The contras: a view from the
NICARAGUA am an administrative technician, and I thought that at that time it was more useful to go work in the economic sphere, to rebuild the country. At the start, I went to work in the lumber industry.
After three months, the enterprise was on its feet, and was on the point of exporting and everything. They sent a fellow who had inside been in the National Guard to replace me
That was a very bitter blow, very bitter. I left.
ON JANUARY 15 and 16, the presidents of the five Central
American countries who signed the Esquipulas accords back in August last year — Nicaragua, Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Honduras and Guatemala - met to review the progress made. It has not been a great success. Fighting has been as intense as ever in the region since August.
Faced with the threat of renewed US financial and military aid to the contras, and confronting a serious economic crisis because of the war and a US-led aid and trade blockade, more pressure is being put on Nicaragua to comply with the accords than on the other so-called "democracies". After the meeting, Nicaragua's president Daniel Ortega announced that the Sandinista government would take following measures: lift the state of emergency imposed in 1982; hold ceasefire talks with the contras; expedite the application of the wide-ranging amnesty law; and call direct elections for the
Central American parliament and domestic municipal elections.
Meanwhile, the contras, disoriented since the signing of the accords, have been concentrating their attacks on economic targets inside Nicaragua, hoping to aggravate the economic crisis. The following interview with ex-contra Lester Ponce is from the Nicaraguan review Envio, and gives an idea of what life is like inside the contra camp. His testimony, although incoherent and full of contradictions - if not lies, in some cases - throws an interesting light on the functioning of the counter-revolutionary forces.
O
N AUGUST 17, I was at the El
Paraiso telephone exchange. "Is the line to Nicaragua working?" I asked. "We'll try," they told me.
I talked with my mother. She told me all about Esquipulas and asked, "In December?" "No, I said," today, we're playing for double or nothing. " It was 2.30 in the afternoon. I came that day. At 5.00, I crossed the frontier, avoiding customs. I came with my wife and two children, and another boy who also wanted to return to Nicaragua. He had left to avoid military service here.
Since everybody in the area knew me, I went into a house looking for help. They helped me out, and we slept there that night. In the mountains, I went to a frontier guard post and told them that I was so and so from such an such a village, and that I wanted them to put me in touch with state
The compañeros only asked me where I had come from. "I've come from the other side," I told them. "OK," they told me, "we are going to the guard post." From the frontier guard post, they took me to Brigade 312 and from there to the Ministry of the Interior, then to Esteli and finally to • That's the end of the story. But what Is the beginning? Why did you part company with the counter-revolution?
It's a long and strange story. I was a Sandinista fighter. My father inculcated the principles into my head. My home was a political school, and I left it for the mountains to join the guerrillas on August 2, 1978. After the victory, I was in the army until about October 1979. I left it because I
• Was he an opportunist?
I don't know what he was, but the fact is that a lot of them claimed to be pure socialists, but I don't know them, and I do not know what they are. But this was a very bitter blow for me. After that, I worked in the social service programs. After three months, I realized that wasn't for me. I left for a while. I worked as a bus conductor on a transport line, and ended up going to Matagalpa. In a year and a half, I became the manager of the enterprise — the government had sent me on courses.
But in Matagalpa there were situations that I did not like at all. Some people were privileged, others had weaknesses, like the people we fought against, the weaknesses of the past. I had dreamed of the changes the revolution would make. And seeing these weaknesses - well. These things bothered me. There were personal clashes. One day, I had a problem and was put in jail. I got three months. I got out in March 1984
I left for Ocotal, still looking for a way to help. I think that that is the best thing in me. I started working with other compas [compañeros], trying to change things, trying to take measures with the little that we had in the way of knowledge and the means we had. That is how the break began. Why? Because a lot of the compas were twisted. That is the reality. I was there a year, and then I gave up.
After a year, I started working independently, cutting wood in the mountains. Then I had other problems, because I was supposed to be a contra, because I was supposed to be a courier, because I was in the counter-revolution. In reality, that was false. I got another month in jail here in Ocotal. When I got out, they started putting pressure on me to do bad things to certain elements. I did not like that.
One day, like a lot of people, I was a little drunk, and I picked a fight with the police. I decided that I had to get out. That was in July 1985. At the beginning, I had the idea of going to the United States. I had my passport and all my papers in order. But I went to Honduras first, by unwatched roads, finding my own way. I had a lot of resentment against the revolution. • You were on your way to the United States and you stayed with the contras. How did that happen?
