International Viewpoint Archive

The Fourth International’s English-language review, from 1982

Mexican PRT Analyse Outcome of Election Campaign — Interview with Edgard Sanchez

International Viewpoint No. 15, 18 October 1982 · pp 15-18 · 4,773 words

Latin America Repression and political prisoners Peasants and land reform

More than 200,000 people attended our election meetings

The Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT - broadcasts.

Revolutionary Workers Party) Mexican section of the Fourth In International Viewpoint we have carried regular coverage

International, has just led a very dynamic and effective election of the progress of the campaign. In IV Issue No 13 we described campaign around the candidacy of Rosario Ibarra de Piedra for the massive electoral fraud that had robbed the PRT of its president, and dozens of PRT activists and supporters in the representatives in Parlament.

local legislative elections which took place at the same time. Edgard Sanchez, member of the Political Bureau of the PRT,

Through this campaign the PRT won registration as a legally spoke to Fernando Zamora in Mexico City on September 1 recognized political party. This gives it the right to participate in explaining how the PRT assesses the outcome of the election elections, and to have other rights such as regular television

Question: How does the PRT analyze the per cent in previous elections to some 25 general results of the July 4 Mexican presidential elections? Answer: Among the most significant aspects of the results of the elections was the reduction in the rate of abstentionism. Previously about 50 per cent of the electorate had abstained from voting, while in these elections this figure dropped to 30-40 per cent.

This drop in abstentionism does not at all mean new support for the PRI, Mexico's governing bourgeois party which has been in power for more than 50 years. In fact, the percentage of the votes obtained by the PRI had gone down. Those who benefited by the increase of new voters were fundamentally those parties who were able to attract these new sectors, fundamentally the bourgeois opposition party, the PAN, and the PRT.

Other parties tended to maintain their previous percentages in these elections. The PSUM (Partido Socialista Unificado de Mexico, a fusion of the old Communist Party with several small Stalinist sects) increased their overall vote, but proportionally remained the same. There was also a marked tendency of those parties most closely associated with the PRI such as the right wing PARM, the PST (Socialist Workers Party) and the PPS (Partido Popular Socialista, a party which traces its ideological and organizational roots to Lombardo Toledano) to decrease their percentages. In fact, the PARM fell below the minimum needed to maintain itself as a registered political party.

It is also obvious that the regime was able to generate some political hopes through its much touted political reform. One result of this was an increased interest and participation in the electoral process by workers.

Id like to briefly discuss the results of the PAN whose vote increase is particularly significant. The PAN went from 10 16 campaign. per cent (14 per cent according to the government). Our analysis is that this vote does not reflect a right wing shift on the part of broad sectors of the population. Rather the fact that opposition to the government in the electoral arena is still not reflected through a class vote. There has undoubtedly been a more belligerent attitude on the part of the right wing, both in the election campaign as well as since then, particularly around the rumours being spread concerning the economic crisis. However the vote for the PAN was not a vote for their reactionary positions, for example, to the right of the PRI on questions such as Central America and austerity. Rather it reflects a protest vote against the PRI. It is an expression of social discontent.

This is obvious when one looks at the vote in those sectors of the working class which have a history of trade union experiences and struggles, such as the mineworkers of Monclova, the slum dwellers of Naucalpan and Ciudad Nezahualcoyotl. Despite a history of social struggles, these areas gave strong votes to the PAN. In fact, in Naucalpan, located in the industrial belt outside Mexico City, the PAN scored its only recognized electoral victory. In Ciudad Nezahualcovotl. a slum neighborhood of some 3,000,000 inhabitants the election results have been disqualified due to blatant irregularities on the day of the voting. There has not been an increase in PAN membership, although there has been a certain support for the PAN's denunciations of widespread electoral fraud.

There is a real danger however that Mexico might be moving towards a two party system. For example, in the parliamentary chamber corresponding to proportional representation, of 100 deputies, the PAN has exactly half.

One interesting sidelight of all this is that the PSUM was on a campaign within the left to promote the concept of a "productive vote", that is, to vote for the PSUM and not the PRT. In reality what happened was that it was the PAN who gained from this idea of a "productive vote" and the PSUM's campaign was in reality counterproductive for their own party.

So, in short, we have a greater electoral participation by workers but on the other hand a real contradiction between their social struggles and the fact that they are politically voting for bourgeois parties. Q: What type of campaign did the PRT wage? What were some of its highlights? A: The PRT had an activist campaign from the beginning to the end, and a very dynamic one at that.

