El Salvador: a failure for Reagan's "pax
EL SALVADOR squads and for intransigently blocking any serious agrarian reforms? In 1984-85, the injection of American economic aid and the relaunching of the agrarian reform momentarily stabilized the continuing fall of salaries and the per capita national product.
At a military level the Salvadoran army increased its regular forces four-fold,
Americana"
formed elite battalions (today there are eight of them) and received a modern airforce for bombarding the war zones and guerrilla bases. The FMLN itself, following the failure of its "final offensive"
of Janu-
EIGHT YEARS of "low-intensity" warfare have destabilized the whole of El Salvadoran society, and even the United
States' plans, without resolving any of the social and political factors at the root of the conflict. Yet in 1984, North American strategists were optimistic about the future: the election of
President Napoleon Duarte provided a democratic facade.
At that time, General Paul Gorman of the US Southern
Command - the troops "in charge" of Latin America and based in great numbers in Panama - announced that in two years "we will have control of 80%-90% of the country and the guerrillas' ability to rebuild will be severely undermined." Four years later this attempt at imposing a pax Americana has become a failure.
MICHEL THEVENAZ
OBODY denies this failure any longer. Senator M.O. Hatfield and
Representatives J. Leach and G.
Miller assessed it in the following terms in November 1987: "American aid for 1987 has reached $608 million, or
105% of Salvador's budget. El Salvador has almost attained the record dependence of South Vietnam at the height of the Vietinsurgency campaign of pacification'
[based on the South Vietnamese model] has not succeeded in eroding the social base of the rebels....The aid allocated to the war corresponds to $45,000 for each of the 7,350 rebels, while the aid allocated to reforms and development only amounts to
$105 for each one of the millions of Salvadorans who live in a state of 'absolute
"The size of the Salvadoran army has grown from 10,000 to 54,000 men since
1980. In spite of good wages and allowances, recruitment is only 25% of that needed
- 12,000-15,000 new recruits are necessary.... The US ambassador has envisaged that it will take another seven years to marginalize the FMLN [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front] - that is, until
1994! " The list could go on.
This reminder of Vietnam is not accidental. Since the Pentagon's defeat in one of the longest and hardest wars since 1945, its strategies have aimed at putting an end to revolutionary movements by other means.
8 "Low-intensity warfare", as they call it,
International Viewpoint #146 • July 25, 1988 was to replace the sending of a big contingent of US troops (costly, including in human lives, for the United States). This was realized by two complementary means. The first was setting up native elite units, trained in the US, specializing in counterinsurgency and equipped with sophisticated armaments. The second was advancing so-called democratic reforms, from agrarian reforms to the constitution of elected and representative governments, in order to wear away the social base of the resistance.
Salvador — a tiny country on the map of the world where open civil war broke out in October 1979 just after the Sandinistas' victory in Nicaragua — has become the laboratory and the model of this new North American strategy. This should be remembered so as to measure the scope of the cur-
US prospects looked promising in 1984
Indeed, in 1984 this project was not an unpromising one for the United States. Duarte's election had channelled the hopes of wide sectors of the masses for an alternative to the extreme-right represented by the National Republican Alliance (ARENA). A long-standing opponent of the Salvadoran oligarchy, Duarte was supported by a number of mass organizations, mainly of peasants, who signed a "social pact" for reforms with him. ARENA was responsible for the 1980-83 wave of terror, the death ary 1981, was recomposing its forces at the expense of violent internal tensions. The Pentagon's plan was, therefore, not totally unrealistic, and all the international press was singing the praises of the exemplary "democratic solution" under way in Salvador.
US intervention led to social disaster
So today's failure is even harder to take, not only for Duarte who is ill and out of action, but for American strategists themselves. And it is not for nothing that the experts in the US Congress are recalling the spectre of Vietnam: once again, the "pax Americana" has not achieved its goal.
