In two other approaches, the Charter is seen as an element in mobilizing against national oppression and exploitation. In a general way, the positions taken by the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) can be put in this category.6 But these positions diverge over the question of how adequate the Freedom Charter is programmatically for a growing over of the struggle into a fight for socialism. They also diverge over the question of the spontaneous social dynamic that could be touched off by a concrete application of this
Debate over the Freedom
Charter another current opposes the Charter or any political document, on the grounds that this would be a divisive factor in the union movement and that the debate on these documents has not gone through COSATU's rank-and-file structures?
The discussion around these questions focuses around the documents adopted by the two most powerful industrial unions, the NUM and NUMSA. Both unions adopted the Freedom Charter at their congresses. Thus, their differences of assessment are not over the need for a democratic program summing up the aspirations of the mass movement - a function that the Freedom Charter and other similar programs have fulfilled for decades. They are rather over two questions: One is the specific context and place of workers' demands that reflect the South African workers' movement's recent experiences. The second is the form of unity to be sought between the various components of the mass movement and the which the working class should exercise hegemony over it.
In a nutshell, does the Freedom Charter summarize the main demands of the working class today? To what extent is it the single or best instrument for enabling the workers' movement to win hegemony over the mass movement? Should not the workers' movement itself define a programmatic orientation that brings together workers' demands with a potential socialist dynamic?
In this regard, the NUM resolutions seem to want to exercise a certain selflimitation. The policy of the miners' union was explained explicitly in that way by its leader Cyril Ramaphosa:
"A democratic, socialist
South Africa"
"Our view is: fine, ultimately there has to be a system where there would not be any exploitation by anybody — a socialist system - but then again you still have to canvass mandates from people. We believe it could be incorrect at this stage to actually say we want this kind of socialism, put it down on paper in black and white, when it is an issue which needs to be canvassed on a much wider scale." 8
Of course, despite this statement, you find articles in the NUM's journal that have a socialist perspective. miners' union congress, James Motlatsi, president of the NUM, said: "It is only in a democratic socialist South Africa that the working class and all the oppressed people will control the wealth they produce.
One of the resolutions of the NUM congress specifies: this country are not only working conditions in 4. South African Labour Bulletin, Braamfrontein, 6. The metalworkers' union, which claims 130,000 7. Such an assessment was adopted by the CCAWUSA congress, a resolution of which says, the Freedom Charter though important are limited. Endorsing either of the two documents [the Freedom Charter or the Azania Manifesto] lays the union open to serious divisions." This trade-union current — which activists close to AZAPO or the National Forum have an influence — therefore resolved "to discuss at all levels of the union and our federation the importance of a socialist programme of action which will bind together all workers regardless of political affiliation." (South Africa Labour Bulletin, July 1987.) 9. SALB, March-April 1987.
mines, but for a democratic socialist society controlled by the working class." And the NUM does not reject the idea of workers' control, because it states, "the solution to the workers' AN INJURY TO problems was clear - they must take control of their workplace." In this regard, it has to be pointed out that there may be differences in the union leaderships on all these questions.
However, the conception supported by Ramaphosa seems above all to put the emphasis on the objective social of the democratic Going on from this, the content of the
"a guiding document of the struggle against national oppression," is also presented as a possible basis for the workers' struggle for socialism, which is seen rather as a preordained growing over of the national
5 democratic stage.
NUMSA also adopted the Freedom Charter, but "as containing the minimum political demands that reflect the INJURY TO view of the majority of the metalworkers' vision of a free and democratic, non-discriminatory South Africa." It thus regards this document above all as "a good foundation stone with which to start building our working class That is the nub of the gramme. " 10 debate.
Proletarian leadership of the mass movement has to be expressed concretely in daily struggles, but also through the workers movement having its own programmatic references. NUMSA has, therefore, called for drafting a Workers' Charter that would sum up the workers' demands of the moment and define a specific strategic orientation. The union declares, "it should be a priority of the new union and other organizations of the working class to build a clear political programme."
