Social crisis and the workers' economic struggles.! This is an element holding back a further radicalization.
A second factor that exerts a strong influence over the economic situation is the debt. Also as a result of the partnership with "mafia capital," the consequences of the debt have not been so onerous as in other Latin American countries. But today the
BOURGEOIS SOCIETY is decaying very rapidly in Colombia, despite the fact that the economic crisis in this country is less severe than in most others in Latin-America. The increasing number of murders committed both by para-police gangs and drug traffickers' goons have begun to become a major international scandal, like the "dirty" war waged by the repressive forces under the last Argentine dictatorship.
Revolutionary guerrilla forces have become well rooted and are apparently growing.
The following article describes the growth of governmental and drug gangsterism in the country, their connections, the deteriorating living conditions of Colombian working people and the relationship between the guerrilla organizations and social struggles.
RENE GONZALEZ
HE "DIRTY WAR" is develop-
T ing in the context of a social crisis and a crisis of traditional values and the state institutions. It is these pressures today that determine the way the regime behaves toward the population of the country.
The following figures illustrate the social situation created both by Colombia's dependent capitalism and by the accelerated urbanization of the country over the last decade. These figures come from an official report presented in connection with a project for the most backward parts of the country, where absolute poverty prevails and the population has been left in total
It is in such areas that the social radicalization has been the strongest and where the guerrillas have found their traditional base of support. The government has begun a campaign to try to gain entry into these regions through paternalism, by undertaking some socially useful schemes, such as building roads and water pipes.
Illiteracy is 30%. In a country of 28 million inhabitants, only 6 million have access to state health services. Only 50% of housing needs are being met; 30% of the population is "undernourished," and 15% live in what the international bodies call "absolute poverty," that is, below the subsistence level. They do not even get the minimum calories the human body needs to sustain itself.
In the present economic situation, these
"structural" living conditions are growing worse. Over the last two years, the Colom-
22 Van econemy has expens an average
International Viewpoint #141 • May 16, 1988 growth of 5% in Gross National Product. This has led the bourgeoisie to boast about abundance. But today the bourgeois economists themselves agree that the upturn was fundamentally due to capacity installed at the beginning of the 1980s.
Production will be much more limited this year. Inflation will increase, even if, in relative terms, Colombia has been relatively stable until now in comparison with other countries in Latin America. The reason for this is the association with "mafia
No political tradition in trade-union movement
In the first months of this year, we saw the beginning of an inflationary process. For January and February alone, there was a 7% increase in the cost of living. By way of comparison, at the start of the year the country's main labor organization, the Central Unica de Trabajadores (CUT, the United Confederation of Workers) negotiated a wage agreement calling for raises of the order of 21% for the whole of 1988.
In other words, in only two months, a third of this increase has been eaten away. This factor is quite important because, as we will see later, the Colombian trade-union movement is fundamentally concerned with immediate economic demands. It has no political tradition. The fact that the bourgeoisie can still negotiate the minimum wage level and a ceiling on annual wage increases enables it to keep a rein on government itself recognizes that nearly 40% of the national budget goes to pay the interest on the debt. If you add to this fact the government's splurge on "modernizing" the army and the police, nearly 70% of the national budget goes on the debt and the military.
"Mafia capital" and the drug trade
In this social panorama of crisis, the agrarian question has to be highlighted. It continues to be a problem because of the traditional domination of the big landowners. The democratic struggle of the peasants for the land has always been met by the armed forces with assassinations and the formation of paramilitary gangs.
This is the context in which "mafia capital" operates. The importance of the mafia in Colombia is not simply economic. As I said, the debt is not as burdensome as elsewhere because the Colombian bourgeoisie has come up with a mechanism enabling the mafia to "launder" dollars piled up from the drug trade. The public banks do this job. and this makes it possible to maintain a currency reserve giving the government a certain margin of maneuver with regard to the debt, although this of course has no effect on the productive infrastructure.
What has happened in Colombia, especially in the last 15 years, is a fusion of traditional and mafia capital. Today, banking would be unthinkable without the mafia. The buying and selling of land, especially in the urban areas, would be unthinkable without the mafia. The immense fortunes circulating in the real-estate business are considered publicly by everyone to come from the drug trade and be controlled by "mafia capital."
