are also made up of Chileans, and they have to realize that in acting as they are doing
The Communist now, they are departing every day further from their professional responsi-
Party's twists and bilities.
To preserve their professionalism, they must come to an agreement with the civil society. This is how a democratic reconciliation could operate in
Chile. If the military officers think that they can defeat the civilians, they are mistaken. By following that road, they can only isolate themselves further.
As for us, we do not want to defeat
THE TWO statements which follow are by Luis Corvalan,
What we want is to come to general secretary of the Chilean Communist Party, who has formula that we propose has been put lived in Moscow since 1976 after being exchanged for the in writing. It is the formula of
Democratic Alliance, and it cannot be anything else than coming as soon as
The first of the following two documents is an extract from possible to a vote, because neither we an article that appeared in October 1985 in the Soviet nor the military own this country. And
Pinochet owns it still less. Like all dicweekly New Times. The second is an interview given to the tators, he is coming to think that he is
Chilean magazine ASPl in August 1986. There is less than
God. He believes that he represents the because his stooges national feeling a year intervening between these two statements, and and intimates applaud him. Batista, Sononetheless, they are very different.
moza, Trujillo, Hitler and Mussolini were like that — they are all alike.
Q. Most people in Chile think that the situation is getting tenser by the day, and they are demanding that the political leaders come up with concrete solutions. What does the Christian Democracy propose?
A. For its part, the Christian Democracy is conscious of the fact that this situation has to end in order to get back to something very simple, practical and always valid - a plebiscite to find out what Chileans think; a plebiscite by means of a free vote and a secret ballot.
Q. The only problem is that General
Pinochet is never going to hold such a plebiscite. So, how do you think you can reach an agreement for this with the armed forces?
A. I have already said that General Pinochet was the obstacle, not only to a plebiscite but to a normal transition to democracy. With regard to what we intend to do, we will continue to stress verbally and in writing, in Chile and so that the armed forces will abroad, understand, that we are ready to come to dissident Vladimir Bukovsky. DOMINIQUE LEGRAND THE FIRST, the 198b lionle a naks about "people's rebellion" and a "mass uprising" as the form that the fall of the dictatorship will take.
In the second, Corvalan puts a great stress on dialogue with the armed forces (and in an especially shameful way when he speaks of the episode under the Allende government), and there is no allusion to any insurrectional objec-
What is more, while in 1985, he talked about "the need for employing the most diverse forms of struggle, both peaceful and violent," any allusion to violence has been effaced by the 1986 turnabout.
This is not an isolated statement. "Appeal for dialogue for democratic coordination" (See Le Monde, December 10, 1986), signed again outside Chile by Corvalan for the CP, Luis Maira for the Christian Left and Clodomiro Almeyda for the Socialist Party. In this statement, things are clarified: "It is possible with the active participation of the people to agree with the armed forces on certain conditions for a real process of transition to democracy." It excludes both "the road of military defeat [of the dictatorship] and of negotiations within the system" in favor of "defeating the dictatorship politically, a difficult but sure road."
The CP therefore seems to be betting on Pinochet's departure as a result of political maneuvers with the military, the bourgeois opposition and the imperialists. And it seems to exclude any perspective of overthrowing the dictatorship by a mobilization of the Chilean people, which would impose democracy, free elections and a constituent assembly.
Thus, a drastic turn has occurred. This fact in itself is not astonishing. The novelty is that it has generated a crisis May 18, 1987 • International Viewpoint
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turns
CHILE in the CP, because it collides with a practical course that has been followed for nearly four years.
The emergence of the first big anti-
Pinochet demonstrations around 1982 brought whole sections of a more radical youth into the streets, a youth that had grown up in the poverty of the shantytowns and wanted to put an end to Pinochet. It was, of course, not very receptive to the soothing proposals of the bourgeois opposition. The class difference was too great.
Searches and murders in the shantytowns
The violence of the repressive forces almost naturally produced a violent response from these youth, for whom the dictatorship meant massive searches and murders in the shantytowns, unemployment, soup lines - having to struggle to survive day by day. It should be membered also that for several years, the MIR (Movimiento de Izquierda Revoluicionaria — Movement of the Revolutionary Left) has been carrying out armed actions. "people's rebellion" turn of the CP, and in particular the founding of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) in December 1983, have to be understood. Quickly the Front became the known and the most effective of the armed organizations. On this level, even if it failed, the attack on Pinochet in September 1986 gave a spectacular display of the FPMR's level of preparation and organization.
There is no formal link between the CP and the FPMR. What is more, CP members who join the Front automatically leave the CP. The FPMR seeks to be "the armed wing of the Chilean peoand is not "a new political par-
However, the change in the attitude of the CP has become a source of crisis both within the party itself and in its relations with the FPMR. In fact, the political course defined by the perspective of "popular uprising and rebellion" has made its mark on the activity of the CP members, above all among the youth recruited on this line, most of whom know nothing of the CP's policy before 1983, during the People's Unity period under Allende.
