CHILE the state of siege that had been declared after the general strike of October 30, 1984, he found himself in a position of extreme weakness.' A whole series of scandals had besmirched the regime. The most important was over the affair of three Communist leaders found in March 1985 with their throats cut, and the subsequent trial of the carabineros [militarized police]. The heads of the police were at stake. The
THE OPENING of electoral registers in February, and the passage of the law on political parties in March, were important stages for the dictatorship in the process that is supposed to lead to a plebiscite in 1989.
According to the 1980 constitution, which was the first milestone on the road to Pinochet's version of "democracy," only one candidate for president — civilian or military — chosen by the military junta in power, can be proposed
Christian Democracy, despite its repeated protests against these laws and Its launching of a campaign for free elections finally agreed to play the game according to the dictatorship s rules. It is going to register as a party and is calling on its membership to sign up on its electoral register.
This policy has not failed to provoke tremors within the party. The trade-union wing of Christian Democracy, through the voice of the bank workers union leader Ricardo Hormazabal, opposed registering and called for an allance with the left.
Rodolfo Seguel is president of the National Workers Command (CNT), B unfted-front trade-union organization, and one of the most popular figures in Christian Democracy. After the fallure of the CNT's March 25 mobilization, and after seeing the opposition partles lack of enthusiasm aboul supporting mobilizations, he declared: "The only thing that Interests the politicians today is the seats they can get in parliament with or without Pinochet as presdent." (Latin America Weekly Reports, April 9, 1987.)
As for the Nunez and Briona Socialist Parties (named for their respective leaders), which are in the process of fusing, they have just taken the same path as the Christian Democrats. Moreover, General Mathel, the airforce's representative in the Junta and undoubtedly one of the military officers most courted by the bourgeois opposition, has declared for the legalization of these parties, saying "The socialists are not anti-constitutional." He has tened to add that "Marxist or Leninist parties" are clearly banned by the constitution. (El Pais, January 17, 1987)
The left, grouped in the Popular Democratic Movement (MDP), has clearly rejected these two laws and called on its ranks not to sign up on the electoral registers. In beginning a new stage in the preparation of 1989, Pinochet has acted intelligently. He has managed to divide the opposition deeply - and perhaps In a lasting way - between those who are to get legality and those who are not, between those who will participate in the plebiscite and those who, at least for the moment, refuse to do so.
What is more, despite their Indignant and vehement statements, the bourgeols opposition and its allles, such as the Nunez SP, have swallowed Pinochet's bitter pill and accepted de facto the 1980 constitution.
As for the MDP, at least its soclal-democratic and Communist component, the question is whether it is going to maintain Its present firmness. For the moment, it is in Its Interest to do so. That enables it to put pressure on the contradictions within Christian Democracy and to appear as the only political expression of the popular masses confronted with the Christian Democrats capitulation. But the political concessions that it has made in recent months Indicate clearly that It's present firm attitude is only conjunctural.
The following article was written by the For Socialism Group, whose members Identify with revolutionary Marxism. It takes up the main questions In the Chilean political situation. ORLANDO SERRA chief of the carabineros, Cesar Mendoza, was forced to resign in August 1985.
The unity of the armed forces, the pillar of the regime, was far from being re-consolidated by the state of siege, and was more and more problematic. There were a growing number of statements by members of the high command of the three armed services other than the army — the airforce, the navy and the carabineros — taking a certain distance from Pinochet. It was an open secret that they were meeting regularly with the bourgeois opposition.
The bourgeois opposition itself went on the offensive, signing the "National Accord for Full Democracy," an agreement linking 11 political parties of the center-right and right, the backbone being Christian Democracy.
### Mass opposition intact
However, above all the active mass opposition remained intact, as shown by all the mobilizations that followed during July to November, culminating in the big protesta of November 4-5, 1985. The situation could not be more favorable for envisaging a head-on assault on the dictatorship. Everything then depended on the proposals to come from the leaderships of the mass movement.
But the bourgeois opposition grouped in the Democratic Alliance, which is dominated by the Christian Democrats and the left forces that take an opportunistic position toward them, was to avoid the challenge and to keep putting off the perspective of a frontal assault on Pinochet. This is the situation that has prevailed since September 1985.
The CNT refused to put on the agenda the perspective of a general strike against the regime — a general strike that was not to be called before July 23, 1986. And when the students went on strike in April 1986, they were totally isolated and suffered a grave de- 1 feat. In other words, between the moment most favorable for calling the strike and when it was actually called, a
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1. The lifting of the state of siege did not mean a retur of normal life, far from it, but rather a retur to the state of emergency in force in Chile since September 1973. May 18, 1987 • International Viewpoint
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CHILE year passed, and in the meantime Pinochet had regained the initiative.
