Contragate:
the shit hits
THE CONTRAGATE scandal has produced revelations, confirmed suspicions and provided valuable evidence for anti-imperialist, peace and human rights movements. This article reviews the course of the Contragate affair, and its relation to Us and international politics.
USA the fan
JOHN BARZMAN
NE WEEK AFTER the Tower commission published its report on February 26, 1987, Reagan admitted in a national TV broadcast that, although his intentions were noble, he had been wrong to let his underlings proceed with arms sales to Iran. He fired his White House secretary, Donald Regan, and replaced him with Howard Baker.
The following week, Marc Kravetz, a journalist for the Paris daily Libération, wrote a commentary praising the openness of US democracy: "You have to recognize that nowhere else can elected representatives, judges and journalists freely challenge the executive power right up to the top, explore its most confidential mechanisms and make public the results."
This is a rather widely held opinion in those European left circles that have come to regard the United States as the guarantor of democracy in the world. There is a grain of truth in it. Few European powers can afford the luxury of such scandals.
But the institutions of the United States should not be idealized. All the "most confidential" mechanisms of the state were not opened to scrutiny. Those that were could not be explored by all the nation's elected representatives and all its journalists, but only a select few.
Nearly all the "nation's elected representatives and judges," products of the selection mechanisms of the Democratic and Republican parties, accept the
1
assumptions of the administration's policy and only ask questions of procedure that do not challenge this policy as such. It is they who direct the con-
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gressional and judicial investigations and who are interviewed in the media.
It is also worth noting that the chain International Viewpoint • June 1, 1987 reaction of revelations was set off and fueled by forces external to American "democracy," that is by Lebanese Shi'ites and Nicaraguan Sandinistas.
The saga began on November 3, 1986, with the revelation by a Lebanese (not an American) magazine, AlShiraa, that Robert MacFarlane had travelled to Tehran incognito in May 1986. At the time, MacFarlane was director of the National Security Council (NSC, a body that was to become the focus of the controversy), and a confidant of President Reagan.
The leaks were too numerous
The president of the Iranian parliament, Rafsanjani, confirmed the report and added that the negotiations had been recorded on tapes. The US authorities pretended to check their files, hoping to bury the affair.
But the facts revealed by the American press were conclusive, and the leaks were too numerous. It was verified that MacFarlane had been part of a delegation whose mission was to negotiate arms sales to Iran, notably antitank missiles (TOW), anti-aircraft missiles (Hawks) and spare parts for material purchased by the Iranian army before the fall of the Shah. The US president's confidant brought little gifts for his negotiating partners, a key (symbolizing the opening of a new era in Iranian-American relations), a bible signed by Reagan himself as a token of good faith, and a cake!
Reagan was forced to recognize that there had been contacts with the Iranian authorities. He claimed that his main motivation had been humanitarian concern for US hostages in Leba-
THE EMPERORWEARS NO CIOTHES non, that he had been informed of these contacts only late in the game, and that he had never considered paying a ransom for the hostages, but only encouraging Iranian moderates to mediate the crisis.
Even that much constituted a violation of the January 1984 congressional decision imposing controls on all exports to Iran. It also contradicted the president's appeals to European allies of the USA not to yield to blackmail and reject any sort of negotiations with hostage-takers, in the name of civilization and the crusade against international terrorism.
This modest confession immediately touched off a major crisis of confidence among an American population that had been deluged since 1979 by incessant propaganda against the "ayatollahs" and other terrorists, and put the US government in a embarassing position with regard to its allies. Reagan's first problem was therefore the contradiction between past rightist patriotic rhetoric and the actual conduct of US diplomacy.
But another issue with more progressive implications emerged quite rapidly. The use of the US secret services for covert operations - which would not get the assent of a large part of public opinion if made known — recalled unpleasantly the machinations of former president Nixon.
In fact, the operation violated at least two laws - the arms control act, which stipulates that any sale or transfer of more than $14 million worth of US arms must be approved by the State Department and reported to Congress; and the national security act, which requires that Congress be informed in due time of all covert operations.