In Medellín, the country's second largest city, which has been made famous by the notorious "Medellín cartel" 2, the weekly Semana ventured to say that it could be calculated that more than 70% of the city's economy is today controlled by the mafia.
Not only commerce and banking are implicated but now the productive apparatus, especially textiles, Medellín's traditional industry. "Mafia capital" has now expanded to such an extent that the process of accumulation is unthinkable in Colombia 1. The minimum wage level is negotiated between the government and the unions annually. The govemment also imposes a ceiling on wage increases relative to the rate of inflation. 2. A group of "big wigs" in the drug business, including the Escobar family and the Ochas, who have one of the world's biggest fortunes.
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COLOMBIA "dirty war"
today without it.
This factor is compounded by the social crisis, the fact that the workers' movement is unable to respond on the political level, political fragmentation and the demoralization produced by the growth of unemployment, which stands officially at 15%. (Of course, you have to add to this the high level of under-employment reflected in the expansion of what is known as the "informal" economy, which involves nearly half the population.)
State institutions riddled with mafia influence
The result is that sections of the population are beginning to be drawn into the mafia. It is no longer just the "lumpen" dregs of society, but also technicians and professionals, who realize that working for themselves or for the state will not bring them as much income as the mafia can offer. There is no need to dwell on the fact that these developments have to be taken very seriously by all those who want to offer a social
The problem of the mafia is linked to the institutions of the state themselves. At the beginning of last year, Reagan tried to force Virgilio Barco's government to declare war on the mafia, or at least to clean out some sections of it. This offensive led to the terrorist attack on the home of Escobar, one of the Cartel's "godfathers," in Medellín, a house well known to everyone in the region.
The mafia's response was swift - the assassination of the general prosecutor of the republic, Carlos Hoyos, on January 25 and the kidnapping of the Conservative presidential candidate, Andrés Pestrana, today mayor of Bogotá. It became glaringly evident to everyone that the state institutions —the army, Congress and the traditional parties — are riddled with mafia influence.
AL CAMPOS The interpenetration is so great that it is unthinkable that war can be waged on the mafia in Colombia based on the bourgeoisie.
There is no bourgeois institution, even the Catholic hierarchy, that is not linked to the mafia! Traditionally, Catholicism has been a very strong mechanism for controlling the population, purveying an ideology of submission, resignation, waiting for rewards in another life. But the exposure of the links existing between the mafia and the ecclesiastical hierarchy has provoked a deepgoing unease in the population. It is beginning to think that the Church is not as pure as it would like peo-
The same phenomenon is developing with regard to the army. The military's ties with the mafia are so tight that in some regions you cannot tell where one leaves off and the other begins. This army has never faced a foreign enemy. Its sights are set entirely on the struggle against the "internal enemy." It is shaped by a profoundly antiCommunist ideology, a long tradition of assassinations and state-of-siege conditions in which there is no guarantee even of most minimal democratic freedoms.
Emerging centralization of struggles
As for parliament, it is totally corrupt and discredited, a gang of tinhorn politicians thoroughly infiltrated by the mafia. It is based on patronage and a distribution of bureaucratic posts, along with forms of siphoning off state revenues.
Such an all-pervasive crisis of the state obviously has not failed to have an impact on the development of the mass movement. The latter is beginning to go beyond immediate reactions to the social crisis and to the austerity plans of the government and the IMF. A centralization of the various struggles is beginning to emerge. This is a major
COLOMBIA change, because for 30 or 40 years the mass movement in Colombia has had a tradition of division.
For example, until 1987 when the CUT was founded, the trade-union movement was divided into four confederations?, , not counting what were called the independent trade unions, which were not linked to any of these. So the appearance of the CUT is an extremely important development. There is now an organization that can respond centrally, at least on an economic level, to the austerity plans of the government and the IMP.
Plans for a single peasant confederation
Likewise we are seeing a centralization of the peasant movement. The formation of a single peasant confederation is being discussed, which is going to facilitate the development of peasant struggles in the country, and there are already rather strong united actions in the countryside. The same thing is happening among the Indians, who are also building a national apparatus for struggle. But these advances made by the mass movement are contradictory. There
Because of the sort of leadership the CUT has, the trade-union movement's struggle is limited entirely to immediate economic demands. Political struggle, even for democratic liberties, is not posed. Therefore, the response of the mass movement to the "dirty war" falls far short of what is needed.
