Aquino scores another personal
IN THE May 11,1987, legislative elections, more than a year after her triumphal accession to the presidency,
Corazon Aquino passed another popularity test with flying colours. Owing to an extremely slow count, the complete results of the vote are not yet known. But government candidates must have received at least 20 - and perhaps
22 - of the 24 senatorial seats, and two-thirds of the 200
For the first time, the radical left participated in the national
PHILIPPINES
Cory Aquino (DR)
broken on May 9, shortly before the elections.
Although the official voting count electoral contest under the name of the Alliance for New
Politics (ANP). In the absence of precise percentages, it is still difficult to analyze the results it got. But while the campaign itself seems to have been relatively good in mobilizing activists and in political agitation, the electoral performance of the popular left seems to have been disappointing.
The following article takes a brief look at the initial implications of this election.
PAUL PETITJEAN
A
CCORDING TO THE new constitution adopted in February
1987, the structure of the National Assembly in the Philippines is modeled on that of the US
Congress. On May 11, 24 senators and
200 deputies of the lower House were elected. The senators were elected nationally, and the deputies in local districts. There were four competing national slates:
• The presidential slate, Lakas ng
Nation),
Bayan (Strength of the for which Corazon Aquino waged a vigorous campaign.
• The Grand Alliance for Democracy
(GAD), led by Juan Ponce Enrile, minister of defence under the dictator Ferdinand Marcos and in the first Aquino government, who went into open opposition to Aquino at the end of 1986.
• The Kilusang Bagong Lipunan
(KBL), the Movement for the New Society, the official party of the Marcos dictatorship.
• The Alliance for New Politics
(ANP), which included three militant left organizations: the Partido ng Bayan (PnB), formed in August 1986 and led by former political prisoners; the
Bayan coalition of mass organizations, formed in 1985, which includes notably the KMU union confederation formed in 1980', and the KMP peasant confederation formed in 19852; and the Volunteers for Popular Democracy (VPD). The VPD was formed in mid1986 and is led in particular by Father Edicio de la Torre (former leader of Christians for National Liberation) and Horacio "Boy" Morales (former leader of the National Democratic Front), both of whom were imprisoned under Marcos.
Other left organizations, such as the socialist organization Bisig, campaigned for the ANP, where it ran candidates. Kaiba, the new women's party, also ran some candidates.3
Cease-fire broken before elections
On Mindanao and in the Sulu islands in the south of the chain, where there are large Muslim communities, MNLF called for boycotting the elections.4 The cease-fire signed between the government and the MNLF was has been extremely slow, the exact results are not yet known, but the trends are clear.
The rate of participation was very high - 80-85% of the 26.3 million eligible voters (out of a population of 57 million) went to the polls. This fact deserves to be underlined. The Filipino electoral game remains deeply marked by patronage politics. But it seems that, in the eyes of the masses, such elections are again being seen as embodying their democratic aspirations.
The American model and the appeal for civic responsibility launched by the Church must have also played a role in this respect. But Filipinos have a rather long-standing electoral tradition, and are just coming out of 14 years of dictatorship. This was probably one of the most important factors that the militant left needs to analyze.
Lakas ng Bayan stood under president's banner
The high rate of participation undoubtedly favored the candidates supported by Corazon Aquino, because these elections represented a new personal triumph for her. The Lakas ng Bayan candidates did not fight the election on a legislative program, but under the banner of the president. This made it possible to elect unknowns or newcomers to the electoral game and to transcend the traditional influence of local personalities.
So, for the present, Corazon Aquino 1. Kilusang Mayo Uno, May 1 Movement. 2. KMP, Peasant Movement of the Philippines. 3. On the founding of Kaiba, see Sonia Rupon's article, as well as the interview and report by Maita Gomez in 3
International Viewpoint 115, March 9, 1987. 4. MNLF, the Moro National Liberation Front led by Nur Misuari. June 29, 1987 • International Viewpoint
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triumph deputies' seats.