The press recalled the Watergate scandal that led to Nixon's resignation,
----- photo credits and running heads -----
BILL DAY. DETROIT FRET perSe
THE EMPEROR STAGING A COMEBACK hence the term "Irangate." In view of growing questions among the public and in the press, Congress decided to open an inquiry.
Very quickly, it became obvious that an aspect of the arms sales had been to offer a ransom for the release of US hostages. The affair seemed to be coordinated by Oliver North, a Marine officer linked to the far right and a member of the NSC.
The Israeli government, which had always maintained discreet but good relations with Tehran, suggested this course of action. The intermediaries were Israeli army agents; the Iranian millionaire Ghorbanifar, a former SAVAK agent who remained close to the top circles of the Iranian army; and Kashoggi, an intimate of the Saudi royal
The CIA gathered the arms from US arsenals (notably in Anniston and Texarkana in the United States, as well as in Italy and Turkey), apparently without the approval of local military authorities or the Pentagon, and had them transported to Iran via Israel on charter flights of Southern Air Transport. The operation was entitled Project Recovery. The money from the sales was deposited in Switzerland.
The CIA had convinced Canadian business people to loan several million dollars to cover the expenses of the operation. But Iran was late with the first payments as the arms delivered were not the ones that it had ordered. The Canadians therefore got impatient and threatened to go to court to recover their money. The Pentagon denied all responsibility. The CIA could no longer cover up its role in this aspect of the affair. (Newsweek, December 1 and
At the end of 1986, the press began to follow the trail of the Swiss accounts. The inquiry was helped along by the Nicaraguans. In fact, the capture of the US pilot Hasenfus by Sandinista forces on October S last year had unleashed a chain reaction of revelations on the role of the CIA in supplying and financing the contras. But no clear connection with the Iran operation had
Hasenfus named names that made it possible to reconstruct the chain of responsibility. This coincided in part with the people and companies implicated in Irangate. Attorney General Meese then recognized, on November 22, that $10 to $30 million from arms sales to Iran had ended up in the coffers of the contras. Reagan claimed to know nothing about it.
was now referred to as "Contragate" rather than Irangate. With Americans who are opposed to aid to the contras. It appeared in the light of the revelations that all the congressional votes against aid to the contras, all the amendments suspending it or
Inhair a it to ho so-called defensine
veapons only (the "Boland amend ments in force from October 1984 t spring 1986), all the lobbying and press campaigns for and against, were only a show put on for the public's benefit. The government was determined, in any case, to provide this aid by devious channels. US foreign poli cy thus evaded democratic control by the people. But to what extent?
"Damage control" operation
Sometime in late November or December, Reagan's White House team decided to implement a "damage control" operation, more commonly known as a cover-up. Donald Regan, the authoritarian White House secretary, got the team to agree on a new chronology of the meetings between Reagan and his aides. This chronology was intended to make it possible to put the blame on North, MacFarlane and his successor as head of the NSC, Poindexter. The CIA's role would be mentioned only in passing. The president was cast in the role of a distant overseer, informed by his staff only after the fact. In line with this scenario, Reagan appointed a special prosecutor, Walsh, to investigate possible criminal actions, and fired North and Poindexter.
But a turning point had been reached. "It can be said that critical mass in a scandal is achieved," wrote radical journalist Alexander Cockburn, "when half of the wild rumors turn out to be true, and people start giving the other half their undivided attention. This is when
USA official denials have the same effect as on gasoline." ("The shit hits the fan," The Nation, December 6.)
In view of the lack of credibility of the statements by Reagan and his aides, Congress decided to open an inquiry. The task was given to three respectable members ment, headed by Senator Tower. Testimony was heard. The media sent their journalists looking for scoops.
