SPANISH STATE
INTRODUCTION
A rising sea of unrest mass student protests I the Spanish state around the turn of the year, Felipe Gonzafighting for higher wages and against layoffs brought on by lez government has begun to look more and more battered by
The General Workers' Union (UGT), the social-democratic a rising sea of unrest. Powerful momentum built up for a generunion confederation, is now distancing itself from the al strike. In the first week of May, policies of the ruling Spanish Socialist Workers Party the death of a worker in the
(PSOE), after suffering heavy losses in last November's
Cantabrian industrial town of union elections. The Workers' Commissions, in which the
Reinosa as a result of a police
Spanish Communist Party (PCE) play a leading role, are punitive assault threatened to now preparing for their next congress. The call for general set the tinderbox alight. It was an important news item even in strike action has divided its leadership.
the northern European media.
The following article is based on a report on trade-union
The Gonzalez government work by the Revolutionary Communist League (LCR), the had been probably the strong-
Spanish state section of the Fourth International.
est and most arrogantly rightwing social-democratic regime
In Europe. Only a year ago, it managed to defeat a mass movement against NATO membership, essentially by assert-
Ing its authority as a government to which there was "no alternative."
The student protests combined with desperate struggles by workers against draconian industrial reconversions in a number of flashpoints, such as the
Puerto Real shipyards in Andalusia, the mines of Leon and at the HUNOSA mines in Asturias.
In Reinosa, the brutality of the police has served as a dramatic reminder that the "forces of order" of the social-democratic government remain essentially unchanged from the time of the
Franco dictatorship
The articles that follow give the assessment of the Fourth
Internationalists in the Spanish state and describe their plans for political intervention both in the coming elections and in the upcoming Spanish state-level congress of the Workers' Commissions, the strongest trade-
8 union force in the key sectors of the working class. *
International Viewpoint • June 1, 1987 industrial reconversion.
T HE SOCIAL-democratic govern-
ment won victories in both the NATO referendum of March 1986 and in the June 1986 legislative elections. The low level of activity by the working class, which had waged no major struggles since the general strike of June 20, 1985, led Felipe Gonzalez' government to step up its austerity policy.
This escalation was reflected in particular in contract negotiations, which the government began to link wage increases to productivity and to acceptance of changes in working conditions. Likewise, the employers' contribution to social security was again reduced, while attacks against the social wage increased.
Finally, ( the policy of introducing "flexibility" into the labor market followed its course, and a second wave of industrial reconversions began.
This sharpening of austerity was accompanied in the trade-union field by a scheme for setting up a conciliationist form of trade-unionism to make it easier for the government to impose a capitalist solution to the crisis. In this area also, there was a turn by the social-democratic government.
In fact, like any social-democratic government, the PSOE regime had used its links with the working class to put over reactionary measures. In the trade-union elections in December 1986, both the government and the UGT [the confederation dominated by the PSOE] tried to make a qualitative leap to establishing the dominance of the UGT on the labor front. Their aim was to consolidate a conciliationist trade unionism ready to accept social pacts and based on a mandate won in union elections, and not on the participation of the workers in the union branches.
This scheme involved putting the signing of a social pact off until after the elections. In fact, even while the UGT presents itself as the advocate of social partnership, the fruits of this in terms of unemployment, lost buying power and the growth of part-time and temporary jobs might have been seen as unacceptable by a lot of workers. The bosses were demanding a new tightening of the austerity policy.
Defeat for UGT in union elections
However, the result of the November 1986 union elections knocked the props out from under this scheme. While the UGT won more delegates than the Workers' Commissions, it lost in enterprises with more than 50 workers, in the key sectors of the economy and in general where the workers' movement is well-organized.
Thus, the government's plan for establishing a conciliationist trade unionism and getting a social pact has failed for the moment. If we put this together with a growing social discontent in all sections of the masses, reflected in the mobilization of young people, agricultural workers, small peasants and of the workers' movement itself, we can draw
the following conclusion:
While the government has not given up the objectives it set itself, it has been obliged to adjust its projects to the social reality of the moment by proceeding with a form of industrial reconversion that does not confront the workers' movement head-on but is being introduced gradually, while the legal rules on labor market flexibility and so on are being delayed.
