Gorbachev's conference: how much perestroika?
WHAT DID Gorbachev achieve at the Nineteenth Conference of the
Soviet Communist Party? Most of the observers in the international capitalist press agreed that he got a display of "glasnost," with an unprecedentedly open debate, and that he did not get the changes in personnel that he wanted. The results in the second area are most
USSR cerned with the preservation of nature, his-
"Of course, it would not do to close our eyes to the fact that in the flood, some groups have appeared whose interests are far from the goals of perestroika, the inter ests of the people...I am confident that the difficult to evaluate, since fights over posts in a bureaucracy by nature tena to involve complex intrigues in which none of the contenders are likely to be very honest about their objectives.
it is clear, however, that there was frustration among the more reform-minded elements of the bureaucracy, especially in the intelligentsia, about the elections of delegates to the conference. That was expressed in such liberal journals as the weekly magazine Ogonyok, and the Pravda editors apparently felt obliged to try to respond objections of this sort in order to smooth the waters.
The institutional changes that were proposed and accepted do not seem to represent major new departures. The most interesting thing about the conference were the political signals it offered about the bureaucracy's anxiousness to limit glasnost and perestroika, and the problems it faces in doing so.
GERRY FOLEY
IMITED as it was, the openness at the conference did impress much of the Western capitalist press, espe-
I cially after the direct argument between the out-on-a-limb liberal Yeltsin and the conservative leader Yegor Ligachev.
In that sense, the conference achieved
Gorbachev's political objective of presenting a facade of democratization. This confrontation, in fact, marked a dramatic contrast with traditional Stalinist monolithism. But there is a long way between unashamed totalitarianism and the emergence of possibilities for real workers' democracy, even if, as the bureaucrats realize, it can be a slippery slope.
The capitalist press, whose own ideology is formal democracy, tended to be easily impressed by some democratic gestures and formulas, some conflictual exchanges.
After all, it does not demand more from its own rulers than democratic pretences and minimal tolerance.
In fact, Gorbachev's role in the conference itself presented a bizarre contrast to his declared objective of achieving a "state of laws," that is a system of rules and limitations that would apply to all. He appears in the transcripts of the proceedings in
Pravda rather like the familiar omnipotent narrator of the nineteenth century novel, breaking into the speeches of the participants, challenging them, admonishing them. (It is interesting that the correspondent Paris daily Libération saw this as resembling the "presidentialism" of the Fifth
Republic.)
In fact, in Gorbachev's introductory speech to the conference was marked by warnings against attempts to abuse perestroika: "Consolidation of individual rights and liberties, an expansion overall of democracy and openness, must go hand in hand with the strengthening of legality, education in unconditional respect for law. Democracy is incompatible with either willfulness or irresponsibility or lack of discipline."
### Warning on "abuses of democracy"
The prime example of such abuses was the mass movement in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh: "As you know, recently we have more than once run into attempts to use democratic rights for antidemocratic purposes. Some people seem to think that in that way it is possible to resolve all sorts of questions — from redrawing frontiers to creating opposition parties. The Central Committee of the CPSU thinks that such abuses of democracy are in fundamental contradiction to the tasks of perestroika, and are at loggerheads with the of the people. (Prolonged applause)."
The other warning related to the forming of independent organizations. "Another remarkable aspect of perestroika is the tempestuous growth of social associations reflecting the whole range of social interests. This includes organizations of veterans of war and work, associations of scientists and engineers, societies of theatrical people, the Soviet Culture Fund, the Children's Fund, various societies conparty organizations and the workers can distinguish genuine contributors to the renewal of socialist society from those who
Limitations of the "democratization"
"Statization" of all social activity had become a problem, Gorbachev as well as other speakers said, and more room should be opened up for the "civil society," for nongovernmental organization. But in the above statements, he made it quite clear what sort of "independent organization" was acceptable, that is, organization of a completely neutral, technical sort, the kind taken for granted in all but the most repressive systems.
Permitting this is a step forward of course, but hardly corresponds to hopes aroused by the perestroika line. Moreover, erosion of the totalitarianism of Stalin's time has been going on for a long time in the USSR.
Thus, it is obvious Gorbachev wanted to draw a line that put the two examples of actual democratic action encouraged by perestroika — the development of independent organizations and the mass movement in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh — out of the sphere of what is permitted in the "democratization."
With respect to the Armenian question, the Soviet leader showed no qualms about continuing to use Stalinist "newspeak," saying that a movement of hundreds of thousands of people who called for recognizing the right of self-determination of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh was motivated by "undemocratic purposes." Logically, then, the incorporation of Nagorno-Karabakh into Azerbaidzhan by Stalin for the sake of diplomatic relations with the Turkish nationalist regime of Ataturk was in the interests of democracy. Black is white, and white is black.
