Jaber about Zia's legacy, and the future prospects for the
Pakistan opposition. Tariq Ali is a member of the New Left
Review editorial board and author, among other works, of
Can Pakistan survive? *
HE REACTION to Zia's death
T in Western capitals remained silent on the record of his internal politics...
With few exceptions, the reaction of
Western politicians and the Western media in general to the assassination of Zia ul-Haq is marked by myopia and hypocrisy. Myopia, because the Western press and Western leaders — in particular Shultz, Thatcher,
Reagan, Bush and Jeane Kirkpatrick amongst others — have talked exclusively of the role Zia played on the border of Afghanistan. This is totally understandable because that was Zia's only real function for the West. He acted as a conduit for
Western arms and money to the Afghan
Mujahideen. That was his importance.
But for people who constantly talk about democracy and freedom, to ignore the internal record of this butcher is grotesque. It is not simply sickening, but also somewhat shortsighted. Not a single leader has spoken about the barbaric practices introduced by
Zia's regime in Pakistan. These include public floggings and hangings, torture of political prisoners — including women prisoners — and the execution of the country's first and last elected prime minister to date, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. There has been no mention of the total and complete failure of the Zia regime to stop the cultivation of poppies and the manufacture and distribution of heroin both inside and outside the country. Under Zia Pakistan has become one of the main suppliers of heroin to the West. All these aspects of Zia's legacy have been largely ignored by the media.
Secondly, the media have tended to downplay the fact that the citizens of Pakistan in their overwhelming majority expressed open relief — and in some cases even jubilation — at the death of this despot. The images on Western television concentrated on Zia's funeral, but it is very important to take note of who attended it. The crowds at the funeral were brought from the Pakistan/Afghan border in several hundred truckloads. They were mainly Afghan Mujahideen, secondly soldiers and police out of uniform and thirdly civil servants and army officers who had worked seen. As regards the working class, the regime has totally and shamelessly backed the big capitalists, putting down strikes extremely ruthlessly. Trade unionism has been totally destroyed under General Zia, and occasionally heroin mafia gangs have been used to break strikes. The whole situation is extremely messy. Added to this is the fact that when heroin takes over a country you have the growth of a parallel government, and Pakistan today is, I would say, a heroin state. So you have had, over the last few years, an official government which is a puppet civilian government representative of nobody except a tiny layer of officialdom. You have the army in the background, whose interests were protected by Zia, and in addition a virtual parallel administration run by the heroin mafia who have infiltrated the army, the civil service and other parts of society. No major decisions about society are taken without their being consulted. For example the city of Karachi, which is a port town and vital for the outflow of heroin, is very reminiscent of Beirut in the early days of the civil war in regard to the amount of guns available. Stinger missiles can be bought, virtually everything is available there. Of course, heroin and guns go together. So the arms and heroin mafias have linked up and terrorize large numbers of citizens. Often the city just erupts in a bloodbath. This is the legacy of General Zia that has not been made available to readers of newspapers or watchers of television programmes in the West. I think that many of these things will come out if there is a democratic election in mid-November, as appears to be the case now. We have to wait and see — the next few weeks are going to i 11 be critical.
International Viewpoint #147 • September 19, 1988
PAKISTAN
• In contrast to the silence surrounding
Zia's internal record, in the West there has been a big emphasis put on his role in promoting the "sovereignty" of
Pakistan.
The argument that Zia has preserved the sovereignty of Pakistan is a very cynical argument. Prior to Zia taking over, Pakistan was moving towards non-alignment.
American influence in Pakistan has been strong since 1951 when the first aid deals were signed, and the US has played a major part in Pakistani politics.
In fact, it is one of history's ironies that the US ambassador who died with Zia was a senior political officer at the embassy in
Islamabad when the Americans helped to organize the coup that toppled Bhutto and put Zia in power. Many people in Pakistan have noted this and concluded — alas, in a slightly mystical and religious way - that
God always punishes evil people. One point I would like to make is that the death of Zia, the American ambassador and four generals is not going to make it easier to get people to move towards rationalism, because they do believe that fate and God combined have helped to punish the
Far from protecting Pakistan's sovereignty, Zia totally prostituted the country's armed forces and the country itself to the United States. Pakistan is totally mortgaged to the United States of America and nothing happens in that country without its prior approval. Pakistan today is more of a puppet state than it has ever been in its entire history, and that is saying quite a lot.
When American leaders talk about Zia preserving the sovereignty of Pakistan what they mean is that he has preserved
American sovereignty over Pakistan. Without formally being a member of any pact, Pakistan has played a major role. Its troops are now active in 16 different countries of the region, including most of the Gulf states. They are used as mercenaries in the region. Pakistan is part of the Central Command planning of the United States in the region. There are substantial allegations made by leaders that on the Baluch coast special American radar bases and refuelling facilities have been prepared for the US Rapid Deployment Force.
