Perestroika and the
N RELATION to the Soviet Union today the question therefore arises: have the internal reforms introduced by Gorbachev been accompanied by corresponding changes in the country's foreign policy? (At the same time the extent and character of the changes in Soviet foreign policy should be able to shed light on the real nature and depth of the internal reforms.) Changes in Soviet policy in the area of the East-West arms race have been the most striking.
Gorbachev's domestic policy, the perestroika, has its origins in the need to improve Soviet economic performance that, by various indices, has been declining since the middle of the 1970s. The basic idea of the economic reform is to replace the centralized, "administrative" system of management with a decentralized system coordinated through a market mechanism. The role of the center
USSR arms race
MARXISTS have always contested the sharp distinction that bourgeois politicians and political scientists tend to draw between a state's internal and external policies. For
Marxists, it is not simply a matter of internal politics having a more or less important influence on foreign policy. Rather, the in this system will be limited to longer-term strategic planning, accomplished foreign policy of a state, on the most through regulation of the market mecha- profound level, necessarily corresponds nism by manipulating such economic to its internal policy, because it is levers as taxes, interest rates, subsidies, controls on foreign trade and a limited basically the interests of the same number of centrally fixed norms and prices.
The other side of the perestroika is political reform, what Gorbachev calls "democratization", but which is really more of a liberalization in the sense of increased individual freedoms and protection against official abuse of power. As for democratization - empowering ordinary people to decide major questions of public life — this has been of a very limited and halting, though in the Soviet context not negligible, character.
Bureaucratic interests threatened by the reform
Gorbachev himself has called democratization the very essence of the perestroika. This reflects his understanding that powerful bureaucratic interests are threatened by the reform and their resistance can be overcome only if there is popular pressure in favour of the reform. At the same time, since the economic reform will not be able to significantly improve consumption for a number of years (indeed, many workers view the reform as immediately threatening), the political reforms are a necessary measure in order to mobilize the working class behind it.
Politically, then, the perestroika has entailed a certain shift — albeit unstable and hesitant — in the political base of the regime (that is, the central power: in the last analysis the politburo). It has moved away from the position it had assumed under Brezhnev, as spokesperson and arbiter of bureaucratic interests, and has attempted through changes of style and substance to acquire a more popular base, one that would actively support its policies.
At the same time, there have been some important changes in foreign policy, particularly in the area of East-West relations and the arms race. These changes reflect, of course, a desire to cut military spending in order to facilitate the economic reform. But, more profoundly, they have been made both possible and necessary by the shift that has occurred in the regime's political basis.
Soviet policy under Brezhnev toward the West, and in particular towards the US as the West's hegemonic power, was of a typical bureaucratic character and in its essence dated back to Stalin. This involved a search for security based on the military might of the Soviet Union on the one hand, and on diplomatic accords with the capitalist powers on the other. In this view, military power was a precondition for the accords.
In this approach, popular and revolutionary movements abroad were not seen as allies of the Soviet Union but as adjuncts of its diplomatic strategy. This meant that they were counselled moderation, a strategy that rarely, if ever, met with success. In any case, for most of the post-war period, particularly in countries where the Communist Party was weak, it was often enough for the movement to become even indirectly associated with Soviet goals for it to become discredited among the broader strata of the working class.
ruling class that are in question.
DAVID SEPPO
This was particularly evident in the area of the arms race under Brezhnev. Soviet policy here has always been "defensive" in the sense that it reacted to American initiatives and was clearly interested in reaching agreements to limit or put an end to this extremely burdensome and dangerous competition. At the same time, Soviet policy seemed designed precisely to perpetuate the arms race, based as it was on the premise that the Americans would take the Soviet Union seriously and treat it as an equal only when they realized that it was as strong as they are, and completely determined and capable of matching any escalation they might attempt.
