No progress in had no mandate to take decisions. Despite this the URNG decided not to slam the door.
It preferred flexibility, because it is determined not to let itself be portrayed in Guatemala and internationally as responsible for the failure to open up a dialogue. • How do you explain the fact that the negotiations government and the army sabotaged the negotiations?
It is the army that has retained the real power, and it is divided into two tendencies. The first is represented by the majority of field officers. They are favorable to dialogue as a weapon in the counter-
ALL REVOLUTIONARY movements in Central America are affected by the Esquipulas peace accords signed in August
1987, which were supposed to bring about a peaceful settlement of the armed struggles in the region. Washington, however, has not allowed the accords to be implemented.
They have become stalled, and the meeting of the five
Central American presidents on January 16-17 failed to relaunch them.
In November, our correspondent Arnold Berthu asked
Belisario and Gerardo Escalana, European representatives of the Guatemalan Revolutionary National Unity (URNG), about their view of the agreements and the effect peace proposals had had in their country. The following is the text of this exclusive interview.
W
HAT IS YOUR evaluation of the Esquipulas accords?
The URNG General Command issued a statement back on August 7 pointing to the positive character of this agreement. It was positive because it rejected the Reagan administration's ultimatum. This is particularly important for
Guatemalan revolutionaries, because, you have to remember, in 1954 the US intervention to overthrow the Arbenz regime was given cover by the Organization of
American States (OAS). The Esquipulas agreement makes illegitimate any US intervention in the region.
• When did the URNG begin proposing dialogue?
When Vinicio Cerezo, the first civilian president after 32 years of military dictatorship, took office. That was at the start of
1986. Our proposal for dialogue dates from the trip that Cerezo made to Spain after his election. On that occasion, under pressure from journalists and political forces, he said that he was favorable to opening up a dialogue. On the other hand, the minister of defence, General Gramajo, immediately came out publicly in opposition to this. On his return to Guatemala,
Cerezo went back on his statement, and said that dialogue could take place only
28 when the guerrillas laid down their arms.
On February 7, 1987, the fifth anniver-
International Viewpoint • February 8, 1988 sary of the founding of the URNG, we reaffirmed our desire for dialogue. We had to wait until July 1987 for the first secret meetings to take place. On July 18, the URNG again proposed a public dialogue, not just limited to the URNG and the government. These contacts were continued after the signing of the Esquipulas agreement, and led to an initial official meeting between delegations from the URNG and the government at the beginning of October 1987 in Madrid. The URNG came to Madrid with an overall proposal aimed at assuring a political space for the people's movement and for more humane rules for the war. At the beginning of the meeting, the URNG noted that the government had not held to its commitments.
It failed to publish the previous communique signed by both parties. Secondly, although the URNG declared a cease-fire from October 2 to 11, the army launched a military offensive in Quiche and Solola. Thirdly, through its press and before the meeting, the government declared its determination to see the guerrillas lay down their arms before undertaking real discussions.
Finally, the government delegation was not sufficiently representative. It included, of course, the vice president of the National Assembly, but no ministers. Moreover, four Guatemalan officers attended the talks without revealing their identities or exact ranks. The government delegation insurgency struggle. The second tendency opposes dialogue because it thinks that it would favorable to the guerrillas by granting them political recognition. • What is the prevailing political project in the army?
To understand the appearance of these two tendencies after the signing of the Esquipulas II accords, you have to analyze the reports given by the army on August 12 and 15, 1987. That is when the army faced the need for a new national
For the first time, in the report entitled "27 years of struggle against subversion," the army recognized that the military aspect of the counter-revolutionary struggle was only one element in its strategy, and that it had reached certain limits. It called on Guatemalan businessmen, the parties and the unions, but especially the businessmen, to form a great alliance with it to create the political conditions for a military victory over the revolutionaries.
So, the military themselves think that it is impossible to deprive the revolutionaries of their social base so long as the socioeconomic situation in the country remains in crisis. Therefore, the army called on Guatemalan businessmen to invest more, to pay better wages, to develop the country's economic infrastructure.
The Guatemalan army would like to set up a system on the model of the one in Taiwan, that is a very strong army combined with a system of collaboration with the owning class and the political parties. What is new in this situation is that the army recognizes its inability to defeat the URNG militarily.
On the other hand, this position is not designed to seek a political solution to the conflict. The objective is to maintain the military status quo without carrying out
In fact, conflicts appeared between the Christian Democratic goverment and the bosses organized in the Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Trading, Industrial and Financial Associations (CACIF) over the tax reform. This led to the latter getting the assurance that there would be no reform of banking, production, of the sugar business or of agriculture. *
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GUATEMALA peace