All those who slip over over the border into Hoeduras are taken prisoner. see 15 one. They investigate everyone. First the February 8, 1988 • International Viewpoint
NICARAGUA Hondurans question you. And immediately you are passed on to the FDN [Nicaraguan Democratic Force]. I was jailed on the other side as a result of this interrogation. An old family friend with the FDN got me out, and then, right away, I was implicated. When I got to the base, I met people that I knew, people from here, even people who had also been in the guerrillas. • What base were you on?
I was in the Capire sector, in the department of El Paraiso, in the various bases there. It was July 1985. There were then more or less 8,000 "commandos," all in Honduras. Inside Nicaragua, there were none - at that time, I stress.
On arriving, my impression was that they were old guerrilla camps, but more seriously organized. It was a complete army, with everything. Logistically, it was an excellent army, with well-trained "commandos." • Are the "commandos" soldiers.
Yes, ordinary soldiers, the picture of your ordinary soldier. • Did you stay with the "commandos"?
No, I was taken to a place they called the Strategic Command, which was also in Capire. That is where the chiefs are, number 3-80 and the "Invisible One". We discussed why I had come, what my reasons were, what I thought of them. About ten days later, they called me to start work. • And they had no doubts, given that you had been in the Sandinista
No. People on the other side knew me and vouched for me. But it is true that I was an exceptional case. As soon as I arrived, I was sent directly to the Strategic Command, and I was already given a work plan, in direct liaison with the Strategic Command. Other intelligence officers like me came to this by "bridges." San Marcos asked for approval from Tegucigalpa, Tegucigalpa from the Strategic Command. But not for me, I went directly there. It happened like that because I had been vouched for, I was backed up. • What job did you get?
Enrique Bermudez, number 3-80, a colonel in Somoza's National Guard, offered me a military intelligence job. Not just any-
There were three lines of work. The first was to gather all military information on the area, check every military post, every military movement. Secondly, there was keeping track of the military leaders, the political leaders, and the leaders of the
Then there was building a democratic student front in Region 1 to carry out strikes and demonstrations against the government. All this work was in my 16 this job of intelligence officer? • How many people in the FDN have International Viewpoint • February 8, 1988
In fact, I don't know how many there are, but one thing that is sure is that there is one intelligence officer per zone. As a chief, they gave me two kinds of credentials — the papers of intelligence officer and another grey document that identified me to the Honduran armed forces. You did not need any other paper, any other document to move around. It is a very well-known document, which only officers have. The "commandos," do not have them, obviously. They do not leave their bases, and when they do, they leave with an authorization sent them from the Strategic Command or from the base itself. From there, they go to the Honduran immigration services, and they are given a temporary permit so that they can go out just for the time given them. I had no worries about papers; I al• It is said that Somozista National Guards control the FDN.
That is certain. All the leadership posts, all the command posts are in the hands of people were in Somoza's National Guard. There is no civilian with a command. The situation is totally controlled by Enrique Bermudez. You can say, Tigrillo is a regional commander, and what about that? The truth is that Tigrillo is a regional commander because of his prestige, because of the number of men he has. But he has no real command. He does not decide anything. And what is more, they showed him that it is the Guard that is giving the orders. • What did they do to Tigrillo?
Tigrillo is a civilian - not a Guard. He was a fighter, he fought the National Guard. He is from Yali, like Coral and like Douglas. They are three close companions, from the same zone and with an incredible prestige. All three of them were involved in disputes over the way the war was being conducted under the leadership of the Guard, over the way they thought it ought to be run, because of the experience they had when there were fighting the Guard. Conflicts. Conflicts over power. What did they do to Tigrillo? He was one of the men with one of the best regional commando units, the "Rafael Herrera" group, with three or four thousand men. What did they do?
They started by buying off his shocktroop commanders with money. They told
"Listen, brother, we want to take care of you. We are in command. Here is your new salary, take your men, go independent." That is the way, they took his forces away from him.