### Deadlock under
Brezhnev
The result was the growth of a huge Soviet arsenal to match that of the Americans. But instead of convincing the Americans that military superiority of the Soviet Union was a pipe-dream, Soviet military growth supplied the US with its most convincing, albeit entirely hypocritical, justification for its continued arms escalation. The ordinary citizens of the NATO states were unable to discer the "defensive" nature of Soviet missiles, which were after all aimed at their heads. Along with the ubiquitous press reports on the repressive na- 13 ture of the internal Soviet regime (not to
March 7, 1988 • International Viewpoint
USSR mention the "defensive" invasion of a neighbouring state every decade or so), the very existence and constant growth of this arsenal were generally enough to convince people in the West of the reality of the "Soviet threat" and the necessity of the Western arms build-up. In this context, the peace movement had a very hard time fighting accusations that it was the dupe, if not the conscious agent, of Moscow. The call for a negotiated mutual reduction of arms, a stand that was politically acceptable to the broad public, was utopian, given the American policy of maintaining nuclear "superiority" and the Soviet insistence on parity. On the other hand, the demand for a unilateral Western reduction, a politically more "correct" demand, was clearly unacceptable to most people.
NATO's "two-track" policy
The deadlock under Brezhnev was nowhere more evident than in the case of the 1979 NATO decision to introduce American intermediate-range cruise and Pershing-Il missiles into Europe. Despite all the talk of allaying fears of the US "decoupling" from Western Europe, the basic motivation behind this decision was NATO's new "forward strategy" called "overland battle". The idea was that in case of war, NATO forces would move forward rapidly to carry the war into Warsaw Pact territory, thus sparing Western Europe. Intermediate-range cruise and Pershing missiles stationed in Western and Central Europe were just what was needed. Fortunately for NATO, as has often occurred in the past, the Soviets inadvertently supplied the prelext: quite independently of the NATO decision, they decided to "modernize" their own intermediate-range missiles. The SS20s thus became the "reason", after the fact, for NATO's new and very dangerous
NATO policy was officially "two track", that is, we won't install our new accurate and fast intermediate missiles in Europe if you remove all the intermediate missiles you already have there. At the same time, the US refused to consider elimination of the French and British nuclear arsenals, which were due to be upgraded. This so-called "zero option" proposal was put forward in 1981 only because it was assumed to be unaceeptable to the Soviets. And it was. Moscow broke off all arms negotiations and, following its policy of "parity", answered the Americans with an increase in the number of SS-20s and their installation in the GDR and in Czechoslovakia.
When all this failed to move the Americans, the Soviets finally agreed to return to the START (long-range missiles) talks, believing that the Americans had agreed to put "star wars" on the table. While this indeed seemed to have been the case, the US 14 negotiming on this questiony need at soon emphatically denied any intention of International Viewpoint • March 7, 1988 with nothing to hope for, would cancel the scheduled summit.
But, soon after Gorbachev came to power, Gromyko - who represented the traditional policy — was "kicked upstairs" out of his post as foreign minister and into the presidency of the Supreme Soviet. This was a sign of a shift in policy. There followed a most remarkable series of unilateral concessions and proposals from the Soviet Union beginning with the freeze on nuclear testing, repeatedly extended in the face of American testing. This was followed by Soviet agreement to separate the talks on the European missiles from the two other arms reduction negotiations. Finally, to the Americans' total consternation, the Soviets in effect accepted the zero option proposal, including the total exclusion of the French and British arsenals.
The Americans, at a loss, then added a new demand: no longer a freeze of SS-20s in Asia but significant cuts and finally their complete elimination. The Soviets accepted this too. Then the Americans insisted on linking the agreement on intermediate missiles to the short-range missiles based in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, as these could be seen as a substitute for the SS-20s. The Soviets agreed to this too, thus causing consternation among West European political leaders, who began worrying about the de-nuclearization of Europe (the truth finally came out) and its "decoupling" from the United States. (Actually, it is not so much that they fear a Soviet invasion or "nuclear blackmail" as that they fear being left to govern without the "Soviet threat", which has been a crucial basis of political stability in Western Europe since the second world war.) All this without the slightest American concession.
