NICARAGUA Sandinistas continue their hard fight THE REJECTION of Reagan's request for new aid to the Nicaraguan contras was an important political success for the Managua government. Undoubtedly, this success — like the results achieved by Daniel Ortega during his tour of Europe in January — was facilitated by the Sandinistas' determination to respect fully the pledges they made in the Esquipulas Il agreement. The US press itself has pointed to this, acknowledging that the other signatory governments, especially El Salvador and Honduras, have failed to demonstrate a similar good will.
VIO MAITAN ship, and therefore their cases cannot be compared with those of political prisoners in El Salvador or in Guatemala.
La Prensa, the voice of the reactionary opposition, has been able to resume publication, and a series of radio stations were authorized to begin broadcasting. (In early January, there were in total 20 state radio stations, 21 private ones and three of mixed ownership.) The state of emergency, which in fact was never very strictly applied (for example, the provision suspending the right to strike), has been withdrawn.
Finally, although the military actions continue and are still hitting civilian targets and defenceless populations, the government has agreed, after all, to direct discussions with a delegation from the contras, although with the proviso that this is not political dialogue but an attempt to negotiate a cease-fire.
Proposal for a cease-Tire cease-fire
On January 28, the Sandinista government spelled out its proposal for a ceasefire, which could begin on March 15 and last to April 15, the date on which an inter. national commission would carry out an inspection. The Sandinista army would halt operations, enabling the contras to go to an area assigned to them on Nicaraguan territory, where they could continue to get food, clothing and medicine through the Red Cross. After an accord, the contras would lay down their arms and and amnesty would immediately be granted. Those who so desired would be authorized to go to other countries.
An inspection commission went to Nicaragua early in January. It was able to sound out all the interested parties, even though its composition did not meet the requirements stipulated by the accords and in principle it could have been rejected.
Some have raised the question of whether with Esquipulas and after the Nicaraguan government has not made excessive concessions. In particular, the announcement of direct negotiations with the contras seems to have aroused some disquiet in Nicaragua. Obviously, a balance sheet can be made only at the end, with the benefit of hindsight. Of course, it may be supposed that even the real application of the accords by all the parties — which so far has not happened - would leave open questions that are crucial for Nicaragua (for example, the accords offer no guarantee against the imperialist blockade and economic sabotage). And still greater problems could arise for the revolutionary forces in El Salvador and Guatemala. However, the Sandinista government has a perfect right to make every possible attempt to end the contras' attacks, or even to limit their scope by taking advantage of the differences in interests and concerns between imperialism and sections of the Cen-
LIVIO MAITAN T HE PROVISIONS of the Esquipulas accords can be summarized as follows: the beginning of a dialogue between the governments and the "unarmed" opposition groups; proclamation of an amnesty and release of those imprisoned as members of "irregular forces"; formation of a national reconciliation committee; suspension of military activities; adoption of democratization measures; election of deputies to a Central American parliament in mid-1988 and the subsequent calling of administrative, parliamentary and presidential elections; an end to military, logistical and related forms of aid from other countries; refusal by every signatory country to allow forces hostile to other countries in the region to use its territory; the formation of an inspection commission. At the beginning of October, the Nicaraguan government had already initiated a dialogue with all the opposition parties — whether or not they were represented in the National Assembly — and even with the various factions into which some of the parties are divided. An agreement in principle was reached on the questions to be considered. The dialogue was interrupted in mid-December, but the responsibility for that fell entirely on the opposition bloc. The latter rejected a priori the government's proposal for following constitutional procedures in any revision of the constitutional norms.
It should not be forgotten that even before Esquipulas, and despite the state of emergency, a myriad of parties, factions and groups operated quite openly. Since the accords, some of them have become more aggressive, putting forward programs that involve wiping out the principal gains 4 of the revolution. Likewise, it should be re- membered, parties and groupings identifyInternational Viewpoint • February 22, 1988 ing with with the workers' movement and the left have been able to organize, distribute publications, call meetings and demonstrations and lead trade unions. Two of these groups claiming to be left, the PSN and the PCN have blocked with the conservative parties in the recent months' negotiations, joining in the Bloc of the 14. Another, the MAP-Frente Obero, has taken more independent positions, explicitly declaring its defence of the gains of the revolution. Finally, there is a small group, the PRT, which calls itself Trotskyist and is linked to the international Moreno tendency. Starting off from a sectarian line toward the FSLN, it has condemned Esquipulas as a capitulation. It withdrew almost immediately from the national dialogue in which it was invited to participate.
