Jaruzelski's referendum d raises new challenges for opposition
"NORMALIZATION" suffered a major setback in Poland at the end of November with the unexpected defeat of the plebiscite that the generals engineered to gain a façade of popular approval for their projected market-type economic reform.
POLAND open letter to Lech Walesa, 22 historic leaders of Solidarnosc demanded a meeting of the union's statutory leadership. They criticized the multiplicity of ad-hoc structures set up over the preceding year. At the same time,
The government's defeat in the referendum was also a shock for the leadership of Solidarnosc, which itself proposes market-type reforms. (See /V 132, December 21, 1987.) It posed a new and major challenge to the different currents that have been forming in Solidarnosc.
A
FTER THE release of almost all the political prisoners in
September 1986 and the decision of a section of the leaders of Solidarnosc to set up a public leadership of the union, divisions came out into the open in the various leading teams of the movement. First of all, in autumn 1986 the differences crystallized around the tactical question of whether or not it was opportune to set up a leadership body functioning openly.
However, since the spring of 1987, it appeared that the main political line of cleavage was political. Should Solidarnosc concentrate on trade-union work in the plants? Or should it rather give priority to developing the structures of the "independent society" (press, book publishing, cultural activities), with trade-union activity becoming one of its main concerns, among others?
It was in such terms that the debate was posed, notably by the Warsaw
Solidarnosc leaders. For their part, they came out in favor of the second orientation, which they had been following for some years in their region. In contraposition to them, a current giving priority to trade-union activity in the plants and opting for a greater centralization of the work of Solidarnosc appeared in particular within the Wroclaw and Szczecin regional leaderships.
(See IV 125, September 14, 1987.)
In the context of this debate, another major political difference has appeared. Could the reforms that General
Jaruzelski's regime undertook assist the independent social movement?
Could it base itself on certain aspects
14 of them and radicalize their contents
International Viewpoint • January 25, 1988
Or should it reject them as a new attempt to increase the exploitation of the workers? And, in the latter case, should it build the working-class mobilizations that the introduction of these reforms would necessarily generate?
Convinced that only the establishment of a free market could make it possible to combat the economic crisis effectively, the majority of Solidarnosc leaders —and in particular the better known Warsaw leaders - opted for the first solution. Jacek Kuron wrote the following, for example, about the reforms announced by the regime:
"The struggle does not end in publications, in parliament or in the apparatus. They all want to save their power, but some are coming out for repression, and others for rationalization. The latter are the strongest, because Gorbachev's conception is to save communism through rationalization. The development of enclaves of efficiency impels into confrontation the managers of the productive enterprises, the secretaries of departmental committees and those apparatchniks who have the souls of organizers. If it becomes pos sible to wrest the economy from the control of the nomenklatura, then whatever the regime's intentions, we will be living in another system." (Tygodnik Mazowsze 219, September 2, 1987.)
Such an approach, which led to neglecting the immediate struggles in the plants, as well as to abandoning the values of equality and self-management that were the cornerstones of Solidarnos's identity during the Polish revolutionary upsurge of 1980-81, was challenged by many union activists. On September 22, in an they pointed out that the manifest lack of attention paid to social ques tions was leading to a loss of the union's identity. Other activists considered that it was be coming urgent to offer working people their own political representation, and undertook to form the
Polish
Socialist
Party
(PPS).
In the meantime, in
October the mut tiplicity of leading centers in Solidarnosc was reduced.
In place of the
Temporary Coordinating Com mittee (the clandestine TKK) and the Temporary
Council of
Solidarnosc
(the public
TRS, formed in October
1986), a united structure was established. It was the National Executive Committee (KKW), presided by over
Lech Walesa.
This was
"If we continue in the framework of the system, the breakdown will be feat done without calling a session of the statutory National
Commission, and none of the 22 leaders who called for it was included in the KKW.
The debates that continue to run through the Polish independent social movement are far from closed today, and the differences that are sketched above are the main lines of the currents that are crystallizing within it.
In the aftermath of the referendum vote, Cyril Smuga conducted telephone interviews with three Solidarnosc leaders, who had distinctive points of view on the meaning of the referendum results for the political and social situation in Poland, as well as for Solidarnosc's strategy and perspectives. Jan Litynski's opinions reflect those of the present leading circles of the union. Andrzej Gwiazda is one of the signatories of the letter of the 22. Jozef
Pinior is vice-chair of the new Polish Socialist Party
(PPS).