We calculated that just in the final six months of the campaign some 200,000 attended rallies for Rosario Ibarra de Piedra, our presidential candidate. This does not include figures for people who attended rallies for local candidates.

The PRT's closing campaign rally was attended by between 40-50,000 people, according to the bourgeois press. About 4,500 came from the provinces, and the remainder from the Mexico City area, which reflects a real implantation of the party in the Valley of Mexico. The vast majority of people marched behind the banners of the PRT in this demonstration. The PSUM rally was also very significant. Some 100,000 filled the Zocalo, the seat of the government. The other parties, except of course the PRI, had very small rallies. The PPS for example, had a rally of only 1,000 people to end their campaign.

The TV programs also had a big impact. From last August until June we had a monthly program of 15 minutes aired on all TV stations, usually in the early evening hours. In the last four months we had an additional 5 minute program per month. Our message reached literally millions of people. We were able to gauge the impact of these programs by the fact that when we gave the phone numbers for the PRT headquarters, we were flooded with telephone calls from listeners asking to join the party.

Different sectors of society looked upon the campaign as their own. There were womens support committees formed in some 10 cities. In Mexico City they were fundamentally made up of activists from the womens liberation movement, but in most of. the provincial cities they were made up, in their majority, of women workers, and housewho wanted to emphasize the importance of womens participation in political life, economic demands, etc. A central rally of these committees took place in Mexico City in March to launch a Front of Committees in Support of Rosario Ibarra. The PRT had the highest percentage of women candidates of any political party.

Mexico's gay movement threw itself behind the campaign in a big way. All over the country chapters of the Committee of Lesbians and Homosexuals in support of Rosario Ibarra (CHARI) were formed and three leaders of the gay movement ran on the PRT lists. CLHARI was well organized and active throughout the campaign. It is interesting to note that the only PRT rally physically attacked during the course of the campaign was one organized by the CHARI in Mexico City. For the first time ever, the gay movement successfully defended its right to hold a public rally, and the following week another rally in the same site was held without incidents

In three universities, those of Baja California Norte, Guadalajara and Monterrey, groups of porros, groups of right wing thugs, tried to prevent Rosario from entering the university. In these universities, repression had prevented the student movement from really developing. The successful organization of rallies on these campuses was a great help to the student movement as a whole.

The campaign was able to visit practically all the prisons in Mexico. As such it was the human rights campaign. During the course of the campaign several of the political prisoners who we were demanding freedom for, were released. However the real result of the campaign has just been registered this past week with the granting of a very broad amnesty which frees all political prisoners, although it still does not successfully problem of the 500 "disappeared" com-

Among peasants the campaign had important support. The majority of the peasant organizations not controlled by the government officially gave their support to the campaign. Most of those that declined to do so adopted an abstentionist position on the elections.

I'd also like to mention that we held rallies on the two Mexican borders, that is, on the US border in support of the undocumented workers and on the Guatemalan border in support of the Central American revolution. Needless to say, we were the only election campaign that did such a thing.

Finally, we were able to use the campaign effectively in the trade union sector as well. Rosario was present in all the key strikes that took place during the entire campaign period and hundreds of meetings and rallies were organized in working class neighborhoods from one end of the country to the other. It's worth pointing out that the majority of the PRT's votes came from working class, peasant, and Q: What were the PRT's electoral results? A: The official government figures credit us with some 416,000 votes for president, although we calculate that we received far more than that. Even if we accept the official government results, it places us in fourth place nationally.

As I said before, the new votes went fundamentally for the PAN and the PRT. In our case, we attracted newly radicalized sectors who previously never took part in elections. In this sense, we did not have a traditional electorate, to say nothing of previous experience as a party in this type of campaign. Therefore being in fourth place is particularly significant.

We didn't expect such a high vote. Generally in election campaigns of radical parties, there's lots of success in terms of mobilizations but not in terms of votes. In our case, there was a correlation between the two, as can be seen by comparing statistics on attendance at PRT rallies and our vote. Rosario's meetings were generally the largest of any party, except those of the PRI, of course, and we campaigned in 29 or the 32 states of

This national implantation of the PRT place throughout the country, and on a local level, that is, where we ran local election campaigns for our 171 district candidates there was also a tendency to come in fourth place. In two states, Baja California Sur, where we had candidates running in all the districts, and Morelos, a state with a new industrial proletariat and a peasantry with a revolutionary tradition dating back to the days of Zapata, we were in third place, out of nine parties.

