 10,000 members each. And about 18,000 workers have paid up in the textile, transport and paper industries. COSATU grown stronger because our structures democratic. Because fight for workers' needs.
Of course, there is more to the of COSATU than membership growth, enough. Major difficulties have shown up in certain regions or industries over the way of applying the founding concerning structuring of the merging of the unions in each industry. Unity grows with influence
In the Eastern Cape province, the setting up of regional executive bodies of COSATU has already been postponed twice because of differences among the unions over the rules representation and election of
In textiles, there was even a split Workers' Union (NUTW), after three of its shop stewards formed a rival union, the TAWU.
These problems are not limited just to peculiarities in various regions or industries, although this aspect has its importance. They are more generally the reflection of debates that run through COSATU. But over and above these particular cases, unity seems to be growing apace with the influence of COSATU
While they have not destroyed the mass movement, restrictions linked to the state of emergency have considerably reduced opportunities for open work.
- demonstrations, mass
& funerals, rallies - that have been the of expression apartheid mass mobilization over these last two years. Since June 12, on the other hand, there has been a marked slowing in the tempo of such actions.
Nonetheless, resistance to the state in other forms. The work of the civic often been maintained. This is indicahave, to be sure, been limited to those times when the police are not patrolling the township. of ACA leaders are wanted and forced stay in hiding, often outside the township. But have been arrested, so the ACA is able to maintain a certain state of emergency. was attested to by one of its leaders, who said that the police "have picked up many of the youths and some executive members, but not the key
• One thing is certain, there are a lot of activities. Although pressures, they are carrying on very, very well." (4)
On the same theme, the publicity underground,
"We are still intact and able to hold meetings at national level. But the UDF power base is at the local level, where there is more intimate contact with the community." (5)
For its part, after a series of strikes, sometimes spontaneous, to demand
0. 2. Ibid, p. 3.
3. Ibid, p. 10.
*Weekly Mail. Johannesburg, August 29, 1986.
Weekly Mail, August 22, 1986.
International Viewpoint 29 September 1986 union movement seems to have set its more limited objectives, focusing mainly on securing the jobs and wages of jailed activists.
Conflicts occurred for example in the auto sector in Port ElizabethUitenhage between the automobile demanded full pay for its members, and the managements of the multinationals. General Motors offered 50 per cent of wages, Volkswagen 60 per cent and Ford 60 per cent.
The debate between COSATU and the Federated Chamber of Industries (FCI) on the eve of the one-day strike called by the confederation on July 14 was indicative both of the ambiguous attitude of the bosses toward the state of emergency and of the determination of the trade unionists. The FCI in fact tried to get COSATU to go back on its decision by arguing that it was against apartheid.
bosses would have liked to see a veritable common front arise between a section of the bosses and the union movement in the name of combating the government's repressive
Sidney Mafumadi, assistant secretary of COSATU, responded to the bosses argument by saying that the confederation considered it high time that employers took an unequivocal stand on the conflict in South Africa. ... If one has listened to the State President when he announced the declaration of the state of emergency, he said its principal aim was business confidence by bringing radicals to book know very well that the state is there to protect private property and that change if they wanted to." (6)
COSATU's tactic has been to use its capacity bear on the bosses to win demands that undermine the effects of the state of emergency, or else make the exploit the well-known divisions in the bourgeoisie over the future of the apartheid system and the means of overcoming it. But if the bosses interpret the regime's present repressive offensive in different ways, few voices have been heard from this quarter firmly condemning it.
The Labour Monitoring took note of this in concluding a study on the question, stating, contrast to the high-sounding claims in support of civil rights in the FCI Business Charter, employers have been silent on the state of emer-
This study looked at 114 firms workers in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal region. It produced the results: 50 per cent of the bosses questioned said that the state of emergency had not modified producrelations; 13 per cent even thought that they had been improved. Only 37 percent thought that it had had a negative effect.
Moreover, the index of confidence produced by went up slightly in June 1986. This led Gordon Waddel, a representative of the FCI, to say that "there is a view held, I suppose by the majority emergency was necessary and desirable to restore law and order." (8)
Many examples could be cited to illustrate the way in which the bosses have taken advantage of the state of emergency and tions it places on trade-union political activity by the Black masses.
