What was involved in the indo-Sri Lankan peace accord
LEADER of the Ceylon Mercantile Union, Bala Tampo gave the following interview to Gerry Foley in Paris in
September before the outbreak of the fighting between the Indian Peacekeeping Force and the Tamil Tigers.
Tampo is also a leader of the Workers' Party, a group formed to advance independent working-class political action; and of a Sri Lankan sympathizing section of the
Fourth International. This interview provides background information on the clashes in Sri Lanka, as well as on the peace accord and the opposition to it, both within the
Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority.
OW MUCH resistance is there to an accord imposed by India? I don't think that it would be correct to say that it has been imposed by India. On the Sri Lanka side, President Jayawardene in fact stood to gain more immediately from the agreement than India. For India, it is a more long-term gain, essentially in the foreign policy field. For Jayawardene, the agreement provided for him to call in Indian troops, and he called them in immediately after the accord was signed. As soon as the Indian troops landed, the armed conflict that was taking place in the North and the East came to a dead stop.
What has supervened is something quite different. That is conflicts between the Tamil groups, a most unfortunate aspect of the situation. This has resulted in Indian troops having to intervene to stop that conflict, and even to some extent, apparently, in some of them turning on the Indian troops. But there is no question that only the arrival of Indian troops could have ended the conflict between the Sri Lanka state forces and the Tamil armed forces or groups that had been going on with increasing devastation and destruction and loss of life for four years. • This conflict among the Tamil groups is not new, is it? No. My own view is that they are very sectarian. The main group, called the Tamil Tigers, had a policy which in my view was not at all really that of achieving the right of self-determination in the democratic sense for the Tamil-speaking people of the
North and East. Their aim was to establish a separate state called Tamil Eelam, which as far as they were concerned, would have meant their setting up a new state with themselves constituting the sole armed power, and thereby establishing a complete military dictatorship over the Tamil people themselves, but separate from the Sri Lankan state.
Among the masses of speaking people these armed groups were originally regarded with sympathy. They called them "The Boys" to begin with, and The Boys were fighting the occupying Sri Lankan state forces, which were definitely carrying out a policy of terror.
Such state terror involved search and destroy missions into the villages, raping and robbing women, arresting large numbers of youths purely on suspicion and sending them down to the south, economic sanctions, cutting off telecommunications, cutting off the fishing population from the sea and so on. It meant the Sri Lankan state forces and the Sri Lankan government were definitely carrying out a policy aimed at intimidating the whole mass of the Tamil people in the North and the East and the Tamil-speaking people, including Muslims, in the East.
So the fight of these armed groups against the state forces was welcomed and gained a lot of mass sympathy. But later the Tamil armed groups, particularly the Tigers, also started killing their political opponents and even dissidents. These so-called lamp post killings and just plain shootings and killings, even of hostages at certain stages, not only alienaied sympathy from outside for them, but alienated sym-
SRI LANKA pathy among the Tamil people themselves. • This sectarian fighting goes back a way, doesn't it? It goes back over a year. But there was a time up to the first massacre of Sinhala civilians in Anuradhapura in 1986 when the Tamil groups were essentially fighting the armed forces. Then they had a lot of sympathy. Even among the Sinhala people, there was no great hostility towards them, and in fact their propaganda was to some extent finding a response even among thinking Sinhala people. We, the Workers' Party and my union, helped to contribute to that. But then our fight took the form of defending the right of self-determination. • How long did that stage last? The real armed struggle developed after the July 1983 pogrom when Tamils were killed and an organized drive took place to terrorize Tamils in the south and drive them out of business, drive them out of their homes. Then a very large number became refugees and fled to the North and into the East, and others even fled to other countries, such as India and so on. These refugees provided the first real broad recruiting base for the armed groups, which up till then did not even number a few hundred. They were probably a few
But from being a few scores, in a relatively short time, the armed groups grew to at least two to three thousand. Then they acquired arms on a bigger scale also from outside, as a result of the international reaction essentially among expatriate Tamil 23 groups and others to the July 1983 December 7, 1987 • International Viewpoint
SRI LANKA pogrom. • What specifically did the Workers' Party and your union do? We put out a statement on January 1,1985, in the name of the Workers' Party on the situation in the North and East, upholding the right of self-determination. Then the CMU adopted a very important resolution on this issue of the North and East at our last delegate conference in October 1986.
