Who are the
Mujahideen?
IT DOES NOT say much for the "objectivity" and reliability of the media in the imperialist countries to see that they have glorified the "Afghan resistance," almost entirely passing over glaring facts. This is especially the case when they are so quick to point up the slightest indiscretion by the Communist guerrilla movement in the Philippines, to cite only one example.
Thus, the TV in Western countries untiringly broadcast tional" reportage of the operations of the Mujahideen, which are all so many remakes on the same scenario. But only on the rarest occasions have they explored what lies behind the facade.
They show little interest in the extraordinary corruption of the bureaucracy of the parties in the Peshawar, the insolent luxury displayed by their leaders, the diversion of a part of the arms they get to the black market, their participation in the narcotics traffic. They overlook the atrocities commonly commited by the Mujahideen and the violent battles that often break out among them, which have aspects both of tribal and gang warfare. SALAH JABER
They also ignore the savage fanaticism of the fundamentalists, the exa roes in core in treme backwardness of the social and political mores in force in Peshawar, the medieval oppression of women and other aspects of reactionary Islamicism. These things draw the outraged spotlight of the media when they happen in Tehran. But they become harmless folklore, even an imminent withdrawal of a strong contingent of Soviet troops. According to the rumor, this would involve 50,000 troops, or about half of all those engaged in Afghanistan!
In any case, the more the Soviet military presence in the country is reduced, the less is capacity of the reactionary forces for mobilizing. Their main argument has been, and continues to be, resistance to the shoravis ("Soviets," in the local language). The Mujahideen will certainly find less recruits for a jihad for their Islamic state than they have found until now for the fight to liberate Afghanistan from foreign troops. • charming, when they happen in Peshawar or the Saudi kingdom.
Behind the myths, let us look more closely at the main organizations of the Mujahideen. Their only positive denominator is their reference to Islam. It cannot be nationalism, given the ethnic heterogeneity of Aighan society, which does not constitute, properly speaking, a nation. Nor can it be any political ideology, since on this level the divergences are considerable, running from the Khomeinites on one side to the royalists on the other.
Islam as the sole unifying symbol is, by the way, a characteristic that the Mujahideen share with Pakistan. This helps to explain the ease with which Zia ul-Hag's regime, which is Islamic fundamentalist in its own way, was so quick to welcome them to its territory. It exploited their presence for its Islamicization drive, which is the only ideological justification for ex. istence that it has. The common reference to religion, however, has not kept the Mujahideen from lining up according to the sect of Islam to which they belong. There are the Sunnis on one side, linked to Pakistan; and the Shiites on the other, linked to Iran. Two rival alliances fused
On the Pakiscan side there are the Sunni parties, which represent the great majority of the Mujahideen, since more than 80 per cent of Afghan society is Sunni. In April 1985, the seven main organizations based in Peshawar formed the Islamic Alliance of Afghan Mujahideen. Under the pressure of their patrons, they fused the two rival alliances that had coexisted rather badly up until then -the alliance of the fundamentalists, and the so-called moderate one, actually an alliance of the royalists. International Viewpoint 6 April 1987
International Viewpoint 6 April 1987
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Up until 1985, the Kabul government almost chose not to intervene in the Hazarajat in order not to get
Iran on its back, but also because the Shiite parties were more occupied in killing each other than in fighting the Soviet-Afghan troops. This policy
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However, owing to the cessation of the conflicts among the Shiite parties and Iran's desire nearly to play a greater role in the Afghan
Hazarajat has, in turn, the crisis, become another theater of clashes with the Soviet-Afghan army.
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AFGHANISTAN