Political landscape begins to change
WEST GERMANY • BELGIUM sight, we will fight for the livelihood we have today. Naturally, we also want to see new industries come in and new jobs with them. We have already developed programs for this. Training programs for our fellow workers that would enable them to learn other after government's trades so as to bring about a certain structural change in the region. But all of this was wiped out by the factory closure plan.
• It is said that too much steel is being produced in the world, that there are enormous surplus capacities.
That is a very interesting question, which
FOR THE FIRST TIME in Western Europe, a monetarist we have also discussed. As regards,
"surplus capacities," my thinking is as follows:
government has fallen. In Belgium, the Martens-Gol
We make a product here that we are proud government was forced to resign in the wake of parliamentary of, rails for trains and also for trams. We elections in mid-December provoked by an apparently petty think that there is a great social need for this product, not only in the countries of the linguistic border dispute between Walloons and Flemings.
third world, but also in neighboring East
The following article explains that something much more
Germany.
The problem does not lie in any lack of important was behind the governmental crisis than that. It demand, but in the lack of ability to pay. It describes the very complex new political stage opened by the would be much more reasonable if the fedgains of the left and deep-going erosion of the capitalist eral or state governments offered these countries interest-free credit so that they could build up a rail network and a public local transport system. In this way, among other things, an outlet for our products could be assured within the framework of a sensible interational division of labor.
• In any case, in steel the "free market"
is a myth. What is your attitude to the need for nationalization?
This demand has long been in the basic program of the DGB [the German Confederation of Unions] and in the statutes of IG
Metall. Since 1983, it has been brought up to date by the shop stewards in the whole industry. Since 1985, IG Metall has had a program for steel that calls for nationalizing the whole industry, including the prof-
The struggle has to be waged, in the last analysis, with this perspective. The precondition for success is, of course, a decisive change in the political relationship of forces in West Germany as a whole.
• What do you plan for the near future?
We have taken advantage of the holiday period to discuss and prepare the actions for January and February. It is quite clear that we have to put on more pressure. Our strategy is aimed at bringing the workforces of other steelworks more into the movement, especially our fellow workers in
Mannesmann-Huckingen, who are already involved in the cooperation plan [see preceding article]. We want to bring in our fellow workers at Thyssen and at Krupp Steel in Bochum.
We want also to try to get IG Metall to take advantage of ongoing wage negotiations in steel to put on more pressure industry-wide. We want to put forward demands that can offer all the workforces in all the steel complexes a common perspective. *
International Viewpoint • February 8, 1988 parties. FRANÇOIS VERCAMMEN
A DOUBLE paradox emerged
from the December 13, 1987, parliamentary elections. The bourgeois parties of the outgoing Christian Democratic and Liberal coalition kept their majority in parliament. But they are politically unable to continue to govern without the Socialist Parties [the parties have both Walloon and Flemish sections], who were the victors in the election. On the other hand, while the bourgeois parties lost the elections, the workers' movement is far from having won as regards any immediate possibility for reversing the austerity
Belgium is entering a grave political and govermental crisis in which the reformist leaders of the social-democratic and Christan workers movement will try to come to an agreement. Within the workers' movement, the strategic debate around the ques-
"what is to be done about the crisis?" is more to the fore than ever.
A new political situation is gradually taking shape, against a background of persistent class polarization (the result of ten years of active working-class resistance to the crisis) and of a new international recession. Moreover, with the perspective of a single European market, the new phase of social and political life can be expected to be distinctly more turbulent, spasmodic and political in character.
To start with, let us look at the raw election figures (see Table 1). The "political families" in the government declined slightly in vote percentages.! The Social Christians (PSC/CVP) lost 1%; the Liberals (PRL/PVV) remained stationary. In the Chamber of Deputies, they retain a slender majority, 109 seats out of 212. Theoretically, a Liberal-Christian Democrat coalition remains possible. A political will to continue was displayed clearly throughout the election campaign.
### Bosses support
Thatcher-type policies
In order to relegate the Socialist parties to opposition for another legislative term of four years, a fiscal reform was announced with a demagogic fanfare and an obvious vote-catching intent. Belgian politics was thus coming into line with Thatcherism. This orientation had the avowed support of the bosses. Before, during and after the elections they openly proclaimed their position, which is something rather unusual in Belgium.