Valley of Mexico, includes Mexico City, we received our greatest number of votes, some 150,000,

Finally, it should be mentioned that we had to organize a small army of poll watchers the day of the elections to try to reduce the possibility of electoral fraud. This was particularly difficult since

Mexican PRT campaign supporters (DR) such poll watchers could not be candidates or the party's representatives on the district electoral bodies. These figures alone account for some 750 comrades. In Mexico City we were able to have representatives in about half of the 8,000 polling stations. Q: How extensive was the electoral fraud? Was it widely recognized as having occurA: The fraud was massive and wide-

On July 5, the day after the elections, Olivares Santana, secretary of the Minis-

Interior, Gobernacion, announced that they had computed 73 per cent of the polling places, that the PRT was in fourth place with 400,000 votes and the PSUM had 1,200,000 votes.

week later, the government announced that with 100 per cent counted, the PSUM had dropped to 800,000 votes, and the PRT from fourth to either fifth, sixth or seventh place, gaining only 20,000 additional votes.

Jose Angel Conchello, a PAN leader says that on July 5 at 6am the government knew that the PRI had received 8,000,000 votes, the PAN 7,000,000, the PSUM 2,300,000 and the PRT 1,200,000 and the other five parties lesser amounts. This has been backed up by an independent European investigator.

On July 4 itself we knew that there was serious fraud occurring, although it later became evident that the bulk of the fraud took place after July 4.

On election day, in various parts of the country, groups of soldiers were brought in block to vote, in the presence of their commanding officers. This in itself is illegal according to governments own election laws. In addition, these soldiers did not appear in the electoral lists, which means they could vote again in different places.

In the city of Puebla many polling station opened one hour before officially announced hour, in the absence of representatives of any of the opposition parties. When the poll watchers showed up at the scheduled hour, they found the ballot boxes full, the people supposedly having already voted.

In Monterrey, the third largest city in the country, the election day fraud was most obvious. Both the PAN and the PRT had expected to receive very high votes in

Monterrey, and in fact, the presidential candidates of both parties come from this city. Representatives of the opposition parties, in particular the PAN and the PRT, were physically thrown out of the polling stations. The bourgeois press has published accounts, along with the photo. graphic evidence where possible, of trans cripts of the police radio telling the police where to fill and refill ballot boxes with ballots marked for the PRI and where to bring the genuine ballot boxes, and where to throw away their votes. The press, as I said, has published photographs of the police carrying away ballot boxes, which is completely illegal under Mexican law, and of ripped up ballots scattered on

The PRT, which was expecting a good vote in Monterrey, actually wound up with below its national average. In the falsifying the proportional representation lists. While in many rural areas the PPS has ten times as many proportional representation votes as they do presidential votes, for the PRT, we are credited with less votes. The government argues that voters wanted to vote for Rosario for president but not for the PRT. This is patently absurd even on the face of it. To begin with, Rosario was our number one candidate for parliament on the proportional representation lists, a fact widely publicized by the party. It is simply illogical to assume that someone would want her as president but not as a member of parliament. Secondly, even looking at the official government results, one can see clearly what the real score it. On the senatorial lists, the PRT had candidates in only 37 per cent of the districts. On the "uninominal" district lists in only 57 per cent of the districts. The proportional representation lists were in 3 national districts, that is, the PRT had candidates in 100 per cent of the areas. Logically, 63 per cent of the people who voted for the PRT for the proportional representation list could not do so on a senatorial level and 43 per cent couldn't do so on a "uninominal" district level. Yet, according to the governments figures, the PRTs proportional representation, district representation and senatorial lists received approximately the same vote. If voters from only 37 per cent of the districts gave the PRT senatorial lists X number of votes, isn't it logical to assume that voters from 100 per cent of the district where Rosario lives there was not Political prisoners freed a single vote for her. Much to the embarrassment of the local authorities, when she went to vote, her name had disappeared from the registration list.

However, as I said, the bulk of the fraud took place after July 4, in the one week period when the ballot boxes were in the hands of the government. The results were particularly modified in those areas where the only poll watcher was the PRI representative.

The most evident example of this fraud took place in the case of the PPS and PST, two reformist parties noted for their slavish support and dependence on the PRI. The votes of these parties were grossly increased so as to assure them parliamentary representation as payment for their opportunist political support. In cases the PRI simply gave their own votes in the proportional representation lists (where the PRI doesn't receive representation in any event) to other parties. For example, in Morelos the right wing PDM (Mexican Democratic Party) received some 7,000 votes in the presidential column while they are credited with almost four times as many in the proportional representation lists, something which would not normally occur, to

There were three objectives which the PRI hoped to get through the massive use

Firstly, to increase the presidential vote of Miguel De la Madrid, PRI candidate. No one disputes him as the winner of course. But the PRI wanted a maJority, not only of all those who voted, but indeed of the entire potential electorate. This is so as not to appear as a "minority government". Toward this end, the presidential vote of the PPS, who were supporting De la Madrid, increased, as well as that of the PRI itself.