The concentration of power around the presidency has its contradictions. Instead of being immediately destroyed, as their authors thought, the secret messages transmitted by NSC computers between North, Poindexter, MacFarlane and Casey were stored in a secret memory. It, along with notes on the working out of the new chronology, fell into the hands of the investigating Hall, admitted to having shredded his notes the evenin be a crea
Secret parallel CIA budget
The affair exploded. All trails were
The most interesting charges raise in this period included the following
• The Swiss bank accounts supplied with money from the arms sales are no used only to finance the Nicaraguar contras. They are part of an enormous secret parallel budget controlled by the CIA and the NSC which provides aid for example to UNITA in Angola, to Renamo in Mozambique, to Afghan
• While Reagan preached against drugs, the CIA-supplied contras fattened on the drug traffic between Latin America and the United States, using their airports in El Salvador and Honduras as
• Besides the profits from sales of arms, North collected funds from US and European business people, the Sultan of Brunei, Saudi princes and others, for various anti-communist foundations, such as Carl Channell's National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty and William Singlaub's US Coun cil for World Freedom. He used letters 1 signed by Reagan, and even the promise of meeting the president in person 1. The Watergate affair got its name from Nixon's use of the secret service to spy on his Democratic rivals meeting at the Watergate Hotel, in Washington, DC, in July 1972. One thing leading to another, many CIA and FBI surveillance operations were challenged. June 1, 1987 • International Viewpoint
USA for the biggest donors.
• These funds, as well as the CIA's own funds, financed the contras' public relations campaign to present themselves as respectful of human rights, notably by opening offices in Paris and Madrid and by creating a fund to influence European "opinion makers," in particular trade-unionists and intel-
• The Standing Committee on Human Rights in Nicaragua, source of accusations of human rights violations by the Sandinistas, received a donation of $44,000 in 1985 from this network. Its reports were then used to convince Congress to vote $100 million for military aid to the contras in August 1986.
• Examples of pressure on the press: North suggested to Associated Press that if it wanted to gain the release of its reporter Terry Anderson, who was taken hostage in Lebanon, it was in its interests to rein in its investigations of the links between the CIA and contras.
• While Reagan was condemning terrorism, the CIA trained the Lebanese commandos who planted a car bomb on March 8, 1985, in Beirut in front of the house of Mohamed Hussein Fadlallah, spiritual guide of the Hezbollahs. The device exploded killing 92 people and wounding more than 200.2
To try and stem the proliferation of such revelations and rumors, commission of inquiry decided to focus its attention on the decision-making mechanisms only. The leading Democratic and Republican politicians and the media followed suit, with few exceptions. The question became: had Reagan been fooled by his aides? Was he ill, lazy or senile?
the NSC have operational
The final report of the Tower Committee, published on February 26, made a rather detailed inventory of the measures taken by Reagan and his entourage in the affair of the sales to Iran and payments to the contras, posing the mechanisms of covert war.
But it did not challenge Reagan's basic options and did not pursue the numerous trails discovered during the inquiry. It limited itself to condemning the lack of professionalism on the part of those responsible for both affairs and to recommending that the NSC restrict itself to advising the president and leave the execution of his decisions to other agencies.
Donald Regan was assigned the main blame. Finally, in a crude display of cynicism, the report called for reinforcing confidentiality in the conduct of such affairs, because leaks to the media had been the mainspring of the crisis.
Following this report, President ReaInternational Viewpoint • June 1, 1987 gan admitted making mistakes and agreed to fire Donald Regan and replace him by a figure in the conservative establishment, Republican senator Howard Baker. A sort of Baker regency began, with Reagan remaining president in name.
The Democrats agreed to give Reagan another chance. At the end of March 1987, the Democratic-controlled Senate voted to let the final payment of the $40 million appropriated for the contras last year go ahead. Congress postponed the testimonies of North and Poindexter for 90 days and granted
MISSING
Information wanted
on whereabouts of
IKE THE 6 FATNERS CONTRA FUNDS
LAST SEEN WEARING A SWISS HAT
AND YODELING them limited immunity. They scheduled joint public hearings for May 5.
In March and April, new revelations continued to undermine Reagan and Baker's attempts to re-establish a new aura of credibility around the White House. The role of more institutions was questioned. The CIA, under Casey, masterminded North's operations, with the blessing of Vice-President Bush. US army bases in Central America and the embassy in Costa Rica were involved. Reagan himself helped to raise funds for Channell's and Singlaub's outfits.