What methods are being used today by the bourgeoisie and the armed forces in the "dirty war"? First of all, we have what can be called the traditional one — armed paramilitary gangs. The government recognized in the fall of 1987 that there were more than 140 groups of this sort. Generally, they are regional combinations between the private sector bosses, the big landowners, the mafia and the regional structures of the armed
The intelligence operations are carried out by the army services, and the dirty work is done by mafioso goons. There are mafia training camps. If the government has officially recognized the existence of 140 groups, it can easily be imagined that the real figure is five or six times that number.
These gangs stop at nothing to terrorize people. Death lists are made public throughout the country of trade-union leaders and human rights activists. The gangs also use telephone blackmail, threatening to kill people if they do not stop their activities. They send activists death notices bearing their names and inviting them to their own funeral. In general, the first step is intimidation, but it does not stop there. 3. The Workers' Confederation of Colombia (CTC), linked to the Liberal Party; the Union of Workers of Colombia (UTC), Catholic in inspiration and linked to the Conservative party; the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) and the Trade-Union Confederation of 23 Workers of Colombia (CSTC) led by the CP. May 16, 1988 • #141 International Viewpoint
COLOMBIA
The second step is sending a thug to assassinate the person concerned, or causing a "disappearance." Activists are kidnapped, and their bodies are found a few days later, mutilated by torture. For some time, especially in the province of Antioquia, there have been mass murders. This happened in Medellín in November 1987, when a group of paramilitaries burst into a headquarters of the Communist Youth and executed all the activists there, about 20 people.
Selective repression of the vanguard
Recently, in Urabá, also in the province of Antioquia, on the border with Panama, thugs murdered about 40 union leaders in the area, where there are big banana plantations. They went onto an estate and killed about 20 people; then went onto another and killed 20 others. Here the link with the mafia is clear, because it wanted to get hold
On the model of what happened in Argentina during the dictatorship, what we are seeing at work is a mechanism for selective repression of the vanguard. The paramilitary groups are assassinating the best trade-union and political cadres, those who have a mass following, so that if a generalized upsurge of the mass movement occurs it will find no leadership. We see this clearly because it is not just the "public" cadres of the left who are being murdered, but also internal cadres of the organizations. Here the hand of the military intelligence servic-
While it makes more and more statements about opening investigations to find the assassins — who are known to everyone — the government is investing in modthe police and army increasing their numbers. Today, the armed forces include about 120,000 men. The government proposes to increase this by 40,000 to 50,000 men over the next two years. What is more, in Colombia the police are not under the Ministry of the Interior but under the army. In the same period, the police apparatus is to be beefed up by 30,000 more men.
The bourgeoisie is already acting as if we were in a civil war situation, as if we already had a general confrontation. It is throwing the full weight of the state into
The mass movement made a major response on the social level. The number of "civic strikes," especially in middle-sized cities, is impressive, as are the agrarian struggles, which in Colombia are almost inevitably guerrilla struggles. In fact, conditions have been such that waging a legal struggle in the countryside automatically means accepting the murder of the cadres of the peasant movement. This is why peasant mobilizations are inevitably ac24 companied by guerrilla struggle, and provide a base for guerrilla movements. International Viewpoint #141 • May 16, 1988
However, the leaderships of the guerrilla movements have realized that because of the urbanization of the country, it is necessary to "transfer" some of the gains they have made in the rural areas to the urban ones. And they are doing that, especially in the middle-sized cities. Alongside this radicalization in the countryside, in the cities - as already mentioned limitations of the trade-union movement, which restricts itself to immediate econom-
In the big cities, the state institutions retain a considerable weight. This is indicated by the recent mayoral elections, where we saw a reinforcement of the traditional two-party system, despite an abstention rate of 44%.4 This shows that on the electoral level at least there is no alternative to the Conservative and Liberal parties.