### Balance of terror immoral
The new orientation in foreign policy was summarized in an article by Academician Primakov in Pravda of July 10, 1987. Primakov begins by rejecting the traditional view that "increasing fighting sufficiency... [is] virtually the only means of maintaining the country's security at the proper level....Today, such assessments and interpretations are clearly insufficient and inaccurate. While maintaining the great importance of improving its defence capability, the Soviet Union is bringing to the fore political means of ensuring its
Primakov argues that deterrence based upon parity, upon a balance of terror, is both immoral and unreliable. However, until nuclear weapand replaced by political and legal guarantees, strategic parity, despite everything, will have a stabilizing significance. However, he rejects the traditional view of parity as a quantitative concept, putting forth rather the notion of reasonable sufficiency: "the inability of either side to avoid a devastating retaliatory strike". It is this abandonment of the policy of parity and the return to the concept of minimal deterrence (which was the policy under Khrushchev at least until 1962-3) that has allowed the Soviet government to make these unilateral concessions, unthinkable under Brezhnev.
Primakov admits that the old policy was a losing game for the Soviet Union that played directly into American hands:
"In the past, in a number of cases we agreed to the 'rules of the game' that were imposed on us, which consisted of symmetrical responses to American steps in the arms race. In this way, the US, one can assume, deliberately wanted to wear us out economically. Now, with the introduction of the principle of reasonable sufficiency, will find such attempts very
"Concessions to common
It is clear that this policy is not to the liking of a very significant part of the military establishment or to the more conservative sectors of the party and diplomatic bureaucracies. As Primakov notes:
"Sometimes the measures are perceived as concessions on the part of the USSR. In fact, one must say in no uncertain terms that in a number of cases concessions are designed to reduce things to a common denominator where the problem of arms reduction is con
cerned. But these are concessions to comsense, not a retreat under US mon pressure...
"Events have shown that stagnation is by no means a synonym for firmness; the flexible and dynamic Soviet proposals, which are constantly being developed and clarified, keep the militaristic forces that felt much more comfortable without this flexibility and this dynamism on our part in a state of constant tension and give them no respite.
Gorbachev sends warning to the military
"We proceed from the premise that the new approaches to international affairs that are guiding Soviet policy are not just the only approaches possible in today's conditions, but also are perfectly realistic."
Despite popular Western theories about the supposed militarization of the Soviet regime, civilian control of the Soviet armed forces has never been challenged, although
Brezhnev definitely did have a warm place in his heart for the military and generally shared its outlook on the arms race. Gorbachev, however, has not had much trouble in moving away from these policies and putting the army in its place. He sent a warnthe military, when, following ing to
'plane landing in Red
Matthias Rust's
Square in May 1987, he dismissed not only the commander of the antiaircraft defences, but the minister of defence himself, to replace him with a man of his choice.
This, of course, has not necessarily put an end to the military's complaints
(for example, it has openly taken exception to recently published too-truthful accounts of the second world war), and it might well eventually play a role in any coalition that sought to remove Gorbachev or force him to abandon his internal and external policies. But, for the time being at least, despite certain signs of a slowdown in the reform process due to internal opposition (especially after the dismissal of Moscow party chief Boris Yeltsin), Gorbachev and the backers of perestroika are still quite firmly in control.
Of course, Gorbachev does not have any illusions about being able to change the basic course of Reagan's policy. In particular, the agreement on intermediate-range missiles has not at all affected NATO strategy in Europe. Land-based missiles, in any case, were too visible politically and too easily aroused popular opposition. Now, with the public's fears allayed by the removal of European land-based missiles, the move to precision and deep strike air and sea weapons can go ahead smoothly just as Reagan continues to push "star wars", the real aim of which is to give the US the ability to launch a first strike without itself being exposed to "unacceptable" destruction
But Gorbachev's aim is not to influence Reagan. Soviet concessions are aimed at influencing American and NATO policy indirectly through the US Congress, but more generally through public opinion. As Primakov wrote:
"Of course, the situation is still a long way from one in which these new approaches and the new political thinking are adopted by the American leadership. More than that, the US is putting up fierce resistance to the Soviet course. Militarism does not surrender so easily, and it is not going to surrender its positions.