What is more, mathematically, the outgoing coalition could possibly count on the 16 Flemish Volksunie deputies coming to their aid. This party has transformed itself from a petty-bourgeois nationalist into a respectable party by separating from its fascist wing, which has become the Vlaams Blok 1. Since the traditional parties split on a linguisticnational basis, the term "political family" is often used to describe the "old" parties. There are thus three political families: the Socialists (PS/SP); the Liberals (free enterprisers, PRL/PVV); and the Social Christians (PSC/CVP). They run single slates in their own "regions," that is in Flanders and the Walloon country. On the other hand, they all run slates in the "Brussels region."
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defeat
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Table 1: Election results 1946-1987 (% of votes).
1946 1949 1950 1954 1958 1961 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1978 1981 1985 1987
BELGIUM
PSC/CVP 43 44 48 41
PS/SP 32 30 35 37
PRL/PVV 15 11 12
RW/FDF
Volksunie
Communist Party 13 8 4
Ecolo-Agalev
WALLONIA
Socialists 37 39 45 48
Social Christians 26 31 33 30
Rass. Wallon
Liberals 9 15 12 12
Communist Party 22 13 7
Ecolo
FLANDERS
Social Christians 56 54 60 52
Socialists 27 24 26 29
Liberals 13 9 11
Volksunie
Ecolo-Agalev
BRUSSELS (19 communes)
FDF
Social Christians 30 31 35 25
Socialists 35 30 45
Liberals 13 25 19
Ecolo-Agalev . [Flemish Bloc]. But the bourgeoisie would take a very great risk in trying once again to govern against the opposition of the Socialist workers' movement. In that case, the Socialists would be in opposition for 11 years, from 1981 to 1992. Therefore, the return of the Socialist parties to the government, either with the Christian Democratic family or in a "tripartite" national union, seems inevitable. In order to understand this situation, you have to look beyond the raw figures and national averages.
Belgian big capital has two reasons to ponder what orientation to follow, even aside from the persistent strength of the workers' movement. Its political project is disintegrating. The CVP has plunged into a deep crisis. The bourgeoisie's political instruments for controlling the working people and the youth are faltering, especially in Flanders. Of the four political parties directly on its payroll, only the Flemish free enterprise party, the PVV, came out of the elections in good shape. It increased its vote from 17% to 19%, taking about a third of the votes lost by the other bourgeois par-
However, the other three traditional bourgeois parties, the French-speaking Liberals (the PRL) and the two Christian Democratic parties, the PSC and the CVP lost ground. The PSC stagnated, and even lost one seat. It was this party that, under the pressure of its wing linked to the Christian Workers' Movement (MOC) brought the government down, using the Fourons incident as a pretext.2 It is true that this maneuver undoubtedly enabled it to cut its losses.
With 31%, the CVP registered its lowest score ever. It has gone into a deep political crisis, which at the same time is striking at the heart of the Belgian bourgeoisie's system of political domination. Since the "his-
47 42 34 32 30 32 36 36 36 37 28 28 27 27 27 25 11 12 22 21 16 15
2 6 11 11 2 10 11 10 10
3 3 47 47 36 35 35 37 39 37 34 30 23 20 20 22 25 27
21 10 10 15 11 12 26 27 17 17
10 7 6 6 57 51 44 39 38 40 44 44 28 30 25 26 25 23 22 21 10 12 17 6 17 14 17
12 17 19 17 16 12 10 19 40 35 35 34 28 20 28 23 24 24 43 42 26 20 21 21 17 17 17 18 33 26 14 12 11 toric tum" of 1894, this system has rested on a simple mechanism but one deeply anchored in the reality of the society.
The pivot of this system is the Christian Democratic Party. This is an inter-class bourgeois party. It openly embraced - and in Flanders this structure persists — the organized social classes (the Christian Workers' Movement, the middle classes, farmers' associations, the bosses), which send representatives to the party's local committees. These classes wage a political struggle within the party at every election (from this standpoint the municipal elections are still more important than the parliamentary ones!) to increase their respective weights — always in the name of "the general interest" and against "class struggle"!