Let us look now at what is happening on the left. First of all, it has be to noted that because of the country's features, owing to the social structure itself, a large part of this left is linked to guerrilla warfare. That is not only an expression of the peasant movements but also the result of the the left's very limited possibilities for legal activity. Recently, in September 1987, the various guerrilla organizations decided to form a common coordinating body, the "Simón Bolívar" Guerrilla Coordinating
The Communist Party is the strongest organization on the left, and is linked to the oldest of the Colombian guerrilla organizations, the Fighting Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC-EP). The latter participated in the truce operation carried out under the government of the Conservative Betancur (1982-86) in 1983. At that time, the CP's policy was to try to integrate itself to the greatest possible degree into the state's po-
Rural guerrilla movement
In this period many CP statements, as well as those of the FARC leadership, maintained that it was possible to gain a place in mass politics by "reinvesting" the capital of the guerrilla movement in legal activity. Such statements went so far as to envisage the guerrillas laying down their arms in order to take advantage of this opportunity. They thought that the regime could offer democratic guarantees, a minimum agrarian reform and so on.
The FARC is largely a rural guerrilla movement, with an agrarian program and peasant self-defence methods. The CP operates in the urban areas and the FARC in the rural ones. The FARC today has about 50 "fronts" and about 4,500 guerrillas, according to the Colombian army's own
On the basis of this negotiation with Bentancur, the CP publicly avowed its link with the FARC and in 1985 formed the Unión Patriotica (UP), which brought together CP cadres and FARC cadres who had become "legal." This organization has conducted a policy of what could be called classic class conciliationism and collaboration. In particular, its policy has involved presenting all the government's maneuvers
During the recent elections in March, in 80% of the cases, the UP made deals with the most corrupt Liberals. They did not even try to ally themselves with the more "presentable" Liberals, despite the fact that this regime has been ruthless toward the UP. In two years, the UP has seen nearly 600 of its leaders and activists murdered, including its general secretary, Jaime Pardo Leal, who was executed last October. In the municipal elections, it won only 14 posts, and one of these mayors has already been
Contradictions open debate in CP
The contrast between the massive repression that the UP faces and its reformist political language is preparing the way for a debate within this organization. But we know that this will not come about automatically. There is not going to be any major crisis in the Communist Party of Colombia until an alternative revolutionary pole is built up that will offer an example of a revolutionary policy in all areas of the struggle — in the trade unions, the countryside, the cities and so on.
M-19 is another armed left current. A part of the leadership of this guerrilla organization came out of a split from the FARC, another came from the ANAPO [Alianza Nacional Popular, a populist party led by the former dictator Rojas Pinilla]. In the 1960s, they launched a debate, noting that there was a stable guerrilla movement but that it had no impact in the country, because it was essentially rural and urbanization was accelerating. Bateman, who came from the FARC and was to become the major leader of M-19, raised the idea of a guerrilla movement projecting itself into
In Colombia, the guerrillas are a strong pole of attraction for the class-struggle left, for radical trade unionists and for the radical peasant movement. Therefore, at the beginning of the 1970s, when the M-19 was formed, it gained an influence over a large section of the radical trade-union movement. From the outset, it was different from the traditional guerrilla movements that the country had known.
Under the Turbay Liberal government (1978-82), M-19 launched a series of large-scale operations. The government's response was brutal. It resorted to systematic torture and assassination of the guerrilla leaders. The entire leadership, except for Bateman, was imprisoned. But because M4. For an analysis of the municipal elections, see "Democracy and the dirty war," in /V 138, April 4, 1988.
19 had already gained a mass following, this repression led to the formation of organizations to defend hu-
These groups man rights.
waged an international campaign that offered M-19 an opportunity to increase its prestige.
So, when the Turbay government came to an end in 1982, not only had it been discredited by the activity of the military, but the role of M-19 in the left and in the social movement as a whole had been reinforced.
So, when Betancur set up his peace commission, at the start it was directed primarily at the M-19.
The M-19 had said that if there was a process of general amnesty, it was ready to go back into a legal framework. This is what happened when Betancur advanced his operation. But the military cadres were the political ones and vice versa; the leadership was at once political and military. Those who publicly conducted the negotiations with the government were also the movement's military cadres.
M-19 leadership decimated by repression
At the end of the Betancur period and the beginning of the Barco period, this leadership was to be decimated by repression. In other words, the regime's operation consisted of getting them to come out into the open in the period of "peace" in order better to assassinate them, and it was successful.
