No Soviet
deals with
imperialism
THE UNITED Secretariat of the Fourth International issued the following statement on March 21. ington and Islamabad on the formation of a new Afghan government, as is being demanded by the Pakistani dictatorship.
"This is a purely internal Afghan problem. Only the Afghans can settle it, even if they belong to different, or even opposing camps. When it is suggested that the Soviet Union must take part in negotiations over this and still more with third states, we answer clearly: Spare us this, it is not our problem, or yours." That is what Mikhail Gorbachev has said.
This attitude is in total contradiction with the crude interference represented by the intervention of Soviet troops in Kabul in December 1979, just as it stands in contradiction to the very numerous occasions throughout the history of the Soviet bureaucracy when it has negotiated the fate of governments in other countries with imperialism and forced its allies in these countries to conform to the results of these
The coming months and years will make it possible to verify whether the principle declared by Gorbachev is more than a purely circumstantial argument, especially since under Gorbachev Moscow today is advocating a worldwide course of "reconmarked by the worst kind of "peaceful coexistence" illusions. This conciliationist course has already revealed its futility in Afghanistan, where Najibullah's "national reconciliation" got the brush-off from the reactionary Islamic Alliance.
However, this did not keep Gorbachev in his February 8 statement from expressing a wish for the same sort of "reconciliation" for the Middle East, South Africa, Kampuchea and Central America! We will oppose any attempt by the Kremlin to pressure the peoples of these countries and regions into accepting so-called reconciliation with
The USSR's duty is to provide aid, without strings, to the peoples struggling against imperialism and reaction. Only the leaderships of these struggles have the right to negotiate compromises with the imperialists and their partners. In this respect, since Moscow initially made ending US and Pakistani aid to the Mujahadin a condition for the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan, it rapidly found itself confronted with a new condition from Washington — the ending of Soviet aid to the Kabul government following the withdrawal of Soviet troops.
This sort of trading between Moscow and Washington, over the heads of their respective allies, in the last analysis can only harm the more advanced revolutionary struggles. To get what it wants in Afghanistan for example, Moscow might be led to make concessions at the expense of Nicaragua, which is less important for its own security. This is why, rejecting such deals in principle, we call for a withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan without negotiations between Moscow and Washington. The USSR must withdraw its forces from Afghanistan without delay, and continue to provide aid for the Afghan progressive . forces struggling against the feudal-tribal and Islamic reactionaries, who are supported by imperialist and the reactionary Muslim states. It should conform to the announcement by Moscow on March 17 that its troops will withdraw, even if no agreement is reached with Pakistan and the United States. Moscow is continuing, however, to express its desire for such an accord and to pursue that end. Washington raises the
Even before being implemented, the Soviet decision has already sown deepgoing disarray in the enemy camp. This is true at an international level. The most reactionary currents in the imperialist countries are disgusted by the perspective of losing what has been one of their main anti-Soviet arguments in recent years. Some have gone so far as to denounce the decision for a Soviet withdrawal, calling it "Machiavellian"! Far from making it easier for Moscow to withdraw its troops, the US is upping the ante.
The same thing is happening on the ground. After having concealed their differences and rivalries behind a facade of unity against the Soviet invader, the various components of the Islamic Alliance based in Peshawar, on Pakistani territory, are clashing and more openly. Recently, the strongest of these forces, but also the most fanatical and the most reactionary — Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islamic — has taken the leadership of the Alliance. As the Soviet troops withdraw, the Mujahadin organizations will lose their aura of "freedom fighters," as Reagan calls them, and appear as they are — profoundly corrupt reactionary organizations representing contending, irreconcilable ambitions for power.
If, however, the government proves incapable of surviving the Soviet withdrawal, its fall would anyway be a lesser evil than the Soviet Union getting bogged down indefinitely in Afghanistan. In any event, in the long run, the withdrawal will benefit the development of a mass revolutionary movement in Afghanistan and in its neighboring countries. *