To test opinion in our own union we decided to have a secret ballot at the delegates' conference. The delegates' conference covers the entire union, and the delegates are freely elected. We had a clear 70% vote for a resolution presented by the executive supporting the right of self-determination of the Tamilspeaking people and also calling
I think it was also to some extent related to the peace moves that were being mediated by India, and the attempts to bring the different groups together to bring about some kind of consensus for a political settlement with the Ceylon government.
Now, any kind of political settlement with the Ceylon government had necessarily to exclude the setting up of a separate state. But the Tamil Tiger slogan was, and remained until the very end, "Tamil Eelam," a separate state in the North and East. That was not something that could really be negotiated. But I think that some of the other groups were willing to come to some negotiated settlement, following the lead of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), that is the parliamentary first group that the LTTE set about to liquidate.
That happened just at the time when an accord was being pushed by the Indian government, and there was every reason for us to believe that the TELO group were inclined to go along with the Indian govemment on that question. That was the first time a political settlement mediated by India emerged as a possibility. • What role was played by the Tamil Nadu state government? Many people in Ceylon and outside have tended to equate Tamil Nadu with India. That is not so. The Indian government's position was in relation to overall Indian
The Tamil Nadu position was much more specifically in relation to the Tamils of Ceylon, Tamil
Bay of Bengal for the withdrawal of troops from the North and East. That was the demand that our own branches in the North had put forward.
Of the remaining 30%, only about 12% voted against the resolution. The others either abstained or were neutral. That was a very significant vote because our union at that delegates' conference had at least 95% Sinhala-speaking delegates. There were only 4% from the North and East. So it was clearly a stand taken on a working-class position by a majority of Sinhala-speaking delegates.
Our union is exceptional in that context. I wouldn't say that you could get that kind of vote in any other union that has a majority of Sinhala members. But, by and large, there was no ethnic conflict between the Sinhala and Tamil people. That was clear. And that was one of the things stated in the resolution, that there was no ethnic
• Jaffna
Palk Strait
Mannar
Trincomaiee
Gulf of Mannar
Anuradhapura
Sigıriya•
Putta am
Batticaioa
Mahaveir
Kandy
• Badulla
Colombo *
Nuwara
Dehiwala
Eliya
Mt. Lavinia
• Kalutara
Gale
Nadu being the only state in the world, even on a federal basis, with a predominantly Tamil
Moreover, Tamil Nadu had a much more direct connection with the armed struggle in the North. A tradition of smuggling between the coastal villages of the North of Ceylon and the south of India for smuggling goes back generations. This has also involved conwith the state forces, customs, navy and so on, for smuggling. It is in that traditional context that the real armed strug-
The first leaders of the Tigers were all from that main coastal town called Valvettithurai. It is a town that from British times has produced seafarers and smugglers, as distinct from fisher folk. In ancient times, they were seafarers. When the British came, they stopped seafarers as much. Then, they took to smuggling. They conflict, that is, no conflict be-
INDIAN OCEAN tween the people as such.
The July 1983 pogrom also created a situation in which the armed struggle now became an important factor among the
Tamil-speaking people, and the armed Tamil groups gained increasing credibility in struggle with the armed forces, and victories of a limited type, at least in holding the armed forces at bay. That was the period when they won a lot of sympathy, from
Then as they gained in strength, the rivalries emerged. At first they combined in keeping guard around the Jaffna fort; there was a certain degree of loose collaboration. But each group always maintained its own separate forces. I would say that period continued for more than a year.
But then came a change, when the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) definitely began to exert itself to knock out the other groups.
24
• What was the basis of the conflict
' among the Tamil armed groups?
International Viewpoint • December 7, 1987 political group that existed previously and still exists in exile in south India, and no doubt still has a base the North and East of • So, in your opinion that is basically what the fighting was about, that the Tigers were firm on a separate state and the others were soft? That's right. The other groups were ready to look to some kind of an accommodation on the basis of a degree of regional autonomy, short of a separate state. Then the Tigers started to knock them out. First, they started to denounce them. They broke with the common front that had been set up in south India. And then later came armed
The other main armed group at the time was the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO). They were a breakaway group from the original Tigers. They had also become relatively strong, and had carried out some armed attacks. They were the were closely linked with, but not identical with, the fisher folk, who also belong to a separate caste in Jaffna.
