GULF WAR
End the
slaughter
BY RESUMING its attacks on August 29 against Iranian oil installations and the tankers serving them, the Iraqi airforce provoked a new flare-up of hostilities on a vast scale in the ArabPersian Gulf. Within three days, a dozen merchant ships of various nationalities had been hit by Baghdad's planes or Tehran's patrol boats. SALAH JABER
T HE NEW EXPLOSION of the
Gulf war, and in particular of attacks on maritime traffic, followed a tacitly observed truce between the two belligerents that had been in effect since July 20. On that day, the UN Security Council unaniadopted Resolution No. 598 demanding an immediate cease-fire between Iran and Iraq and the withdrawal of their forces to internationally recog-
The adoption of this resolution came shortly before convoys of US warships in the waters began escorting Kuwaiti tankers flying the American flag. The discovery of mines in August provided a pretext for reinforcing the imperialist military presence world, with British ships being sent to the Arab-Persian Gulf and French ships to the Gulf of Oman. This vast deployment of floating engines of war was to create a climate of relative security for merchant shipping in the seaway separating the Arabian peninsula from Iran.
Paradoxically, it was Iran that was the main beneficiary from this situation. Iranian oil exports rose spectacularly in August. This stepped-up flow of oil out of the country - plus the price rises resulting from the higher demand created by the military tension and the July 30-August 1 riots in Mecca - boosted Tehran's oil income by $20 million a day over the 1986 level.
7%
This windfall for Iran naturally bolstered the arguments of the "bitter enders" in the ayatollahs' regime, who favor "war until victory" against the Ba'athist regime of Saddam Hussein. In these conditions, it could not be expected that Tehran would accept the cease-fire called for by the UN. To keep the international organization off its back, however, Iran decided to take an evasive course. It was the continuation of this attitude that prompted Iraq to break the truce that had lasted through August.
Nerve center of Iran's war effort
Finding it more and more difficult to resist the Iranian offenses, and having lost all hope of turning the military situation to its advantage, Baghdad had no other choice but to try to force Tehran to end the fighting by cutting off
Since Iraq's meager outlet to the sea had long been blocked, Baghdad fell back on building pipelines. Today they enable it to export 2.5 million barrels a day, its total production, through Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Iran, on the other hand, remains dependent on maritime traffic in the Gulf, in particular from its Kharg Island terminal. So Baghdad began attacks in 1982 on this nerve center of Iran's war effort.
Tehran, however, has found an effective way to parry this move by tening to block all navigation in the Gulf, which would penalize Iraq's Arab allies and severely affect oil supplies to the European and Japanese econo-
MIDDLE EAST mies. Nonetheless, Baghdad decided in 1985-86 to brave the Iranian threats and the pressures of its allies. The Iraqi airforce stepped up its attacks, and extended them to all Iran's oil terminals.
In reprisal, Tehran started attacking Kuwaiti exports in 1986, picking on an ally of Baghdad that had no military forces of its own. Kuwait then demanded that the Western powers, above all the United States, protect its oil fleet. When they refused to "get involved" in a conflict with Iran, the emirate turned to the USSR, which put three Soviet tankers at its disposal.
In this way, Moscow sought to embarrass Washington at a time when the Reagan administration's stock was lowest in the eyes of its traditional Arab allies as a result of the Irangate revelations. What followed is well-known.
If there is a common denominator in the policies of the great powers toward the Gulf, it is their duplicity and their ignominious exploitation of the enormous market for arms of all kinds that
United States playing both sides along
The United States has been playing both sides. Through the intermediary of Israel, notably, it has been arming the Iranians. The USSR and France have been Baghdad's main arms suppliers and at the same time have been trying to improve their relations with Tehran by "indirect" sales of military material. And even China has become involved in the game. 1 hain, West Germany and Italy have 3 September 14, 1987 • International Viewpoint