Fifth congress of the VCPtime for self-criticism rational defence (in Cambodia and on the • economic liberalisation measures). The
The Fourth National Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP), December 14 to 20, 1976, was the ConMarch 27 to 31, 1982, was the Congress eral political report and announced very
"the Central Committee comes before this Congress with a harsh
He added that: "following the congress, we will move to deepen criticism and self-criticism in the party and different levels of state administration and to devise effective means to overcome the very grave shortcomings and errors of these bodies." (1)
Like Le Duan (the general secretary of the Central Committee of the party), Pham Van Dong (the president of the Council of Ministers) included a highly critical balance sheet of the current situation and of the implementation of the line of the Fourth Congress in his report on social and economic problems. Le Due Tho (who heads the Organisation Bureau) did likewise "party-building Dong's task was to present the self-criticism of the Council of Ministers:
"The shortcomings and errors that have shown up in economic and social leadership and management over the last five years are serious. Following the harsh self-criticism of the Party Central Committee presented in the political report by the general secretary, Comrade Le Duan, I feel I must emphasise that direct responsibility for these shortcomings and errors-especially in the elaboration and implementation of the plan-belongs mainly to the Council of Ministers." (2)
Naturally, the reporters went over the enormous objective problems the country had to face after the April 1975 victory: the terrible poverty and great backwardness of the economy, the fearsome wounds inflicted by three decades of war, Vietnam's isolation, mainly as a result of the vengeful policy of American imperialism, and the magnitude of the new China....
"The underlying cause of the problems of our economy and everyday life is the fact that on the whole we still have a petty production economy that has suffered the devastating impact of long wars and colonialism. last five years, we had to wage a war of
Chinese border). We had barely finished bandaging our old war wounds when new
Add to this continual and severe bad weather, and the ceaseless attempts of the enemy to undermine our work in many fields. our economy had to respond at once to three basic and urgent problems: defending the homeland, stabilising our people's conditions, and gradually building the material and technical base for socialism. Under the circumstances, problems and imbalances were unavoidable." (3)
But Le Duan did not hide the seriousness and scope of the VCP's errors over the last five years. In fact his report
"The problems also arose because of the shortcomings and errors of various party and state organs, from top to bottom, in the field of economic and social leadership and management. spects, the shortcomings and errors in leadership and management were the main cause of the onset and sharpness of the economic and social problems of the
Several Central Committee plenum resolutions have already emphasised these shortcomings and errors."
### SELF-CRITICISM
This is not the first time the Vietnamese leadership has drawn attention to the party's "shortcomings." But the nature and harshness of the balance sheet put before the Fifth Congress supports the judgement of the editor of Doan Ket, the bimonthly of the General Union of Vietnamese in France:
"Without venturing into risky comparisons we can state that this is the second timesin its fifty years of existence that the VCP has made such a solemn and harsh self-criticism-the other being the self-criticism it made in September 1956 on the errors committed in the course of the land reform." (5)
Reading Le Duan's and Pham Van Dong's reports (Le Due Tho's is not yet available in translation), one gets the impression that presenting this self-criticism, recasting the leadership bodies (especially the Central Committee), and adopting a few measures concerning party-state relations, were the main reasons for holding the congress. The fact is that the reports said very little on several controversia questions (such as the exact scope of the presentation of the third five-year plan (1981-1985) was also very general, although theoretically this plan was already being implemented
The self-criticism did not encompass all questions. In general, the regional and international policy pursued by the VCP since 1975 was defended in Le Duan's official report, especially the alliance with the USSR, the decision to join Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), the intervention in Cambodia, and the need to preserve the "special relationship" with Cambodia and Laos. As far as these issues were concerned, the purpose of the congress may have been to implicitly condemn VCP members who are critical of the international orientation of the leadership. It is also worth noting that the establishment of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, as early as 1976, signalling that the reunification of the country as a state had been completed, was given vigorous endorse-
"Our party and our people achieved a resounding success in rapidly unifying the country at the state level and establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat over its whole territory." [Emphasis in the general analytical framework of the social and economic transition to socialism defined by the Fourth National Congress was upheld
The balance sheet's criticism focused mainly on: the judgement right after the victory, concerning the problems to be expected and goals to be realised by 1980; the party's ability to implement concretely the orientations adopted at that time; the policy for consolidating the party and recycling cadres; the evolution of party-state relations on the one hand and masses-party-state relations on the other. A sombre description of the country's economic and social situation and of
(Note of translator: available some of the official documents in En-
Therefore the page references are to the Central Committe. "Political report
Fifth National Congress of March 1982, photocopy page 18. tions, tasks, and objectives of economic and so-
National Congress, 1982, photocopy pp. 8-9.