• All are Hindus?
They are predominantly Hindus. But the Catholic Church, as in many countries, had carried out conversions in the coastal area. And the influence of Catholic priests in those coastal areas was significant.
And it is significant that the Tigers' leader, Prabhakaran, it is alleged, turned to a Catholic priest for advice and assistance. That is what brought this Catholic priest whom I defended in a big trial, Father Singarayer, to the attention of the authorities. Prabhakaran calls himself the Supreme Commander of the Tamil Tigers. He belongs to that caste of seafarers in the coast-
In south India, there was mass sympathy amongst the Tamil people as such for the Tamil-speaking people in the North and East for what they were suffering under the Jayawardene regime. The south Indian
coast is a very long coast. All along that coast, there were large numbers of people, particularly fisher folk and others completely in sympathy with their Tamil brothers across the Palk Strait. So, the arms smuggling could continue without any difficulty. And considerable supplies of arms did come in, including modern weapons - mortars, things like that. • How is the accord being implementThe Indian troops are preoccupied with bringing the Tamil armed groups under the accord. These groups have not surrendered all their arms. But they have surrendered substantial quantities, more than some people expected that they even had. But they obviously have more. And it is very clear from Prabhakaran's own statements, as well as from those of the others, that they fear each other, and therefore don't want to disarm completely. troops are being very, very tactful about it. They understand that position. But at the same time they cannot allow these people to continue armed conflicts with each • I would think that if the masses of the Tamil people see what looks like a solution that these armed groups could lose their support very quickly. Definitely. I can tell you from all that I have gathered that after the accord mass sympathy such as had existed for the Tigers has fallen away. The arrival of Indian troops was greeted with widespread sympathy, if not outright expressions of joy, because the Tamil people had suffered for four years, and the economic situation had been very bad because of the government sanctions. All that has changed with the accord. Now the government is at least ostensibly pursuing a policy of reconciliation. The finance minister has spoken pub-
"three r's," rehabilitation, reconstruction and reconciliation. The line of his wing of the government, backed by the president of course, is to try to reconstruct - to get foreign aid for that purpose. Furthermore, India has for the first time given 500 million rupees economic assistance for rehabilitation in • In this situation, don't the armed groups risk being isolated and If the Indian troops decide to smash them, in my view they can be smashed without much difficulty. There is no question that there is enough cooperation from the public for this and also enough providing of information by the rival groups. • They Inform on each other? Exactly. • In this situation, have the contradictions between the Indian government and the Tamil Nadu state government disappeared? Yes. That was the big achievement of Rajiv Gandhi. He managed to persuade even the Tamil Nadu prime minister, chandran, to look at the issue from an allIndian standpoint. He got Jayawardene to accept an Indo-Sri Lanka accord, leaving out the Tamil Tigers, who could not be brought into any accord on any basis acceptable to India. India was never going to support the formation of a separate state for one million Tamils in the North and East of Sri Lanka when in Tamil Nadu there are 55 million Tamils.
Secondly, India's main concern has been its own strategic-defence interests. And the last thing it would want would be a little fragment of a state left on its own.
That might open the door to any imperialist power. As it is, it is the weakness of the Sri Lankan state that caused concern to India, because the Sri Lankan government was leaning over more and more to the imperialists and to Israel, Pakistan and other
On the other hand, India intervened to win the Sri Lankan government and Jayawardene to the acceptance of some degree of real autonomy for the Tamilspeaking people in the North and East. The Indians were prepared to go as far as setting up a separate federal type of state within a federal constitution.
Of course, Jayawardene was not going to accept this. In the first place it is fundamentally contrary to the provisions of the existing constitution, and would have required a referendum. He is never going to go to a referendum on an explosive issue like that. The autonomy offered does not go beyond administrative devolution. • Is there any possibility that the TIgers will change their policy? Well, I am told that the possibility of some kind of dialogue with them is now possible, and I understand that Prabhakaran says that he is open to political discussion.
But, unfortunately for him and his group, they have drawn a line of blood between themselves and the kinsfolk and comrades of the people they killed. And I know for a fact that there are literally hundreds of people in the North who will not rest until they have taken revenge and bumped off Prabhakaran and his close
So, it is very difficult for them even if they wanted now to turn to the Tamilspeaking masses, to turn to what is called • If It is too late for them now to become a political leadership for the Tamil people., who Is going to take the leadership? I would think that if peace were restored in the North and East among the Tamils themselves, at the beginning it is possible that the TULF itself can again emerge — that is, enter an electoral process, if one can be got going.