Historical decline of main bourgeois parties
The Christian Democratic Party is not an electoralist collection of notables, but has a very dense network of powerful social organizations (unions, mutual aid societies, schools, hospitals, churches and their parallel social structures). The PSC has remained perpetually in government, allying itself successively with the Liberal (freeenterprise) Party or the Social Democratic
Party, and in exceptional cases taking part in tripartite national unity cabinets with both. On the social front, it has been able to drive a deep wedge into the workers'
The Christian union confederation, the
CSC, which is part of the MOC, includes slightly more than half of organized workers (1.2 million, as against 1.1 million in the Socialist union, the FGTB, out of 3.3
BELGIUM million wage earners). Even though the CSC is organizationally inde26 29 28 pendent from the CVP, 25 28 31 its leadership and cadres 21 21 21 have been historically,
4 1 10 8 8 and in the case of the
1 1 generation now leaving 7 the scene, personally and ideologically very much attached to the CVP/ 36 39 44
PSC. 20 23 23
6 0.5 0.6 The irreversible de22 24 22 cline of the CVP is un-
2 dermining this system of 6 domination. In fact, it can only continue to 32 35 31 function on two condi21 24 24 tions. First, the CVP's 21 17 19 near political monopoly 16 13 13 has to continue. In order 7 to satisfy the appetites of the party's very broad 23 11 11 clientele, it needs an al16 17 17 most continual hold on 16 20 26 23 34 31 the state apparatus. Sec-
3 ondly, "balanced" class collaboration within the party has to satisfy all the groups concerned. The drop in the party's vote from 60% in 1950 to 31% in 1987 shows that it is becoming increasingly difficult to meet both of these conditions.
Socialists make big gains in Wallonia
What is more, deputies openly linked to the Christian Workers' Movement are now in a majority in the party. Representing
35% in 1946, they have come to represent more than 50% in 1987. The more the CVP weakens, the more the MOC is gaining influence within it, and the less the party is able to remain the foundation of the Belgian system of class collaboration.
In a broader political perspective, the
Belgian bourgeoisie has good reason to be worried by the CVP's decline. First of all, the CVP's virtual political monopoly in
Flanders has always been an essential counterweight to the "threat" of a "red"
Walloon country. Moreover, while the
CVP is declining, the PS [the Frenchspeaking Socialist Party] is making spectacular gains. Having got 44% in the 1987 elections, it is now on the verge of an absolute majority of the Walloon seats. There is a very clear "left majority" in the region, if you add up the votes of the PS, the greens,
2. Fourons is a group of villages transferred administratively in 1962 from the Walloon country to Flanders in a typical Belgian "trade-off". The population voted by a two-thirds majority for restoring the area to Liège, a Walloon city. The mayor, Happart, understandably refuses to speak Flemish, which arouses Flemish national feelings. That is also understandable, because the area is supposed to be part of Flanders. In fact, underlying this whole tug-of-war is the national problem and the inability of the bourgeoisie to undertake the great
A ederatie reform of reorganizing the Belgian state on g
a federal basis.
February 8, 1988 • International Viewpoint
BELGIUM the Communist Party, the Socialist Workers' Party (POS/SAP — Belgian section of the Fourth International), and the Belgian Workers' Party [(PTB/PvdA - Maoists).
Secondly, the CVP's electoral losses, which undermine its ability to dominate Flemish society and, through the national state apparatus, Belgian society as a whole, also reflect a loss of social control over the Christian workers' movement and the "Catholic" youth, which have been in ferment since 1965.
A clear victory for the
Socialist Parties
Finally, all this comes at a time when the political project undertaken by the bourgeoisie in 1980-81 has been upset by universal suffrage. The bourgeoisie had taken a real turn in seeking to exclude the Socialists' parties from the national government (and from the Walloon and Flemish "governments") for a whole period in order to reduce the considerable weight of the organized workers' movement (both in the political and trade-union spheres) in society. Unable now to continue "the line" of 198187, it cannot make a simple about-face back to the class collaboration of the
Fortunately for big capital, the social democratic and Christian democratic reformist leaders have again offered themselves as its best servants. The Socialist parties have just won a clear electoral victory. Throughout the country, creased their vote by 3%, and (as in 1936) they have become the leading "political family" in the country. This observation has, however, to be qualified, because the workers' movement has not regained the 40% and more that it got in the elections of 1925, 1932, 1946 (45%) and 1961 (after
In the Walloon country, the PS won back the support it lost after 1965, regaining the votes of the left "Walloonists". Once again, it has emerged as the dominant force. The Flemish SP regained a certain vigor, but it was blocked by the greens (Agalev: 7%) and the revolutionary left (very much in a minority, but highly visible).
However, the PS/SP's election victory came at an awkward time, since it followed yet another defeat of a major working-class upsurge in May 1986, which almost led to an all-out general strike. The social-democratic leaders — who did everything possible first to break the momentum toward a general strike and then to anesthetize the workers' combativity — managed to gather the fruits of an undeniable and persistent socio-political polarization between the social classes, but in a period of downturn in social struggle.