A year after the government's victory in the NATO referendum, the mass movement is in full effervescence.
Young people have erupted onto the force of primary importance. And a series of the most diverse social sectors - small merchants protesting against removal of restrictions on hours; peasants protesting against the agricultural policy and the effects of Spanish integration into the EEC, sections of the health service protesting against the policy followed in this area - along with the workers' movement, have displayed a level of combativity that contrasts drastically with the reserve of recent years.
It is also important to stress that obproved in 1986. while the share of wages in the GNP continued to decline, the great majority of workers suffered little, if any, loss in buying power. On the other hand, employment increased. In the 18 months that have just gone by, 543,000 net new jobs have been created, and at present there are more wage workers in work than there were when the PSOE came into government. The consequence of these two factors is that of wage earners' households has increased.
However, these various factors, to which others should be added, have far from strengthened the credibility of an austerity policy, as the government would have us believe. They have had the opposite effect on consciousness of working people, who felt that conditions were more favorable for mobilizing to express the social malaise generated by the cumulative effects of the austerity policy.
In fact, the increase in the number of jobs, the decrease in the number of workers affected by such expedients as "job regulation" and the economic growth of certain industries, such as construction, have had the result that workers in work — with the exception of some sectors affected by industrial reconversion - are now less afraid of losing their jobs.
This growth in employment does not mean that the problem of unemploy ment has become secondary. It simply means that subjectively working people's fear of losing their jobs has diminished. But the high rate of unemployment and the way that it has increased under a Socialist government explain why it remains one of the primary causes of social discontent.
In fact, while the numbers in work have increased slightly over the time that the PSOE has been in government, the growth of the economically active population and the decline of nonwaged labor have meant that the number of unemployed has grown over this period by 700,000. A total of a million unemployed is the most eloquent condemnation of this austerity policy for working people.
Dramatic cuts in social services
Second, during the PSOE government, the number of temporary jobs has increased considerably. Thirdly, if we leave out 1986, the cumulative loss of buying power is enormous. Finally, austerity has had dramatic effects on some social services. In health, the deterioration of the public service been so great (there is a lack of even the minimum supplies for operating) that it has led to general mobilizations throughout this sector.
The current contract negotiations are being conducted without a social pact laying down guidelines. The social partnership policy's loss of credibility that we mentioned earlier, combined with the results of the trade-union elections, has made it impossible to sign a social pact.
Carlos Solchaga, the economics and finance minister, who is pursuing policy of stabilization at any cost, has appealed to "the employers' sense of responsibility" to keep them from raising wages by more than five per cent, which is the official inflation rate projected for 1987. He has not hesitated to apply blackmail, making a reduction in the employers' share of social securFelipe Gonzalez (DR)
SPANISH STATE ity contributions dependent on respect for this ceiling. At the same time, he has made it very expensive for the employers to exceed this limit by implenting a restrictive monetary policy and raising interest rates.
This wage policy has been applied most harshly in the public sector. The state rail service, RENFE, is a good example. The management has proposed a wage increase of 5 percent, a three-year contract, freedom to transfer workers to other jobs and regions, very broad job classifications, changes in work norms and so on. In a nutshell, these are all the basic elements contained in the government's scheme.
As a result of this policy, the current contract negotiations have been hard fought, and there has generally been unity between the UGT and the Workers' Commissions. As we will see later on, this leadership of the UGT seems to be taking its distance from the government. But there are many negative points in the attitudes of the union leaderships, such as the UGT's acceptance of the general contract for the metal industry, which only gives workers a six percent raise for 1987.
The source of the sharpest conflicts has been the so-called second industrial reconversion. Despite its tragic consequences for working people, the first wave of industrial reconversions was insufficient for the needs of the system. Its sails were trimmed to avoid predictable working-class opposition.