PHILIPPINES represents a distinct and relatively durable political factor. A widow and victim of the dictatorship, she gained legitimacy successively through the February 7, 1986, elections, then by the "parliament of the streets" (the mass mobilization of February 22-25, 1986, which forced Marcos to flee the country) and, finally, she was virtually beatified by the very powerful Filipino Catholic Church.
Her legitimacy has been reinforced by the constant blackmail threat of a coup d'etat by the military right, which made her appear to be a guarantor of stability in the eyes of the population; the constitutional referendum in February 1987; and, finally, by the legisla-
Rejection of the dictatorial past, well as the role that Corazon Aquino has played, were major factors in the defeat of the GAD and the KBL, two movements associated with the former regime who spent fortunes on the electoral contest. The defeat of the extreme right assured a certain stability for the Aquino regime. But, because of the support the rightists have in the army, they can keep up a constant pressure, and will not fail to do so.
### Rumours of mutinies widespread
On the occasion of the legislative elections, the military bases once again demonstrated their defiance of the government. Rumors of mutinies were widespread after the vote. And on May 24, some 20,000 to 30,000 demonstrators came out in response to the call of the GAD and KBL. They built extensive barricades with buses whose tires had been flattened, and for 24 hours occupied the area around the headquarters of the army general staff and of a police
While it does not represent an immediate danger, such permanent pressure serves Washington's interests well by helping to reinforce feelings of insecurity and thus increase the hold that the United States can exercise over the
Corazon Aquino's popularity as head of a bourgcois state and government poses difficult problems for the militant left. But it should not conceal the revival of the traditional politics of the big provincial families. The president herself has not been exempt from nepotism. Corazon Aquino has not failed to offer a helping hand to those close to her.
In many election districts, alliances were formed between Lakas ng Bayan
4 and local personalities linked to the
former regime. In others, rival "families" fought bitterly for official recognition from Malacañang, the presInternational Viewpoint • June 29, 1987 idential palace. The House will be primarily the parliament of the traditional elites and a marketplace for influence-
Lacking financial resources, the ANP was unable to win the electoral contest. It will not get a single senator, and seems likely to get less than 5
Even in very poor election districts, such as Malabon-Navotas in the dock zone of northern Manila, its candidates did not manage a break-
Lean Alejandro, general secretary of Bayan who comes from the neighborhood, ran in this area, where intensive mass work has been carried on for years. In his campaign, he called for rejecting the "politics of money and guns," and stressed the social needs of a particularly badly-off population. But he seems to have only come in third place, behind a candidate of the Aquino "family" and one of the rightist Partido
The perceptible disappointment at the results probably comes from the fact that many activists hoped that the base of the mass movement would be reflected directly at the electoral level. In fact, experience in this many countries shows that this is not generally so simple. It takes time and experience to establish yourself in this
The balance sheet of this first electoral campaign is certainly going to revive the discussion in the militant left about how much importance should be given to electoral work. It is not clear, moreover, that nationally the underground National Democratic movement fully mobilized its forces behind the ANP campaign.
In late November provincial and municipal elections are to be held, which should be easier for the militant left than the elections to the National Assembly. Seventy-two provincial governors and about 1,500 mayors are to be elected. But such campaigns require major financial investment, especially since the electoral rules are particularly inequitable in this respect in the PhiMurder squads and police repression
Another obstacle is repression. More than 20 ANP activists, it seems, were killed by thugs during the past campaign, which was nonetheless one of the least bloody in the country's history. At a press conference ANP chair Fidel Agcaoili denounced "a systematic, concerted and institutionalized campaign [which] was launched by the entire government machinery lies in the [Roman Catholic] Church hierarchy, the media and big business
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SOUTH AFRICA circles to discredit [us]."5
Parallel police repression did not stop with the end of the electoral campaign. On June 8, Bernabe Buscayno suffered a murderous attack. He was hit twice by bullets in Manila, but a TV cameraman lost his life. The "target"
chosen, probably by the military, was especially symbolic.
