Economic ruin sparks mass
After these demonstrations, we saw more or less organized actions by the working class. The Executive Council of the CGTL, the confederation of the Lebanese unions, met and began to envisage the possibility of a general strike. A national conference was called for the end of the month. On its agenda were the collapse of the pound and the economic crisis in general. On September 22-23, demonstrations organized by the unions took place simultaneously in East and
The national conference at the end of
THE DISASTROUS SLIDE of the Lebanese economy has accelerated in recent months. A clear index of this is the plunge in the value of the local currency, in a country where most consumer goods are imported.
In response to this situation, mass riots broke out in
August, and in November the Lebanese General
Confederation of Labor called an unlimited general strike. For the first time, Lebanese working people united across confessional lines against the collapse of their standard of living.
Zafer, a representative of the Revolutionary
Communist Group (GCR), the Lebanese section of the
Fourth International, gave the following interview on these new developments to Ariane Merri in early
December.
OULD YOU describe how the
You have to go back a bit to understand what has happened. The start of
1986 was marked by a very major event — the battles in East Beirut for control of the
Lebanese Forces between the pro-Israeli
Samir Geajea and Hobeika. At the end of
1985, under Syrian auspices, signed a tripartite agreement with the
Shi'ites of Amal and Walid Jumblatt's
Druze to "solve the Lebanese problem."
This accord was favorable in every respect to the interests of the Syrian regime.
That is why the reactionary Christians the Phalange and the part of the Lebanese
Forces led by Samir Geagea, and we should include the pro-American president,
Amin Gemayel, with them - were all
On January 15, very violent battles in the
Christian redoubt brought a considerable reduction in the influence of Hobeika and also, by ricochet effect, in that of the Syrians. Assad's forces intervened massively in
Beirut in February 1987, while all the attempts to rebuild the relationship between
Amin Gemayel and Damascus failed. In early June 1987, the assassination of the premier, Rachid Karami, himself close to the Syrian regime, strained their relations still more.
It seems that from now on it will be very
10 difficult o cavisage are sumption of very-
International Viewpoint • December 21, 1987 tions between the president and the Syrians, all the more because, it has to be remembered, this is the last year of his term. In a few months, there will be new presidential elections. The government is totally paralyzed, and it is unquestionable that this paralysis has had a major influence on the economic problems. Such difficulties obviously have an autonomy from the political problems, but the governmental crisis is one of the causes, if not the only one, of the collapse of the Lebanese pound and of the acceleration of the economic crisis.
This eclipse of the currency is not a new thing. It started in the summer of 1984, but in recent months the depreciation of the national currency has accelerated to a dizzy rate. Today, the a dollar is worth 500 Lebanese pounds, and the process is not over. In 1984, a dollar was worth four pounds. It is not hard to imagine what consequences this has had for the Lebanese people. Until this summer, the popular masses did not respond to this constant depreciation. They
But at the end of August, people started to move. There were three spontaneous demonstrations in the streets of Beirut. A crowd smashed the shops of the money changers and more generally those of the rich merchants, whom the people accused, often rightly so, of speculating in commodities. Clashes occurred between the Syrian forces and the population, and dozens of demonstrators were arrested.
September 1987 decided to call an unlimited general strike for November 5. Several demands were put forward. The main one was for a sliding scale of wages. But there were also political demands, such as a call for the unification of Lebanon and the elimination of the confessional militias. The state was also called on to take control of the ports, which are now in the hands of the
Moreover, the teachers in both the public and private sectors decided on a general strike for October 20 in support of their own demands. Wages, of course, were an issue, but also firings in the private sector. This strike lasted until November 2, but the teachers made only very partial gains that in no way changed the wretched conditions
The general strike started on November 5, and extended to all sectors of wage earners in Lebanon. From the outset, pressures were exerted by the Lebanese bourgeoisie as a whole, without any distinction between the various religions. Syria is also experiencing a catastrophic economic situation, and the Syrian government feared that strikes and demonstrations might prove contagious. The mobilization lasted about five days, and ended with an enormous demonstration of more than 100,000 people coming from both sectors of the capital. Demonstrations took place also in every city of the country: in Tripoli, Sidon, Tyre and so on. But after the central demonstration, the CGTL Executive Council met and called for an end to the general strike.
Who dominates the Council The chair, Antoine Bechara, is close to the Phalange. But the Phalangists are by no means the only political force in the CGTL. You also find trade-unionists linked to the Lebanese Communist Party, the representatives of the National Federation of Blueand White-Collar Workers. The CP is not a negligible force in the working class, and a lot of people did not expect them to call for an end to the general strike. In fact, the party is the prisoner of its alliances, notably with Walid Jumblatt's Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), and more generally with the Syrian regime.