This first phase of reconversions so far has only been carried through halfway. Moreover, even though we have seen layoffs, people are still waiting for the promised compensation for this, the investments that the bosses were supposed to make. Now, economic conditions in certain industries point toward a second wave of reconversions.
In steel, the picture is dominated by excess capacities, which have been aggravated by entry into the EEC,
up left trade-union candidates in accordance with these positions. As regards the MC and LCR, candidates will be put forward in accordance with the relative size of the forces of each party present in the conferences or
SPANISH STATE since all of Europe faces similar problems and the production quotas assigned to each country in the Community are being cut. In steel, as in other industries, we are only just beginning to pay the bill for EEC membership.
In shipbuilding, the trend of demand has not followed the projections made at the time of the first reconversion. What is more, worldwide excess capacity amounts to seven times world production. And, with the emergence of some very competitive countries, projected orders for the Spanish shipyards have not materialized.
Bloodletting in steel, shipbuilding and mines
Steel and shipbuilding were at the center of the first wave of reconversions. The cost in terms of employment was high, amounting respectively to 13,000 and 16,000 jobs. But despite this bloodletting, the crisis was not solved. The economic situation of these industries is untenable, and EEC pressures, justified by the accord Spain signed to reduce its productive capacities, are becoming more and more insistent.
These two industries, then, along
PSO government. Government reports specify that it will be necessary to eliminate about 18,000 jobs in steel, 12,000 in the mines and about the same number in the shipyards.
In this second wave of reconversion, the government also plans to put in order public enterprises deeply in the red, and to extend the reconversion to industries untouched by the first measures, such as producers' goods and the railways.
However, all these measures are not going through without provoking very sharp conflicts, such as at Reinosa in Cantabria, at the Puerto Real shipyard in Andalusia or in the HUNOSA mines
Another source of conflict linked to the industrial reconversions is the suspension of the Employment Promotion Funds which is now being opposed by all the unions [see box on page 12].
The profound social discontent now being expressed throughout the Spanish state made a general strike possible. But for that very reason, the fact that it was scuttled by the Workers' Commissions has had the most negative repercussions. First of all, a good opportunity for undertaking a general action was lost in a situation in which there was an upsurge of mobilizations.
lated partial mobilizations and dealt a major blow to the government's social and economic policy. Conversely, the failure to call a general strike created a feeling of frustration among the most militant vanguard, which saw it as a perspective for generalizing the present struggles.
The decision gave a respite to the PSOE government and to the bosses, who had been seeing a growing number of conflicts and were sure that there would be a general strike. With this breathing space, they are in a better position to pursue their offensive against the fundamental rights of working people.
Finally, the decision meant a victory for the most right-wing sections of the Workers' Commissions and a shift of the union to the right. As a consequence of this evolution, the UGT will feel less vulnerable to pressure and gain a larger margin for maneuver.
The fact that the general strike was scuttled shows how subject the Workers' Commissions are to contradictory pressures. Some factors push the leadership to act in a more class-struggle direction. In fact, the union elections show that it was profitable for the Workers' Commissions, and in general for the Spanish Communist Party with the mines, are the primary targets for the dismantling planned by the
Left slate for the Workers' Commissions AN AGREEMENT has been made between the Movimiento Comunista (MC) and the LCR for the Confederal Congress of the Workers' Commissions. This article from Zutik, the newspaper of Fourth Internationalists in the Basque country, explains the basis of the accord:
The Workers' Commissions have just begun the process that will culminate next autumn in the holding of the fourth confederal congress.
The refusal to call a general strike and the various positions that were expressed in the union on this question give an even greater importance to the political discussion that will unfold in the Workers' Commissions.
For the activists of the trade-union left who are working in the Workers' Commissions, it is of vital importance to get their positions known within the union, to defend with a single voice a consistent line of working-class resistance to the bosses' attacks and to the anti-labor policy of the government, and to put into the leading bodies of the Workers' Commissions men and women committed to this line.