It should be noted that the Polish opposition has, to a certain extent, a language of Its own. For example, It habitually counterposes "the society," meaning the masses, or regime, to meaning tor ruling meaning bureaucratic caste. *
CS
JAN LITYNSKI took part in organizing help for Ursus and Radom strikers who fell victim to repression in 1976. He worked with the Workers' Defence Committee (KOR), joining in 1977. He then founded the journal Robotnik, the first opposition bulletin intended for workers. In 1980, he became a Solidarosc expert.
Arrested on December 13, 1981, he escaped and went underground. A member of the Warsaw Regional Executive Commission, he is a close collaborator of Jacek Kuron and Zbigniew Bujak.
W HAT can you say about the
results of the referendum? Obviously, they were a surprise for everyone, because even if you take as good coin the official explanation given by the authorities, you don't hold such a referendum in order to lose it. But the results were unambiguous.
The government lost. You might wonder why they didn't fake the results in order to be able to announce that they had an absolute majority of positive responses. I think that they were so certain of winning that
POLAND total"
Interview with Jan
Litynski they were not prepared for falsifying the returns. Maybe, and that is giving them the benefit of the doubt, they didn't want to falsify the results — but that doesn't seem to me to be very likely.
The outcome seems clear as regards the general assessment of the situation. Whatever the government does, whatever kind of propaganda it engages in, it does not have the confidence of the society. This is all the more so because the campaign conducted before the referendum testified to a lack of respect for the society. The questions were not clear. And even though they announced that they would clarify the meaning of the questions, they did not do so.
Today, it has become evident that the authorities engaged in a form of blackmail. "You'll get reforms, maybe you'll get a better life, there may even be some political changes. But to get that, you'll have to accept a big price rise." What seems to me to have been the big success in the referendum was that the society refused to grant such confidence. And in my opinion a lot of those who voted "yes" in the referendum did so only because they are convinced any reforms will have to come from this government.
On the other hand, a lot of those who voted "no," or who abstained, and in that case those who did so in response to Solidarnosc's appeal, were also convinced of the need for reforms, but thought that this gore 15 ernment was incapable of carrying out the January 25, 1988 • International Viewpoint
POLAND reforms that it proposed. In my opinion, this was a signal for the government. Without real reforms today, the situation cannot improve. As regards Solidarnosc, the result shows first of all that its decision to ignore this referendum was proved to be correct.
Secondly, the result shows that there is a possibility for overcoming the social apathy that has prevailed for rather a long time in our country if Solidarnose shows that it is able to stimulate the potential for social activity indicated by the referendum results, that we can expect quite significant changes, over which the society will have
• But in calling for ignoring the referendum, in its first appeal at least the
National Executive Commission of Solidarnosc (KKW) did not mention the question of the price rise. You say that today there is a possibility for remobilizing society. Around what axes can this be done, and what place should be reserved in this for the workers' materi-
I think that that is not the only axis, although material demands are indispensable. What is more, since 1982, it has become apparent that the spontaneous resistance to the price rises and the struggles that developed spontaneously for wage increases have been useful, because they have prevented the government from getting a surplus at the expense of the society alone. All this resistance, this wage fight, has been a struggle for reforms, because it has forced the regime to undertake structural reforms. I think that that was something very valuable. On the other hand, today, while such resistance is necessary, it is not
Today, we need social activity in a lot of different areas at once. First of all, there is the problem of self-management at the enterprise level. The councils are functioning in one way or another but they should increase their activity. There is the fundamental problem for Solidarnosc of finding ways to rebuild the union - a process that is beginning through the creation of Solidarnosc organizing committees in the enterprises. There is the question of democratic self-management at the local govern-
If reform gets off the ground, its fate will be decided on the local level. The present structures, the various cliques, or even mafias, have to be dismantled. They serve as a straitjacket because of the ties that exist between the administration, the nomenklatura and even a section of the private entrepreneurs. If all this can be destroyed, to the benefit of local self-management, normally functioning industries and cooperatives, as well as private economic activity, then the reform will be successful. The success of the reform, therefore, will be determined on two levels. The first is the dismantling of the nomenklatura and the cliques in the 16 • stronger industries. The second, perhaps more important, is the local level. International Viewpoint • January 25, 1988
• Don't you think that the essential question is that of the central
It is obvious that it is the system that is in question. But this system is evolving under social pressure. What is at stake is getting the central power to give up control of economic and social life. In order for it to do that, appropriate pressure will be necessary, because it functions in such a way that its natural tendency is to fill up all the gaps in social life. On the contrary, the society must penetrate into all the breaches that open up. I do not see today any possibility of solving this problem centrally, in the sense of the system being transformed overnight into something else. This can only be a process advancing as the system
• When you talk about economic reform, are you thinking about a market reform?