The FPMR has had no political line of its own up until now; the CP's line
2 has served this function. But its very
existence and its armed actions, which have resumed since the repression suf-
4 fered during the state of siege, are hard-
ly reconcilable with the dialogue the CP wants with the armed forces.
The coming months should indicate what course this crisis will take. International Viewpoint • May 18, 1987
A popular
uprising ...
-ROM 1956 until the fascist cou d'etat, in the struggle fo sive and revolutionary transformations, our party supported the thesis that it was possible to achieve change by the peaceful road. It followed this road firmand consistently in the face of attacks from the right and incomprehen-
The peaceful road corresponded to the conditions of the time. Salavador Allende's victory in the 1970 presidential elections and the revolutionary transformations carried out by his government showed that the Communists were right. We followed the road that we proposed for a period of a thousand days.
The defeat suffered in 1973, in our opinion, did not invalidate the thesis that we held. But it would be naive to under a ferocious terrorist dictatorship that seeks to perpetuate itself by the force of arms, that we could believe in the possibility of a peaceful road or exclusively peaceful forms of struggle, as the center-right opposition would wish Right of the people to rebel against tyranny
The concrete forms of the struggle in the present conditions are a question that is answered in a constant process of practice and theoretical and political elaboration. In September 1980, on the basis of the new political situation, we supported the right of the people to rebellion against the tyranny. We did that a few days before the plebiscite by which Pinochet imposed his fascist constitution, subjecting the people to a permanent state of emergency.
We had to make a decision. Should we sit back and wait for time to do its work, remaining, at best, a relatively comfortable opposition for the dictatorship? Or should we reject the fascist laws in word and deed, and therefore advance rebellion and build a militant and many-faceted mass struggle?
We chose the second road. That was our duty as patriots and revolutionaries.
The gains of these last years are not the result of our efforts alone. But if in 1980 we had not understood what the institutionalization of fascism meant and if we had not perceived the changes that were taking place in the peoples' consciousness, we would not have understood either the requirements of the
More concretely, if we had not upheld the people's right to rebel, if we had not said firmly that it was necessary to employ the most varied forms of struggle, both peaceful and violent, if we had not shown in that area that we were able to go beyond words to actions, Pinochet and his court would have had nothing to worry about, and the centerright opposition would be sitting back waiting for something to happen.
Everything that has been done in recent years to give impetus to the multiform determined struggle of the masses, to harass the tyranny by every means, give it no breathing space, has been a fundamental factor in the creation of a new political framework in the country. It has opened up new perspectives and forged a strong fighting spirit in a considerable section of the people. This explains clearly the haste with which American imperialism and some sections of the bourgeoisie are looking for a solution to this conflict-ridden situation that would suit them.
The Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front has also made its contributions to bringing about this climate through such actions as sabotaging electric pylons, which require advanced specialized knowledge, organization and daring.
We Communists think that the most likely course of events will lead to a decisive confrontation between the people and the dictatorship. As the report to the last plenum of our Central Com-
mittee said, "We see this as a mass insurrection that will embrace the entire population, the bulk of the political and social forces and, we would hope, also a part of the armed forces opposed to the dictatorship.
"It is necessary to reach a level of general rebellion that can paralyze the country - popular uprisings in the main urban centers, with determined participation by the industrial proletariat, the students, the middle layers and the peasants. Such actions would be reinforced by major blows that will accelerate the paralysis of the country and will help to speed up the political and moral collapse of the repressive forces. This process would culminate in the seizure of the principal political centers of the country by the masses."
Moreover, the social impelled by the National Workers' Command (CNT), as well as the ideas of civil disobedience and active non-violence that have appeared in the parties that make up the Socialist bloc or the Democratic Alliance, are gaining ground.
### Making the country ungovernable
The proposal of working for a national strike making the country ungovernable for Pinochet also has broad support in the opposition.
Our position on a possible uprising, the proposals and ideas I have just referred to, represent, in our opinion, the main elements that could give rise to an original road, which could not be identified either with the armed road or the unarmed road. It can in practice approach one or the other, be more or less violent, more or less peaceful, depending on the breadth of the movement, on the determination and fighting capacity of the masses, and on changes that might occur in the mentality and conduct of the armed forces and in the attitude they take at the decisive moment.
There is no Chinese wall between these two forms of struggle. They are neither opposites nor irreconcilable but complementary. We speak of rebellion and an uprising by the people. Others talk about civil disobedience and making the country ungovernable. We might wonder what is the conceptual difference between them? If there is there one, it is a question of nuances.