Seeing that, he continued to conspire. Then they took him into the Strategic Command as a personnel assistant, which is not just any post. But Tigrillo could not do it. He can't read and writes with difficulty. Of course, they knew that he was not capable, then why did they bring him there? To deflate his vanity, his ambition. After two weeks in this job that he did not know how to do, they sent a "commando" to him. He provoked Tigrillo, and Tigrillo killed him. It was a veteran "commando," who had been fighting in the FDN for five or years years. Tigrillo was automatically jailed and
After that, Tigrillo was no longer anything. He was a "historic" figure, but he did not go into the mountains any more. The scrap left him handicapped, and he could not go into the mountains. He is no longer a threat to the power of the Guards.
Coral ended up with one leg missing Mike Lima's bodyguards, who were National Guards, fired on him. It was a scrap over a truck, and he was left an invalid. Now, he is no longer anything. What can you do in a war with a cripple? Douglas came out OK because he was more often inside Nicaragua with his men than on the bases. The Guards who run things never go • And in these rivalries, do they go as far as killing each other?
When I arrived, there was a lot of talk about the death of Commander Suicide. They killed him. They accused him of selling arms to the Salvadorean guerrillas, and so on and so on. But the truth is that the guy had prestige, and the "commandos" said a lot of good things about him when they returned after fighting with him. They eliminated him, and practically all of his team.
It is the Guard that dominates in reality. And the Guard never forgives those who managed to play a role in bringing down • Do the "commandos" know about the Guard's total control? How is that reflected among the troops?
It is reflected above all in the kind of political education given to certain cadres — not to the "commandos," who are nothing. One day, for example, a journalist, Maria Travieso, arrived at the Strategic Command. She was working for Radio Impact in Costa Rica and for Radio Liberación [one of the contra radio stations]. They organized a meeting in 3-80's office and called in the group chiefs and shock-troop commanders. I was there, they called me. They asked us to sit down and started running a video. When Robelo went to Cuba, when Cruz was in the Group of the 12, when he worked for the Sandinistas - all that. And what did 3-80 say to the soldier boys? "Is that what you want, is it these reformed piris [a pejorative name for Sandinistas] that you want?" All that was to create division, to ensure their social base, to maintain their power. • Did you hear people talk about Eden Pastora? What does the FDN think
From what I saw and heard, it is clear that Pastora was never, and will never be, one of them. Never, because he is a piri. For a time, it seemed probable that Pastora would come to control certain FDN positions. What a bombshell! No! no! no! And in Pas-
tora's case it was still worse, because they are jealous of him as a military man.
Pastora coming would have done a lot of harm to the Guard. That is why they rejected it totally. Pastora is not, and has never been, trusted — any more than he is by the • Who is above Bermudez?
The gringos, unquestionably. There is a CIA office at the Strategic Command; the gringos are there. They are the ones who make the decisions. The two chiefs in the Strategic Command - 3-80, Bermudez, who is the military chief; and the Invisible One, Rodolfo Ampié, an ex-Guard lieutenant, who is the chief of the intelligence service - their subordinates. All the orientations and all the decisions are always adopted in accord with the gringos. • Has it always been like that?
Always. The number of gringos on the bases, in the camps, has increased since 1984. But they were always the ones who made the decisions. There are also Vietnam veterans who have been with the "commandos," who have fought inside Nicaragua. • Did you have relations with the gringos in your work?
No, my contacts were with 3-80 and the Invisible One. I had few relations with the gringos, but I saw them there. I saw Republican and Democratic senators, political representatives of the gringos. They all go through here, they constantly visit the Strategic Command. • What sort of relations do the have with the "commandos"?
They are very interested in them, not so much in training them directly, at least as far as I knew. They are there on another level. They are there to make the decisions. When they want to train people in new special skills, they take them to the United States — directly. In November and December 1986, they took shock-troop commanders and group chiefs for training, but to the United States. They take them for a period of two months. The gringos' approach to the "commandos" is different from that of the Guards. • The gringos treat them better than the Guards?
Very much so. And why? Because they know very well who is really fighting the war, who is really waging it. It is not Bermudez, it is not the Invisible One. It is the "commandos," the ones who get the least. The gringos know that very well. • And do the "commandos" know that Reagan calls them "freedom fighters"?