Doan Ket, Paris, May 8, 1982, p. 5. Le Duan art. cit., p. 2.
the ideological level of the VCP was given as a background.
Turning to the economic situation, Le Duan noted, after referring to some positive achievements (especially the first steps toward socialisation in the South,
"over the last five years, besides our victories and advances, been a great deal of problems, and our faces critical problems in the economic field. The results of the implementation of the 1976-1980 five-year plan were not able to reduce the serious imbalances of our economy. Production is developing slowly while the population does not yet match social consumption and a part of the latter must rely on loans
The economy is not yet in a position to allow for a process of accumulation. There is a lack of food, fabric, and essential consumer goods. The supply of energy and materials is posing a very acute problem. The same is true for the problem of transportation and communi-
Many factories are operating below capacity (...) Trade and prices are not stabilised ployed workers is still high. Workers are still confronted with numerous hardships in their daily life (...) In some fields, capitalist and non-socialist factors have encroached on socialist ground." (7)
Pham Van Dong re-endorsed the orientation of the Fourth Congress: for the whole transitional period to socialism, the key question is industrialisation and large-scale socialist production, heavy industry remains the priority. initial phase of the transitional period, the concrete priority must be agriculture and consumer goods industries whose development is indispensable both for raising the standard of living of the masses and for building up a base for the development of heavy industry. But herecognised that the Vietnamese leadership has not: "yet clearly defined the strategy for the initial stage of socialist industrialisation which could serve as the scientific for 1976-1980 could be rae stap. 13). foundations upon which the state
To be more precise, the conditions of newly reunited Vietnam were not sufficiently taken into account: "We did not fully perceive the problems and complexities that would arise in many fields during the whole historical stage in which we advance toward socialism on the basis of an economy where petty production still predominates. We did not appreciate the full magnitude of the economic and social upheavals of the postwar period and the deleterious effects of neo-colonialism. We did not predict, as we should have, the problems that the hostile policy of the Chinese expansionists would create (...) We did not fully realise the extent of the problems and complexities we would encounter when we tried to overcome the weaknesses of our economic and social management, or the problems that unfavourable changes areas of the world situation At the same time we did not perceive all the real potential that
Vietnamese Communist Party members (DR) would permit us to meet the requirements of the initial stage of socialist industrialisation."
"Our inadequate and inaccurate assessment of the situation caused us on the one hand to display subjectivism and impatience when we set the tasks and goals of the plan too high (...) which led to a considerable wastage of labour power and
On the other hand we behaved with a great deal of conservatism and slowness in implementing the line (...), in appreciating and exploiting our opportunities in many fields." (9)
Le Duan also denounced: "subjectivism and impatience, conservatism and
" (10) He attacked the follow"bureaucratism, unrealism, lack of receptivity toward the realities of life (...) irresponsibility" (11). tic management of the administration" (12) and "a cumbersome apparatus that is excessively hierarchical (...) and run by a numerous but not very effective staff" (13) must be done away with. On balance, the criticism focused on the party its relations with the masses and the state, and the activity of the Of course, Le Duan began by stating that the important victories that have been won since 1975 were only possible: "thanks to the firm leadership of the party, a party founded and steeled by Presi dent Ho Chi Minh and unswervingly faithful to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, to the destiny of the nation and the cause of the people." (14)
"Over the past several years, mass movement displayed a lack of uniformity and in some cases efficiency while the level of consciousness is very uneven among workers and youth." (15)
"The reason for these insufficiencies is that the full impact of the dictatorship of the proletariat is not yet felt in the mobilisation and education of the masses (...) Many party organisations and committees are not yet trying to understand the life and state of mind of the dif ferent layers of the population. They still give too little importance to the task of making full use of the role and function of the mass organisations and are negligent in their work of leading the revolutionary movement of the masses. A not insignificant number of state bodies still act in bureaucratic, authoritarian, and ar bitrary ways, and infringe on the rights of the people as the "collective master." The activities of the mass organisations are also bureaucratised, slow in being renewed, and no longer correspond to the new requirements of the masses. A certain number of party members and cadres who have been morally corrupted abuse their power, harass and insult the masses, and break the law, thereby undermining the party's prestige and bringing a nefarious influence to bear on the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses."
