CONTRA AID
for military aid made by the contras have been rejected by the US Congress shows that the USA has to look for other ways to destroy the Sandinista revolution.
Objective is still to overthrow Sandinistas
The reasons for this defeat can be found in internal American politics as well as in its relations with Latin America.
To take the internal reasons first, because everyone knows that for a very long time Central America in general, and Nicaragua in particular, have been considered to be a domestic problem by American politicians, whether they be Republicans or Democrats. For a whole period the Democrats were concerned above all not to distance themselves from Reagan, for fear of being accused of opening the door to communists in the region. This policy was to culminate in June 1986 with the vote for giving $100 million to the contras. After Irangate and with the development of the anti-war movement, the Democrats finally realized that the military option in the low-intensity war was not necessarily the best, especially on the eve of elections. Until now, the disadvantages of this strategy have clearly outweighed the advantages.
But this does not mean that the final objective of overthrowing the Sandinista regime will be put aside in the future. It is simply a question of accomplishing this by other means. As the contra military leader Enrique Bermudez opportunely recalled, what is at stake is the "direct defence of the security interests of the United States". (El Pais, May 29, 1988.)
Among the (numerous) disadvantages, in particular attention should be given to relations between the imperialist metropolis and the Latin American regimes. "Democracies" under strict surveillance from their respective armies, these regimes are facing an economic crisis without any forseeable end. And this is provoking a growing mass movement focusing against the IMF, synonymous for many with the "yankees". In this respect, the relative autonomy of these governments' foreign policy — expressed in the Contadora group process, and also in the recognition of Cuba by countries such as Brazil - has both internal and external benefits. The Latin American regimes' foreign policy aims to prove their nationalism to the masses, who criticize them violently for their submission to imperialism. At the same time it is a warning to the United States in a period when the European Community, as well as the Soviet Union, is mounting a diplomatic and economic offensive towards Latin America. Accords are an expression of the balance of forces
It is in this context that the Nicaraguan government's signing of the Esquipulas II accords in August 1987, followed by the Sapoa accords in March this year, must be understood. The accords are the product of the balance of forces that the Sandinistas have been able to establish at a diplomatic level, exemplified by the ruling of The Hague international tribunal in June 1986.2 The same is true at a military level: the USA's armed gangs have been incapable of carrying through their project of overthrowing the regime, or at the least setting up a provisional government with some sort of legitimacy in part of the "free" Nicaraguan territory
Esquipulas took the Americans by sur1. All the same, the (relative) social peace in the country is deteriorating. In March and April, for example, there were a number of strikes, called by the Permanent Workers' Council (CT), protesting against the govemment's economic policies dictated by the IMF. 2. The judgement of the international court of justice, whose headquarters is in The Hague, Holland, declared that the mining of Nicaraguan ports by the US in 1984 was illegal. That said, this judgement was without any practical consequences, even though it had a high symbolic value in terms of legitimating the Nicaraguan goverment.
prise and put them on the defensive. Then, making the best of a bad job, their policy consisted of exploiting all the possibilities opened up by this accord to bleed the Sandinistas dry. Everyone knows that a treaty is simply an expression of the balance of forces — and this is even more true of one that is opening up a process. Nothing is ever static and given for all time. The cynicism of the United States in this case was a real lesson.
### Contras' military collapse
They did not exactly hesitate to remind their allies, in the crudest way, of the aid lavished on them and that this implied, in return, a certain code of ethics in relation to foreign policy - not biting the hand that feeds you. Nicaragua was put in the dock and ordered to apply the accord to the letter, whereas the other countries could treat it as a scrap of paper, regardless of the fact that one of the Esquipulas accords' main points stipulated that it should be applied simultaneously. The prize once again went to Honduras, which went as far as refusing to allow the International Verification and Follow-Up Commission (IVFC) to enter the country. The IVFC was charged with checking with its own eyes the open secret contra presence on Honduran
But alternating spectacular political measures and military offensives, the Sandinista government proved that it was capable of turning the double-edged weapon called Esquipulas against the Central American regimes, which were beset with internal problems that cannot simply be sorted out with American dollars.
It was this same political judgement that led to the signing of the Sapoa accords. The Congress vote refusing military aid to the contras sowed panic in the ranks. The "freedom fighters", as Reagan liked to call them, had seen their financial life-line severed. (In passing, it should be remembered all the same that contra leaders like Bermudez or Calero earned some $7,000 per month; that intermediary grades like commandants Toño or Tigrillo (who rebelled against Bermudez) earned around $1,000; and ordinary soldiers not even $30 (although it is true that they were fed, housed, given everything necessary and armed for free).