"Popularity of Soviet state abroad is unprecedented"
"All the same, the situation today is far from what it was two or three years ago. It is becoming more and more difficult for the anti-Soviet elements in the West to maintain their artificially created image of the USSR as a bellicose undemocratic state that threatens the world and thinks about nothing but expansion. Public opinion polls in the US and Western Europe indicate that this myth is not holding up when it collides with perestroika and glasnost [openness] in the USSR and the Soviet Union's constructive foreign policy. The popularity of the among the masses and among intellectuals -is unprecedented
"Of course, a change in public opinion in the West still does not create, in and of itself, a decisive shift in the international situation. But important preconditions are forming for such a shift. The flexibility and constructiveness of the Soviet Union's foreign policy is certainly conducive to the development of this trend." In the area of the East-West arms
USSR race, then, Soviet policy has clearly taken a turn, one that seeks to create the conditions for a genuine alliance between the Soviet Union and the popular antimilitaristic forces in the West. There are definite signs that popular belief in the "Soviet threat" and the gut-level antiSovietism, basic elements of the dominant ideology in the post-war West, are indeed weakening. It goes without saying that if this process were to be carried through to its conclusion, it would have a tremendous impact on politics in the capitalist world, both international and domestic.
But whether this process can be carried through depends in the last analysis on genuine democratization in the Soviet Union. Democratization means the genuine and complete shift in the political basis of the regime from the bureaucracy to the people (that is, the working class). The liberalization and the ultra-cautious playing with democracy that have so far marked the perestroika clearly do not provide a stable basis for the change to a consistent internationalist foreign policy.
A potential threat to imperialism and militarism
But the opposite is equally true: a consistent internationalist foreign policy is not a realistic option for the Soviet regime unless it is democratic. For unless the Soviet Union convincingly sheds its authoritarian, anti-popular domestic policies to become a genuine socialist democracy, any attempt to base its foreign policy on alliances with working class and popular movements in the West will necessarily fail.
On the other hand, as even the liberalization to date has demonstrated, a democratic Soviet Union (which would necessarily be infinitely more democratic than any existing bourgeois state), would have a tremendous attraction in the West. Such an alliance would pose the greatest threat to Western imperialism and militarism.
The prospect of genuine democratization in the Soviet Union depends upon the independent mobilization of the working class, possibly in alliance with the most radical sectors of the bureaucracy. So far, despite some popular stirrings, this has not occurred. It probably will not happen until the crisis at the top, the struggle between pro- and anti-reform elements in the bureaucracy and in the leadership, becomes much more acute.!
Developments in the Soviet Union over the next few years will therefore be decisive, not only for the USSR but for the entire world.* 1. For an analysis of the politics of Soviet reform, see (USSR special issue), October 26, 1987.
March 7, 1988 • International Viewpoint
Table 1: World Military Expenditure 1985(1980 prices)
USA
Other NATO
Total NATO
USSR
Other Warsaw Pact
Total Warsaw Pact
Other Europe
China
Third World states
World total
$ billion 123 18.5 328 49.4 146 22.0 14 21 160 24.1 17 2.5 :30 :4.5 128 19.5 663 100
USA
Strategic forces
USSR
Britain
France
China
Intercontinental missiles Submarine-launched missiles 640 Bombers 339 Theatre forces
Aircraft 2,900 Artillery 4,300 Missiles 2,300 Strategic warheads
1,398 20 967 64 96 26 140 100 3,800 238 129 15 3,700 5,500 62 125
13,680 (see Table 1). An enormous potential for repression and 22,640 aggression has been built up, threatening not just the Table 3: Missiles eliminated (Washington Treaty) movements for liberation and independence, but the survival of humanity as a whole.