"In such a situation, our party must (...) find remedies to shortcomings in mass mobilisation work, eliminate bureaucratism in party institutions, state organs, and mass organisations, and urgently launch a truly powerful and broad mass movement. [Emphasis in the original. (16)]
Le Duan is particularly worried by the:
"evidence of a weakening in the revolutionary fibre, will to fight, and sense of responsibility of a part of the party members and cadres who are in charge of a variety of levels and sectors." with the result that "the prestige of the party among the masses has been negatively affected." (17)
A CHANGE IN PERIOD: FROM THE FOURTH TO THE FIFTH CONGRESS There is quite a contrast between the triumphant euphoria of the Fourth Congress (1976) and the harsh and alarming picture given by the Fifth Congress re-
Leaving aside the question of this contrast raises a fundamental political question. The Fifth Congress mainly acknowledged criticisms, namely that the party was unable to resolve the difficult problems of the post-victory pe riod and these still had not been satisfac torily resolved. By contrast, the Fourth Congress was a time for presenting the lessons drawn from the successful national liberation and social struggles. We note then that, while the Fifth Congress de. monstrated that a wealth of lessons could be drawn from its experience, at least on several key questions.
This applies first of all to the question of the trajectory of the Vietnamese revolution. In the political report of the ibid, pp. 13-14 Pham Van Dong art. cit., p. 6. ibid. p. 9.
10. Le Duan art. cit., P. 16.
ibid, p. 17.
12 ibid, p. 16.
13. ibid, p. 89.
ibid, p. 11. ibid, pp. 98-99 ibid. pp. 99-100. The last formula is emphasised in the original.
17. ibid. p. 132.
Central Committee given at that congress, Le Duan had noted:
"In the present period in which national independence and socialism are indissolubly linked, and since in our coun try the working class plays a leading role in the revolution, the victory of the national democratic popular revolution is also the beginning of the socialist revolution, the beginning of the period of the transition to socialism, the beginning of the period in which the historical tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat are accomplished. This historic turn took place in the North over 20 years ago [i.e., in 1954] and on a national scale after April 30 of last year [1975]." (18)
It is clear here that Le Duan was not only emphasising the link between national liberation struggles, democratic struggles and socialist struggles in the colonial revolution, but that he was also specifying that the decisive transition of the revolutionary struggle from the democratic popular stage to the socialist stage takes place when state power is seized, at the moment of victory. His statement is consistent with the fundamental conclusions of the theory of "permanent revolution.". We should also note that the national bourgeoisie was tioned in Le Duan's description of the Front: "It was led by our party,' said, and represented a patriotic front of workers, peasants, youth, school students, intellectuals organisations, • gious organisations, and of various ethnic groups." (19)
Le Duan's report also analysed the significance and depth of American imperialism's involvement in the Second Indochina War and therefore also of the impact of the victory of the Vietnamese
"For American imperialism, it is the greatest defeat in US history.
victory of the August revolution (1945) and of the resistance against the French aggressors signalled the beginning of the collapse of old-style colonialism, that of the resistance against American imperialism demonstrated to the entire world that the demise of neo-colonialism was inevitable." (20)
Le Duan summarised the main features of the revolutionary war as it had been practised in the sixties and seventies. Because of their highly dialectical and political nature the Vietnamese analyses represent a substantial advance over the Maoist theory of "surrounding the cities from the countryside."
Finally, it is a fact that the overal! economic policy proposed to the Fourth Congress for the transition to socialism drew the lessons of the problems and advances experienced between 1954 and 1965 (and after). It avoided the pitfalls of forced collectivisation, of absolute priority for heavy industry in Stalinist fashion, and Maoist ultra-voluntarism.