Our two parties consider that this alliance must serve as a rallying point for all left activists in every congress who want to defend in the Workers' Commissions a clearly left form of trade-unionism as an alternative to the various reformist currents. Our two organizations will consider case by case the advisability of extending this agreement to other trade-union forc-
The activists of both parties working in the Workers' Commissions will draw up and defend in a united way amendments, resolutions and positions as an alternative to the reformist proposals that will be presented in all the congresses and conferences preceding the confederal congress.
In every case in which the conditions for this are assembled, they will put congresses. * International Viewpoint • June 1, 1987
In these circumstances, the call for a general strike itself would have stimu-
(PCE), to take a more confrontationist attitude toward the PSOE government.
Being outside the institutions of government is an incitement to establish a relationship of forces through mobilization. The social discontent and the approach of the municipal elections are an encouragement to take the initiative in the field of social struggle in order to be able to capitalize on it. Finally, the more militant sections of the Workers' Commissions have had better conditions for building working-class mobilizations.
### Verbal radicalism not matched by deeds
The apparatus of the Workers' Commissions at the Spanish state level, and the pro-Soviet Communist Party of the Peoples of Spain (PCPE) led by Ignacio Gallego, have been most sensitive to this left trend in their language and in their way of proceeding. But this shift has been very limited.
They have not fundamentally challenged the social partnership policy, and their verbal radicalism has by no means been matched by deeds. Most of the union leaderships and activists are stuck in their old rut.
Moreover, what has just happened with respect to the general strike shows clearly that negative factors have gained the upper hand. The opposition in the confederation to calling a general strike was very strong, espe-
cially among the leaders of the United Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSUC, the PCE's name in Catalonia); among supporters of Gerardo Iglesias, present general secretary of the PCE in the Madrid union (although not Iglesias himself); and those of Santiago Carillo, grouped today in the Workers' Party of Spain-Communist Unity (PTE-UC), which was formed in February.
We knew that we would run up against this sort of resistance, but we thought it would be easier to overcome. This resistance to a general strike, very widespread among the cadres and leaders of the Workers' Commissions, is rooted in the profound which they have been educated and that is the frame-
LCR
ception of the ers based on negotiation and not confrontation, on conciliation and not mobilization. It involves trade-union activity limited to contract negotiation and a fundamentally economist view of things; a conception of unity in action with the UGT based on adapting to the conciliationist unionism that the latter
The contract negotiations underway in many industries that are being carried out in united action with the UGT are a good example. In these instances, are adapting to proposals that they think would be acceptable to the UGT.
Underlying this is also a philosophy of joint responsibility for finding a solution to the crisis, which is generally reflected by a cultivation of social pacts and more concretely by the acceptance of the FPE, industrial reconversion and so on. To all this has to be added the fear of heading for a confrontation with the government and the "destabilization" might pro-
These are the decisive factors in the political practice of the union, although there are also a series of others that can push a section of the leadership of the Workers' Commissions to
Rejection of the general strike has opened up a crisis in the Workers' Commissions, in particular because the union is in a pre-congress period. This crisis is not unrelated to the one that the Communist Party has been undergoing for nearly ten years, and which has been reflected by fragmentation into numerous conflicting factions in the Workers' Commissions themselves.
The PCE current was the most divided on the question of the general strike. Marcelino Camacho, general secretary of the Workers' Commissions, who was favorable to it, was weakened by the decision that was made. In a certain sense, that is also true for Gerardo Iglesias, who openly declared in favor of the general strike. On the other hand, the most moderate section of the PCE in the Workers' Commissions was
The stance of pro-Soviet current, the PCPE, was determined by the process of unification which it is through with the PCE. They were already together in the Izquierda Unida (IU - United Left) electoral coalition. It adopted a rightist course that has not failed to have negative repercussions.
Despite everything, some sections of this current are resisting PCE and its political implications. However, no one should have any illuscope of this even if on some occasions and in some places it can have interesting results.