So this argument about sovereignty is a total and complete joke. When you add to all this the fact that Zia has — with American backing — been running camps in Pakistan to train and arm Khalistan and Sikh extremists to try to destabilize the neighbouring government of India we can see what Pakistan is being used for.
The sovereignty of Pakistan has been totally wiped out under Zia. A sovereign power has the right to negotiate both with the superpowers and with its neighbours in the interests of the country. Zia has negotiated and behaved in the interests of the United States of America. This cannot be stressed enough, which is why they were so 12 , deeply upset when he was removed. They were shocked. Washington was thrown into total panic at Zia's removal.
• What are the prospects for the internal situation? First, in relation to the ruling layers, [ex-prime minister] Junejo's possible role and the homogeneity of the army. Secondly for the opposition, in particular Benazir Bhutto. Finally, do you think that the fundamentalist movement will play any specific role?
At present there is a National Council in power in Pakistan, essentially consisting of the chief ministers of the provinces and others who backed General Zia. The aim of these people is to prevent a free and fair election. The acting president is a veteran civil servant who has served every military dictator, Ghulam Ishaq Khan - reportedly he is now in favour of a general election in the country
Recently the civilian members of the cabinet called on the new commander-inchief, General Aslam Baig, and asked him to take over the country. But he refused and said that the constitution must be upheld.
Since that time I think he has come under very heavy pressure from Pentagon/CIA military officers in Pakistan, Pakistani officers, who have forced him to make a harsher statement. But it seems as though the army is divided at this point in time. It's not a monolithic force. The other thing is that the very fact that half the high command has been blown up in a plane must concentrate minds inside the army as to whether it should carry on playing a role in politics or not, because they saw the results before their very eyes.
I think that the Americans were banking on a more gradual transition to elected rule, but it's been taken out of their hands. People used to talk about the "arc of Islam" but now you see an arc of democratic movements stretching from the Philippines, through Burma to Pakistan. These are destabilizing American plans in the region.
The government that Zia had set up was made up of notable and bandwagon careerists, basically the political dregs and hoodlums of that country. Junejo himself was a fairly harmless fellow. His party was called the Moslem League. (The Moslem League was just a name of convenience, along the lines of the flags of convenience flown by oil tankers. This type of name of convenience is flown by every party that generals want to put into office.) Junejo did not prove to be totally reliable as far as Zia was concerned. When there was a big explosion nearly a year ago now in Rawalpindi at a secret ammunitions dump in the heart of the city that was for supplying arms to the Afghan rebels, Junejo wanted the head of the general who was responsible, wanted him sacked, and for that Zia dismissed Junejo. But that general, Akhtar Rehman, was travelling in the plane with Zia, so Junejo unexpectedly got his way in the end. Meanwhile, Junejo's Moslem League has split into two warring factions, with one half trying to tell the army to take over, and Junejo himself is a fairly isolated figure. Neither faction has any significant support outside of army backing.
Coming to the opposition parties, the main opposition force remains the populist
Pakistan People's Party (PPP) led by Benazir Bhutto. If free and fair general elections were held in mid-November they would win between 60% and 70% of the popular vote, and thus sweep to power with an overall majority. I think there's very little doubt about that. This is why the Americans are worried. Even though Benazir Bhutto has been reassuring them they know she is a politician with mass support who will often have to respond to the sentiments of the masses. The Americans are not keen on politicians who have mass support in the third world because they fear that they will veer between the masses and the apparatus of the state, making it difficult for the
Americans to get their own way all the
On this front a lot will depend on who wins the US election. I think that if the Republican Party wins in November then the chances are that the transition to democracy in Pakistan could be delayed. If the Democrats win the effect inside the United States will not be very significant, but the effect in some third world countries like Pakistan will be to give a breathing space to people fighting for democracy. Many leading
Democrat congressmen and senators have said that they want an immediate restoration of democracy in Pakistan and have backed Benazir Bhutto's cause. So the situation depends on changes in Washington as well, unless there is a big, big upsurge in
Which case they will immediately grant
The masses have so far not been brought out into the streets by the People's Party since Zia's death, since it was considered to be in bad taste. But Benazir Bhutto's statement expressed the feeling of the majority of the country when she said "I, for one, cannot mourn Zia's death because for 11 years the shadow of death and destruction has hung over our country and now it's been removed". This was quite a sharp statement to make.