We see, in all these proposals, a different posture in the struggle against the dictatorship, a revolutionary position. To a certain extent, those forces actively involved in the social process are learning from each other, and we are learning and assimilating what comes from the practice of the masses. *
•..Or negotiations with the military?
VESTION. A lot of people think that the opposition should present a common proposal, and thereby offer a clear alternative that would help to focus the will and activity of the maximum number of people against Pino-
Answer. Our party is ready down at the negotiating table with all the other opposition parties at any moment, and talk until an agreement can be reached. We think that it is possible to come to an agreement on a compromise consisting of three or four points, on which, anyway, we are practically in agreement. These can be found in the various proposals that have been made following the one from the MDP, which, as you know, made a big im-
Q. So, what is happening then? Why has such a common proposal always been put off?
A. I prefer not to add fuel to the flames. I prefer not to name those responsible for this delay.
Q. Hasn't the CP's attitude to violence been an obstacle to an agreement on a single proposal by all the opposi-
A. Frankly, no. This is much more a pretext. What is sure is that since the fascist coup in 1973 violence has dominated political life in Chile because of the application of the so-called National Security doctrine that has led the armed forces to unleash a war against their own people. We cannot close our eyes to this reality. It is necessary to get out of it by starting from the beginning, that is, by putting an end to
Q. Don't you think that the opposition is not reaching an agreement because some people do not want a pact with the CP?
A. Yes, to a certain extent. The probsuch a proposal comes from the opposition as a whole, it will be like the National Accord, a wobbly proposal. It will not be a common proposal, it will not have the support of all the people, and therefore it will not have the authority and the
Q. Has the Communist Party come out for dialogue and an agreement with the armed forces?
A. Yes, in the same way as the other
CHILE opposition parties, which, it should be said in passing, is a very important point of agreement.
Q. But a lot of people say that the armed forces don't want an agreement and dialogue with the Communists.
A. We have de facto a dialogue with the armed forces, or rather with members of the armed forces.
Q. With the generals as well?
A. I don't think so, not yet at least. But we have contact with officers, and of course with the non-commissioned officers and the soldiers. I recognize that the armed forces are not distinguished by their sympathy for the Communists. Nearly all the officers gone through the Pentagon's schools, and they have all been trained most irrational and primitive form of anti-Communism. But who is to say that they can't change?
Let me tell you something. At the moment of Salvador Allende's victory, in the very tense days between his election and his inauguration, we Communists made contact with the top officers of the armed forces. Modesty aside, I can say that we helped establish a certain understanding between them and the new president regarding some prob-
In that period, we had many meetings with the generals. Little by little, they came to know us, to know our way of thinking, our behavior. They learned to know us on many levels. I do not need to add that ideologically and on many points there was a great distance be- 2 iween them and the Communists.
But many of them learned to know us and to respect us for our seriousness and our honesty. That is clear. In his memoirs, Carlos Prats mentions several Communists that he got to know best in those moments, and he treats them May 18, 1987• International Viewpoint
CHILE • CANADA all with respect, or even affection.
Q. You told me that the CP was having dialogue with members of the armed forces. But let us take a hypothetical case. Say the armed forces as an institution accept dialogue with the opposition but not with the CP. What would you do then?
A. The most probable thing is that such a dialogue would not be conciliation in order to apply a policy aimed at "wiping the slate clean," giving a safe conduct to those responsible for the crimes that have been committed and leaving the military institutions more or less intact. That would not be a good thing. In any case, we will examine the facts and act accordingly.
2. In a letter sent to the Christian Democracy on July 8, the National Party proposed a pact between political parties from which the Communists and the MDP should exclude themselves or be excluded. What do you think of
A. The self-exclusion or exclusion of the Communists or the MDP from any political pact does not depend on the National Party or on the Chrstian Democracy or anyone. We are convinced, and many others are with us, that the MDP and the CP represent a force that cannot be relegated to the sidelines in the struggle against the dictatorship and which is going to play a still more important role in the future.
2. But the does the CP not propose to be an integral part of a provisional government that takes over after Pino-
A. That is another matter. At present, we cannot say categorically that that is going to be the situation when the dictatorship falls. We will fight for the dictatorship to be replaced by an advanced democratic regime pointing in the direction of socialism. possible solution, and in our opinion it would be the best one and the one that will come to pass finally, even if it does not at first.
But at the present time, I insist, the outcome is not clear, and that is why no party makes it a condition that it will participate in the government that will replace the dictatorship, which undoubtedly will be a consensus government. We do not think that it is essential that we participate. Of course, we would not participate in a government that would not go beyond just changing
2 the personnel in La Moneda [the gov-
ernment palace or would try to leave the structures of the fascist state intact.
We will participate in the government
6 when the people's will imposes this.
That is why we are fighting. But this is not on the agenda today. It is necessary to get rid of the dictatorship. International Viewpoint • May 18, 1987