Reconciliation between the generals
TURKEY forces joined Demirel's party, and then the PND dissolved. The People's Party, which was launched as a left party, also experienced major erosion in the municipal elections of 1984, and ended up fusing with Inönü's Social Democratic Party, which became the SHP. Of the and the politicians three parties recognized by the military in the 1983 elections, only the Party of the Motherland (ANAP) held up, thanks to its electoral victory.
FOR SOME TIME, the military regime in Turkey has moving in the direction of restoring parliamentary forms of rule. The next major step is to be a referendum in September on lifting the ban on political activity by the pre-coup bourgeois politicians. FUAT ORÇUN
OMPLETE paralysis of the par- liament was one of the pretexts the Turkish generals put forward to justify the coup d'etat of September 12, 1980. The two big parties — the Justice Party (AP — Adalet Partisi) of Sulyeman Demirel, the traditional rightist party; and the Republican People's Party (CHP — Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) of Bulent Ecevit, the traditional party of the left — did not manage to combine forces to suppress the "anarchy" prevailing in the country, which had caused 5,000 deaths within five years.
The military junta held these parties and their leaders responsible for this. Nonetheless, no attempt was made to take legal action against these parties. On the other hand, on various grounds, criminal actions (i.e. not political were undertaken against the Islamic party of Erbakan (the Milli Selamet Partisi - National Salvation Party) and the fascist party of Türkes (the Milli Haraket Partisi — National Action Party).
At the beginning, the generals even considered taking ministers from the two big parties into the cabinet they formed, which was headed by retired Admiral Ulusu. But both AP and the CHP refused. They had gone through an experience of such direct collaboration with the military during the previous of the army into politics in 1971, and had drawn a negative bal-
Moreover, it would have been suicidal for Demirel to support the junta (it was his minority government that had been overthrown, and he had been "legitimate" premier). Ecevit also had to steer clear of supporting the military, so as not to compromise his democratic image once and for all. On the other hand, these two parties did not try to oppose the military and develop an alternative policy. They sat back and waited for "normalization."
In 1982, the generals re-worked the constitution and introduced a clause forbidding the main leaders of the two big parties from participating in politics, some for five years and some for ten. That was the starting point for a real struggle between the traditional parties and the generals. The generals tried to launch a new party purged of professional politicians. This operation ended in a resounding for the military, as is recognized today by the head of the general staff himself. But all this created a "superfluous" conflict for the regime.
The referendum, or rather the plebiscite, that is to take place in September is designed to eliminate this conflict. The voters will be called on to decide about lifting the bans on political activity by the old bourgeois politicians. The referendum will, however, legitimize an already existing situation, because the old parties have reformed other names, with the direct backing of the old leaders. Only three parties allowed to stand in elections
The Party of the Just Road (DYP), supported by Demirel, is posing itself as an alternative to take over from the governmental party of Premier Ozal. The CHP, on the other hand, has experienced a split. Most of the party stalwarts have regrouped in the Social Democratic People's Party (SHP) led by Erdal Inönü, the son of General Inönü, Atatürk's successor and Ecevit's predecessor as leader of the CHP. Ecevit himself has formed a small party, the Party of the Democratic Left (DSP), led by his wife, Rahsan Ecevit.
In the 1983 elections, the military allowed only three parties to run. The Party of Nationalist Democracy (PND), the generals' favorite, lost the elections and broke up. The bulk of its
However, these processes of recomposition have also had the effect of legitimating a parliament manipulated by the military. In fact, Demirel's DYP -as well as Inönü's SHP and even Ecevit's DSP (thanks to crossovers from the SHP) — are today represented in a body that they yesterday denounced as "illegitimate."
An unexpected development, however, has upset the projections for the transition. Contrary to predictions, Demirel's party, the DYP, got a good score in the September 1986 partial elections. It outdistanced the "left" party, the SHP, coming in behind the ANAP, the government party which is losing votes as its credibility wears out. This is going to give rise to a major crisis of leadership for the right.
Demirel winning back an electoral base
In fact, before now, the country had a de facto two-party system, with two big parties (one on the right, the other on the left) alternating in power (with some small parties as coalition part-
The three main players in the present crisis of the right were already in key posts on the day of the coup d'etat in 1980. The incumbent president, Kenan Evren, was chief of the general staff in 1980 and leader of the coup. The incumbent premier, Turgut Özal, was head of the cabinet of the ousted premier, Demirel. The latter is today the "clandestine" leader of the DYP and its direct candidate for power.
These old cronies, who have no differences has regards their general conceptions, are today obstacles for each other on the road to the regime's future. So a transition is necessary. Moreover, local and foreign business circles have already come out clearly for lifting the bans on Demirel and his
Unlike Ecevit, Demirel has managed to maintain control of his apparatus, and is winning back his old electoral 1 base. In the preceding period, he had adopted an "anti-military" profile, getting a favorable response from certain sections of the left, and even from 3 some "Marxist" circles that were desperately trying to hitch themselves to an "anti-dictatorial democratic right." July 13, 1987 • International Viewpoint
TURKEY
The fratricidal struggle between Demirel and Özal, the master and his brilliant pupil, has continued to occupy the front of the political stage under the eyes of the traditional left, which has been content to play a spectator's role.
Harmony between President Evren, who supervised the transition, and his premier was a guarantee of stability for the regime. But another kind of transition launched by new elections - even early elections - could have created unnecessary friction, if the bans on political activity by the old leaders were maintained.