SRI LANKA President Junius Jayawardene (DR) • By the TULF, do you mean the former Tamil members of parliament? Maybe not them. They have been discredited even among their own following, as having run away and left them to their fate. • So, the TULF in this case would be what was left of their old electoral organization? Yes. In the absence of any new political formation, I would think that they can still get going, maybe with some new faces. • There Is nothing else in the Tamil area, any sort of Marxist organization? The TULF is the only group that has a base in every electoral district. It has the advantage of not having been involved in these internecine conflicts and of having always been in favor of an accord. The TULF did not have an armed force of its own, but preached unity to the other groups, and took an active part in the mediation process of the Indians, advising the Indian government.
I think that most of the proposals that ultimately came into the accord were put forward in consultation with the TULF, who were able to assess how far they could • And the Tamil Nadu government now is also behind the pact? Ramachandran tried to persuade Prabhakaran to accept the settlement, but the Tiger leader responded by saying "I must consult my people." Then Prabhakaran came back and said this accord has been imposed on us. So, this talk of imposition of an accord strangely enough on the one hand ema- 25 nates from the Tiger group and certain othDecember 7, 1987 • International Viewpoint
SRI LANKA er of the groups in the North. But it also emanates from the Sinhala groups, including the prime minister and others within the government who are opposed to the accord, saying that it has been imposed by India on the Sri Lankan government and is a blow to Sri Lankan sovereignty.
The prime minister is taking the position that the accord must be tested constitutionally before the people, hoping that the constitutional court might say there should be a referendum. If there is to be a referendum, of course, then the whole issue will be thrown open among the Sinhala masses, and those opposed to the accord will go all out on an out and out Sinhala racist anti-Indian, anti-Tamil basis against it. But Jayawardene is obviously not going to allow it, nor will the Indians. • In these circumstances, is there a possibility of civil war? Not really. But as the Indian high commissioner said, when he was asked why there were Indian frigates in Colombo harbor, he admitted that there were rapiddeployment troops there. He said that that was because there was a danger of assassination of the president, which fortunately did not take place. But, he said, had it taken place and should it still take place there would be chaos and anarchy. I think that he is quite correct in that estimate. • The Indians are prepared to send troops into the Sinhala areas? Yes, to try to keep the situation relatively stabilized. If the president is assassinated, and that can still happen. The attempt on August 18 was a very serious attempt. He was extremely lucky to escape it. Had he been killed, nobody could say what would happen. Even though the prime minister would have had to succeed him, he would have faced very strong opposition from other groups. There is no other man to step into the shoes of President Jayawardene. • Is the Sinhala bourgeoisie united behind the accord? No. But I would say that a very substantial section of opinion today recognizes that the accord was probably the only way out of an impossible situation. I wouldn't say that they hail the accord. That was quite an exaggeration of some of the national and international press. But there is a feeling of relief. There is a feeling in the business world that they can have better prospects for business, even in the North and East.
To give you a concrete illustration, I met the negotiating committee of the Employers' Federation of Ceylon at the beginning of September. They accepted at the very beginning that we could make some headway on issues where we were deadlocked earlier because of the accord and the changed situation for business in the North and East. Because the North and East are very important, even from the point of 26 view of marketing of goods. The East is probably the best granary and rice paddy International Viewpoint • December 7, 1987 surplus in the region. Now there is also to be rehabilitation and reconstruction with foreign aid. That means also business opportunities. Then the tourist industry shows signs of revival. Hotel shares rose • What about the Sinhala masses? Among the Sinhala masses once immediate propaganda that the accord was a sellout to India, that it was a sell-out to Prabhakaran and Eelam was shown to be false, when they saw that in fact the immediate outcome of the accord was the ending of the armed conflict in the North and East and the Tigers and others were going to surrender their arms, they immediately felt that this was a change for the better. Moreover, the government has said that it can save billions that it would otherwise have had to spend on defence. They have promised a substantial pay increase for the public sector which has been denied for three years on the ground of the defence expenditure. So, there is a feeling of expectancy of better economic conditions as a result of the ending of the conflict. There is also the ending of the feeling of tension, of the danger of bomb explosions and Tamil terrorist activity in the South, and of Sinhala soldiers going to the North and being • So the opposition is in the Sinhala petty bourgeoisie? Sections undoubtedly of the Sinhala Buddhist petty-bourgeoisie are directly opposed to the accord. This is merely on the basis that it brings the Indians into Sri Lanka, and that is against the interest of the Sinhalese and that they have come for the benefit of the Tamils. That very simplistic attitude is a basis for a hostility. But I would say that the opposition is much opportunist. Even Mrs Bandaranaike's party and the other Sinhala political parties and groups that have come out against the accord are saying that with their tongue in their cheek. They are saying it because they believe that they must play on what they believe is Sinhala nationalist sentiment against the Tamils and against the Indians. • Do you see this as a continuation of their practice of basing themselves on Sinhala chauvinism? Definitely. Mrs Bandaranaike made an absolutely disgraceful statement saying that she has to look after the interests of "her people," meaning the Sinhala people, even though she has been the prime minister of a multi-ethnic country.