Some outstanding features make it possi ble first of all to measure the veritable social disaster created by the US intervention. The war has magnified the economic crisis to the point of catastrophe. The Economic Institute of San Salvador University estimates that from 1980 to 1986, the per capita gross national product fell by 16.7%, and the review of the José Canas Central American University (Jesuit) puts the fall in real wages during the same period at around
"According to the minister of the economy, the value of the average family food basket for March, which measures real wages, went up to 1,771 colons (about $354). Taking into account of the numbers of people unemployed, it is obvious that a growing percentage of the active population was unable to buy these basics, represent four times the value of the minimum wage for workers in commerce, industry and the services, and more than seven times the income of workers in the agricultural sector. Far from improving, 1. Report to the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus (official report to the US Congress, November 1987), cited by Correos de centroamerica, June 1988. 2. It was developed notably by Henry Kissinger, who was sent to Central America by Reagan in 1983. Both Republicans and Democrats have made it their model. 3. On the subject of the agrarian reform, see IV 134, February 8, 1988. For more general coverage on the economic and social situation, see /V 119, May 4, 1987. 4. The culmination of this crisis was the assassination of Commandant Ana Maria and the suicide of historic leader Caetano Carpio ("Marcial") in April 1983. 5. ECA, journal of the Central American University, February 1988. See also Coyunctura Economica 11, Economic Institute of El Salvador University, February 1987.
this situation has worsened even further during 1987." 5
The same magazine estimates that the combined rate of full unemployment and under-employment is 65% of the economically active population; the UNTS union federation puts the figure as high as 78%.
According to them, last year a pound of haricot beans — the main staple of the daily diet — went up 200%, and rice by 50%. "In
January 1986, three colons would buy ten eggs, but in January 1987 the same money would only by seven." Around 5,000 families live in shantytowns, 29,000 in multioccupancy slums, 14,600 in illegal camps
(which spring up on empty land and have no basic services), 1,500 families who have fled from the zones live in tents
5,000 others on land at the side of the roads. In total
300,000 people are living in such conditions in the San
Salvador region, a quarte
There was a slight economic upturn in the construction sector last year, following the earthquake in
October 1986, but this had no multiplier effect on other sectors. On the contrary, coffee exports - which make up a third of the state's income — are down, as is production itself. The national budget, whose main item is defence spending, goes into a huge deficit every year with foreign aid
America) filling the gap, but at the cost of mounting interest on the foreign debt.
properly speaking, according the the magazine ECA:
"In 1987, $3 of North
American aid were destined for the war and its effects, as against $1 for remedying its causes. Even though this ratio is lower than in 1985 (when it was 4 to
1), the budget proposed by the government for 1988 indicates a ratio of 3.5 to 1. 'Economic' aid is therefore still being used to stimulate the war effort." The magazine explains that American law forbids in principle the use of economic and food aid for military ends. Experts in the Congress say in this regard:
"As was the case in the Vietnam war, some American personnel are there to promote a counter-insurgency campaign, including 'civil actions', in poor rural areas, and to create 'civil defence' groups to patrol and report on rebel movements. When villagers refuse to take part in these patrols for fear of eventual reprisals from the rebels, local commanders force them to join by blocking American economic aid until such patrols are formed." 8
These few examples suffice to show what the five-year-long "American peace" plan means on a social and human level in Salvador. The agrarian "reform" has sold (and not distributed) land to some peasants, loading them down with debts. The economic crisis has aggravated unemployment, and the war has displaced thousands of peasants who now have nothing. State spending on the war and consequent indebtedness to the USA leads the war effort to eat up an ever higher proportion of the budget.
Reagan, Duarte and the extreme-right ARENA were, and still are, ready to pay this social price in order to win the war. However, this result is far from being accomplished at a military level. In 1987, the armed forces suffered 3,285 dead and wounded, or 6% of their forces. This was 20% higher than in 1986. On the other side, the FMLN reckons these losses to be more like 8,079 — 14.7% of the army. In return, the armed forces estimate FMLN losses at 1,674 men, or less than 4% more than the preceding year.