Held together by anti-communism and dollars, the mercenary leadership began to be torn apart between the armed-struggle hardliners and the partisans of the line "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush". Sapoa is at the same time the product of this crisis and a factor greatly accelerating it. The contras' military collapse increasingly resembles an American soap opera. There have been armed feuds in the Honduran camps, a battle at the top between the "hardliners" (Bermudez) and the "negotiators" (Calero), mutual accusations of corruption, junkets by the CIA to pick up the pieces and constant comings and goings to the USA to get Big Brother's advice. In addition, Honduras expelled contra commanders who were "traitors", according to Bermudez, because they signed the accord.
In other words, if one section of the contras wants speedy negotiations today, it is because it is a question of life or death for them, with "looking out for number one" taking precedence over ideological considerations, if ideology ever mattered. From this stems the consternation of the Reagan administration and its barely hidden contempt for this truly despicable spectacle offered by its proteges.
On May 23, the correspondent of the Spanish newspaper El Pais reported the following anecdote: "The hotels in Tegucigalpa [the Honduran capital] are full of Americans of doubtful profession, before whom Honduran soldiers snap to attention. We even overheard this joke from a US functionary addressing a member of the contras who was taking a drink in a hotel: 'So, you're spending the humanitarian
Peace for Nicaragua is a life or death question
From this also comes the Sandinistas approach, who make a point of blowing hot and cold towards the contras. From this point of view, their number one objective, divide and rule, has been 100 per cent successful, inasmuch as their intelligent policy applied to the cease-fire zones regarding "rank-and-file" contras is bearing fruit. Many of the contras have watched their leaders squabbling and may be amenable to the idea of going quietly back into the country to see their families, especially because of the amnesty that wipes the slate clean on their recent warlike exploits. Whether a section of the Nicaraguan population that has directly experienced these "exploits" views the same perspective with as much peace of mind is another problem,
This being said, it does not mean on the one hand that the Front did not have an urgent need to negotiate, or on the other that the United States threw in the towel and resigned itself to the existence of a revolution that, simply by its presence, is a fire-brand
For economic and political reasons, Nicaragua needs peace — and even peace at any price, however high - if it simply wants to live. On the economic front, everyone knows the situation. We will not go into details of the consequences of a small country like this having to devote over 50 per cent of its budget to the war, and by the same token diverting a considerable part of its available labour power. In fact, there is a cruel labour shortage in the productive sector. In large part the success, even limited success, of the economic reforms set in motion last February depend on such a
NICARAGUA peace.
However, for the time being, inflation is nowhere near disappearing, even if it has slowed down (in relation to the 1,500% of 1987!). Inflationary pressure is shown by the two successive devaluations since the introduction of the new currency and the growing discrepancy between the official exchange rate and the black-market rate. While the official rate is 12.3 new cordobas to the dollar (against 10 last February), it is still 110 cordobas to the dollar in the currency black market. Similarly, nothing indicates that the drastic cuts effected in ministerial jobs has led to movement towards the productive sectors, as was its objective. Beyond the psychological impact of this or that measure, many have noted that there is no question of improving the Nicaraguan economy while the war
Speaking about the consequences of the Sapoa accord, the vice-president of the republic, Sergio Ramírez, declared: "We think that there are risks, that there will be tensions in the future. But any risks or tensions that appear outside the framework of a war are preferable to the continuation of a war that is bleeding the country dry"4
Although there was no automatic connection between the depth of the economic crisis and a political weakening of the regime, nothing can guarantee that this situation will go on forever without having consequences. The large-scale mobilization of the population against speculators at the time of the introduction of the new currency was in this respect much more of a political than an economic campaign. restructuring of the FLN and the attention given to mass movements are designed to meet this need to put politics and political explanations up front. Particular attention has been paid in this regard to the Sandinista Defence Committees (CDS), which have been in crisis for some years, and which have just been taken in charge by commandant Omar Cabezas.
Everything negotiable except political power
Obviously, negotiations mean concessions. What is negotiable now? It is not being cynical to reply everything, excepting political power. Replying to one of the demands of the contras and the internal "civil opposition" on the separation of the Sandinista Front from state institutions, the viceminister for foreign affairs, Victor Tinoco, said: "I don't think that one would lose a lot by changing the army's name [getting rid of the adjective "Sandinista"), but I ask myself if anyone loses anything with the present name?" (El Pais, June 3, 1988.) In fact, while the Sandinistas could change the name of their armed forces it would not 3. Latin American Weekly Report, June 15, 1988. 1. gencia Nueva Nicaragua (ANN) 105, March 29, 21 June 27, 1988 • #144 International Viewpoint
NICARAGUA change one iota the nature of the army, but it would be another thing to do as the contras want and to fuse the two armies.