Not much of news like that comes in. They only talk about the war; that is all they know. But sometimes journalists turn up and 30 or 40 commanders are gathered together; they show them Reagan's film. For them, it is a great thing to sit down in front of a TV and watch a video of Mr. Reagan. A very great thing! • But the "commandos" at least are aware that Reagan is helping them a
Yes, of course, from the lowest to the highest. "As long as there is Reagan, there will be the Contra," that is the watchword. Now, with the Esquipulas Accords, what they say is: "It doesn't matter much that they are telling us to sit down and conduct
LET'S SEE NOW... dialogue and all the rest, we are going to go on waging the war." Why? Because there is Reagan. • What sort of relations does the Contra have with the Nicaraguan civilian refugees in their area.
In general, refugees are regarded as piris, suspected as being Sandinistas. There is little in the way of relations among the "commandos" and these civilians. • Doesn't the FDN recruit people among these civilians?
Yes, of course. The FDN intelligence and counter-espionage services constantly visit the refugee camps in order to recruit. There are few volunteers; they twist their arms. More and more of those who are recruited in this way surrender when they go into Nicaragua. That is why they say that all of them are piris. The last recruitment of refugees that I know about was in June 1986. The Honduran intelligence services and FDN members carried out a general recruitment operation in the El Paraiso and Danli zone. Of course, the FDN always
NICARAGUA does work among the refugees. They have informers among them, people that they control. • What kind of life do these civilian refugees lead in Honduras?
A very difficult one. They work at most two or three days a week. They earn three lempiras [2 lempiras = $1] a day and eat rice and beans. The situation is very difficult, because the economic situation in Honduras is very critical. And Hondurans complain because the Nicaraguans are taking work away from them. • Are these Nicaraguans legal in Honduras? What kind of papers do In fact, most of them move around with an immigration permit, for which they pay 5 lempiras a month. It is very difficult to get residence permits. They cost about 600 lempiras. None of those coming out of Nicaragua are able to pay a sum like that. • And now, with Esquipulas, are they going to return to Nicaragua? A lot of them would like to come back, a lot. People don't want to stay on the other side. And there are a good number of people on the other side! For example, so many young people left Nicaragua to avoid military service, only to fall into the "other" service over the border, that of the FDN. • What do these people need to get them to decide to come back? Well, Esquipulas has helped enormously — the Esquipulas amnesty. • But the amnesty has existed since 1985 for those who wanted to come back.
Yes, of course. I knew that it existed, but I did not want to take the chance. With Esquipulas, it is a different matter. I have the impression that there are more guarantees. And it is like that for a lot of people. But what is needed above all is family support. Their families here in Nicaragua have to tell them the truth about the way they see things here. Of course, we are halfway to the poor house here, but at least you can live. There, there is not even milk for the children and they often go hungry. Here, there are problems, but honestly, what you see there is how people are half dead of hunger, have nothing to do. I came here, and I have seen that everybody has enough to eat, that everyone is at ease, I did not think that it was so relaxed. Those on the other side should know that so that they can make up their minds to come, that they will not be a burden to their families, that their • And how did the refugees find out about the amnesty? Well they listen. Radio Segovia in Oco. 17 February 8, 1988 • International Viewpoint
NICARAGUA tal has played a very important role in passing on messages, in giving information on the amnesty, messages from families here to those over there. • Do they listen to the radio in the contra camps too?
Well, there it is harder with the "commandos." You can't listen to Radio Segovia. They point you out. The problem is that the "commandos" cannot find a way to cross the frontier as I did, because they cannot leave the camp. Leaving is desertion, and desertion means imprisonment, or else.... • They kill them?
They kill them. • They're shot?
No, there they don't shoot them, they cut their throats. • To frighten the others?
Because it is the rule! • Where are the disarmed contras going to go if Azcona applies the Esquipulas agreement and removes the contra camps in Honduras?
Nobody talks about that there, nobody thinks about it. But there is going to be total disintegration. Will those people remain as bandits? I don't know. Who is going to take their guns from them? What are all these people going to do? In Honduras, they have no future. They could end up in El Salvador, in Duarte's army. • To go back to something else, the Somozista Guard's control over the FDN. Didn't that disillusion you when you hooked up with them?
Not really. Because when I left Nicaragua, I wanted to do things, my resentment was so great. • You started working with the FDN. What results did you get?
My job was collecting military information on the Nueva Segovia region especially. Others prepared the operations and made contacts for this student front. In May 1986, the Sandinista state's security forces uncovered the whole network and destroyed it and all my work. • In your opinion, how well do the Sandinista security forces work?