Bourgeoisie wants a policy of "liberalization"
In fact, contrary to the generals' illusions, the old parties had deep roots in the society, and more than speeches were necessary to get rid of them. This problem had to be resolved. This is the reason for this referendum.
However, this process could generate grave problems for the ruling ANAP. This party is a typical product of the crisis. It would be unable to maintain itself in opposition, and is doomed to disappear if it loses the elections and thus the advantage of power. Özal has by-passed even a parliament in which he holds an overwhelming majority. He is working in an "American style," relying more on advisors than his ministers. Because his political career is at stake, he has to find a means of neutralizing Demirel at all costs.
Several indicators show that the bourgeoisie is determined to follow a policy of "liberalization," even under the most reactionary sort of governments. This will not, of course, be a thoroughgoing process of democratization. But, in any case, a certain normalization will be carried through without interruptions until the new system with the bourgeois parties is stabilized.
Among these indicators, the following could be cited: In April, Turkey officially applied for full membership in
(it had already been "associate" member). It also finally signed the accord permitting individual appeals to the Hague court. Even if only intermittently and in response to foreign pressures, begun talking about removing those articles from the penal code that restrict of thought and organization. (These are articles taken from Mussolini's penal code and which ban activity
1
After years and despite all restrictions, strikes have occurred, as well as some demonstrations. Social opposition is beginning to express itself, and for the first time feminist and ecological currents have made their appearance International Viewpoint • July 13, 1987 on the political scene. For the first time also, the Kurdish national question is being discussed openly and explicitly, even in the bourgeois papers.
The bourgeoisie is in a very different situation than it was in 1980. Above all, the coup and the crushing of the mass movement have increased its self-confidence. It has seen that it has much greater resources and means for defending its system than it thought. Another factor is that the coup made it possible to test the society's political
For 40 years Turkey had grown accustomed to "civilian" and trade-union institutions. These were not really gains that came out of a militant or revolutionary struggle. But even if the workers did not defend their organizations or these institutions at the time of the coup, there was still a certain tradition too deeply rooted for it to collapse entirely under the blows of the military.
Within the context of the traditional even legal socialist parties were able to appear from time to time. Outside of the periods of direct military intervention, Marxists have been able to maintain a presence and legal work. There have been three coups d'etat in 40 years of parliamentary life, but the first two did not prevent elections from being held as scheduled. Only the last brought a two-year break in parliamen-
However, even today, politicians, writers and unionists who were imprisoned and persecuted by the junta are openly part of the political scene, participating legally semi-legally in
In agreement with General Evren, who is supervising the scene on behalf of the putschists, the government is trying to gain time in the crisis and is preparing for new elections. It is limiting itself to placing few obstacles in the way of the use of political rights that existed before the coup d'etat.
Political and economic imperialist circles openly want a victory by Özal. The IMF has already loosened its grip and is allowing the government to evade its strict monetary policy in order to get into position for early
Demirel has adopted a less classically capitalist profile on social and economic questions and a much more liberal one on political questions, in order to differentiate himself from Ozal's policy However, it was his government that took the initiative in imposing an policy and enterprise" policies that Ozal was to apply, beginning in January 1980.
However, at that time, social opposistrong. Ecevit's democratic" party was the leading opposition party. Demirel's minority government was under constant pressure on the right from its allies, the fascist MHP and especially from the Islamic MSP. Consequently, a civilian government would have been unable to face up to the requirements and social backlash involved in imposing an austerity policy dictated by the IMF. That is why the military coup became neces-
As for the heirs of the CHP, who have proclaimed themselves democrats, they have been incapable of developing a strong and credible alternative. Both the SHP and the DSP have distinguished themselves most of all by their cravenness and their lack of initiative. This political vacuum has given the right the room to fight out its internal wars.
The generals vetted the social democratic candidates at the time of the stage-managed elections of 1983. Despite this, both the SHP and the DSP accepted this parliamentary framework, and even returned to this parliament through the transfer of deputies who had been elected with the endorsement of the generals. They thus separated themselves from the social opposition.
This new situation has opened up important possibilities for the Marxist left, with a rise — even though a modest one - of strikes, student struggles, the Kurdish question, human rights, the feminist movement and so the previous coup d'etat, it was Ecevit's CHP that captured the rise of social struggles and radicalization and which filled the political space on the left. The Marxists limited themselves to "democracy," and were not able to develop an independent class-struggle Left recomposition will be a slow process
Today, the Marxist left, divided into dozens of groups and smaller in size and influence, seems far from being able to regroup its forces and take initiatives. The process of recomposition of the socialist left is far from being completed. This process is going be
The social opposition [the union movement] had already gone into crisis before the 1980 coup. It was on the retreat, and seemed to be breaking up. It was routed by the military coup without
The weight of such a defeat and the ensuing repression continues to be felt, and in part explains the slow and timid nature of the process of recomposition on the left. The Marxist left must overcome its divisions and its lack of organization in order to be able to organize and lead this rise of social struggles. *
against the resistance of reactionary ion, the Mouvement Quebec Français
The drowning at Meech
Lake
CONSTITUTIONAL questions have played an important part in Canadian politics. In particular, this is because of the bi-national character of the country and its history as a British dominion, and therefore subordinate to British legal institutions.
The rise of Quebecois nationalism put into question the old British