So, the strike ended without the government making the slightest commitment to take steps that might stem endless fall of the Lebanese pound and the constant decline in the buying power of wages, which
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LEBANON revolts
can no longer meet people's most elementary needs. • Has the depreciation of the pound been reflected in a galloping inflation? Definitely. You might even say that the price increases have exceeded the fall in the pound. This is a result of speculation, but also merchants anticipating a further drop in the currency. So, prices have continued to rise at a frantic rate. • Let's go back to the demonstration you talked about before. That was the first time we have seen masses of people surmounting the confessional divide - a massive rejection of the war. We have now reached a situation of real destitution for a very broad layer of the population. A lot of people can no longer get even a minimally adequate diet or afford medicine or doctors. A large proportion of the people are in that situation. There is certainly a new development, a coming together of people of different religions who now realize that everyone is in the same boat. But it needs to be stressed, and this is very important, that these people who are demonstrating, who are going on strike, have no leadership or organizations ready to pursue the fight to the end.
When the CGTL decided to call the strike, when it called on the population to strike, the people placed their confidence in it, after they had lost their confidence in the confessional political parties — even in the left parties, including the CP. But when you look at the way the general strike ended, you can understand why the people felt disillusioned. They had placed their confidence in the CGTL, which was not a party to the confessional warfare. But the leadership of this workers' organization showed that it also was in the pay of the Lebanese bourgeoisie. This does not mean that the people do not want to move again, or that there will not be other explosions of mass anger. It is difficult today to predict exactly how they will express their feelings. • Is there no structural reason why the state of the Lebanese economy should improve? None, quite the contrary. I think that the situation is going to get worse. There is no reason for the deterioration to stop. The mass movement has been largely spontaneous until now, and when the organizations intervened it was to go against the workers' interests. Likewise, on the political level, it can be said that there is no solution to the problems Lebanon has been experiencing.
The cleavage in the government can only widen between now and the presidential elections, and we can even expect a new flare-up of clashes among the various forces. In particular, when you consider that the anger of the masses represents a danger for the Lebanese bourgeoisie as a whole, the bourgeois forces have every reason to resort to more confessional battles to divert the outrage of the population and its refusal to tolerate the consequences of the crisis. From now until the elections, which may take place before next summer, things can evolve. This depends on relations between US imperialism and the Syrian regime. If there is an accord between them, we can expect to see a certain military lull. Otherwise, we can expect a new explosion.
It is hard today to make precise prognoses for the coming months. Lebanon is a coun try where the situation is very fluid and where foreign influences, both from other states in the region and from outside powers, are decisive. • What is the state of the "war of the camps"? Some months ago, the war between the Amal movement and the Palestinian camps was halted by the Syrian forces. But now it seems we are seeing a resumption of the fighting, although partially and feebly, in the Sidon region. It seems likely, however, that the Syrian region, which influences the Amal movement, does not want the fighting to become general, especially since nothing indicates that Amal would have the upper hand. The Assad government fears that such fighting would lead to Yassar Arafat's forces gaining wider intluence. Moreover, the Soviet Union's pressures on
LEBANON Syria to put an end to these battles might be mentioned. According to all appearances, the calm should continue. Of course, this also depends on a whole series of factors, such as the relations between the various Arab regimes, between the Syrian regime and the Gulf states, the evolution of the Iran-Iraq war and so on.
What is more, it is not always the Amal militias that have started the fighting in the camps. Sometimes it is Arafat trying to regain the upper hand, or simply resuming the fighting for eminently tactical reasons that have to do with the relations between the PLO and Syria and the regional context. • What role is Iran playing today? The Muslim fundamentalist currents, both Shi'ite and Sunni, have close relations with Iran. This is certainly true of the Hezbollah, the Shi'ite armed organization, which has a base in some regions, especially the Bekaa valley and the southern suburbs of Beirut. The Syrian regime is trying to weaken these currents, but so far there have not been any 1 large-scale military actions against the
Hezbollah or the other organizations
4 linked to Iran.
For nearly two months now, we have been hearing talk about an operation to bring Syrian soldiers into the southern suburbs of the capital. But it is difficult to predict what may happen. Too many factors enter in. Anything is possible, especially in such a crucial year as 1988. The elections will be very important for the coming years. All the parties in the game want these elections to serve their interests best. • What did the GCR do at the time of the mobilizations? You have to remember that we are a small group in the midst of a very difficult situation, Our influence, therefore, is limited. In the November 9 demonstration, we distributed several thousand leaflets, which were also signed by another far-left group, the Organization of Revolutionary Socialists (OSR). We put forward a certain number of demands, such as a sliding scale of wages and nationalization of the banks and foreign trade. • What are your perspectives for the coming year? We are presently considering ways of intervening in the economic crisis. We are engaged in discussions with the OSR to try to arrive at common work, which, by unifying our forces, will enable us to have more of 11 an effect on the situation. * December 21, 1987 • International Viewpoint
Imperialism and the
A FORMIDABLE imperialist armada is cruising the
Arab-Persian Gulf and adjacent waters in a show of naval coordination on a scale unequalled since the last
This is an array of almost 60 ships belonging to the US,
French, British and Italian fleets, to say nothing of
Belgian and Dutch mine sweepers. It includes three aircraft carriers. This concentration is also being indirectly reinforced by West German ships deployed in the Mediterranean to replace units of the US Sixth Fleet assigned to the intervention force.'