"damage control" shifted to diverting attention onto financial and accounting irregularities. On April 29, Carl Channell was convicted for falsely claiming tax-exempt status. His was the first conviction in the scandal. A New York Times editorial entitled "Influence Peddling" gave the cue: "The ideologues misused public money. The new charge is that they stole public money with bogus exemptions for private donors." (International Herald Tribune, May 4.)
The joint congressional public hearings opened on May 5. They are being televised live across the entire United States. The first testimonies heard so far, those of retired air force general Richard Secord and Robert MacFarlane, were very damaging for the CIA, Reagan himself and almost all foreign policy institutions.
Secord rejected the accusation that he had embezzled funds and portrayed himself as a patriot trusted by Casey and the CIA, working on orders from
North with the blessing of Vice-
President Bush and Reagan. His answers confirmed that the methods used in the Iran-contra affair, far from being "unprofessional," were standard procedure in covert opera-
Using profits from US arms sales for CIA or CIA-inspired operations was a pattern. North and other US officials had proposed to South Korea, Taiwan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,
Egypt, Israel, Honduras and El Salvador that the bill for the arms they purchased be artificially inflated.
The extra funds were to be used to finance anti-communist causes. In exchange, these countries were promised special favors, or, if they refused, threatened with reductions of aid. Some chose to contribute directly rather than through the arms deals.
Other funds were raised from individuals by US Under-Secretary of
State Elliott Abrams, North, and
Reagan himself. The donations were channeled through far-right foundations posing as charities or research institutes. Donors were told they could deduct the money from their
The money was then allocated out to the various forces fighting "lowintensity" wars with CIA support. A network of companies, bank accounts, arms dealers, transportation facilities and mercenaries facilitated the transfer. Funds were also assigned for public opinion campaigns. Clandestine radio broadcasts targeted Libya and Cuba. Many US agencies cooperated with these operations: US military bases, ambassadors and drug enforcement agents.
Secord referred to this set-up as "the enterprise," and testified that it was set up in the mid-1970s to bypass legislation regulating CIA activities. CIA director Casey deliberately ran covert op2. On all the charges raised, see in particular the articles in The Nation, December 6, January 1 and 31 and February 14. See also Newsweek, December 22 and January 19.
erations outside the CIA to avoid congressional surpervision. The New York Times on May 8 now conceded the obvious: "Such an operation is impossible unless key officials from various government agencies participate and systematically deceive and disobey Congress." (International Herald Tribune, May 8.)
With the testimony of MacFarlane, Reagan's personal responsibility moved to the fore again. The former NSC director testified that he had briefed Reagan dozens of times on the progress of the fund-raising for weapons for the contras during the congressional ban.
No challenge made to covert action
The hearings continue. So far, though, neither the Republican and Democratic senators and congressmen, nor the major media, have ever challenged the need for the United States to complement its legal, diplomatic, economic and military means of action with destabilization operations, covert wars and disinformation.
None of them have even proposed trimming back the CIA or restricting its information-gathering role. Covert war is now a central pillar of US for-
The main goals of this foreign policy are shared by Republicans and Democrats alike — overthrowing the Sandinista regime by economic blockade, military pressure and contra terrorism; imposing a Pax Americana on the Middle East; imposing US hegemony on the capitalist world by relying on its superiority in nuclear weapons and counterinsurgency; preserving blance of stability in South Africa as long as possible; assuring transitions that maintain the arbitor's role of the army in Haiti, the Philippines, Brazil, Argentina and in other such cases.
How then can we explain the scandal? The fact is that Washington's power has limits. The Republican-Democratic consensus on foreign policy aims does not guarantee the government against mishaps, dilemmas and the need
Reagan scored some successes, such as the invasion of Grenada, the growth of the Afghan rebellion, the cold transitions in Brazil and Argentina and the launching of Starwars. But these have been limited in time or fragile. Today, in hindsight, one can see that certain aspects of Reagan's policy have been stalled in blind alleys.