Discussion on proposed
Workers' Charter
Questioned about this perspective, the miners' leader Cyril Ramaphosa acknowledged that "a Workers' Charter which demands the recognition of unions and democratically elected shop stewards committees should be seen as complementing the demand on freedom of association enshrined in the Freedom Charter." 11
But in so doing, from the outset he limited the content of this Workers' Charter to certain democratic demands (the right to strike, union rights in the workplaces) that do not appear in the Freedom Charter. He seems to want the trade-union movement's contribution to end there. In fact, he specified, "Any other position to the contrary, I'm afraid, plays into the hands of those who, in the 1956 Treason Trial, characterized the Freedom Charter as a communist and therefore subversive document."
The self-limitation proposed does not, however, seem to be motivated only by the threat of greater repression. It is based on a strategic conception of the struggle. It is clear that if you attribute to the Freedom Charter a capacity to set in motion a natural dynamic of the democratic stage growing over into the socialist stage, then it is hard to see the usefulness of adopting a program with overly specific socialist
But how, then, is the working-class over the mass that is called for to be asserted? Can this hegemony be reduced to the union movement adopting the general democratic program (the Freedom Charter) and on this basis forming a united front between COSATU and the Chartist
In the minds of those who support it, working-class seems to serve a twofold need. On the one hand, such a program would be an element in a strategic advance toward "the creation of a worker-controlled socialist society." On the other, it would give substance to the need to concretize "the practical leadership of the industrial working class in the struggle establishment of a socialist
This is the first time that a major trade-union current has spelt content of working-class hegemony over the process of popular mobilization. This formulation is an important contribution to the debate. It represents an interesting perspective, offering, in the framework of trade-union unity, a concrete advance over the purely propagandistic approach of those who previously evoked the goal of socialism. A good part of the debate is over this question and precisely over the clear limitations of the specific role of the unions.
Alliances and the united front
In fact, as long as the idea of working-class hegemony remains a general agreement. Because it is hard to set your face against an objective reality: the size of the working-class in the social formation and its growing weight. But every different point of view gives a different concrete meaning idea. Who specifically is to exercise this hegemony, the South African Communist Party, the ANC or the industrial unions?
Moreover, behind the discussion on the Freedom Charter looms a debate over concrete alliances and the conception of the united front. Holding up criteria of representativeness, the NUM proposes a special alliance with the Chartist current. On this basis, it criticizes certain interpretations of COSATU's initial conception of organization-
It is clear that in its day-to-day policy an organization like COSATU has to make a distinction between organizations that have a mass influence and actually lead a part of the mass movement and small propaganda groups that 10. SALB, July 1987 13 11. SALB, May-June 1987. 12. SALB, July 1987
October 12, 1987 • International Viewpoint
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SOUTH AFRICA are absent from the real battle grounds of class struggle nationally. But this is quite a different matter from trying to make restrictive definitions of what a "progressive" organization is.
Once adopting the Freedom Charter becomes a precondition for being considered "progressive," there is a danger backsliding and divisiveness, including
In this respect, some of Cyril Ramaphosa's formulations could lend themselves to confusion, as, for example, when he says: "At a political level, the Freedom Charter has been adopted as a guiding document, and if there is an organization which is violently opposed principles of the Charter our members would find it very difficult to regard that as a progressive organization with which they could get into alliance." 13
UDF writes on "errors of workerism"
Political formations, both legal and illegal, are also intervening in this debate. 14 A position in the United Democratic Front (UDF) has been expressed in several articles. One of these, published in Isizwe (The under the title "Errors of Workerism," criticized both those union leaders who opposed the trade-union movement adopting too precise a political definition and those who too openly displayed their infatuation with socialism. "For the UDF, the problem with the workerists is not their correct call for worker leadership but rather what they understand by this." 15
What this article rejects is the idea that "the leading role of the working class means the leading role of the prothis is a conception of alliances that reduces the role of the union movement to one element among others in an anti-apartheid unity based on the Charter.
Rising level of consciousness
It is clear that the trade-union form limits the political expression of the working class, and this has given a certain shape to the debates. But the growth of union organization and the rising level of consciousness of the industrial section of the proletariat organized in COSATU could offer real possibilities for overcoming this situation by giving explicit form to a mass socialist workers' current. A necessary step in this direction might be for the union movement to assume a greater responsibility in popular mobilization and political debate.