Nonetheless, the working class, which was blocked but not beaten, is continuing to show its opposition to the austerity policy. Direct evidence of this is the vote for the PS/SP. Indirect evidence is the fall of the Martens-Gol government, which led to the snap election of December 1987. This was precipitated by the working-class wing of the Christian parties in the government. Fearing a dismantling of social security for the sake of a pro-bourgeois fiscal reform, the MOC used the Fourons affair to prepare the way for a shift of governmental
Moreover, it is no accident that for the first time in ten years the government that comes into office will find on its table a common memorandum from the FGTB and the CSC. This declaration does not, any more than the PS/SP election programs and the MOC candidates on the CVP/PSC slates, go outside the framework of the austerity policy. But it still formulates demands that the bourgeoisie has just resoundingly rejected. Unless some unexpected development upsets things, we cannot expect this election "victory" and this increased pressure from the joint trade-union front to bring about a rapid revival of cross-sectoral social struggles.
The workers' parties to the left of social democracy (the Communist Party, the POS/ SAP, and the Mao-Stalinists of the PTB/ PvdA) did not manage to capture a significant part of the working people's discontent. The notion of "making your vote count" in order to "finally" get rid of Martens-Gol once again led a whole layer of workers to vote for the PS/SP. This was the case even though — as we saw clearly in our campaign — distrust of the PS/SP was deep and widespread even before its return
Together, the Communist Party, the Socialist Workers' Party, the Labour Party of Belgium (PTB) got 197,134 votes in 1981. In 1987, they fell to 127,678 votes, or 2% (see Table 2). But this figure has to be properly interpreted.
Dramatic drop in Communist Party vote
First of all, there was the green vote, which in large part was a vote to the left of the social democracy and the Christian democracy, even if these parties (Agalev and Ecolo) cannot be considered an integral part of the organized workers' movement. The greens got 7.1% (+0.9%). Secondly, the decline of what is seen as the far left in Belgium is entirely owing to the dramatic drop in the Communist Party's vote. From 151,500 in 1977, it fell to 52,000 in 1987. With its 75,675 votes, the revolutionary left for the first time has outdistanced the CP!
Even though all this remains a marginal electoral phenomenon at the national level, this ceases to be true when you take a look at those cantons [the basic election district, often corresponding to a city and its suburbs] where there is a strong concentration of urban workers. For example, in Antwerp, where the social democracy is the
Table 2: Results of POS/SAP, PTB, PCB
1981-1987
1987
POS/SAP
30513
Total
Flanders
15830
Wallonia
10923
Brussels
3760
PTB
Total
45162
Flanders
34389
Wallonia
8448
Brussels
2325
PCB
Total
52003
Flanders
14621
Wallonia
10
30572
International Viewpoint • February 8, 1988
1985 1981 14003 12352 8233 7110 4731 3717 1039 1525 45685 45804 36457 40446 7574 2955 1654 2403 71703 138978 16173 42265 46910 80040 leading force with 27.3% of the vote, the "left of the left" (Ecolo, CP, POS/SAP, PTB/PvdA) got 14.3% — a total amounting to more than 50% of the social democratic vote. In a whole series of cantons, the PTB/ PvdA and the POS/SAP got more than 1.5% of the vote and sometimes more than
In fact, there is a lag in the electoral expression of the weight that the revolutionary left wields in society at large and in the workers' movement. This weight can be seen for sure in struggles, but also in certain phenomena of recomposition in the organized workers' movement. Militant trade-unionists (including many revolutionary activists) got the support of their fellow workers in the April 1987 social elections.3 They are increasingly breaking through into leaderships of factory locals and into 3. These social elections are held every four years over a three week period. The workers in the private sector elect their delegates to the factory councils and to the health and safety committees.
PRENDRE
ARGENT
LÀ OÙ IL EST the national union executives.
Another phenomena fits into this framework - the POS/SAP's breakthrough in the media and its spectacular election gains. With nearly 31,000 votes, we doubled our score, gaining in every single electoral district. The POS/SAP has become the second party of the far left in the Walloon country and in Brussels (behind the CP in both cas-
CHEZ LES BANQUIERS ET LES PATRONS! es, but ahead of the PTB/PvdA); and in Flanders (ahead of the CP, but after the PTB/PvdA). The CP's decline, the PTB/ PvdA's stagnation and the POS/SAP's gains have upset the relationship of forces to the "left of the left."