What was unthinkable at the end of 1985 started happening in March-April 1986. Massive repression, unimaginable when the state of siege was lifted, reappeared. About forty poblaciones [shantytowns] were ransacked by the army in April and May. Some 15,000 people were arrested, that is about 20 er cent of the population of the ttlements! The army systematical attacked street demonstrations, which did not happen in 1983-1984.
Attacks against the Church
Attacks were mounted against the Church, in particular against the Vicariate for Solidarity, which organized defence of political prisoners, denunciations of violations of human rights and
Pinochet stepped up his pressure
On July 2 and 3, when the general strike was finally called, it took place too late, at a time when confidence in mass mobilization had begun to decline. That explains why the general strike was semi-failure, semi-success. The mobilization was large, but did not measure up to what could have been expected of a 48-hour general strike. It was a success on the first day, and virtually a failure on the second. Most importantly, no perspective was pro-
Throughout the first six months of 1986, the mobilization crumbled, owing to a lack of political perspectives.
On the basis of this attrition, the bourgeois opposition, that is, in the first place the Christian took the initiative of breaking the unity of the opposition as a whole that was achieved around the formation of the Civil Assembly on April 1986. This rupture was carried out on a derisory pretext: a statement by a Communist leader to the Chilean paper El Mercurio, in which he alluded to a private committee of opposition political parties in the Civil Assembly.
The Christian Democrats' move led both to a decline in the authority of the Civil Assembly, which was no longer a unifying body, and a paralysis of the mass movement, an increase in the disarray that was felt after the July general strike. In doing this, the Christian Democrats were clearly seeking to re-
2 move any obstacle to dialogue with the
armed forces, who have made a break with the Communists one of the conditions for any pact with the bourgeois
The attempt by the Christian Democrats to revive the National Accord, which had fallen into a decayed state, International Viewpoint • May 18, 1987 by broadening it still more to the right - even though this failed - pointed in the same direction. From July to Sep. tember 1986, the mobilizations went into a downward spiral, and the September 4 day of action was clearly a failure. If the assessment of the July general strike has to be mixed, the September 4 action was an unmitigated flop.
The day of action had been called by two leading bodies, in an extremely for-
- by the Civil Assembly, which wanted "a day for democracy"; and by the MDP, which sought to steal a march to the left by calling a general strike, for which it lacked the authority. The CNT could call a general strike, because it is a united body, but not the
A final factor of confusion for the more radical sections of the mass movement, the shantytowns, was the growing opportunism of the left toward the
The Christian Democratic Party is a bourgeois party with populist features. It has a social base in sections of the masses, especially among trade unionists. To judge the relationship of forces existing between the Christian Democrats and the left in the mass movement, you have to look at the three "sectors" of the movement.
Among the students, the Christian Democrats still hold a very slight predominance, reflected in the elections in the November 1986 elections in the Chilean Student Federation (FEch).2 In the shantytowns, the left, and its most radical sections, clearly predominate. In the unions, there is an equilibrium. But this is not reflected very clearly in the leaderships, because of the conditions under which the union elections have been held. But a significant event occurred in 1986. In the big mining center of Chuquicamata, one of Chile's main copper mines, where the Christian Democrats had held the leadership of the union for years, they lost out to the
The opportunism of the left toward the Christian Democrats is exemplified clearly by the case of the Civil Assembly. This body was formed on the basis of a correct idea — the need for coordination of all forces opposing the regime and for unity in mobilizations. But from the beginning the cards were stacked in favor of the Christian Democrats, because the Civil Assembly was formed on the basis of one organization, one vote.
Thus, the petty bourgeoisie, which is organized in Chile in professional groups, associations of lawyers, doctors, merchants and so on, was overrepresented relative to the workers' movement. The latter was represented in the Civil Assembly by the CNT, and the CNT had one vote, like the association of truckers or journalists.
In these assemblies, the more militant sections were totally owed, and from the political point of view, that meant automatically that the assembly would be led de facto by the Christian Democracy. The latter was over-represented politically in comparison to its real weight in the mass
The Christian Democrats do represent a section of the masses. That is an undeniable fact. But the left's pollicy of accepting the way of functioning of the assembly imposed by the Christian Democrats meant abandoning the leadof the mass movement to the bourgeois opposition.