The managers of the national enterprise SASOL recently informed
Chemical Workers Industrial Union, CWIU, that it intended implementing its wage offer, regardless of the unions agreed. all meetings of COSATU were banned in the region where the factory is located, thereby reducing the capacity of the union to react. Bosses press home their advantage
A company belonging to the Anglo-American • Corporation, Rand Scrap Iron and Metal (RSI), decided to break off all negotiations with MAWU in reprisal for a go-slow. Chamber of Mines President Clive Knobbs openly recognized that the state of emergency meant additional constraints on the NUM during nego-
Thus, the independent Black trade unions face at the same time the restrictions of the state of emergency and offensives by the bosses trying to take advantage of it and change the relationship of forces in the factories. This explains COSATU's insistence on the need to relaunch trade-union the growing exasperation the July 14 strike was an impact mainly Elizabeth region, degree in the Transvaal.
This outcome no doubt owed to the difficulties of communication among the various trade-union structures arising from the repression and to the limited time left for building the strike.
In fact, the state of the trade-union movement cannot be judged just by this action. As a commentator wrote in the Johannesburg Weekly Mail of July 18:
"In terms of the Congress of South African Trade Unions' strategic goal — a symbolic show of strength to put pressure on employers and the state to release detained unionists and lift the state of emergency — Monday's day of action was a failure.
"However, it will have its most negative effect if it masks the fact taken effective action during the Emergency and successfully achieved limited targets - such as the release of unionists agreement by employers to meet
While it has slowed the tempo of anti-government protests and muffled of emergency has not the fighting spirit of the various forms, illustrating the extent of anti-apartheid Black population.
Nonetheless, coordinating and centhese actions remains very difficult. However, this situation does leave open the possibility for the appearance of local hot spots in individual townships or factories, and even the multiplication of such focuses of conflict.
In a general sense, apartheid and structures objectively of these mobilizations, even if they are far from developing in a coordina-
For example, in a series of townships rent boycotts are underway. But commitment. In general, these actions are to protest against rents or to management of the townships by the representatives of the councils set up by the regime to run the Black
Such rent boycotts have a destabilizing effect on some of the institutions of apartheid, which increases the problems of the Blacks who have agreed to collaborate with the regime.
In all, 38 townships and 300,000 families are affected by rent boycotts, at a cost of 30 million rands a month to the state [one rand equals about 40 US cents]. In these townships, the rent boycotts are about 60 per cent effective.
In the region of Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal (PWV) alone, the rent boycotts have already cost the state 188 million rands. A still more concrete - example is that of Soweto, where the council collects no more than 3 million rands for a total of
6. Weekly Mail, July 11, 1986 •Weekly Mail, July 4, 1986. 8. Ibid.
International Viewpoint 29 September 1986
75,000 families, when it should be collecting 9 million rands. (9) This movement has also extended to towns located in the Bantustans, such as Mdantsane in the Ciskei.
The regime has reacted by staging ants evict who ten have their
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14, 300,000 complied of the government to assign pupils levels. guards at But as bomb." (13) Class boycotts
Where schools have been closed as a result of refusal to re-register pupils, parents and teachers have organized to demand their reopening. In other places, pupils formally registered have nonetheless refused to accept the new setup and have protested against the presence of security forces by boycotting classes.
In the Orlando West neighborhood of Soweto, at the Matseke high school, the teachers have protested against the fact that the security forces went to the point of accompanying the boys and girls to the toilets.
This attempt to pacify the high schools has already given rise to sporadic clashes between pupils and police, notably in mid-August in Soweto. Calm is thus far from returning to the high schools, despite the extent of the repression applied to achieve this objective.
Other forms of resistance are persisting as well, such as the boycott of white stores that has been going on in Port Elizabeth for many months now.
But in recent weeks perhaps the most resounding demonstration of the determination and militancy of the Black masses has been the rebuff dealt to the policy of the South African government and its local
Since endorsed the
Kwandebele.
Since have auxiliaries, on the other.
of traditional teachers, civil delibera-
"the fact on dependence' resumption of regime itself tions in Soweto.
various
9.
'Weekly Mail', August 15, 1986.
10.
'Weekly Mail",
September 4, 1986.
•Weekly Mail', August 1, 1986.
11.
12
'Weekly Mail,
August 22, 1986.