At least the accord recognizes Sri Lanka as being multi-ethnic and multi-religious, with recognizing the need for preserving the unity of the country. Furthermore, it recognizes for the first time that Tamil and English should also become official languages, ending a thirty-year grievance of the Tamils since Sinhala was made the only official language in
• To what extent is the Buddhist clergy an obstacle to the accord? There are different types of Buddhist clergy. For instance, I have had some direct contacts with two Buddhist high priests who are organizers and leaders of a movement called the Movement for the Defence of the Motherland. Now, they are quite radical, militant. They organized a May Day meeting, and the government sent the police there and attacked them inside the temple premises when they tried to come out, and shot and killed two people there.
In that connection, I have come into contact with them. As a result, I have had the opportunity at first hand to question them about their own concepts. One of these high priests mentioned to me that they wanted a national figure for their movement. So, they turned to the SLFP and Mrs Bandaranaike. In consultation with them they set up a section in the movement called by a very similar name, the Organization for the Protection of the Motherland, and made Mrs Bandaranaike the president. Now, when this May Day shooting incident took place, Mrs Bandaranaike issued a statement saying that the Organization for the Protection of the Motherland, of which she was patron, had nothing to do with it.
So, I asked this priest to explain the difference. And then, speaking in Sinhala, he made a very significant remark: "We turned to Mrs Bandaranaike because she was a national leader and set up this other organization, but unfortunately the SLFP wing of this movement tried to turn it in a Sinhala Buddhist racist direction. We were concerned to try to create a movement among the Sinhalese for the preservation of the unity of the country on the basis of bringing the peoples of the country together and preventing a separation."
I would say that among these Sinhala Buddhist priests there are different trends. You can't generalize for the Buddhist priesthood even, and certainly not for the Buddhist public. • But where does the Sinhala opposiThe SLFP, Mrs Bandaranaike and her son are publicly opposed to the accord on a completely racist premise. But in fact they oppose it absolutely opportunistically, thinking that it is the best plank for them. Politically they are bankrupt. They have nothing to offer as an alternative to the Jayawardene regime.
The main open political opposition is from Mrs Bandaranaike's party. In addition, there is undoubtedly opposition to the accord within the government, by a group including the prime minister, in the context of a power struggle to succeed or replace President Jayawardene in the all important post of president. Outside the government, but probably having links with people in the government, are the proscribed Janatha
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Tamil Tigers in training (DR) more obviously Sinhala racist group that is anonymous. It has put out illegal publications under the name "People's Patriotic Front" (FFP). President Jayawardene has attributed robberies and acts of violence in the South, including armed robberies of weapons and explosives from police and military units, to "Southern terrorists." Frequent reference has also been made by him and by the police to the "JVP" in that
Whether the organization that was headed by Rohana Wijeweera and proscribed since July 1983 is the same as the "JVP" now given publicity in relation to "terrorists" or "subversives" in the South, it is difficult to say. It may well be that both the "JVP" and the "PPF," are fronts for rightwing reactionary groups in and outside the government that could emerge in an open power struggle later on.
ly have no truck with sections like the Tamil Tigers and others that are out-and-out Tamil racists. But they might go along with more moderate Tamil groups. At one time, for instance, the TULF had Muslim Tamil-speaking MPs from the Eastern
If there is a referendum — as is envisaged under this accord - in the Eastern province after a year or so, a very interesting question will be whether the Muslim section of the population swings en bloc with the Sinhala minority of about 25% against the main group of Tamils, who constitute over 42% of the population, or whether they will split, with at least a substantial section joining with other Tamils for a single Tamil-speaking administration for the North and the East.