What will happen next remains to be seen. The ruling class in Pakistan — represented essentially by the top echelons of the army and elements in the civil service, with the army playing the dominant role -would like to delay the process in collusion with the United States. have always been important players in Pakistan's political games so what they say is very important. They would like to delay elections, but they may not be able to. • How much of a threat would Bhutto's victory represent for US interests and in general for their domination over I think that she will proceed very slowly. There will be some reforms, some statements. Pakistan will move marginally, maybe half-an-inch, away from the US. I think she will try to restore normal relations
September 19, 1988 • #147 International Viewpoint with India, which have been very bad. The PPP is committed to a settlement in Afghanistan, and this worries the Americans more than anything else. Benazir Bhutto may not be prepared to continue allowing Pakistani troops to be used in Afghanistan as Zia did. The Americans may try to put pressure on her, but in any event it's going to be a messy situation, even after the elections. • Are there any prospects of a general radicalization?
I don't think so. All hopes at the moment are being channelled through the Pakistan People's Party. • What about the fundamentalist movement? The Jamaat-e-Islami are a small force. They have always been a minority force in Pakistani politics. Zia tried to build them up but didn't succeed. Finally they weren't prepared to negotiate with Zia, so in the last tew years they broke away from him. Naturally, they will put up candidates and win some seats in a few towns, but nothing very significant because in the minds of the people they are identified with Zia. • How essential to the present regime is Islamic fundamentalism and support for the Afghan fundamentalists?
The Islamic fundamentalism that Zia talked about was a cloak that he used to legitimize his rule in the eyes of the common people and that has failed. If he had been able to win support he would have held elections and won. But he has been avoiding a general election ever since he seized power in July 1977. That brand of Islam is not popular among the masses. The army and the present government may try to continue with it, but with little real
Regarding Afghanistan, there are people in Pakistan - including in the army — who want to get rid of that mess. That policy came directly from American pressure. • Many commentators say that Islam is the only unifying ideology for Pakistan, given its heterogeneity on other levels, that this is a common feature for both Pakistan and Afghanistan, and that this is why Zia promoted the fundamentalist wing in the Afghan Mujahideen....
All these fundamentalist wings are backed by the US. They want these people in power because they feel they could manipulate them. As far as Islam is concerned, it has always been used. If religion was the only unifying theme in Pakistan it would collapse very soon. It isn't. The unifying theme in Pakistan is that it is an existing state with a structure and an army. That keeps the country together, and it has a history of sorts — albeit a very checkered history. Within Pakistan there have been clashes between Shias and Sunnis, so even the unity of Islam is not a very profound thing in the eyes of the people. They will have to find a different form of legitimacy for the state and Benazir Bhutto is already talking about a secular state. She says, "our religion will always be Islam but we have to secularize the state". • You made a comparison between Karachi and Beirut, and there has been talk of the "Lebanization" of Pakistan. Is such a civil war situation a possibility in Pakistan?
The first key problems a new elected administration will have to solve is Afghanistan, getting the refugees back and how to stop the heroin business. I have no easy answers. My own feeling is that heroin is a cancer that can only be rooted out by surgical methods. It would really need a social revolution to get rid of it, and there isn't the slightest hope for that at the present time. Any elected government of whatever complexion is going to find this difficult to deal with, which means that this form of instability will probably continue in Pakistan for some time. A Lebanese-type scenario cannot be excluded.
There is also the question of how the United States will want to use this country in the coming years if there is a Democratic Party victory in the White House. Traditionally, the Democrats have always been closer to India, thinking that it is much more important to be friends with India and to unite India and Pakistan on some level.
Whether they will try this again remains to be seen. " * New Leakiss, London 9a3 Ali, Verso 13
(New Left Books), London 1983.
shot down five people, including a 60-yearold woman. The regime's "toughness" was also expressed politically. On August 22 the Democratic Coexistence Commission
International Viewpoint #147 • September 19, 1988
COLOMBIA T HE OFFICIAL strategy was in full swing, and the results were clear. In only three years, Colombia had been transformed into a shooting gallery for political assassination and massacring peasants.! The armed forces pursued their plan with utter ruthlessness. The mass mobilizations against state terrorism and the few international protests did not manage to change the situation.
Bogotá's pious explanation was that the acts of violence were perpetrated by "rightwing extremists," "left-wing terrorists" and gangs of drug traffickers, that is, by groups out of the control of the state. When Amnesty International announced that "there is convincing evidence that the Colombian armed forces have adopted a policy of terror to intimidate and eliminate the opposition without the need to bother with legal proceedings," the ministers of the interior and defense blew their tops and demanded that Amnesty revise its report.
This demand, which was not accompanied by any serious measures to stop the killing, was rejected by the human-rights organization. The repression continued. An event, however, altered this picture. On
May 29, a commando unit of the M-19 guerrillas kidnapped Senator Alvaro Gomez Hurtado in Bogotá. Nothing like this had occurred in the country before.
Gomez Hurtado is the chief of the most reactionary wing of the Colombian establishment. He has twice been the Conservative Party's presidential candidate. The charges that M-19 made against the senator indicated that the affair was going to end in an "execution," like that of Aldo Moro in Italy.
Government reneges on negotiations