Better known under the name Kumander Dante, Bernabe Buscayno was one of the main leaders of the New
People's Army, the guerrilla force led by the Communist Party of the Philippines. He was arrested and spent ten years in detention under the Marcos regime, not being released until after the
"February revolution" in 1986. Today, he is one of the best known leaders of the Partido ng Bayan.
The fight waged by the ANP, the PnB other militant left formations is not limited to the electoral arena. It is also a constant fight for the right to a legal existence for the radical, Marxist left in the Philippines. *
5. Quoted by James Clad, Far Eastern Economic Review, June 4, 1987, p.41.
PASOK's right turn
OPULAR re-
GREECE arty, as well as wil actions to the were violent. The creates crisis on wave of mass protests unleashed after
October 1985 ran up he United Socialis Tendency of Greece (ESPE). This was formed in 1984 by the ex-PASOK minister of finance, Manolis Detrakis, and foragainst an intransigent Papandreou government. In order to show its determination 1o impose THE PAN-Hellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) was returned aus exampie," the to power in the legisiative legislative elections, with of of the sier for the economy.
regime did not hesivote (as opposed to 48% in 1981).
tate to inflict a very
In October 1985, PASOK introduced a series of austerity heavy fine on the
Communist daily Ri. measures, contrasting sharply with its previous economic zospastis for giving course. These included a two-year wage/price freeze, its workers a raise.
abolition of the sliding scale of wages, higher prices for
That touched off a general strike of the public services and a 15% devaluation of the drachma.
press in March
The PASOK government, headed by Papandreou, thus
1986.
accepted the IMF and the EEC's "language of reason".
Far from ebbing, spread the strikes
They had been pressing Greece to reduce or at least and grew after the stabilize its budget and trade deficits, and to assure a autumn of 1986, hitting every sector of more regular payment of the interest on the country's the economy, both foreign debt. In 1985 this was of the order of $14,000 public and private, million. In 1986, a third of foreign currency income — and also drawing in young people.
nearly $1,300 million - went to pay this interest.
In the October
The Papandreou government's turn toward a head-on
1986 municipal elections, PASOK paid a attack on working people shook up not only his own party high price for its and the union movement, but also the two Greek austerity policy. The country's big cities
Communist parties, which had tried to attach themselves
- Athens, Piraeus to PASOK. The political crisis of the left in Greece today and Salonica - fell is described in the following article.
into the hands of the rightist opposition,
New
Democracy
(ND). They continued the advance begun in the 1985 legislative elections, gaining 41% of the vote as opposed to
35.8% in 1981. It was this party that profited from the high abstention rate of 20%.
A series of splits and realignments
The Moscow-loyalist Communist Party (KKE), which had made an electoral alliance with some sectors expelled from PASOK, took no position on the second round, leaving its voters to cast their ballots "according to their consciences." At the same time, in the capital, it called on them to "punish"
PASOK.
The so-called Communist Party-
Interior (KKE-es) had not yet split at the time, but it was already deeply divided. It took iwo positions toward the elections. The majority of its Central
Committee called on its members to
### DIMITRI IONOS vote for PASOK in order to block a return of the right. At the same time, some members of the CC - especially the party's organization in Piraeus -called for abstention or left the choice up to the ranks.
A thoroughgoing crisis gripped this party and more generally the Greek left has a whole. This has been reflected by a series of splits and realignments both in the trade unions and political
Shortly before the 1985 elections, two PASOK deputies - T. Injes and V. Evangelinos — who had already been flirting with the KKE for a long time - reached the conclusion that they were certain to be expelled from their party. So, together with two other former members of the PASOK Central Committee — V. Filias and L. Fillipatos — they formed a new organization, Militant People's Unity (LEA).