SRI LANKA • What is the policy of the Workers' Party toward the accord? Well, both the Workers' Party and the CMU, from a working-class standpoint, take the view that the accord does provide a new situation that, in relation to the previously existing situation, is more favorable for political activity, for a lessening of the repression - even though the Emergency has not been ended opening of something like more peaceful conditions for political struggle.
From that point of view, the accord in the immediate situation is certainly something that we would say we cannot possi bly oppose. But of potential risks from the presence of Indian troops. But the accord itseif cannot be criticized on that basis, insofar as it provides for the Indian troops to be there only as long as the president asks that they be • What position would you take in the Eastern province itself on the question of whether it should be included in a Tamil autonomous area? We would support that. We would support that for the reason that having a single Tamil speaking administration in the North and East - I don't say for the North and East - would bring the largest body of land settled by indigenous Tamil-speaking people together under something like an autonomous administration, which would help to develop them and help them to develop on a basis of accord with the rest of the Sinhala population in the rest of the country. *
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• Can you say what percentage of the
CLASS STRUGGLE AND TECHNOLOGICAL
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27 December 7, 1987 • International Viewpoint
After the general work stoppages for a limited time (four hours at most), not providing for new initiatives and a stepping up of the struggle if the objectives are not won. In other words, it is conceived solely as a limited means of pressure.
This time the accounts of the strike and the comments about it in the bourgeois union bureaucrats mass media have been different from on previous occasions. In general, they have played up the successes of the strike, withrunning scared out overemphasizing the lack of support in some important factories (Fiat in Turin, for example. They have accepted with much less reservations the unions' own figures on the demonstrations, which are almost
THE GENERAL STRIKE of November 15 was an overall success. Participation was particularly high among industrial workers, but smaller in the public services - especially in education (no more than 40 per cent of teachers joined the strike). In the main cities, there were mass demonstrations of tens of thousands of working people. The last general strike of this sort in Italy was in
1981.
LIVIO MAITAN
WO ELEMENTS helped to im-
T pel the leaderships of the three union confederations (CGIL,
CISL and the UIL) to take this initiative. On the one hand, the government showed that it had little inclination to make even minimal concessions in matters of economic policy (the so-called Finance
Law). The straw that broke the camel's back was the government's retreat on the proposed reduction of taxes on wages.
At the same time, the government had put forward a bill for regulating the right to strike, a measure designed to blunt this basic weapon of the workers. It was hard for the unions to accept such a decision, although there are divisions among them over it. The UIL is rather favorable to legal regulation, and the union leaders themselves have largely lined up with the government and the big bourgeois press in criticizing the rank-and-file committees
(COBAS) for the repeated strikes in transport. [See articles on pages 6 and 7]
Countering union leadership's passivity
On the other hand, the union leaders could not be unaware of the fact that broad sections of workers were determined not sit back and take the blows inflicted by the austerity policy of the government and the employers, and the attacks on the level of employment. Major struggles had resumed in industry (at Alfa Romeo, for example),
28 as well as in education and transport.
International Viewpoint • December 7, 1987
Since last spring, the phenomenon of the COBAS has taken form. These rank-and-file committees have taken the initiative in waging struggles of various kinds, contering the passivity of the union leaderships.
The union bureaucracies faced a clear danger of losing more ground and seeing their role decline. They could not accept the government ignoring their demands, and they could not resign themselves either to be more widely outflanked by the COBAS, or by individual unions or sections of the union movement that had slipped out of their control (as have the unions in the airports and air transport).
So, the leaderships set a demonstration for November 17 in Rome of pensioners and a general strike for November 25. The latter form of struggle has a tradition in the Italian trade-union movement. It is a form of mobilization that has at most very vague objectives. Most times, it involves always greatly exaggerated. (In Milan, for example, they talked about 70,000 people, while the real number was about a third of that). A test for rank-and-file committees
The reason for all this is obvious. The government and the bosses want the unions on their knees, but they have no interest in seeing the union bureaucracies outflanked by rank-and-file initiatives, and still less when they come from instruments of struggle more effective than the ossified union structures.