The bourgeois press (Le Soir, La Libre Belgique, De Standaard) did not fail to take note of the "POS/SAP phenomenon." Now, the chance for the far left breaking through into parliament is necessarily linked to unity between the POS/SAP, PTB and CP — something that we have been fighting for for years. The shock that the PTB and CP have just suffered, each in its own way, has provoked some initial movement. The CP, which is at its historic low-
Three currents have appeared. The first is impelled by trade-union officials (both Stalinists and Euro-communists). They are arguing for going back into the social democracy, especially in the Walloon country. The second is the ultra Eurocommunist current (which is in the majority in Brussels). It is preparing to submerge itself into a movement with the greens. And the third is a current that is in the majority in Flanders, which seems to be orienting toward unity with the POS/SAP and the PTB/PvdA. The PTB/PvdA, for its part, has just lined up behind Gorbachev, and is trying for a rapprochement with the CP. At the same time, it has launched a violent campaign against Trotskyism and the
A breakthrough for the
POS/SAP
However, the demand for unity is very strong in the politicized vanguard, and this sentiment exists at a time when local and European elections are coming up in October 1988 and June 1989 respectively.
The POS/SAP is approaching this new stage with an increased political and organizational energy. Above all, the gain we made from our election campaign was a breakthrough in the media, in broad public opinion, which took note of the existence of what it saw as a "new" socialist party. We were number one on the lists, which drew the attention of a broad public to us. So, our political message, which we improved over our previous election campaigns, aroused interest and made a significant impact.
Over the last ten years, the POS/SAP has undergone a major political and organizational change. By shifting the center of gravity of our base toward the big private
POS
and public enterprises, by waging political battles in the trade-union movement, by intervening with our political line in the successive social upsurges since 1977, the POS/SAP learned how to accompany the working-class and youth vanguard that emerged from these struggles toward achieving an overall political perspective based on a working-class united front.
This broad political and social agitation was systematically projected into the electoral arena. With growing strength and organizational experience, the POS/SAP has participated in all the general, that is, country-wide elections — the parliamentary elections in 1977 and 1978, the European elections in 1979, the parliamentary elections in 1981, the municipal elections in 1982, the European elections in 1984 and the parliamentary elections in 1985 and 1987. (We also participated in the social elections in 1979, 1983 and 1987).
Such regular electoral activity requires a higher level of organization in terms of a system of mass propaganda and collecting signatures in order to get slates on the ballot and to fill them with candidates for deputy and senator. It is advantageous to have complete slates, since in the Belgian elections there is only one round and there is ranked voting for multi-candidate slates [alternative preference votes are redistributed as first-preference candidates are
Thus, in 1985, we campaigned in all of the country's 30 electoral districts for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. We fielded about 325 candidates, which was essential to get access to the mass media and to involve the maximum number of sympathizers in the party's electoral
At the same time, we learned to see elections as a real struggle to win votes "one by one." This mass work to convince people (in the factories, in trade-union meetings, in the markets, door-to-door) had a considerable impact on the application of our political line. Breaking with an abstract and somewhat ultra-left propagandism, we refined our message. We took account of the real consciousness of the masses and and oriented systematically toward an overall "political solution." We consistently pushed a resolute anti-capitalist line; sup-
### PARTI OUVRIER
SOCIALISTE port for a working-class united front; and firm political support for a "workers' government." At the same time, the CP hugged the social democracy, and the PTB/PvdA locked itself into sectarian self-affirmation — support for struggles combined with abstract anti-capitalist propaganda. Contradictions of situation present a challenge
The special character of the situation in Belgium lies in the eruption of mass self-activity on a level rarely attained, which has continued for ten years now, since 1977-78. At the same time the austerity offensive and militarization have gathered steam. In all, workers, women and youth have waged a large-scale political battle. So the increasingly defensive position of the masses has been accompanied by an accumulation of political experience (with and without direct struggles). This has created a socio-political classes, a "raw" politicization and a radicalization among the vanguard. The fruits of this on the electoral level remain limited.
On the social level, the results are of another order. For the POS/SAP, the working class has continually grown, and the beginning of a recomposition can be seen in the trade-union movement. Building a united anti-capitalist pole of attraction is vital at a time when a very grave international recession is looming on the horizon and the Belgian social democracy is going to have to face it with governmental responsibility on its shoulders.
What will be the response of a broad current of social-democratic workers who are already very much opposed to the right and very distrustful of their own leadership? What repercussions will the changes in the East European countries have on the politicized vanguard that is interested in political debate in the full sense? How are the greens, the CP and the PTB/PvdA going to respond to the difficult problems of program, line and tactics that will be posed by the conjuncture that is emerging?
All these questions present will present difficult, but at the same time interesting, challenges for building the POS/SAP in the February 8, 1988 • International Viewpoint