Nevertheless, on two occasions (in 1956 and today, this party, which was able to face the immense difficulties of the struggle for power, which assimilated many lessons during its prolonged fight, this party which had been put to the test a thousand times, was plunged into a severe crisis a few years after taking power. As early as 1945, Ho Chi Minh had sounded the alarm against the "bureaucratism" of a party in government. The Fourth Congress in turn had called for a struggle against bureaucratism. Yet the
The problems of the transition to socialism-and of a party in power are of the same type as those of the revolutionstruggle-and of a combat party. Moreover, the mould in which the party was shaped, the long and difficult military struggle for national liberation, can become an obstacle once the problem at hand is economic planning and the democratic organisation of the new society. The post-victory period constitutes a new test, which raises new questions as the Vietnamese historian Le Than Koi noted:
"In this struggle against bureaucratism which represents (...) one of the major obstacles to democracy as well as economic, social, and cultural development, will the Vietnamese party be able to display the creativity it so brilliantly demonstrated in the political and military field?" (21)
We are compelled to recognise that as of now the answer is negative.
SIGNS OF AN INTERNAL CRISIS Certainly, as is the custom, the Fifth Congress appeared unanimous and the new leadership united: six former Political Bureau members, including General Vo Nguyen Giap, were not re-elected to this body, but they remained well the Central Committee. General Giap for some years now has no longer held a key position and the differ traditional "sensibiities' within the Vietnamese leadership seem to be still represented in the leading bodies with Le Duan, Truang Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Le Due Tho, ete. One could go so far as to the departure of six former members of the PB corresponds to a willingness to progressively renew the central leadership (the Political Bureau and Sec18. Le Duan. "Central Committee ReportFourth National Congress of the VCP." Hanoi, 1977. p. 27 19. Le Duan art. cit., 1977. p. 24. 20. ibid, 1977, p. 21. 21. Le Than Khoi, Socialisme et Developments au Vietnam. TEDES, Tiers-Monde, Paris 1978, p. 51. 22. Paul Quinn-Judge has presented large extracts from this letter from Nguyen Khac in Far Eastern Economic Review, February 26, 1982. 23. Cf. Nayan Chanda, Far Eastern Economic Review, April 16, 1982, p. 15: "There have been open calls from provincial delegates
It is no longer the same at Central Committee level. The CC has been enlarged from 133 members (including 32 alternates) to 152(36 alternates). There are 68 newly elected members (32 of whom are full members) which represents therefore 45% of the new Central Committee. Thirty-nine members of the previous CC were not re-elected-many of whom held key posts. Furthermore, for a long time sectors of the party have been asking for sanctions to be taken against cadre-including at the top-who are corrupt or worthless.
This demand had been formulated by the intellectual Nguyen Khac Vien, Director of the publication Vietnamese Studies and Vietnam Courrier. In a letter to the National Assembly, he drew an alarming picture of the situation ("things cannot continue like this, important changes are necessary on all fronts") ard denounced the policy of building up the apparatus, that is "a policy which assures the promotion of mediocre people to key positions" , which pushes aside creative militants in favour of "intellectuals who specialise in opportunism and in grotesque flattery of the leadership." (22)
Nguyen Khac Vien demanded that guilty or incapable cadre should no longer be "protected by the apparatus." The same demand was expressed in the regional congresses of preparation for the National Congress, to such an extent that the government radio had to give it some airing. (23)
One meeting of the Central Committee was enough for the direct preparation of the Fourth Congress in 1976. The political report had been published in the press several weeks before the Congress in order to allow a public discussion. This time, on the other hand, it was necessary to have three CC meetings in four months (with a marathon session of 25 days in October-November 1981) and put back the date of the Fifth Congress in order to prepare it-a sign of the conflicts which have emerged. There was no public discussion.
On December 31, 1981, the VCP had 1,727,784 members. In five years, it is claimed that 370,000 new members have been recruited-86% of them from the Young Communists. This confirms (given the previous figures) that more than 100,000 VCP members were kept out of the party when membership cards were up for renewal during the last two years: "for incompetency, opportunism, illicit traffic, speculation, embezzlement, for the purging of leaders who have committed errors or who degenerated. A broadcast from Radio Hanoi in February mentioned that the provincial congress in Ha Bac had suggested that the Central Committee take measures to expell those who had degenerated, including those who held key posts because they were obstacles who broke up internal solidarity and weakened the confidence of the masses this article there is a presentation of the main leaders removed from the Central Committee during the Fifth Congress. Nayan Chanda estimated that about 200,000 party members had been expelled.
19