For its part, the South African Communist Party has launched an out-andout ideological offensive in this area. One of its journals, Umsebenzi, for example, contains a clear admonition:
"The trade union movement...cannot act as the working class political vanguard. If it attempted to do so, it would risk committing organizational suicide as a mass force. We must therefore take guard against premature attempts to incorporate the objective of socialism into programs of trade unions and the federation to which they belong. A trade union cannot demand
La high level of political consciousness from its members or affiliates as a condition for joining." 16 this standpoint, it goes on to say: "The adoption by the recent NUM conference of the Freedom Charter correctly reflects the mass popular mood the trade-union movement of a more réalistic linkage between the economic and political struggle in the present
This orientation flows from a specific strategic conception. The Communist Party views the revolutionary process as consisting of two stages, a democratic one and a socialist one. Rejecting crude stageism, it says in some of that there is no Chinese wall between the two, that it is as important to carry through the second as the first. By the working class must take the forefront of the struggle to guarantee the future.
The social nature of the democratic state, however, is not defined. For the CP, it is a result of the social forces existing at the given moment. Without denying what is obvious in this statement, it can, however, be said that a relationship of forces is something that has to be built. And the debate in the mass movement is precisely over the tactical way to build a relationship of forces favorable to the working
Moreover, the discussion on the precise formula of support for socialism to be adopted bears on the social nature of the state (mass democracy, workers' control and so on). One might wonder, then, whether a democratic drafting of a workers program is not precisely the best means for assuring the hegemony and unity of the proletarian masses in the course of the struggle, and thereby to influence the relationship of forces. Do not COSATU's organizational gains offer the possibility concretely for mass education in socialism, for drawing broad strata of workers behind a workers' program?
Internal democracy and
" The upshot of gressive trade unions.
Notebooks for Study and Research
REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY TODAY
IN THIS new NSR 4, Daniel Bensaïd reviews some of the fundamental positions of socialist politics: the role of the state, the evolution of proletarian class consciousness, the notion of revolutionary crisis and dual power. He attempts to demonstrate their relevance to current debates on left governments, the welfare state, self-management and democracy, and in the light of experiences in the 1960s and
1970s in Southern Europe and Latin America. Also included are extracts from articles by Ernest Mandel and Nikos Poulantzas.
Also available:
NSR 1, "The place of Marxism in history" Ernest Mandel
"The Chinese revolution, Part |" Pierre Rousset
NSR 2,
NSR 3, "The Chinese revolution, Part II" Pierre Rousset
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14
International Viewpoint • October 12, 1987 and understanding. It is a pointer to unity
It was in seeking to respond to this real possibility that the idea arose of a Workers' Charter. The drafting of such a document was supposed to make it possible to open up a debate of this sort without risking trade-union legality or limiting the trade-union movement's capacities for action and unity.
COSATU's Second Congress in July marked a turning point in the debate in the unions. It confirmed that the con13. SALB, May-June 1987. 14. These discussions are not limited to COSATU. SACTU, an exile trade-union pole linked to the ANC, has also expressed itself on these themes. Its message to the COSATU congress was described in the following way in the September issue of the magazine Work In Progress: "In a not altogether clear message the South African Congress of Trade Unions startled most congress delegates by saying that while they should discuss socialism, they should not 'elevate it to a policy. ' Some delegates did pursue a rather crude version of this argument." 15. Isizwe, November 1986, reprinted in SALB, March-April 1987. 16. Umsebenzi, second quarter 1987.
SOUTH AFRICA
federation was maintaining its own orientation and its commitment to the internal democracy and unity of various points of view in the unions that was forged in the 1985 fusion.
After being adopted by several industrial unions, the Freedom Charter was adopted by the COSATU congress as a document that "encompasses the minimum demands of the democratic majority which lays the basis for the building of a non-exploitative society." 17 This
ECONOMIA SUDAFRICANA is a clear recognition of the impact of this document on the broad masses of workers.