Well, I knew things that I prefer not to say for my own security, both here and there. But it works rather well. • In your intelligence work, did you de tect Sandinista infiltrators in the FDN?
Yes, there are such people. And many remained up to two years in the ranks of the FDN before being detected. • Did your work with the contras cost 18 the life of anyone?
As far as I know, not directly. What I did International Viewpoint • February 8, 1988 was to send information on all of Nueva Segovia so that they would mount their operations. But they don't have a great capacity for doing things correctly afterward. • So, you can say "l don't have any deaths on my conscience"?
Yes, I don't have any weight; I don't feel responsible. The terrorist attack on Yalaguina caused me a great deal of sorrow, and still does. In March 1986, the contras blew up the Yalaguina power station, which supplied electricity for almost all of Region I. • And you were responsible for it?
For that, yes. I passed on the information some three months before they mounted this operation. In fact, I did not think that they were going to do it. They had made two attempts, but they had not even been able to get close. This time, they took in 120 men under the command of Samuel from the Nicarao unit. They blew up the station, and got out with only one wounded. It was guys who had been trained in explosives in the United States When you found out that the station had been blown up, what was
I told you that it made me unhappy, because of what it meant for the country and for my region especially. Moreover, I had worked in the Nicaraguan Energy Institute before leaving for Honduras; I was given responsibility and I know perfectly well what leaving the entire area without electricity means. When they blew it up, I thought about all the people in the villages without light, with spoiled food. Now, I think that I never wanted to do that. For the chiefs, of course, it was good news, a big success. In June, they held a party to celebrate the worst blows that the FDN had dealt to the Sandinistas. And the best one was the attack on the Yalaguina power station! • And the crimes of the contras, the murders of civilians. Didn't that disgust you either?
I didn't really pay attention. But shortly before leaving the FDN, I saw a couple of old people in the El Cua zone who had had their throats cut. And really... You see these were attitudes we always discussed with other FDN members. That shocked us. There are people who do not go along with such attitudes. • So, why did they permit them?
The fact is that all this is caused by the lack of political education of the "commandos. " of some of the "commandos " For them, everybody is a communist, everybody is a piri, that is the way they see things.
When they attack a village, they don't think that there are children there, but that everyone is a communist, period. And bullets don't make any distinctions.
• And when they go into peasants' homes and kill them?
It's the same. Most of these crimes are for reasons of intrigue, revenge. Anyone who does not sympathize is a piri, and they kill them on the spot. • Is there no way to control that, to
It's hard. In reality, they cannot be controlled. Presently, at the time of the $100 million [the appropriation for the contras voted by the US Congress in June 1986], they took a decision to form a human rights section. And in each unit, there is a "human rights man." But they are exactly like the "commandos," they have the same education. And what do these "human rights people" do? They collect all the information on these crimes and present them as the work of the Sandinista army. That's all they do. There is no progress on human rights in the FDN. It's all for show. I did not see anything real, anything positive. And nobody wants to be do this "human rights" work. They give them a few courses, they get some recommendations, but in fact the reality is quite different. There is no control, • Why did you decide to leave the
At the end of six months, they stared to carry out a campaign against me where I was working. They said that I was an infiltrator from the Sandinista security services. As soon as I came, they said, "Why can it be that this piri has just arrived, and he has already got such a high post?" The Guards' campaign got more virulent when Nicaraguan state security destroyed all my networks in May 1986. The campaign became more direct. In September of the same year, I was incautious enough to take advantage of the passing of the Torch of Independence to go see my mother at the border. The FDN let her come in. And everyone said, "What's so special about him that he can see his mother?" In fact, they did not let anyone else in. That reinforced their idea that I was an infiltrator. • From that moment, did you want to get out of the FDN?
No, not really. I wanted to work. But the pressures started — more exactly, checks. You could move, but at the same time you couldn't. I was being watched personally. And you know that at the first sign of weakness, they'd cut your throat on the spot, without thinking about it. They started by forbidding me from going into the border area. Then, on November 4, 1986, I was jailed. • How were you treated in prison?
I was tied up for 11 days and blindfolded; I got nothing to eat, was not allowed to sleep and I was left naked. This was in what they call a PM [Military Police] zone. There was nobody there but National
Guards, those who protect the Strategic Command. Nothing but National Guards. • Were you beaten?