Two further military indications add to this sinister picture. During 1987, the FMLN called seven transport strikes. The main ones were in May in solidarity with the unions and at the beginning of November in protest at the assassination of H. Anaya, the president of the Human Rights Commission. According to all the observers, these strikes were largely followed (up
EL SALVADOR to 90% effective, including in the capital, forcing the army to interrupt its operations so as to mobilize around 45,000 men to provide transport services with lorries.
Another indication was the surprise attack in March 1987 on one of the main barracks, El Paraiso, a strategically key entry point for Chalatenango. This not only destroyed, for the second time, a bastion that had been rebuilt using the most sophisticated methods, but also forced the military commandant to use his elite troops to hold strategic points when they should have been free for other operations. Incontestably, the FMLN was able to retake the initiative militarily, and
American advisors now think that the war will take another seven years to finish.
These strictly military aspects, however, reflect a more basic social and political problem. Confronted since 1981 with an increasing American intervention in Salvador, the FMLN has adapted in a remarkable way both militarily and politically. The American intervention certainly modified the character of the war, merging the civil war with a war of aggression, whose full effects the Salvadoran people rapidly came to feel and suffer from, first in the countryside and the war zones and today in the cities. The
FMLN countered the sophisticated means and military superiority introduced by the United States above all in the air - by deepening popular resistance at all levels. A large section of the fighters was dispersed throughout the country, developing both political work in the villages and basic military training.
For a people constantly suffering from brutality from the army and the death squads, the use and distribution of homemade mines has not only extended operations to the whole country but also given thousands of people a simple way of defending themselves. Many army patrols searching for the guerrillas retur empty- handed but with soldiers killed or wounded by the mines, which noticeably saps the morale of the army. The scattering of the fighters and systematic sabotage have made
6. UNTS — National Union of Salvadoran Workers, created in 1986, with around 350,000 workers and a large section of diverse unions, associations and peasant organizations.
7. Analysis of the current movement, report presented to the UNTS national assembly, February 8/9, 1988.
3. Report to the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Car- 9 cus, ibid.
EL SALVADOR massive aerial bombardments less effective (that is, on the military level, because the effects on the civil population are
This adaptation to a war of popular resistance — and this second element is important — has had some considerable political repercussions. The FMLN/FDR [Revolutionary Democratic Front] has effectively combined its military adaptation with a political offensive for a "negotiated solution among Salvadorans without interference from the United States", which large sectors of the population support today. So, especially in the last two years, the cumulative effects of the economic crisis, the burden of the war and the corruption of the Duarte regime, dependent on the United States, have won over ever broader sections of the population to a negotiated solu-
FMLN/FDR. The development of this social and political movement, which is much broader than the FMLN fighters, has become one of the decisive factors in the current crisis.
Rise of the mass movement and UNTS
The intelligence of the Salvadoran revolutionaries should be stressed. From a perilous situation (above all in such a tiny country), they were able to develop a military and political response that has obviously accelerated the failure of the 1983
The rise of the mass movement in this last period can be judged, in the first place, by the development of the National Union of Salvadoran Workers (UNTS), a grouping of left or Christian democrat-leaning unions, cooperative peasant federations and associations of students, women, youth, mothers of the "disappeared" or
The UNTS was created in February 1986 at a time when the Duarte government, absorbed by the crisis and the war, changed horses and proposed a first "economic package" of austerity policies. Some months earlier still (in November 1985), the union at the Ministry of Finances, AGHEMA, had led a strike for wage rises that won increases for all state employees. Rey Prendes, presently one of the two candidates for Duarte's succession and at the time minister of culture and communications, declared that the government "would no longer negotiate any agreements to resolve strikes by public employees"?