This was a lesson for the left as a whole in
Colombia.
If you compare what happened in the case of M-19 with the FARC, the contrast is striking. The latter organization maintains a strict separation between public work and military activity. It has not suffered the consequences of the blows suffered by the
UP. Its leadership is intact today.
Obviously, Betancur's whole "peace" operation was no more than a maneuver, as subsequent events were to prove. There was not the slightest agrarian reform measure or any step to widen democratic liberties. There was only a sharpening of repression.
The Marxist-Leninist Communist
Party (PCml) comes from Maoist origins. It has broken all its ties with China,
Albania and so on. Today, it is adapting increasingly to the policy of the Communist
Party. This has provoked an internal crisis, and that is now paralyzing the party to a large extent. But it still has a mass base.
The PCml is linked to a guerrilla organization, the People's Liberation Army (EPL).
Liberation Army (UC-ELN) is the last major current in the armed left. Of "Guevarist" origin, it included Camillo Torres in its ranks. The priest joined the guerrillas, and died in battle in 1967. After going through a serious crisis owing to its focoist strategy, this organization drew a balance sheet. It turned toward the idea of stable zones with a peasant base where it could build up its strength. This was more or less a conception of "prolonged people's
The ELN did not participate in the "peace negotiations" in the Betancur period, because it disagreed politically with the course taken, for example, by the FARC and M-19, and it was suspicious of the government's intentions. Subsequent events confirmed this judgment. stance strengthened it numerically and politically on the national level.
Today, the Ministry of Defence estimates that the ELN has 1,500 guerrillas fighting on about a dozen fronts. It is, unquestionably, the second largest guerrilla force in the country after the FARC. And, like the latter, the ELN is not limiting itself to sporadic operations but controls certain areas in which the local population play an active
A Luchar includes most radical forces
The organization A Luchar [To Struggle"] has emerged in the general context of a recomposition of the mass movement and the revolutionary left. Today, it includes all the most radical forces in the social movement as a whole, and especially in the trade-union movement.
COLOMBIA
A Luchar is the second largest force on the left today, after the UP. It is the dominant force in the peasant confederation that is emerging, which undoubtedly will hold its congress in the next six months. It controls the major part of the Indian organization, and also a third of the leadership of CUT. It is the only radical force in the CUT, and the only one that is really confronting the policy of the trade-union bureaucracy and the class-collaborationist policy of the UP.
Objective of becoming
La revolutionary party
At the beginning, A Luchar was only a broad mass movement. But because of the needs of the social movement, the need to centralize this movement, it is now tackling the problem of centralizing itself politically, of adopting a better defined program, platform and political activity. It has just gone through a whole period of discussion in preparing for its second national convention, which will be held in May. Its objective today is to become a revolutionary party in the full sense of the term. (PSR), the Colombian section of the Fourth International, has decided to join A Luchar. (See the political accord on page ??). We will take part in the coming convention of this organization, and after that date we will work together as a single
We reached this conclusion after a selfcritical balance sheet of the PR's activity and political line in the past period
We had underestimated some fundamental aspects of the situation in the country: 25 the guerrilla tradition, the weight of the May 16, 1988 • #141 International Viewpoint
COLOMBIA peasant question, the question of national sovereignty. In that respect, we drew a negative balance of the past period. It became clear that we could not build a revolutionary alternative on the basis of the PSR alone. You cannot build a revolutionary leadership only on the basis of the correctness of a general program.
Need to build an activist A LUCHAR backbone
A Luchar is an organization to be built. At present, it sill does not have a stable infrastructure with regional leaderships, a solid foundation of cadres and so forth. That is the main problem facing us. A Luchar is a revolutionary organization with a very broad mass following, and it has to build an activist backbone in order to respond to the needs of the situation. This is also one of the lessons that can be drawn from the experiences of the Central American revolutionists. Moreover, the same sort of problems face our comrades in the Mexican PRT [Revolutionary Workers' Party, Mexican section of the Fourth International]. They arise from the social formations in these countries.
In regard to politics in the strict sense, we are discussing with the comrades of A Luchar what tactic we should adopt in the urban areas and on the constitutional and parliamentary level.