Another illustration of this opportunism of the left toward the Christian Democrats concerns the proposal made by the MDP before the July general strike, which was a revision of its 1983 founding program, and hardly a secondary one. It involved looking favorably on the possibility of an "emergency" government presided over by a "personality enjoying the support of a consensus," who could be a mili-
Attempt at negotiated solution
So, in June 1986, the left started to make the same distinction as the Christian Democrats between good and bad military officers, in the attempt to find a negotiated transitional solution involving dialogue and accord with the
This programmatic backsliding by the MDP, this major concession to the bourgeois opposition has grave implications for the mass movement [see the interview which follows with Gabriel Valdes]. But it has also become an element of crisis in the MDP, and in particular in the main force within it, the Chilean Communist Party.
One of the new elements in these last months has undoubtedly been the emergence of a crisis within the Chilean Communist Party. Broadly speaking, this is a conflict between the traditionalist wing of the party, which is opposed, if not to armed struggle, at least to any insurrectionary perspective; and those who we might say "took serious2. In 1985, the Christian Democrats got 33.2% in the FEch elections against 33% for the MDP. In 1986, with a bit more than 40%, the Christian Democrats slightly outdistanced the MDP, by a few tenths of a percent. The advance of both forces has been at the expense of the classical right, whether pro-Pinochet or not. 3. The elections to the leadership of the Copper Workers' Confederation in April 1987 confirmed a major shift to the left. The president of the union is now a Socialist, and of the 15 seats in the leadership, seven went to the MDP, 3 to independent unionists and only 5 to the Christian Democrats, who held sway by a wide margin in the union up to the resignation of Rodolfo Seguel in August 1986.
ly" the CP's tactical turn at the beginning of the 1980s, which was reflected in the formation of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) in 1983.
It would be wrong to think that for the moment there are two well-defined lines in the CP. There are rather two sorts of sentiment, which in the long run are incompatible.
In this connection, the attempt to assassinate Pinochet September 7, 1986, was probably not the most important element, even if it was the most spectacular. More significant, undoubtedly, was the "arsenal" affair.
After the general strike of July 1986, the army intelligence services made an extremely convenient discovery of arms stocks in northern Chile. There were more than 50 tons of material, valued at $10 million - more than 2,000 rifles, hundreds of bazookas, explosives, ammunition and so on.
According to the CIA, this was the biggest America since the armed movements of the 1960s. At the time, everyone, including the bourgeois thought that the affair was fabricated by the army itself, with the help of the Americans. Retired General Gustavo Leigh, chief of the airforce at the time of the 1973 coup d'etat, publicly cast doubt on the statements of the security services.
The most astonishing thing was that a few months later, in November 1986, the FPMR was to take responsibility for the arms stocks, to offer evidence of this and to specify that the Front had a guerrilla school in the region.
How can this development be interpreted? Until last year, the FPMR was an organization that accompanied the mass mobilizations. It carried out some sabotage actions, such as dynamiting electrical pylons and some spectacular bombings, and even assassinations of officers.
Likewise, it is nearly certain that it has been doing clandestine work aimed at the soldiers and non-commissioned officers in the army, work that led in particular to the desertion of soldiers and a young officer to the ranks of the
FPMR. This defection was announced publicly by the Front.
Moreover, the FPMR has set the goal of forming "militias" in the shantytowns. Obviously, in this context, the presence of these thousands of individual weapons takes on quite a different di-
These events have scarcely been accompanied by a clear political message. But the differences that have appeared publicly in the statements made by various CP leaders, especially after the assassination attempt on Pinochet, have to be highlighted.
A crisis has opened within the CP between the "traditionalist" calls for dialogue with the armed forces and negotiated transition, who are following the "people's rebellion" line that gave birth to the FPMR more than three years ago. It is impossible to say today how this crisis may develop, even if its emergence is unquestionably one of the most important elements in 1986.
After the assassination attempt, Pinochet declared a state of siege, which was not to be lifted until January 1987. But, despite some arrests and searches in the shantytowns and all sorts of murders, he was unable to take advantage of this new apparently favorable relationship of forces to regain the political initia-
On the contrary, the political initiative is with the bourgeois opposition and those sections of the army that favor a liberalization. Three members of the junta — the representatives of the navy (Merino). of the airforce (Matthei) and the carabineros (Stange) - have had regular contacts with the opposition. While there is no public debate, discussion has centered around the possibility of a constitutional reform modifying the mechanisms of the transition scheduled to go into operation in 1989. Concretely, this means replacing the plebiscite by direct general elections.