Yes, of course.
• But don't you think that the society's response to the referendum has been a rejection, if not of the market reform project, at least of the social cost involved in introducing such a reform, no matter in what form and regardless of who carries it out?
I think that it is incorrect reasoning to say that the reform involves social costs. Maybe that is so, I don't know. Social costs do not flow from the reform but from the debits piled up by the totalitarian economic, social and political system that has dominated our country. We have to accept these costs. We are in a situation where the standard of living is going to
The question is whether, with this declining standard of living, we can carry out reform. The question is therefore not whether we want a market reform or non-market reform, but only —and that is much more essential - who should make the sacrifices. If there is no activity and organization by the society, then it will be the weaker social groups that will bear the weight of the sacrifices. If we manage to force the acceptance of independent unions and local self-management, then there is a chance that the costs will be borne by those who have caused them, that is the apparatus and its
The fundamental problem, which no one has yet raised, is that of the military complex, of the administration, the army and the police. In the present situation, if Gorbachev's policy is really aimed at reducing the arms race, then that should have a real effect in Poland by leading to a reduction in production for the army, in the costs of administration and in the military and repres sive apparatus. That is where the reserves have to be found that can make it possible to distribute the costs more equitably. • In 1980, at the time of the struggles that culminated in the founding of Solldarnosc, one of the demands put forward was rationing around the argument that everyone has the same kind of stomach. But the market method, on the other hand, leads to distribution on the basis of money, and so in this context the less well-placed groups naturally pay the costs of this option.
Yes. That is why mechanisms must be introduced that will guarantee a certain minimum for the more disadvantaged groups.
But such mechanisms can only be introduced on condition that Solidarnosc and other real unions can exist legally.
I do not see any other way to develop the country than the one that involves the market, or in other words the one that leads to capitalizing actually existing socialism.
This does not mean that social forces that will take up the defence of the weak groups should not exist in this process. On the other hand, the road of rationing leads to strengthening the central apparatus and creating a group of people with an interest in perpetuating the system.
• In 1981, Solidarnosc demanded social monitoring of rationing. Don't you think that that could be an alternative solution?
I don't think so. The rationing system involves the existence of a developed bureaucratic apparatus, and it is no solution to set up an apparatus for social inspection standing above the society, one that will naturally tend to degenerate. In that way we would have apparatuses that in monitoring each other would paralyze social life. I am, of course, in favor of social inspection, but this must be done through democratic mechanisms, whether of a parliamentary or market type, and through various social groups. This applies, for example, to the question of the environment, where pressure and social monitoring are necessary. • In what way can Solidarnosc exert its influence today with a view to getting such changes?
First of all, Solidarnosc organizing committees must be formed in the factories. If we don't achieve this, we will get nowhere. Even if it was not inevitable, today one can see clearly that the regime on its own will not authorize trade-union pluralism. Rather strong pressure will be necessary.
There are today in our ranks two conceptions of these Solidarnosc factory committees. One is that it is enough to form these committees and expect that when they are numerous enough they will force acceptance of Solidarnosc. The other, toward which I incline much more, is that the committees should be established, go through a stage of organization and begin immediately to act. This would be an indirect way of continuing the work that Solidarosc did in
However, today this is no longer enough. For years we have called for giving Solidarnosc a chance to exist at plant level in the framework of reform. But this is no longer
adequate. We have to take up organizational activity at a higher level than that of the plants. And I don't think we can afford to be slow about undertaking this. For some time, we have been seeing a tendency to abandon clandestine activity, which at present seems quite pointless, in favor of open activity. • In 1981 you wrote an article arguing that the time had come to begin to divide. In Solidarnosc today, differences are appearing more and more clearly, including at the central level. I am referring here to the letter of the 22 Solidarnosc leaders to Lech Walesa.