We think that we also have to fight on this ground to win the mass movement away from the traditional parties, because until the mass movement has broken out of the framework imposed by the two-party system we will not be able to move on to a higher stage of central confrontation with the government. Of course, we cannot limit ourselves to talking about the need for waging what we call constitutional political struggle, because the framework of the dirty war itself imposes a combination of tasks.
We are joining A Luchar as a political current, and will wage political and ideological battles in the organization that will come into being in May, on the basis, of course, of accepting its public discipline. We will have all the means for conducting political and ideological discussions - 1nternal structures, discussion bulletins and so on - in order to convince the other members of A Luchar of what we believe to be correct.
We think that Trotskyists in Colombia today, and what the PSR represents, can play an important role in building a revolutionary leadership. It is a difficult road. In a more than unstable situation, in which tempos can suddenly accelerate, the stakes are enormous.
For us joining A Luchar is not a political "operation," or a "raid." It is an important stage in the process of recomposing the revolutionary vanguard in Colombia, the 26 objective of which is to build a revolutionary leadership. International Viewpoint #141 • May 16, 1988
Political
accord
between
the PSR
and
A Luchar
ONVERGENCE has occurred between the organization Socialist Party (PSR) on a number of important political and practical points. They can be summed up
• The struggle against imperialism, defence of national sovereignty and of our natural resources and non-repayment of the
• Rejection of the Constitutional Reform, of the modernization of the capitalist state, which is trying to take on constitutional forms to co-opt and defuse social
• The need to give impetus and concrete form to various processes of uniting the masses, such as the United Workers' Confederation (CUT), the National Association of Peasants (ANUC), the National Coordinating Committee of Civic Movements (CNMC), the Student Unity Committee (CUE), the National Organization of Colombian Natives (ONIC) and for organizing women.
• Defence against the military, the dirty war and paramilitary groups.
• Support for the processes of political and social unity that are represented today in the National Unity Committee (CNU) and the Working Group for a Democratic and Popular Convergence.!
• Opposition to the government and support for the application of direct mass democracy, for stimulating the mass action and self-organization that have appeared in the strikes in various regions and in the workers' strikes that seek to build up a working-class and people's power.
The bases of this accord are the following:
In beginning this process of fusion, we are aware of the programmatic and tactical differences that exist, of different traditions and practices. However, sensitive to the wind of liberation and the examples of unity offered by the revolutionary leaderships in Central America, the past and still recent experiences in Colombia and the demands of the class struggle itself in our country, we will spare no effort to unite our political will within a single democratic and centralized organization. The objective of this organization will be to become a real revolutionary leadership in the fight against imperialist domination, the oligarchy, as well as against reformist selflimitation and class collaborationism within the workers' and people's movement.
2 The PSR is in agreement on the fun-
damental questions. It considers the conclusions of the first national convention of A Luchar to be an important basis of discussion. It accepts the collective framework of the discussion on program, tactics, organizational questions, the Plan of Action and the line to be followed in the 1. The CNU is a grouping of mass organizations such as ONIC, CNMC, ANUC, political organizations (including A Luchar, the Popular Front, which is linked to the PCml) and various associations (Christians, magazines and so on). Its objective is to coordinate and give impetus to mobilizations.
The call of the Working Group for a Democratic and Popular Convergence that would aim for "a national response to the offensive against Life..in order to seek a solution to the crisis and create a Colombia of peace and social justice" was signed by all the people's, trade-union and left political organizations (ONIC, CUE, CUT, UP, A Luchar, PSR, Popular Front, CP and so on).
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n
With unity, for life, for Colombia and its people,
Simón Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating Committee - the Colombian mass fronts that the various components of
A Luchar have put forward in the preparation for the second convention that is to held in the first half of 1988 in order to build a single revolutionary organization.
Understanding the important role that the revolutionary press plays in orientation, organization and collective cohesion, a PSR comrade will collaborate with the A Luchar newspaper team.
Consequently, while Combate Socialista,
COLOMBIA gradually into a single organ.
We are discussing the possibility of producing a theoretical journal that will consider the fundamental aspects of the national and international situation.