No, not that. They were not very sure of themselves. Before putting me in prison, they put me through a lie detector. That is a little gringo machine. CIA people ran it. They ask you ten questions, and you can only answer "yes" or "no." They put me through it on September 21, and then they let me go, and I went back to El Paraiso. But they never told me the results. In November, they called me, but it was to put me in prison and question me for the investigation. • And what did they interrogate you about?
Especially about my life before - the usual interrogation — 3.80, the Invisible One, they all suspected me. • Were they good interrogators?
One of them was very good, yes. The one who investigated me is a Guard who has specialized in the Sandinista Front since its foundation. He did this work for Somoza, investigating the Sandinistas. • How did you get out?
My wife knew that if I was five days late in getting back to the Strategic Command in El Paraiso, she should warn my family in Nicaragua that I had been jailed. In fact, I was already preparing myself for arrest at any time. Then, my mother informed an uncle working for the Organization of American States who was an officer in Somoza's Guard, although he left in 1954, specifically because he belonged to a group of officers who had risen up against Somoza. For more than 30 years he has been working for the OAS in the United States. He sent a friend to the Strategic Command, and since 3-80 knew my uncle and respected him a lot, my situation automatically changed. I got out at Christmas. It was 3-80 himself who intervened directly.
No, not really. Maybe, because of my past. I even had a chance to talk with the compas who were at the source of the problems that made me make up my mind to leave Nicaragua, and they were all relaxed. Maybe, that was because of the times in Nicaragua. I think that everyone has learned a lot. • When you gave yourself up, how were you interrogated by the Sandinis ta authorities?
There was no interrogation. • What did you expect?
I expected an interrogation. I suppose that is normal. But they just told me, er, you are free to talk about what you want to. We don't force anybody here." • Have you asked for protection [in Nicaragua]?
No, absolutely not. They have told me to watch out, to avoid drinking. I'm not afraid of the people here. I am afraid of the ones on the other side. • What have the FDN in Honduras said about your leaving?
They said at the start that I had never worked for them, that I was a refugee who had been given a house and food. • How did things go when you were turned over to your family? They say
CONTRA HEY PETE,
NICARAGUA that the Segovia Theater was packed on August 23, and that you talked to the people.
I felt like a rare animal facing these people. It was as if I was in front of a jury. You feel very bad in such a situation, very bad. Do you know what it is like to make excuses to people you know? I felt very bad. I made my excuses from the bottom of my heart, because they deserved it. • What was the reaction of the people?
Well, they offered demonstrations of support. This came from people from whom I would never have expected it. It impressed me. • This is a general people.
Too generous. • And if you were recalled to military service, you would go?
Yes, I would go. Even at the start, when I saw that they were letting me go free, I expected a call. If it comes, I will go, and that won't be hard. • To wash away your sins?
No. I don't think it would be for that reason. I have always liked military things. And it is my duty as a Nicaraguan. • Do people look at you strangely in Ocotal?
I think I'm the one who finds things strange. I'm still trying to adjust. *
(I ALWAYS GET THE • Were you totally cleared? FEELING I'VE
I was free, that is, at liberty. They took away my papers and watched me all the time. • Were you thinking then of returning to Nicaragua?
No, not yet. Not at all. I made the decision when the Invisible One arrived and give me a mission to be completed in two months. It was necessary to blow up the Quisuca TV station. I was to blow it to restore my reputation, to show that I was not an infiltrator.
They gave me the mission, and I was still being watched; I had no means, no support, no papers to move about. This mission was a trap. It was then I starting thinking. And then Esquipulas came. I thought that the time had come to return to Nicaragua. • You were not afraid of the
I DON'T KNOW, BUT
AFTER EACH
ORGOTTE
METHING
MANOEUVRE...
THAT'S NORMAL. ITS
ALWAYS THE SAME
FOR PEOPLE WHO
TRAVEL A LOT, LIKE US.
CONTRAS
HONDURAS
19
February 8, 1988 • International Viewpoint
The failure of the agrarian reform
EL SALVADOR supporting the peasants and feeding the
However, this system could not last. The good lands, the fertile ones with deep top soil, have been grabbed by the haciendas. For the individual plots, this leaves only shallow soils, which are quickly exhausted by intensive farming. At the same time, the share-croppers (to whom the big landowners are accustomed to renting land between