In the legislative elections the KKE made an electoral accord with the new mer secretary of state for the interior, Stathis Panagoulis.
In October 1985, G.
then had been miniwho until as expelled frol
ASOK. He had impl citly expressed differences with the austerity policy that the government was go.
ing to institute, pre senting himself as the main defender of the neo-Keynesian policy the freeagainst enterprisers of PA-
SOK.
The General Confedof Labour eration
(GSEE), which included all the tendencies in the workers' movement organized in more or less political currents, was not to escape the backlash
PASOK's against crackdown. The GSEE is the country's main trade-union organization, the other important confederation being the one that includes public workers.
During a meeting of the Executive Committee of the GSEE in November 1985, under pressure from workers unhappy with the goverment's policy, a group of trade-union leaders let it be known that they were opposed to the economic measures taken by the Papandreou team. On February 6, 1986, they were expelled from PASOK. Along with
1,200 trade unionists, they then decided to form the Blue- and White-Collar
Workers' Socialist Trade-Union Movement (SSEK).
New socialist trade-union movement
'he new group's main forces cam ssentially from the public sector - electricity, post office, telecommunications and water. The SSEK took on political activity going beyond the
5 narrow trade-union framework. In disagreement, two leading cadres of th
SSEK decided shortly afterward to re
June 29, 1987 • International Viewpoint
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the left
GREECE join PASOK. In March 1987, another series of departures hit the newly formed trade-union organization. Other leading cadres joined the Socialist Party of Greece, which had just been formed by G. Arsenis.
Finally, along with PASOK, the Union of the Democratic Left (EDA) was Thanks to collaboration with PASOK, this organization was able to elect a deputy, Manos Glezos, to the Greek parliament and another, S. Kolokotronis, to the European parliament.' It was the municipal elections that were at the root of this split.
A minority of the EDA leadership, including Glezos, clung to the alliance with PASOK, while a majority opted for an alliance with the KKE. For example, the general secretary of the EDA, T. Katrivanos (former prefect of Attica for PASOK) headed an EDA-KKE
The CP-Interior was a small Eurocommunist party. It originated from a split in February 1968 by the leadership of the CP's political work country during the colonel's dictatorship, hence its name. There is not room in this article to analyze in detail the reasons for the split. I would note only that they began to emerge in 1944, and took a concrete form at the CP's Sixth Plenum in 1956, which condemned "Zachariadisism" (for Nikos Zachariadis, general secretary of the party from 1931 to 1956), the party's "abnormal" internal regime and certain political decisions of the leadership in the 1950-55 period.
Conflict within the Communist Party
The Soviet Communist Party, seeing that the internal crisis of the KKE could develop its own dynamic, decided to control the outcome by appointing K. Koliyiannis as the new general secretary. Numerous expulsions were carried out, and those members of the Greek CP who had been living in East European countries since the end of the 1944-47 civil war were subjected to systematic persecution.
In the ensuing years, and until the colonels' coup d'etat in 1967, the conflict within the CP took the form of opposition between the part of the leadership living abroad and the part living in Greece. The dispute focused on organizational problems, but also on the question of the relations between the CP (then illegal) and the EDA, in which it was working.
In the years following the split, from
6 1968 to 1972, the CP-Interior had an
influence equal to that of the CP Exterior. Among the youth, with the Lambrakis Youth of the EDA and the Rigas International Viewpoint • June 29, 1987
Fereos (its own youth organization), the CP-Interior held unquestionable dominance. But its political orientation after 1972 and in the period that followed the fall of the dictatorship in 1974 led to its marginalization.
whole political line of the CP-Interior around elections, which were seen as a means of undermining the military regime "from within." By putting its emphasis on the contradiction — which it saw as primary - between the statements of a regime that claimed to be an "advanced democracy of the Western and its dictatorial practice, managed to give the impression that it was a party seeking a policy of compromise with the regime.