Bogotá, August 27, 1987
3
In order to promote to the maximum this process of achieving political homogeneity and this common work in the present situation, we will build A Lu-
Simon Bolivar Guerrilla
"The char's national political campaign, people speak, the people command," for self-determination of the people in decision
Coordinating Committee making, for their building up in the heat of struggle their own committees, assemblies, councils and people's "councils" that will
FROM THE TIME of this conference, the entire body of the guerrilla put forward municipal programs embracing movement represented today by the Union Camillista-ELN, the Quintin the national objectives of Life, Sovereign-
Lame Command [an Indian guerrilla group], the People's Liberation ly, Peace and Democracy for the people.
This is so that the people's economic and
Army (EPL), the Revolutionary Workers' Party (PRT), the April 19 social demands will not be bogged down
Movement (M-19) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombiawithin the bourgeois institutions, but that
People's Army (FARC-EP) will form the Simón Bolivar Guerrilla Coordithe masses will be able to achieve these demands through their own activity and
In this way, we are joining in the process of popular, democratic, civil strength.
and social convergence that all of Colombia is going through. This decision is necessary because of the unprecedented crisis the country is
There is a tactical difference on experiencing, most acutely expressed by the dirty war, rampant hunger elections. The PSR thinks that they and the violence unleashed by the militarist and fascist oligarchy.
have to be used as a platform for making denunciations and for mobilizing.
Aware of the authority, the road and the example that the people's
A Luchar thinks that this is not possible.
arms and unity represent, we have agreed on the following points,
Therefore, the rule adopted is to respect both views. Insofar as the PSR's electoral
• To continue to build unity on the basis of autonomy, ideological and registration offers it opportunities, the PSR political independence and mutual respect among the various forces declares that it is ready to share its access to the media with A Luchar for the presenta-
• To give impetus to all processes and the most diverse expressions tion of their political opinions.
of national convergence around the need for democracy and respect
Through common organizational
• To support and promote every gain and reform that means an immeans, we will advance common proposals in all encounters with othprovement in the quality of life for Colombians.
er political organizations and in the mass
• To demand full and complete guarantees for political action around organizations such as the CUT, CUE, the popular election of mayors for the mass organizations that partici-
CNU, the Working Group, ANUC, CNMC pate in these elections, whether or not they run candidates.
and women's organizations. We will dis-
• To reject the government's ultimatum to demobilize the guerrilla cuss whether or not it is politically oppormovement, inasmuch as this represents a declaration of total war, a tune to appear publicly only as A Luchar.
definite breaking off of dialogue and a false solution for the country,
Consistent with our internationalist
• We reiterate our opposition to war, and we insist on the need for po practice, we will strive to set up solidarity committees with the peoples litical solutions in line with the urgent requirements for democracy and of Central America and the other countries in the world that are fighting for their liber-
• We have not been the first to take the path of war, and we have alation. Likewise, if A Luchar defines itself ways been ready for different solutions. But if the regime wants to step as a unitary organization at its second conup the war and generalize it, we will meet the challenge of such a convention, the members of the PSR will refrontation. We will take on the building of an army that will be the guarmain free to affiliate to an international antor and defender of life for national and political sovereignty.
current.
• To defend life as the greatest good for our existence as a nation. To
7
Regarding the fusion as embracing
We appeal for uniting forces, for multiplying actions in defence of life all the activity of the ranks and leadand for building the broadest possible mobilization to stop the dirty war, erships, we are beginning a process of integrating ourselves (which does not in punish the guilty and to press the demand for life as the most important itself mean an immediate dissolution of the
PSR's bodies) into the national and region-
We call on the people and their organizations to be the guarantors of al leadership structures of A Luchar and these agreements, whose objective is to help to build a new Colombia.
into the assemblies in cach area of work un-
And we ask them to make this meeting of guerrillas and the implementil we have the conditions for adopting a tation of their decisions the guarantee of victory.
single organizational model and structure.
The PSR accepts the rule of consensus that has governed decision making in A Luchar since it was founded.
the organ of PSR, will publicize common political agreements, it will be incorporated nating Committee.
which we pledge to pursue:
engaged in this unity.
for life.
which wants fundamental solutions.
change.
that end:
of the people's rights.
PSR and A Luchar Executive
Committees *
27 mountains, September 1987 *
NEW CALEDONIA