"Encouraging the fullest discussion in COSATU"
COSATU also declared, on the other hand, that the fight against national oppression and economic exploitation are "complementary to each other and part of an uninterrupted struggle for total liberation. " 18
The debate over COSATU's political orientation is not closed. As Jay Naidoo said, "the immediate task facing the COSATU at the moment is to develop a coherent working class understanding of the Charter while encouraging the fullest discussion on democracy and socialism within the federation's ranks." 19 This is a particular view of the role of this document.
However, the question of a complementary program did not come up in the debates over motions submitted for a vote.
Nonetheless, Jay Naidoo said that this idea had supporters in COSATU, but that its implications were not yet entirely clear. And he added, "If, however, most of our members wanted a Trade union or Workers' Charter, we will have to consider it." 20
The formulation of specific policy is thus beginning to surface in COSATU, reflecting the experience in recent years of a non-racial trade-union movement that has been in the forefront of the social struggles.
Jay Naidoo no doubt summed up the feeling of the majority when he said:
"In adopting the Charter, we see it as a guideline, not as a blueprint...There will not be a suspension of the struggle for a non-exploitative society. There is no contradiction between adopting the Freedom Charter as a programme of minimum demands and the struggle for such a society." 21* 17. Weekly Mail, July 24, 1987. 18. Work in Progress, September 1987. 19. Weekly Mail, July 24, 987. 20. Work in Progress, September 1987. 21. International Labour Reports, September/October 1987. Jay Naidoo contributed, moreover, an interesting clarification of the question of alliances by specifying, "the united front alliance is based on agreement on the leading role of the working class in the struggle for liberation." (Work In Progress, September 1987)
GA DE
•MINEROS
Stop
South
African coal!
THE THREE WEEK strike of
South African miners this summer again underlined the crucial role that the mining industry plays in propping up the apartheid economy. It is gold which has been viewed as South
Africa's central life-line. But today, coal is playing an increasingly important role, becoming the regime's second largest contributor to export earnings and providing 75% of the country's energy needs.
In recognition of this growing strategic importance of coal, an international campaign has
WRE been launched in Britain by the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) to block all South African coal exports into Europe. STEVE ROBERTS
INCE THE early 1970s, South
S
• African production of coal has more than tripled from 53 mil lion tonnes to 172 million tonnes, making South Africa the world's third largest producer after Australia and the USA. This increase in production had the dual purpose of satisfying the country's energy needs, and creating a major export industry.
This strategy was particularly aimed at Europe. The South African authorities calculated that if they could stimulate an appetite for cheap South African coal, this could mean energy costs low enough to act as a further disincentive to taking effective action against apartheid.
The export of coal is directly linked to undermining sanctions. In 1971, the South African government announced its plans for the expansion of the coal industry in the 1990s. These plans were centred on the allocation of export quotas, linked to the increase in the handling capacity of the loading terminal at Richard's Bay to the north of Durban.
There was surprise and dismay among South African mine owners in 1976 when, out of a total quota of 20 mil minion and a further 3 million see a l 15 lion tonnes, Shell was allocated 3
October 12, 1987 • International Viewpoint
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TOTAL 1986 DOMESTIC COAL CONSUMPTION AND SOUTH
AFRICAN COAL IMPORTS TO EEC COUNTRIES
SOUTH AFRICA
Domestic coal consumption
COUNTRY (1000 tonnes)
Belgium 12,936
Denmark 12,477
France 32,229
F.R. Germany 90,016
Greece 1,766
Ireland 2,248
Italy 20,467
Luxembourg 179
Portugal 2,158
Netherlands 10,203
Spain 23,815
U.K. 118,726
EEC TOTAL 327,220
• Excluding Ireland • Source: Eurostat 1987 No. 7 located to Ermelo (a consortium of BP, Total and Gencor). Three years later the erosity" became clear when Chris Heunis, the then South African minister for economic affairs, explained: quotas for BP, Shell and Total have been subjected to the condition that they continue their obligations in supplying petroleum fuel to this country"
A carrot to bribe the oil monopolies
Thus the implementation of the coal export strategy was also designed to secure vital oil imports — a carrot to bribe the oil monopolies to maintain
Not surprisingly, these companies also figure largely among those who actually ship the coal to Europe. Shell, in particular, owns a large number of coal bulk carriers with which it ships coal to Eurooport; Amsterdam, Ijmuiden; Aabenraa, Antwerp, Taranto; Ancona; Augusta (Italy) and Carboneras (Spain). Other major shipping companies are BP (UK), Cetragpa (France);
and Cobelfret Carboex (Spain); Thyssen (West Gerand Nippon Yusen Kaisha
About half of South Africa's coal exports are shipped to EC countries. Italy, West Germany, the Spanish state and Belgium are the major importers
Sanctions imposed by 1986) and Denmark (1987) have drastically reduced the amount of direct shipments of coal into those countries. However, the response of the South African authorities has been to increase the secrecy surrounding the shipments
Neither is the coal trade limited to Europe. Hong Kong plays a crucial role in the transshipment of South African International Viewpoint • October 12, 1987
Imports of Sth African coal (in 1000 tonnes) 1984 1985 1986
1,801 2,197 2,136
2,737 3,454 2,663
5,601 6,283 1,534
2,249 3,228 4,002
139 105 261 23 21 (unknown)
6,045 6,376 5,392
145 72 117 50 104 115 776 892 1,536
1,636 2,244 3,979
258 724 313
21,460 25,700 22,044* coal to South Korea and other countries in the Far East.