Sandinistas comply with
Esquipulas Il accord
Barricada and Nuevo Diario frequently inform their readers about the activities of the various opposition parties and about their statements, which are generally reported without comment or polemical swipes. The Managua government rapidly set up a national reconciliation commission, giving the chair to Cardinal Obando, who is certainly not likely to be suspected of sympathy for the revolution. It has granted an initial amnesty, abolished the special antiSomozista tribunals and said that it is ready to release other prisoners if the United States offers them the right of asylum, as well as projected further amnesty measures. It is well known that the great majority of those who remain in prison were sentenced for crimes committed under the dictator-
tral American ruling classes, as well of differences within the United States.' In fact, the concessions made and the steps taken in recent months have not involved giving up any part whatever of the gains of the revolution. Nor has there been any indication of an intention to put the revolutionary regime up for discussion. "Power is in the hands of the people"
Daniel Ortega has been asked whether, in the event of an electoral defeat, the FSLN could relinquish the government. Probably because of the various ways in which his response to this question was interpreted in the international press, the Nicaraguan president clarified his thinking in an interview at the end of the year. According to him, the hypothesis on which the question was predicated would never come about, but in any case the FLN could "hand over the government but not the power, because that is in the hands of the people," and the latter "would not permit the structure of power to be altered by dissolving the armed forces, taking the arms from the people, or taking the land from the peasants in order to restore it to the landlords."
This answer was not only tactically adroit, but substantially correct and profoundly educative for the masses. To use a terminology current in capitalist Europe, Ortega accepted, hypothetically, a change of governmental leadership, but only within the framework of maintaining the revolutionary regime. It is precisely in this area, moreover, that it one can gauge how irreconcilable the Sandinista positions are with those formulated by the armed counter-revolutionaries and shared by a good part of the legal opposition. In essence, the contras are demanding the dismantling of the Sandinista army (in addition to suspension of compulsory military service) and dissolution of the Sandinista Defence Committees (CDS) - in other words, the elimination of the basic pillars of the regime and the initiation of a process of restoration that would inevitably lead to the elimination of all the other gains of the revolution.
The clashing interests on both sides and the resulting difficulty to overcome the conflict and open up a new era of coexistence and "democratic institutionalization" become even clearer from the international angle. The US ruling class — even its most extreme wing — realizes that the contras have no chance of defeating the Sandinista regime militarily, or even of establishing themselves firmly on a part of Nicaraguan territory. It sees, moreover, that in recent months the armed opposition has been politically undermined by defections, resignations by leaders and internal divisions (to say nothing of the positive results of the Sandinistas granting autonomy to the Atlantic Coast regions).
In addition, the US rulers are not unaware that a direct intervention in Nicaragua would not at all be a Grenada-type operation. They know it would run into furious and prolonged resistance, which could create an uncontrollable situation in other areas of Central America and have incalculable repercussions in the rest of Latin America. For this reason, the option that has been taken and will very likely continue to be followed, regardless of conjunctural tactical operations, is an economic blockade and the use of the contras as an element in a strategy of wearing out and gradually suffocating the Sandinista regime.
Esquipulas II has created obvious problems for Washington. But it is not an insuperable obstacle to its policy. The vote in the US House of Representatives itself cannot be overestimated (something that Daniel Ortega avoided doing in his February 4 speech).
The US ruling class has not at all decided to drop the contras. It has any number of ways of continuing to aid them in the face of all of the formal decisions taken by Congress. And this is without even taking into account that there are plenty of private individuals ready to offer even greater aid than the official support that has now been suspended. The strategy of overthrowing the Sandinista regime has in no way been abandoned.
Internal difficulties and contradictions
Unfortunately, the evolution of the internal situation in Nicaragua is not going to induce the imperialists to change their tack. At the end of 1987 and the start of the new year, the government drew a series of balance sheets, which were partially picked up in the international press. To begin with, there is the human cost of the war. In 1987, military operations claimed 6,874 victims (2,491 dead, 3,601 wounded and 782 kidnapped). At the same time, the contras lost 4,832 dead, 502 captured and about a thousand wounded. Since the beginning of the hostilities there have been more than 50,000 victims, with a particularly high toll in the more exposed regions.
From the economic standpoint, the war brought a loss of $376.7 million in a year in which total exports were $260 million. This is besides the 40% of the national budget devoted to defence, which is expected to go up to 59% in 1988. In these conditions, it is a miracle that overall production has gone up, even if only very modestly (+1.7%)3
In addition, the country has been hit by a severe drought. According to official statements, 75% of the bean crop, 45% of sorghum, 25% of maize, and 10% of rice are going to be lost. Moreover, it seems that the decline in livestock herds has continued. From 1977 to 1987, according to data from the livestock breeders' association, the number of animals dropped from
NICARAGUA 2,600,000 to 1,400,000 (Barricada, December 11).