Most of the speakers that immediately followed Gorbachev also stressed the limits of what is to be allowed under perestroika. V. V. Bakatin, first secretary of the KameForsk District party one anizatio seandary. 3 first to speak after the general secretary,
USSR • DENMARK said: "It was correctly said in the report that we will not achieve this [the goal of perestroika] unless we strengthen the CPSU on the basis of Leninist principles, if we give up its role of leader, if we weaken party discipline and indulge the attempts of some voluntary groups to put the party under their supervision. If we encourage attempts to deny the party the right to have its press."
Cuckoo's eggs in the perestroika nest
G. B. Kolbin, the new first secretary of the CP of Kazakhstan, began by saying that the Kazakhs were especially happy about the "constructive" public discussions that had preceded the conference because "18 months ago the situation that developed in Kazakhstan aroused serious fears. In that period a real threat appeared to the transformations sought through perestroika." He was obviously referring to the protests against the removal of the former Kazakh party head [who was of Kazakh nationality], which were the first uncontrolled mobilizations under Gorbachev. They led to a purge in the local organization, and a press campaign against Kazakh nationalism. (It was notable that Gorbachev cited Kazakhstan as a model of a "multinationalism" in his report.)
It was Kolbin, among the first speakers in the discussion (reported in Pravda, June 30) who delivered perhaps the longest diatribe about cuckoo's eggs turning up in the nest of perestroika. "In the conditions of the development of democracy, peoples' activity increases, so-called informal leaders appear. In part, they present correct demands, pose really important, sharp questions, on the basis of which they draw around them advocates of a rapid tempo of perestroika. But along with the activities of these leaders, we run into instances of exaggeration, maximalism, proposals that are completely out of line with reality, and outright attacks on party and soviet organs.
"This category of people require constant attention from the leaders of all communists on various levels. Our task is to support their worthy desire to speed up changes but to direct this into the proper channel. There are others, I would say, pseudo-leaders, among whom you find some with party cards in their pockets. They deliberately mislead the public with hare-brained notions and seek to replace democracy with naked anarchism....What concretely can the organizers of all sorts of rallies, demonstrations offer people....
"These defenders of rights and liberties in their stupid ambitions somehow forget about the other important side of democracy. In their statements they fail to draw people's attention to the vital need of strengthening work and production discipline, and rather pander to those who stage 4 duction. Such pearle are no help lo peres- strikes, disrupt plans for speeding up proInternational Viewpoint #145 • July 11, 1988 troika; they are an obstacle." It would seem that the allegedly corrupt and conservative Kazakh CP leadership of Dinmuhamed Kunaev was not replaced by
A.M. Masliev, first secretary of the Kitgiz party, delivered a broadside against "irresponsible" criticism of officials in the Soviet press. "In all-union and republic papers and magazines, unobjective and unverified materials have started to be published. (Applause)"
He accused "some journalists" of going so far as to make evaluations of entire "elected party bodies" and of undermining fraternal relations among the Soviet nation-
"They present themselves as the greatest advocates of perestroika and try to ignore the party organs and counterpose to them public opinion. (Applause)."
It is notable in Pravda's transcriptions how often such remarks got "applause." Another indication of the feelings of the delegates was the response to a reference to the anti-Stalinist work Arbat's Children. After this, the Soviet CP paper noted, there was "noise in the hall." The speaker, V.V. Karpov of the Writers' Union, responded by saying "Whether you like it or not, I am just saying that these works have aroused attention."
Strong pressures and serious dilemmas
Karpov went on to denounce the harshness of criticisms being published, apparently by liberals, and a so-called struggle for positions in the press.
There were some disagreements, for example over Gorbachev's proposal for "certificates" of good standing of party members, which was presented as a means of fighting complacency and inactivity. A delegate identified as a worker from Leningrad opposed it. There were also some frank statements about present economic difficulties, as well as about the problem of
The statement by V.I. Melnikov calling for the removal of leaders he considered compromised has been much commented on, but it was quite exceptional in the conference, and may have been a slip, as some correspondents indicated. It is undoubtedly hard to avoid slips when some openness is not only permitted but required. That indi-
It was also said frankly that attempts to reform the system in the past had failed, and that the party could not afford another failure. In all, the report and discussion in the first days of the conference reflected very strong pressures and serious dilemmas for the rulers, as well as an attempt to assure that perestroika will remain in narrow limits. Certain interesting information was revealed, both about the state of the coun try and conflict in the bureaucracy, and more will probably come to light in the final transcripts. *