13.
Weekly Mail, July 25,
1986.
14.
'Weekly Mail', August 15, 1986.
of centralizing the struggles and uniting the forces fighting the regime.
The diversity of the forms of mobilization and organization has no doubt been somewhat accentuated by the repression. But fundamentally, it reflects the social diversity of the camp of the oppressed and exploited, as well as very strong regional peculiarities in South Africa.
For example, the state of emergency has not had the same character everywhere. Among other things, the Natal supreme court has twice stood up to the regime by condemning and rescinding some of its repressive measures. In the Western Cape region, the restrictions on the activity of 119 unions and extra-parliamentary organizations were lifted after COSATU appealed to
Such peculiarities affect all opposition forces and, in the last analysis, reflect the unevenesses in the development of the mass move. ment. In these conditions, achieving unity is no doubt a complex task and more difficult today than before the state of emergency.
Nonetheless, certain circumstances linked to this period of intense repression can enrich the debate question in the future. One example is a decision by activists imprisoned at the Diepkloof prison in Johannesburg belonging to rival organizations -
Soweto Students' (SOSCO), linked to the UDF, and the (AZASM), linked to the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO). Put same cells, these young militants, who on the outside had clashed with each other, sometimes violently, decided to make a tactical alliance for the duration of their imprison-
In declaring the state of emergency, the Botha government set itself a number of goals at the same time. On the one hand, it sought to stem the decline in the political influence of the National Party over its traditional electoral base. This decline had above all, by the growing impact last spring of initiatives by extreme-right forma-
From this standpoint, the firmness of the South African goverment toward the opponents of apartheid is doubtless sufficient to reassure, at least temporarily, those worried about maintaining the status quo. To crown the operation, Botha may even have planned to hold snap elections to consolidate the turnaround in the attitudes of white voters. At least, he recently hinted at that.
However, in equipping himself to wage a serious repressive drive against the mass movement, Botha also aimed at bringing the anti-apartheid movement to a standstill and substantially lowering the level of political and social agitation in the townships and factories. He sought to keep the mass movement from getting a second wind and to break the radicalizing momentum that had been building up in it for almost two years.
In this way, Both expected to gain the means to force both the local employers and the international community to accept his repressive policy. He could dangle before the bosses the economic advantages that they could get from it. And he knew that he could count on an understanding attitude on the part of the main leaders of the Western powers.
So the state of emergency is not, therefore, a mere hiccough in an otherwise serene, gradual policy of reforms. However, to get rid of the apartheid rules rendered obsolete by the changing needs of capitalist accumulation and do so at the least political cost -these are still the terms of the government's calculations.
But Pretoria has drawn the lessons of the difficulties it has run into in trying to divide the anti-apartheid movement in a cold way and thereby to give rise to a current of Black moderates representative enough to provide an effective cover for its policy. This is what explains the regime's nervousness today.
Paradoxically, the state of emergency has demonstrated both the undiminished capacities of the regime for repression and its military superiority, on the one hand, and, on the other, the political impasse in which the ruling National Party finds itself. Its "reformist" manoeuvers are failing to defuse the mass anti-apartheid movement, while at the same time arousing discontent among its traditional poor-white electoral base.
The National Party congress reunited the party behind the goverment but it offered no solution for the crisis of the regime. The government is still unable to get out of its pattern of trying to steer a course, by following its nose, between more and more massive repression and less and less credible proposals for institutional adjustments.
Such contradictions were reflected in the National Party Congress in August. This third congress in the 70-year history of the party confirmed the limitations Botha was to put on "reforming" apartheid in an attempt to balance off the conflicting pressures on his government.
Speaker after speaker got up at the congress to reaffirm their intention to maintain certain central aspects of the apartheid policy, notably in education, housing, assignment of racial groups to their own areas and political representation on racial lines.
One such speaker, Gerrit Viljoen, minister of education and development aid, was to specify: "The whites are not on the point of capitulating to pressure from abroad. Whites have the will and the power to maintain internal security and law and order, while proceeding with essential, acceptable reform through negotiation." (15)
The terms in which this reform policy is put drastically limit its effect. But it was on this basis that general agreement was restored in the National Party. Given the scope of its crisis, this peace will probably not last long.
15. Ibid.