### General strike debate fuels divisions
On the question of the general strike, this current has clearly made common cause with the union apparatus and maintained a position for mobilization that is not without certain contradic-
On the one hand, this attitude facilitates an alliance with with a section of the PCE - Camacho and the confederal-level apparatus of the Workers' Commissions. On the other, it makes more difficult a rapprochement with other sections of this party. In fact, while the PSUC was one of those forces most hostile to calling a general strike, the Communist Party of Catalonia, which is the PCPE's group in that
The PTE current lead by Santiago Carillo starts from the principle that the
SPANISH STATE workers' struggle has to be aimed against the right and not against the present policy of the social-democratic government. This is why he has op-
Many mobilization against the PSOE, on the pretext that it would be capitalized on by the right. make unity in action with the UGT its supreme principle. It opposed the general strike, just as it did the previous one of June 20, 1985, arguing that the conditions were not ripe and that it was necessary to create them at the base in contract negotiations, that unity in action with the UGT could not be broken, that the enemy was the economic right and not the government and so on. The convergence that has occurred between a broad section of the present PCE and Carillo's positions on the general strike is not a coincidence. These two currents come from the same reformist mould
The effect of the union elections, the failure of the schemes of the government and the UGT to build up a conciliationist unionism under the latter's dominance, and the effect of the social in the country has been to sharpen the contradictions between the social-democratic union and the gov-
Until now, the government has based all its policy toward the unions on its links with the UGT. The social-democratic union, the advocate of the policy of social partnership, played key role in the demobilization, becoming more and more the "foreman of the change" [the name the PSOE has given to its rule].
The general strike of June 20, 1985, showed that while the Workers' Commissions opted for mobilization, the conflicts between the UGT and the social-democratic government were sharpening. But in the absence of mobilization, the policy of the government and the bosses of presenting the slightest concession as a victory for the UGT, and the paralysis of the Workers' Commissions themselves, have made the UGT into a model for a lot of reformist leaders in the Workers' Commissions.
1
The union elections have modified this situation substantially. The UGT appeared too implicated in the government's policy, and lost the elections in
1
key sectors and enterprises (HUNOSA, the telephones, RENFE, the banks), and in important regions (Barcelona June 1, 1987 • International Viewpoint
from the FPE, which means the cancelling of their contracts and the end of their
SPANISH STATE and Madrid). These losses have forced the UGT to distance itself from government's policy by wage rises higher than the 5 per cent set by the government and also forced it to mobilize against the industrial reconversions, sometimes even competing with the Workers' Commissions, as in the case of HUNOSA.
UGT leader Nicolas Redondo has decided to focus attacks against Solchaga, and the UGT decided unilaterally to withdraw from the party-union commission, in which it sits alongside the PSOE. Likewise, some sections of the UGT are beginning to apply discreet blackmail against the PSOE leadership. Looking toward the municipal elections, they are threatening not to call for a vote for the party if it continues to pursue its social policy so brutally.
In this way, the UGT thinks that it can win concessions from the government that can refurbish its image, and ing that the government is trying to
However, while in many places the bosses are ready to give way on wages, this must not be traded for concessions by the workers on working conditions — night or weekend work, flexible job classifications and geographical mobility, increased productivity and so on. A lot of union leaders are ready to give way on such points in exchange for a "good" readjustment of wages.
Mobilization of the workers remains key to getting favorable contracts. And there again the past attitude of the union leaderships shows that there is a long gap beween words of that is the metalworkers' strike in Barcelona that was projected for March 12, then called off the day before by the Workers' Commissions, who signed a disastrous agreement.
The fight against the industrial reconversions will remain the principal axis of the struggle in the coming months. It includes a fight against the extension of the FPE. Many industries hit in the past, such as steel, shipbuilding the mines, again by "permanent reconversion." It is likely that the government's attacks against these industries will run up against the hostility of the entire population in the regions affected, as in the HUNOSA struggle.
Finally, the fourth Spanish-state congress of the Workers' Commissions will be held next November. In view of the crisis running through the union and of the struggles that the country has been experiencing, it will be important test for revolutionaries. *
Employment Promotion Funds distance itself from the regime.