More and more, this orientation came into conflict with radicalizing among the youth, but also more broadly with all of the anti-dictatorial forces, which called for abstention in the elections that the military were preparing in 1973.
At the time of the fall of the colonels in 1974, the CP-Interior's line was to counterpose two blocs - those forces that were supposed to be preparing the way for a new dictatorship and all the anti-dictatorial forces, including the right. It even failed to see that the apparatuses of the military junta were not going to be dissolved in the new regime, but rather integrated into it. Melina Mercouri campaigning for PASOK (DR)
In the November 1974 elections, it proposed a united slate of all the parties and declared that it was ready to participate unconditionally in a government of national unity, regardless of the results of the vote. Needless to say, all the parties rejected this proposal.
Under the pretext of a threat of dictatorship, and in the name of anti-dictatorial unity, it held back and depoliticized social and political struggles.
CP-Interior expels youth organization
Until the 1977 elections, it kept within the framework of the National Anti-dictatorial Democratic Unity (EADE) and sought to "unify the forces of the left, the center and the anti-dictatorial right" with the aim of extending democracy and limiting "certain social inequalities."
This policy did not fail to have consequences for the party's electoral performance. The CP-Interior never managed to get more than 1.5% to 2% in the various votes. The reason for the predominance the CP-Exterior gained over the CP-Interior has to be sought in the latter's own political line
When, after the 1977 elections, a major part of the CP-Interior's youth organization, Rigas Fereos, challenged the line of the EADE, the party leadership proceeded to expel them.
The expelled Rigas Fereos members formed the "B Pan-Hellenic" organization (the name comes from the Second Pan-Hellenic Conference of Rigas Fereos). They were, undoubtedly, the most revolutionary current in the CPInterior. Today, the leading group in the movement publishes the theoretical magazine Thesis, which places itself in a framework close to revolutionary
After the 1977 elections, it became clear that PASOK was the main party in opposition to the government. The evolution of sections of the small and middle bourgeoisie who had traditionally voted for the right, and PASOK's impact on sections class, had the effect of transforming the two Communist parties into uncritical fellow-travellers of Papandreou's party.
The CP-Interior no longer differentiated itself ideologically and politically from PASOK. Its goal remained to achieve its heralded extension of democracy and limitation of social inequalities through regrouping the left 1. Glezos is a hero of the Nazi resistance, and he still enjoys a strong moral authority. The EDA, founded in 1950, was the party in which the Communists worked during the entire period of clandestinity extending from the civil war (1944-47) to the dictatorship of the colonels.
that it no longer
In fact, PASOK became the supreme arbiter in the confrontations between was begun in 1968, Communist profile.
The main difference between the two currents, thus, centers around the character of the
GREECE employment, unless the number of working hours drops in tandem with a drop in wages, which means a drop in the real income of the working class. This can only become acceptable in the framework of a multi-directional and proportional austerity, that is one extended to all classes through the appropriate measures." (The Left Today, No.