Pinochet and his gang of loyal lieutenants
Pinochet's lack of political initiative reflects a reality that could be described as follows: Today in Chile there is a bunker, Pinochet and his gang. It draws its strength from the support of Pinochet's loyal lieutenants in the army.4 However, if you compare this bunker to the great fortress that the dictatorship still represented six or seven years ago, it is a very small redoubt, since the three other armed services are backing a very different political line from Pinochet's on the question of transition to a civilian regime.
The Chilean armed forces want to bedeck themselves with the virtues of "professionalism," in opposition to the
CHILE ideological conception of the army held by Pinochet.
If you add up all the forces that today want a transitional solution in 1989, you get a pretty impressive total. The bourgeois opposition parties as a whole, a good part of the armed forces, US imperialism and certainly the left parties would line up with a solution of this sort. But until now there has been a substantial obstacle to this — none other than Pinochet himself.
But what can he do? Under the pressure of a part of the junta, he could take the initiative himself of reforming the constitution and organizing early elections in order to forestall any unity of the bourgeois opposition that might lead to the presentation of a single candidate in direct presidential elections. But even then he would be far from certain of being able to win those elections. "After me, chaos - Or, worse, Communism!"
Another solution would be to stand pat and maneuver up until 1989. The 1980 constitution gives him the right, because he alone sets the date for the plebiscite. But if the regime sat back, that could enable the whole liberalization bloc to organize itself and possibly come to an agreement on a single candidate, civilian or military, who would get the junta's endorsement at the expense of Pinochet.
Finally, Pinochet could do what Marcos did in the Philippines under the cover of martial law - put off the elections to an unspecified date, and remain as head of state. Pinochet keeps up a waving the threat of "After me, chaos — or, worse still, Communism!"
The latest reshuffles in the top command of the army, marked by the return in force of the "ideologues" of the National Information Center (CNI), the euphemistic name of the political police, are an encouragement to everyone to take this threat seriously.
There is a major unknown factor in 4. Even this loyalty has been breached, notably by the statements of General Danus, who gained attention for his protests against the assassination in September of the journalist Jose Carasco, a member of the MIR and editor of the magazine Analisis, and by his attendance at a memorial mass for Salvador Allende. General Danus was retired in December. 5. US pressures are exercised through a discreet blackmail involving the credits Chile has asked for from international bodies — the IMF, the Inter-American 2
Bank for Development (IBD) and the World Bank. But since Pinochet has made it a point of honor to pay the debt on the button, Chile has easily obtained its lines of credit. On the other hand, foreign investors are turning up their noses at Chile, since the social situation there does not inspire confidence: "The whole question is 1 whether it going to go into the street," the representative of a big American bank said recently. (Latin American Weekly Report, March 21, 1986.) May 18, 1987 • International Viewpoint
CHILE all these speculations — the state of the mass movement.
We think that it is necessary today to fight along two axes.
First, it is necessary to fight for a democratic break with the dictatorship against all policies trying to maintain the heritage of Pinochet, which imply an "Argentine-style" solution or worse of the human rights problems. This aproach can be summed up as "all is for gotten, all is forgiven." It means maintaining the repressive apparatus intact, or at least leaving the military an important institutional role, as provided for in the 1980 constitution.
It is necessary to fight for a democratic break, which means the overthrow of the dictatorship and the election of a constituent assembly. The latter must reflect such a democratic break on both the political and social fronts, opposing the accords with the IMF, opposing payment of the foreign debt and defending national sovereignty. This is the first axis of the fight, which is essential for maintaining a real left policy today in Chile.
Battle to organize the mass movement
The second axis is the battle to organize the mass movement. The setback of 1986 very clearly revealed the organizational weakness of the mass movement, a weakness that has enabled the bourgeois opposition to establish its hegemony, as it did through the Civil Assembly.
It is necessary today to lay the bases for a counter-offensive by the people's movement, to take a step forward in the organizational recomposition of the workers' movement, and to pose the problem, without delay, for refounding the United Confederation of Workers (CUT). This has to be done immediately, and not in two years, as provided for by the CNT's last agreement.
It is urgent to build an instrument that would go far beyond the strictly trade-union sphere: a rebuilt CUT along the lines of the Bolivian Workers' Confederation (COB); a center of graviy for all the people's forces fighting or their demands: for a democratic break; and against a policy that would involve in fact a total negation of all the working-class and popular demands.
If there is a negotiated transition, if there are negotiations with the armed
2 forces, this can only be at the expense
of the people as a whole, both socially and politically, because such an outcome would certainly involve a social
2 pact that would keep the workers from
recouping their losses, after their rights have been systematically trampled underfoot for these last 13 years. International Viewpoint • May 18, 1987
"We are
ready to
come to an agreement"