As for inflation, which was estimated at 1,225% by CEPAL for 1987. In reality it was 1,500%, and the rise is not about to end. There is hardly any need to point out that Nicaragua has continued to be hit by a decline in the world-market prices for some of its traditional products (for example, the increase in coffee production has been virtually wiped out by the fall in coffee prices).
Grave problems for Nicaraguan economy
In the interview already cited, Daniel Ortega defined the Nicaraguan economy not as a war economy but as one of survival. According to him, in a war economy, as in Europe during the second world war, money disappears and workers are remunerated directly with a minimum of consumer goods. This argument is clearly wrong. But, over and above terminological questions, the essential thing is that the Nicaraguan economy had to give priority to meeting the demands of the war. And, as we have seen, it continues to suffer from an unfavorable trend of prices on the world capitalist market.
Moreover, all of this is taking place in a structural context in which the private sector still controls the major lines of agricultural production (decisive for the export trade).4 The private sector also controls a very large part of distribution. At the same time, industry — also largely in private hands - far from being able to play a dynamic role has been hard hit by the effects of the imperialist blockade. (In 1987, it registered a decline of 2.1%).
In such a situation, the levers in the hands of the state can function only very partially, and the government has not been able to prevent the abnormal growth of a parallel economy in which the most unbridled speculation prevails.
Such a state of affairs cannot fail to have 1. The Sandinistas do not seem to harbor any illusions about there being any qualitative differences between the Democrats and Republicans. In an interview at the end of 1987, Daniel Ortega stressed that both wanted a Nicaragua "under the thumb of the United States," and had "as a common denominator an imperialist mentality." 2. After accusing the government of having made "monstrous concessions," " Bonifacio Miranda of the PRT added, "the only thing that it has not done is yield the power." (Barricada, January 6.) That is quite right, the FSLN has no intention of giving up what is essential! 3. This data was dealt with in the Sandinista press from mid-December to the first week of January. 4. According to figures published in the December 7 issue of Barricada, the private sector produces 73.6 of export products and 86.4% of the products destined for internal consumption. 5. Denunciations by name of firms that sell their products on the parallel market (rice, sugar and even industrial products) are not uncommon in Barricada. In some cases, the unions give their assent to such sales, because the firms claim that that is the only way they can pay their workers. (See Barricada, October 17 and 20, 5 November 5, and December 13.) February 22, 1988 • International Viewpoint
NICARAGUA grave social consequences. Privileged strata — exporters and trading speculators, among others — enjoy high incomes and the high life, while the masses can barely make ends meet from day to day. Imbalances in distribution are showing up also in the public distribution system. There are not enough Workers' Supply Centres (Centros de Abastecimiento de los Trabajadores) and, even where they exist, their stocks are irregularly replenished. In some cases, corruption exists within their own networks.
More lands distributed in 1987
For some time now, phenomena of real social breakdown have been appearing. For example, quite often wage workers prefer to abandon their jobs or practice systematic absenteeism in order to devote themselves to trading activities in the "informal" sector. While these activities are often very modest they frequently earn those involved more than their wages (or at least provide a necessary supplement to what they earn).
Notorious cases of absenteeism have been denounced in important production centers, such as the San Antonio sugar plantation, where about 40% of worktime has reportedly been lost. Out of 653 agricultural workers on the roll, supposedly only 480 actually worked. (Barricada, November 27 and December 5). In fact, people register just to have the right to consumer goods, and do not go to work.
Still worse, in several cases, products have been stolen from enterprises to be sold directly on the black market. (For example, the theft of thousands of chickens was reported on a poultry farm.) All these phenomena certainly do not increase the socio-political weight of the working class, which in a country like Nicaragua was very limited at the outset.
The peasants continue to represent one of the bastions of the revolutionary regime, and all the more so since in 1987 more lands were distributed. But some tensions have begun to show up in the relations between peasants and workers, or more generally the urban popular layers. In fact, the peasants are trying to get higher prices for their products, and are thereby fueling the parallel market.
On the other hand, uneasiness has developed within sections of the peasantry as a result of reactionary campaigns for restitution of the expropriated lands and of the prospect that lands will be given to contra elements ready to return to legality. Some Sandinista leaders, Wheelock for example, have felt the need to exclude categorically the possibility of any restitution of land that has already been given to peasants.