In Nicaragua, after eight years of US efforts, Reagan has not succeeded in overthrowing the Sandinista regime. In El Salvador, the rebellion has maintained its vitality. In the whole of Lattation treaties. Despite its high cost, it does not seem to offer any realistic perspective for bringing the USSR to its knees economically. And it has enabled Gorbachev to regain the initiative in the field of disarmament.
Nor have the enormous investments in Starwars-related projects enabled the United States to reverse the decline of its big industries in the face of Japanese and European competition.
To these external difficulties should be added the persistence of domestic dissent on foreign policy questions. The famous Vietnam syndrome remains strong. This syndrome, that Reagan promised to exorcize, is the fear of seeing the US involved in a new counterinsurgency war, with its train of dead, wounded and atrocities.
General anti-war sentiment has focused on US intervention in Central America. The April 25 demonstrations, which brought out crowds estimated at at least 100,000 people to Washington and 70,000 to San Francisco, showed the potential for involvement by labor. The murder of the American internationalist worker Benjamin Linder by the contras caused a massive outcry.
Washington's support for Pretoria is another major source of internal division, with US Blacks overwhelmingly opposing the administration policy.
Nor is there any consensus on nuclear armament. In 1983, the campaign for a freeze on nuclear arms had a broad impact which could resurface.
Finally, in 1986, the strike curve, had been declining regularly since 1979, turned upward again. From 300,000 in 1985, the number of strikers increased to 500,000, which is still very low. (Financial Times, March 12.) A few sustained strikes, such as the fight of the Hormel packing house workers, opposed the spiral of concessions in which the unions have been trapped for seven years.
The beginning and modest change in situation and the obstacles encountered by the US bourgeoisie on the international scene seem to call for a policy including a stronger dose of negotiations and search for a moderate "third force." US public opinion must again be reassured. This requires changing at least a few faces in Wash-
So far the bourgeois establishment seems to have decided to focus the blame on the so-called cowboys in the
USA basement of the White House. The likes of North and Secord will probably drop out of sight until they can be shifted to other agencies.
Another proposal from the establishment is that NSC powers should be curtailed. Originally only a body for formulating and coordinating foreign policy, the NSC assumed more and more operational prerogatives under Nixon and Carter. On several occasions, direct orders emanating from the NSC have sown confusion in the secret services and armed forces. In summer 1985, the NSC urged Egypt to invade Libya against the advice of the State Department.
The US bourgeoisie can perform much of this house cleaning in public in a way that has aroused admiration from some people in Europe, because while there are opposition movements in the United States on specific issues, these movements have no real counterpart on the political level.
The Democratic Party is no alternative, even in the limited sense that the European social-democratic parties are. It is dominated by millionaires and structurally designed to drown the demands of trade unions and social move-
"general interest" of the country. In recent years, it has attributed its defeat in the 1980 and 1984 elections to an excessively liberal image and taken over Reagan's rhetoric. Even its election-time promises do not correspond to the aspirations of large sectors of the population who form its traditional base. The recent rightward drift of the party is highlighted by the fact that Jesse Jackson's suggestion to revive some populist themes has had only marginal impact on the party.
### Exposing US foreign policy
The US bourgeoisie retains a substantial margin of maneuver, but the people of the United States and the world have a good opportunity to discover and expose the workings of US foreign policy. Questions need to be asked about the invasion of Grenada and simultaneous media blackout; the blackmail of the Honduran and Costa Rican governments; the air raid on Tripoli; the grounding of an Egyptian civilian aircraft flying over the Mediterranean; the use of funds to influence European and American intellectuals and trade unionists; General Singlaub's operations in the Philippines; and, finally, the dirty 1 tricks of counter-intelligence agencies in the United States itself. * 3. For an attempt to tie the prominence of these lasputin" types to the decline of US imperialism, s speculators, Lumpen-Intellectuals ar the End of US Hegemony," Against the Current, March-April 1987. June 1, 1987 • International Viewpoint