I am for expressing differences, if they are around real tendencies, different programs, and not differences over the question of who is or is not in the leadership. It seems to me that the letter of the 22 was an error. Today, calling a National Commission would serve no purpose. Solidarnosc is what it is. That is, it is weaker but continues to exist in the framework of certain structures. It is in this framework that it has to start to act, and that has to be done with the support of other people who also want to act in Solidarnosc. This is not the time to question whether what is needed is National Commission or the KKW. The KKW was set up. I think that it was an organizational step forward, because it eliminated the quite artificial and harmful division that existed between a clandestine and a public part of the leadership.
The KKW is the only possible leadership today. It emerged in a natural way, although its composition is partially the result of chance, since it is made up of people who headed clandestine structures in their regions, or who had a great authority there. In such a situation, to raise the question of convoking the National Commission instead of acting in collaboration with the KKW seems to me to be an error. I say this even though I know that a number of the signatories of the letter of the 22 are active leaders in their regions and that they do • But the signatories of the letter of the 22 are not just demanding the convoking of the National Commission of Solidarnosc. They are are criticizing the weakening of Solidamosc's trade-union character, its lack of concern for defending the standing of living and other material interests of the workers.
I agree with the criticism that Solidarnosc is not paying enough attention to material questions. That is correct. But you have to take into consideration the fact that until now, most of Solidarnosc's documents have gone unnoticed because such documents have to be coupled with a certain level of activity. What purpose would a
Solidarnosc report on working conditions in the plants have, if there were no possibility for struggles to improve these conditions? In fact, people prefer to work in bad conditions and earn more money.
I think that for a union the problem of working conditions is fundamental but should be put in a more general context, that of a movement. And today we do not have any chance to create that. While it is true that various leading bodies in Solidarnosc are neglecting a number of social questions and this is a mistake, this error stems from the general situation and not any bad will. There is no point in issuing yet another appeal. We might have acted not through appeals, but as Zbigniew Rosa zewski proposes, for example, by organizing massive leaflet distributions on working conditions in the Silesian mines or in the Lodz textile plants. We probably did not have the means to do it, and this was an • With respect to the Solidarnosc leadership itself, you mentioned differences that emerged around the question of clandestine or public activity. This difference seems to me today to be a thing of the past. But I have the impres sion that another, deeper one has emerged. It might be described schematically as a counterposition between those who stress the question of a market reform and are therefore prepared to envisage the workers making certain material sacrifices, and those who stress the fight against austerity at the plant level. The second option appeared, for example, in an article by Henryk Wujec and Maciej Jankowski and in some positions defended in the magazine Robotnik.
As regards the document — a very good one in my opinion — by Wujec and Jankowski, it presents the position of Solidarnosc. It has not, unfortunately, had the impact that it should have. That is, it has not helped to get things moving in the plants. This document is not at all in conflict with the reform. In Solidarnosc's view, it is necessary to organize actions for immediate demands in the plants in order to defend living standards, and it is necessary to carry out the reform. These are two
In other words, introducing the reform is inseparable from the struggle for what is involved in the reform, and on this terrain various social groups are going to act in order to defend their interests. This may slow the tempo of the reform, but it will be useful. In fact, what the government proposes is some kind of economic jungle, free enterprise à la Milton Friedman, and Solidarnosc must, of course, defend itself against that. But an economic jungle is one thing, and a market system is another.
On the other hand, it is possible that Robotnik's position is based on another point of view, that is the conviction that a market economic reform means lowering the standard of living of the workers. I do not agree with such an analysis. I think that it is necessary to make normal economic decisions, and that the question of how everyone has to defend themselves is sec-
POLAND ondary. In other words, in the framework of the present system we have nothing to defend because we are living in a country that is not only in an economic crisis but in a state of economic breakdown. What is at stake is ending this breakdown.
It is obvious that through material demands alone and maintaining the existing structure out of ideological attachment to such a structure we will get nowhere. On the other hand, I think that the economic reform would make it easier to defend the standard of living, because it would lead to an economic redeployment, there would be more goods in the stores, and it would be easier to defend the standard of living. • If I understand your point of view, you think that the introduction of the market would mean that more goods would be produced?
Yes, I think that the development of the mechanism of the market, of private enterprise, of cooperatives, of local industry and self-management are the only way today to increase the supply of goods. It is clear that the present system, by its very nature, treats consumption only as a necessary evil. • In the framework of the present system, private enterprises can seem more efficient because they operate in areas neglected by big industry. But it is equally true, I think, that if the Polish market were opened up to international trade, that could lead to a deIndustrialization of the country. The productivity of Polish industry is in fact far inferior to that of the developed countries, and it would not stand up against international competition.