In recent months, the Sandinista press, radio broadcasts and discussions in various assemblies (in particular in a national 6 trade-union assembly held in mid-December) have reflected discontent, comInternational Viewpoint • February 22, 1988 plaints and demands from workers and the masses more generally. Recurring themes are the lack of readjustment of wages to inflation and the insufficiency and irregularity of food supplies. In some cases, protests have been made against what are considered excessive disparities in wages. There have also been denunciations of the failings of trade-union democracy or outright violations of it, and abuses in the workplaces by foremen and managerial personnel, who at times have not hesitated to hit out at anyone who raised criticisms. The demand has been raised for real monitoring of production and management of the enterprises at various levels.
The trade-union assembly mentioned above echoed these concerns in its resolutions, deciding, among other things, to draw up a draft for a new labor code.? If the constitution were modified, the assembly considered, any changes should go in the direction of "deepening the content of the Sandinista people's revolution."
In order to round out the picture, it should be said that since the Esquipulas accords, various opposition forces have been looking for more space to maneuver. On the trade-union level itself, the nonSandinista trade unions — while still weak and often rent by sharp internal rivalries — can hope to get a certain response to their campaign of raising a hue and cry about real problems and to the demagogic demands they raise without regard for whether or not there are concrete possibilities for meeting them. A strike took place in November in the port of Corinto, and there have been some numerically significant demonstrations. The political opposition has been able to organize other demonstrations that have been bigger and more aggressive than in the past.1°
In the Sandinista camp, criticisms have emerged, for example around the functioning of the FLSN's Base Committees. They have been accused of "not very fraternal" behavior and "failing to concern themselves with the problems of others." (Barricada, December 13, 1987.)
Problems of the CDS
As for the CDS, their problems were taken up in a significant interview by the Sandinista leader Leticia Herrera, who recognized the difficulties of mobilizing people. "If people do four-hour tours as vigilantes every two weeks after work and their minds are on the fact that there is no rice in the distribution center, then it is inevitable that they will not concentrate on their task." (Barricada, September 9.)
This comment underlines a more general problem - the difficulty of maintaining the necessary revolutionary alertness without people getting worn out by their more and more arduous daily lives.
The conclusion indicated by the picture outlined here is that the Nicaraguan revolution more than ever needs the solidarity of the international anti-imperialist and workers' movement. There is an urgent need to step up mobilizations to press for an end to all the military actions against Nicaragua and to all threats of aggression, direct or indirect, by imperialism. Even after the vote of the House of Representatives, Ortega noted appropriately, "the war is continuing," and it would be wrong to entertain the illusion that the worst is over.
Solidarity needed more than ever
It is vital to continue mobilizing to press for a halt to the economic blockade and for Nicaragua to be able to get all the economic aid it needs. It is necessary to demand that the workers' states, especially the USSR, increase their aid to meet Nicaragua's needs and drop some of the ambiguous attitudes they have adopted in the past (for example, in Moscow's case, concerning oil deliveries). " It has to be demanded that in no circumstances can there be any idea of sacrificing the needs of the Sandinista revolution for the sake of an "understanding" between the USSR and the United States.
Finally, the solidarity movements in the various countries have to act with the understanding that even apparently modest initiatives, while not able to resolve the fundamental problems of the Nicaraguan economy, can be helpful in overcoming specific problems (such as the practical problems facing education or medical supplies). In some countries, campaigns like this have already been undertaken. Such actions will be a concrete demonstration to the Sandinistas that their struggles and problems are not being ignored, and that they are not alone in their hard fight. * 6. See the denunciation of a distribution center for professionals in Barricada, December 13. 7. After pointing to this problem, a Chinandega trade-union leader said that the relaxation of price controls decided on by the government had negative effects for the workers and called for an agreement by which the agricultural producers would give at least 50% of their products to the ENABAS. (Barricada, December 13). 8. One of the participants in December's national trade-union assembly, a workers' leader, criticized the fact that some functionaries and professionals got incentives much higher than those received the workers, over and above their expense accounts. The recurring egalitarian demands must have seemed excessive to some of the editors of Barricada. They were rejected in an article on October 28 with what, at best, can be called an ambiguous title: "Egalitarianism, a populist concept." 9. In particular, the demand for seniority after six months should be mentioned. This is obviously a measure designed to limit tumover. 10. A very aggressive demonstration was held on February 7, called by a so-called Permanent Workers' Committee, made up of four non-Sandinista union federations ("communist", "socialist", "social-Christian" and social democratic). Around 5,000 people were on the demonstration. (El Pais, February 8.) 11. At the conclusion of the Comecon-Nicaragua joint commission in October, Minister Henry Ruiz pointed to the vital importance of regular oil supplies for his country. He added that he had explained at the meeting that the Nicaraguans "could not continue to show their accounts to prove that they were able to pay."