This change in the attitude of the THE EMPLOYMENT Promotion Funds [in fact, unemployment schemes] were creatUGT can have a positive influence on ed by royal decree on November 8, 1984, and applied immediately for the first time in the mobilization, inasmuch as it puts austerity in question. But it has its lim- Since 1984, the various funds created in those sectors affected by industrial reitations. First of all, despite its con- conversion have been filled up with unemployed workers — 4,053 in the steelmills, flicts with the government, the UGT 13,758 in the shipyards, 2,330 in the electrical appliances industry, 4,000 in steel. has not broken its umbilical cord to A section of these workers, those over 55, would never work again. They were just waiting for retirement age (60). But the others, according to the decree, were supthe regime. On the contrary, it is tryposed to be offered a new job within three years, the duration of the FPE. ing to rebuild its links. The truth about the FPE emerged clearly when the number of workers ready to work who remained in the FPE was made public and when the government was forced to issue another decree extending the FPE for a further 18 months for those
Discussion around work workers who had come to the end of their three years. Of the 19,000 workers who contracts came under the FPE, only 1,500 have found a job. About 7,000 can claim retirement
It is for this reason that the UGT is The government's propaganda around the FPE pivoted around two points. The centering all its denunciations on the first was the offer of new jobs. The second was better financial advantages than unwage issue, and not taking up econo- der classical unemployment insurance, since the workers under the scheme could as a whole. Secondly, the draw 80% of their former wages for three years. The new jobs were a fairy tale, as everyone knew perfectly well. There could be no hope of jobs when the reconversion UGT is benefiting from the fact that was being carried out without a minimum of the necessary re industrialization. the Workers' Commissions cannot put The financial advantages offered by the FPE were real, but they created a major themselves forward as an alternative to problem of divisions among the unemployed. There was a conscious discrimination conciliationist unionism, which they designed to create an "elite unemployed." At the same time, these advantages also represent. In daily practice, a lot were presented as a lesser evil, given the lack of credibility of new jobs, to get the of Workers' Commissions leaders are
A third argument was advanced. At the time, it was presented as an important just as rightist as those of the UGT, facilitates the conciliationist gain, but it rapidly proved to be a shameless lie. It was the possibility that these workers could be taken back into their old plants after spending three years in the policy of the social-democratic union. FPE, because their work contracts had not been broken but only suspended.
Finally, while the UGT's conflicts Obviously, in reality, this possibility was wiped away with the wave of a hand by with the government arise because of the plants concerned. How could they get people to believe that these workers were the extent of mobilization of the work- going to be re-employed when the factories were continuing to lay people off? ers, that does not keep it from oppos- On March 6, the government issued another decree that modified the November ing mobilization, as was the case in the general strike in Asturias, since it First, it extended by 18 months the initial period of three years in order to try to is always out to close any breach that cover up as best it could the failure of any perspective of rehiring and above all to might open up. In this sense, the scut- avert a convergence of the workers still in the FPE with those who are about to enter, coming from the new wave of industrial reconversion. tling of the general strike by the Secondly, it cut the cost of the FPE. During the 18 month extension, 80% of forWorkers' Commissions gave it a con- mer wages will no longer be guaranteed. Henceforth, the FPE benefits will be residerable breathing space. spectively 70%, then 60% and finally 50% of the original wage in each six months.
An immediate test for the workers' Thirdly, this decree set up more coercive mechanisms in order to force the work1 movement is the discussion of the con- ers themselves to leave the FPE. Practically any proposal of work anywhere in the tracts. Unlike preceding years, it Spanish state now counts as the offer of a new job. The original decree stipulated be carried out without a social pact, in that the job offered had to be within a radius of 25 kilometers from the home of the a context strongly marked by the nu- worker concerned and that it had to be acceptable to them. Likewise, it said that workers who refuse job offers considered "acceptable" by the state will be expelled
2 merous struggles in progress. And, as
shown by the contracts already signed in many sectors, there is a real possibility for exceeding the 5 per cent ceilInternational Viewpoint • June 1, 1987 benefits.
layoffs through more easily.
benefits. *
LCR election accord with Herri Batasuna THREE LEVELS of elections will be held in Spain on June 10: elections for the European parliament in Strasbourg, city and town governments and provincial (autonomous) assemblies in Aragon and in Natarroa [Navarra], historically a Basque area but not included in the Basque autonomous region.