In December 1986, the government devalued the colon and imposed an austerity plan. This choice was dictated by the financial impasse that the state was in, as well as by the agricultural crisis. The devaluation was far from sufficient for the long-term relaunching of Salvadoran agricultural exports in the world market. At the same time, it increased the prices of all the goods 10 needed for agricultural production precisely when the first beneficiaries of the agrariInternational Viewpoint #146 • July 25, 1988
EL SALVADOR IN CARABLA I GUATEMALA COSTARICA HONDURAS CUBA PANA MA an reform should have begun to put money back into their land. The peasant debt became unpayable. Parallel to this, the social effects of the war and inflation aggravated living conditions in the towns. These factors pushed forward the process of regroupment of unions and associations inside the UNTS.
In 1987, an important wave of struggles, notably of workers in the public services, gave a new momentum to the urban mass movement. The so-called low-intensity warfare, which, along with winning the war, was supposed to "win hearts and minds" of everyone by promising reforms and democratic rights, brought the opposite result — a vast movement breaking with the government and its bellicose policy, advancing its own wage, social and democratic demands, including the demand for Duarte's resignation and for a negotiated settlement without American interference. Social movement confronts enormous obstacles
But this social movement confronts enormous obstacles. The first was noted in the reports of the UNTS national assembly in February 1988: "Our economic victories for the workers remain minimal in view of the policies of the Duarte government, of the Christian-democratic functionaries and the bosses of private enterprises. They have not only systematically refused to negotiate and find solutions to the just demands of the workers, but even tried to split and break up the principled mass organizations".
Some small wage increases have been obtained, but essentially the struggles in 1987 brought scant successes. For example, the long social security strike ended without producing any results, and the hospitals were put under military control. The strikes did not succeed either at a material level or in terms of winning legal recognition for the unions (in spite of the Esquipulas Accords!) In the long term, this
"systematic refusal" — to which has to be added the murders and disappearances perpetrated by the army or the death squads at a rate of at least two dozen a month - can contribute to demoralizing workers and sapping their resistance.
A second obstacle is that the various unions and associations making up the UNTS — given their very different origins and development — have very heterogeneous levels of experience, organization and cadre training.
Political difficulties for union struggles
The UNTS balance sheet presented in February 1988 noted "a certain separation between the leadership and the base and poor participation in all the activities of the union and association movement, a deterioration of these unions and associations". In order to assess this, the Salvadoran context must be understood. In its effort to draw in broad social sectors, the UNTS has put an enormous amount of effort into social and political activities. At the same time, its struggles have brought few results, if not violent repression.
In such conditions, where the smallest wage rise becomes a political problem (rejections by the government, accusations of connections with the FMLN, action by the unions or the other associations is obviously strictly dependent on a political opening, and therefore on the ending of the war. But between this prerequisite, which workers understand immediately, and the chance of achieving it, looms the wall of the army, the police and American interference.
Extremely exposed to the blows of the repression — selective repression combined with a flat refusal by the government to meet the most urgent needs — the UNTS could suffer a serious setback if no political solution appears in the future.
This somewhat detailed description throws light on the failure of the whole of American policy in Salvador for the last eight years. The accumulated effects of the social crisis, military failures and the growth of popular discontent ended in March in the eruption of a crisis in Duarte's government. The legislative elections were elections inside the ruling layers. Estimates of the rate of abstention vary between 60% and 70%. The whole "electoral" debate -centred on the war and the murders - was dominated by a single question: who can retake the reins with enough credibility in
Duarte's Christian Democrat Party (PDC), now in a minority, held 50% of the national assembly for a few weeks in coalition with the small Party for National Conciliation (PCN), and has just lost it after one of these deputies went over to ARENA. The parliament, which was no longer meeting, will be able to sit with a "legitimate" 9. Coyunctura Economica 2, November 1985, p.14.
EL SALVADOR
"An end to the war is nowhere in sight"
51% majority. In the PDC, two fractions have been formed behind the two candidates for the presidential elections in March 1989.