But this does not mean that the number and scope of the concessions made, and the way they are proceeding, has no importance. Underlining the remarkable political intelligence shown by the leadership of the Sandinista Front in all this business does not mean ignoring the disarray that could follow this or that decision taken - of necessity — in a hurry. "The cup is bitter...but we must drink it"
Of course, a number of militants and even leaders of the FSLN were sick to the stomach when they saw the ex-Colonel of the National Guard, Enrique Bermudez, land at Managua airport for negotiations after having neatly ousted his old friend, Calero. Replying to a journalists' questions on the dialogue with the contras, commandant Omar Cabezas said: "Listen. The Guard killed my father and three of my brothers. The Guard eliminated half the family, and they would have exterminated everyone, me included, if the revolution had been delayed. Humberto Ortega used an apt phrase to describe the situation — 'the cup is bitter'. But if in order to win the liberation of this country, so that peace rules and the martyrdom of our people is ended, we must drink this cup, or even two, I am prepared to swallow three if that could bring happiness again to Nicaraguans". (Agencia Nueva Nicaragua,
Of course, those who fought in the guerrilla forces are not happy about plans to free the "beasts", the ex-Somoza guards, imprisoned since 1979. This is true even though Minister of the Interior Tomas Borge declared: "in all negotiations one must be flexible, and for us Sandinistas it does not seem to be too much to concede the release of these 100 people, at a moment when all this can contribute to peace". (ANN, March 29, 1988.)
These are points that upset more than one person, above all when you consider that since the start of the war direct negotiations with the mercenaries had always been vigorously rejected by the leadership of the Front. "In no way, in no place, by no intermediary, will there ever be a political dialogue, either direct nor indirect, with the chiefs of the counter-revolution" (declara-
Sandinista Assembly, 29
To all these factors must be added the discreet pressure exercised via the infallible friendship of the number one sister country, the Soviet Union. The USSR, and more generally the Comecon countries, are propping up the Nicaraguan economy. This is a secret to nobody, and they deliberately remind people of it more or less aimiably: 22 Ins and he dip paic way, they the "In a subtle and diplomatic way, they [the International Viewpoint #144 • June 27, 1988 could have better results with the resources at our disposal" (Henri Ruiz, minister of cooperation, ANN, September 8, 1987).
This dependence is not wanted by Nicaragua — because it is not desirable — but it is a fact. Owing to the effects of the Amencan trade blockade and US blackmail in international credit organizations, 80% of the ready cash needed by the Sandinista regime comes from the Comecon countries. Thus, Nicaragua only received 7% of the loans it negotiated in 1987 from multilateral organizations — mainly the EEC and the UN. The remainder comes from bilateral organizations in the capitalist countries (24%) and the "socialist" countries (69%).
The overwhelming majority of Nicaragua's trade is with the Comecon countries, including nearly all oil products (760,000 tonnes a year). Taking only the USSR, while between 1982 and 1984 exchanges with the Soviet Union on average represented 10.9% of external trade, in 1986 this figure grew to 32.5% (figures from the Nicaraguan minister of external trade). Soviet aid climbed to around $2 billion since 1979, without speaking of donations in
Continuing the war by other means
However, in the time of the ReaganGorbachev discussions, it is not possible to dismiss the Soviet leader's determination to "decentralize" certain regional conflicts and to subcontract out economic aid for Nicaragua to others (Latin America, for example. Even if this is negligible for the Soviet Union, for Nicaragua it is no less than a matter of life or death. There is no question at the moment of seeing a pure and simple "desertion" by the USSR, which has, for a number of reasons, no interest in burning this particular card. Moscow has every interest in reducing the pressure in this region, even at the price of the Nicaraguans having to swallow some affronts.
US playing its "Chile" card
So, if everybody wants peace — for good or bad reasons - is there a chance it will (at last) see the light of day? It is not certain. At the least there is a strong risk that peace will only mean the continuation of the war by other means, to paraphrase
The internal opposition is playing a wrecking role. Weak and without much legitimacy nor autonomy, everything points to the fact that it wants to push the Sandinistas to the limit, and for the time being must accept all the provocations
How long can this situation last? The FLN correctly denounces the attempts at "Chileanization" made by the right: to create a stifling atmosphere so that afterwards they will be hailed as saviours. But they remember that Allende died because he had not armed the workers and peasants when they demanded weapons. This is more than a nuance - it is a fundamental difference between social-democracy in power and a revolutionary government. The American administration has not had its last word; today it is playing the card of the democratic counter-revolution. And this is a choice that will be maintained regardless of who wins the presidential election next November, Democrat or Republican. *