The following article -from the May 9 issue of Combate, the paper of the Liga Comunista Revolucionaria (LCR), the Spanish state section of the Fourth International -describes the positions and electoral agreements presented by the LCR at the opening of the campaign.
•INCE MAY 1, an election atmos
• phere has started to spread. Felip Gonzalez has just made his umpteenth attempt over the state TV network to hypnotize public opinion. And there is a hysterical campaign against Herri Batasuna [the Basque revolutionary nationalist organization], whipped up over the sinister attack on the office of the ruling Socialist Workers Party of Spain (PSOE) in Portugalete [where a small, shadowy terrorist group, unconnected to HB, threw Molotov cocktails). These are no doubt signs of the climate that the rulers want to build up for June 10.
We are experiencing a period of broad and intense mobilization directed in one form or another against the government. Will this change the electoral map that emerged from the last general elections? That is not very likely. The polls being published confirm what might be deduced from a reasonable analysis of the situation. There will be no "electoral expression" commensurate with the struggles that we have experienced, although later on we may see some important "reprisal" votes against the PSOE.
Of course, elections are always a distorted reflection of social reality. But in the Spanish state, over and above distortions, there is a real schizophrenia in the most active and mobilized sectors of the masses (with the well-known exception of the revolutionary nationalist current in Euskadi). They vote well to the right of the ideas they defend in action. Even clearly revolutionary organizations may find themselves affected by this "infirmity."
In Nafarroa, the EMK [the Basque country current represented in the rest of the Spanish state by the Movimiento Comunista (MC)], the LKI [Liga Kommunista Iraultzailea — Revolutionary Communist League, the Fourth Internationalist organization in the Basque country] and independent elements have formed the Batzarre ["Assembly"] coalition [for the elections to the province's autonomous assembly].
The special conditions for the radical left in Nafarroa have given rise in the past to coalitions which offered interesting perspectives for work. Today, Batzarre has emerged with a clear identity. It is revolutionary, unitary and revolutionary nationalist, although different from Herri Batasuna, with which it seeks to maintain relations of respect. While it of course defends its own proposals, it avoids confrontation.
In these conditions, the coalition can not only win some positive electoral results, but after the elections can also promote stronger and more united action by the radical left of Nafarroa as a whole.
While in Nafarroa there is going to be what we might call a "classical" experience of united work — although we seldom find favorable conditions for putting this into practice in elections — in Aragon a quite exceptional agreement has been reached. It is a coalition between Izquierda Unida (United Left) and the Convergencia Alternativa de Aragon, which includes various sectors of the radical left, including our party. [This agreement is for both the municipal elections and those for the autonomous assembly].
Special conditions for left unity
The relative weakness of the PCE [Communist Party of Spain], and the special conditions for left unity that have existed since before the anti-NATO referendum, have made it possible to reach a compromise on terms acceptable to the radical left. Of course, the coalition is fully independent politically and organizationally of Izquierda Unida at the level of the Spanish state.
Moreover, the coalition functions on 1
the basis of assemblies, with participationist methods in the drawing up of slates and control over possible elected officials (including rotation of some of
3
them).
The election campaign itself will be waged with broad participation of the June 1, 1987 • International Viewpoint
SPANISH STATE • SOUTH AFRICA coalition's hundreds of sympathizers. We think that these conditions permit effective revolutionary work.
Unfortunately, the MC reached other conclusions, and has withdrawn from the coalition. Experience will show who was right. What is important is that a relationship of unity be maintained between both parties in Aragon in the many important activities outside the local elections and the elections for the autonomous government.