the two Communist parties. The one was going to
PIETE STIE differences of political strategy character of the new special and exclucooperation Interior, a challenge ДЕЛТО ТОУ began to develop to M-A KKE A the political choices made since 1971, questioning the logway" to socialism through democracy and freedom. Its leading cadres — such as Leonidas Kirkos, Kostas Filinis, Babis Drakopoulos and Antonis Brilakis - covered whole spectrum of shades of Eurocom-
The election of G. Banias to the post of general secretary at the 1982 gress solved none of the problems of the CP-Interior. Its credibility was being worn away by critical support to the PASOK government. It restricted itself to emphasizing the "inadequacy" of the measures adopted, while everything confirmed that once again a social democratic experiment had failed because, in a period of economic crisis and deep recession, reforms are simply impossi-
Race to fill a political
Increasingly, the press and the parties starting talking about after PASOK." The departures and splits from this party showed that a large number of its members were leaving going on to join There was a political vacuum. This explains why everyone threw themselves into a race to fill it, with a more or less long-term project of forming a new party. This is the main reason for the split that the CP-Interior has just
The majority of the party - the so-called Transformation faction — led by such people as Kirkos, Filinis and Brilakis, is anxious to make a big appeal to the masses. The minority, the evaluation" faction — led by Banias, Kotoula, Bistis and Portaliou — maintains that it is necessary to continue the work of renewing the party that party has been at bates. But this question has been discussed in a schematThe Euro MP Filinis, today leader of the Greek Left (EAR), "Communism repels the since we have failed to change the masses, it is time to change ourselves. The new party will be left, Communist and socialist; it will be inter-class, social, ecological, pacifist, anarchowhatever it has to be to appear modern, beautiful and attractive." (Politis,
You might think that the specter of Communism was haunting Greece, and that this was the reason that the former CP-Interior got no more than 1.5-2% vote. There criticism. No conclusion was drawn from the past course of the party, nor any about the source of the errors.
Filinis was carried along by his own
"It is not necessary to go digging up the past nor get ourselves tied up in exercises of criticizing the options taken by the CP-Interior. The question we have to ask ourselves is why have the new options of the CPInterior proved as ineffective as those that preceded them, and why have they left the party barely clinging onto sur-
The logic, therefore, of the Transformation faction of the CP-Interior -and of the organization that has come from it today, the EAR — is no longer the same. It has been transformed into a purely social-democratic orientation. And if anyone could still have any character of the EAR, the analysis offered Political Bureau member D. Psychoyios of the way to handle the economic crisis should be enough to dis-
"Capitalist economic investment has to be intensified, and productivity has to be increased. Of course, the inevitable result of this in an economy such as that of Greece will be a rise in un-
The function of the new party, therefore, would be to help to impose an acceptable austerity policy!
The founding congress of the EAR took place in April in Athens. The publicity it got from the big press was in inverse proportion to its strength. The pre-congress discussions were open to all. But there were only about 12,000 people who paid 500 drachmas (about $5) to join, and who can be considered to have an ideological and political affinity with this new party. It is estimated that the EAR has 4,000 to 5,000 organized members.
Those who participated in the founding of the Greek left were mainly former members of the CP-Interior who with the majority faction, as well as the party's traditional voters, along with some expelled from PASOK The main decision taken at the founding conference was to run an independent EAR slate in the coming legisla-
On NATO, one of the key questions in Greek politics, the EAR thinks that
"two blocs" are eliminated, "strengthening the European pole will make it possible to reduce American domination, which is total today." The adoption of this position is undoubtedly one of the reasons for all the publicity given to the congress of such a small organization with an uncertain
The minority tendency, evaluation," organized a Pan-Hellenic conference on March 12-15. It decided to adopt the name "CP-InteriorRenovating Left" until its next congress, which is scheduled for October. This new organization has about 3,000 members. They represent the most vital sector of the defunct CP-Interior, and have some mass support.
The great success of "Re-evaluation" was to bring along almost all the active members of the youth organization, Rigas Fereos. The CP-Interior minority has been joined by the current around the magazine 15loros Politis, and a small group of revolutionary left activists who publish the Socialist
7
Workers Bulletin.
The leadership of "Re-evaluation" stands on positions that could be charJune 29, 1987• International Viewpoint
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NATO — a central question in Greek politics
"The leadership is incompetent, if not
GREECE / YUGOSLAVIA acterized as "left Eurocommunist." Their theoretical reference to an anticapitalist strategy or the relevance of socialism, will probably be insufficient to differentiate them programmatically from the EAR.
The main differences they have with outright corrupt"
EAR at the moment are that they are radically opposed to PASOK's economic policy, and that they are for the elimination of the US military bases
AFTER A 33-day long strike, one of the longest in and for leaving NATO. At the trade-