Secondly, to presence of the left, that is, the PSUM and the PRT.

Thirdly, to prevent the PRT from parliamentary representation, since the PRT is known as the most revolutionary force in the country.

The mechanism by which objective was carried out was through

On September 1, 1982, as part of Mexican President Lopez Portillo declared an amnesty for 40 political

The decree encompasses the majority of political prisoners held in jail, although it is, at the same time, partial in that there are still scores of political prisoners, mainly peasants, jailed in connection with land seizures, who remain in jail, and

"disappeared" Lopez Portillo said not a word about these activists in his report, although their situation has been the focus of a long campaign waged by the Frente Nacional Contra la Represion, led by Rosario Ibarra de Piedra, presidential candidate of the PRT in the past presidential elec-

Among those amnestied are Juan Islas and Arturo Gallegos, members of the PRT, Mexican section of the Fourth International. These comrades left prison on September 1, following eight years behind bars.

Islas and Gallegos were active in the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR), an armed-struggle organization active in Mexico City and the states of Morelos and Guerrero. Despite attempts by the FAR to initiate discussions with other organizations involved in armed struggle activities of political elaboration in its ranks, the combinaof isolation from the masses, lack of political clarity, and ferocious police and military repression led to a process of disintegration of these type of political-military organiza-

In 1974 Gallegos and Islas were arrested. For four days they "disappeared" in the infamous Mexi-

2222 can clandestine prisons, subjected to

were then presented to the legal authorities and of conspiracy, kidnapping Three years later they were sentenced to 36 years of prison.

For four years, seven months they were held in the Acapulco Prison. There they were threatened with death on various occasions by the family of Margarita Saad, assassinated several years previously by the FAR, with whose death the comrades were charged. The most famous case occurred in January 1979 when a plot was discovered to murder the four political prisoners held in the Acupuleo Jail. A group of common dollars), their release from prison, and security guards for their protection if they achieved their objective. together with the public campaign waged by the PRT and the FNCR the plot from involved in it finally "escaped" from

In 1979, following a process of political evolution and Islas and Gallegos, together with three other political prisoners, joined the PRT. This process of political clarification included a balance sheet on the armed struggle experience in Mexico and the current needs of the revolutionary movement.

The liberation of the 40 political prisoners, and in particular of Gallegos and Islas, is a victory both for the FNCR and for the PRT. Both organizations had waged a relentless campaign over the these imprisoned included tactics ranging from hunger strikes to mass marches involving tens of thousands.

In the case of Gallegos and Islas, the authorities had argued for years that the powerful financial groupings, the Monterrey Group and the Saad family pressure against the any amnesty decree. Gallegos and Islas is therefore a partimovement in general and the PRT in

The comrades are now active politically outside prison walls, both in the movement for the recovery of the 500 "disappeared", as well as in the PRT.

ZACTO NACIONAL FOR LA CANDIDATURADE

ROSARIO IBARRA DE PIEDRA

MRPLILR PRTdistriets would give a much higher quan-

The fraud has, however, been widely recognized as having taken place. Articles appear daily in the press on accusations and counter-accusations. Particularly in the radical movement there is consciousness on this. Practically all the left organizations that do not have the legal registration as well as the PSUM in Mexico City have protested the fraud against the PRT. This includes electoral allies of the PSUM such as the Corriente Socialista Q: What type of campaign did the PSUM run? What is the current situation with A: The PSUM had the widely publicized goal of being the second electoral force in the country, that is, behind the PAN. The the elections made this the

The PSUM had various factors working

To begin with, the Mexican Communist Party's previous electoral experience was working against them. In a few words, it was nothing spectacular or attractive for the masses. The CP had done virtually nothing to link their parliamentary activity with the mass movement. In fact, inside the CP ranks there has been considerable criticism of their parliamentary orientation. Not too long ago a minority current known as the "renovadores" broke from the SUM, criticizing, among other things, the CP's parliamentary experience.