Numerous methods exist to circumvent sanctions:
• semi-direct shipments — discharging part cargo in another port prior to discharge of the remaining South African coal cargo in another port;
• transshipment and temporary storage in some European port (usually Rotterdam) before shipment — on an-
• import and subsequent re-export of South African coal by one European country to another, perhaps with a new "certificate of origin";
• mixing South African with other coal, either during shipment or in port.
Stopping the remaining tonnes of apartheid coal coming into Western Europe was the aim of a new campaign launched in Sheffield, in the north of England, on September 19. A conference called by the NUM and the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) drew together 430 labour movement delegates, including 103 representatives from pits and the Women Against Pit Closures movement.
NUM President Arthur Scargill opened the conference with a speech applauding the South African miners' and condemning the refusal of the South African authorities to let Cyril Ramaphosa attend the conference (see box). The NUM collected well over £375,000 from many European coun tries to assist the strikers.
Scargill called on governments in Europe to stop completely the import of coal stained with the blood of the 48,000 South African miners who have lost their lives this century in accidents. However, concluding his speech Scargill said that it was not sufficient merely to demand sanctions: "We, as trade unionists, should impose our own sanctions. We should take a leaf from the book of the Liverpool dockers and the Dunnes Stores' strikers".
The Dunnes' strikers were shop assistants in a large Dublin store who refused to handle South African goods, were sacked and remain in dispute with the management. [See IV 99, May 19, 1986.] A representative of the Liverpool dockers explained to the conference that, following an appeal by Ben Ulenga, general secretary of the Mineworkers of Namibia, they now refuse to handle shipments of Namibian and South African uranium into the port.
Action to stop apartheid coal
The conference went on to adopt an action programme including:
• Disinvestment campaigns against all companies involved in the coal trade, particularly Shell, the number one target of the international anti-apartheid movement.
• Action to be organized at all ports of entry.
• Research into sanctions evasion.
• A campaign in the European parliament.
• Action to ban all South African coal transshipments via Rotterdam and Hong Kong.
After the South African miners strike, one of the best ways that militants can support their struggle is to choke the coal connection between apartheid and Europe. *
[Further information on the campaign from: NUM, St. James House, Vicar Lane, Sheffield, Yorks, GB; Kairos Working Group (Coal Section), Kromme Nieuwegracht 10, 3512 HG Utrecht, Netherlands; or national anti-apartheid campaigns./
Travel ban on Ramaphosa
SOUTH AFRICAN miners' leader
Cyril Ramaphosa was refused permission to leave South African for the Sheffield conference.
The only basis on which the apartheid authorities were prepared to allow him to leave the country was on a passport of a designated homeland. Accepting such a passport would have enabled the authorities to deport
Ramaphosa to the Venda homeland as an allen on his return to
South Africa.
Strong protests from the British
NUM and Trade Union Congress eventually secured the necessary documents for Ramaphosa to visit Britain, although, of course, too late for him to attend the conference.*