The PSUM also wanted to take advantage of their recent foundation as the unitary party of the Mexican left. However this project was a failure when the most important and dynamic element in the fusion process which gave birth to the PSUM late last year, that is the PMT (Partido Mexicano de los Trabajadores, Mexican Workers Party) pulled out of the

The PSUM really did not run an active campaign. With the exception final rally of 100,000 in the Zocalo, their rallies tended to be much smaller than those of Rosario. During this whole period there have also been a series of internal crises in the PSUM, especially among the ex-CP ranks. In addition, there are a series of disagreements and fights amongst the various components that make up the PSUM. All this will of course intensify with the post-election period frustration which is a result of their having expected much better results.

The Mexico City base of the ex-CP want joint work and a series of agreements with the PRT. In the last few weeks we have been able to work closely with these companeros on a party to party level. The PSUM in Mexico City protested the electoral fraud, we have discussed a joint electoral balance sheet with them, and we co-sponsored a demonstration against the electoral fraud in which speaker was Valentin Campa, veteran CP leader and presidential candidate in the 1976 elections. In this demonstration they supported the right of the

PRT to have parliamentary representation, even though this would, of course, decrease the PSUM's representation in parliament due to the way the election law determines proportional parliamentary representation. Q: How did the other Trotskyist groups relate to the election campaign? A: The Liga Obrera Marxista (LOM-Marxist Workers League), the Lambertist organization in Mexico for the entire last year had a big campaign for one single candidate of the PSUM and the PRT. The campaign, modeled after their French organizations campaign for a joint CP-SP government, was a bit silly, signatures for a PRI-PSUM ticket, etc. However we did support such an idea, and endorsed the campaign. At this time and the Morenista Partido Obrero Socialista (POS-Socialist Workers Party) were functioning virtually as single party. The LOM continued to call for unity until the end of the campaign. Finally they urged a vote for either the PSUM or the PRT, without giving any

Despite a series of important political agreements, including concerning Poland, and the slogan of a workers and peasants government the POS inexplicably entered into an electoral alliance with the PSUM. This can be explained by their sectarianism or perhaps by their having received a spot on the PSUM ticket, or perhaps by a

In this moment a split took place in the POS. While it was primarily due to international factors, one of the points in dispute was on electoral policy. The minority split off, known as the Liga Socialista (Socialist League, LS) and supported the PRT campaign.

The POS had virtually no participation in the electoral campaign. In fact, the PRT campaign produced a considerable amount of demoralization in the ranks of the Morenist group, and many of their members left, most leaving politics, but some supporting and some returning to the PRT.

I want to emphasize that all three groups - LOM, POS and LS - are really quite insignificant in the panorama of the Mexican left. Q: Was the PRT able to strengthen itself organizationally during the course of the A: Yes, very much so.

Out of the 32 states of the Mexican republic, we now have functioning PRT units in 29, which is a big advance for the

Mexican PRT election rally (DR) party. In general, we were able to experience significant growth during the campaign, and develop a very large periphery.

In addition, we were able to strengthen the national apparatus of the party, acquiring a new national headquarters, a print shop, expanding the number of full

In terms of recruitment, we were able to score important successes in sectors of the working class such as oil workers, texworkers, telephone workers

The central problem which we have is that we are still applying rigid criteria in terms of recruitment while at the same time the PRT's capacity to mobilize people has greatly increased.

We want to close this gap between our real periphery and audience and capacity to mobilize people and our recruitment

We have to strengthen the organization to be able to integrate the many new comrades who are today around the PRT. Q: Many other left groups gave support to the PRT in the elections, some of them actively. What is happening with them? A: It is true that many different groups on the left, in fact, the bulk of the far left gave the PRT support in the elections. Most of these groups came from Maoist or ultra-left backgrounds.

During the campaign itself we worked closely with the MRP (Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo, Revolutionary Movement of the People, an ex-Maoist group) and the ULR (Union de Lucha Revolucionaria, Union of Revolutionary Struggle, which has its traditions in the armed struggle groups of several years ago). And the Organizacion ComunistaProletaria (Proletarian Communist Organization, of nationalist origin). Today we are in discussions with them with the idea of forming a permanent political current, that is a revolutionary wing, inside the general mass movement.

• PAN - Partido de Accion Nacional PARM - Partido Autentico de la Revolucion Mexicana PRT - Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores PRI - Partido Revolucionario Institucional PST - Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores PPS - Partido Popular Socialista CLHARI - Comite de Lesbianas y Homosexuales en Apoyo a Rosario Ibarra LOM - Liga Obrera Marxista POS - Partido Obrero Socialista PDM - Partido Democrata Mexicano LS - Liga Socialista MRP - Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo ULR - Union de Lucha Revolucionaria PMT - Partido Mexicano de los Trabajadores

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