Chilean people say
"No" to Pinochet
FIFTEEN YEARS after the bloody coup d'etat of
September, 1973 which brought him to power, General
Pinochet has just been caught in a trap of his own making. On October 5, the plebiscite he organized resulted in a clear defeat: 54.68% to 43.04% in favor of
Electoral fraud, on everyone's mind since the August
31 designation of the general as the sole candidate, proved impossible: the gap between the "Yes" and "No"
votes was too wide. Cheating in such conditions could have been worse than accepting the result.
October 31, 1988 • #150 International Viewpoint the "No"s. ARIANE MERRI
S INCE the state of siege was lifted
in September, the opposition has again taken to the streets, with hundreds of thousands of people demonstrating for a "No" vote. In a few days, the accumulated fear of 15 years of dictatorship literally evaporated, even as rumors of a new military coup grew more persistent with each poll showing the inevitability of Pinochet's defeat.
The evening of the vote, General Matthei, head of the Air Force and one of the four members of the junta, acknowledged the defeat even before the official results were communicated by the Ministry of the Interior. Tens of thousands were in the streets shouting aloud their victory and demanding that Pinochet step down immediately, "que se vaya ahora!"
But the dictator wasn't listening. He quickly declared that he will respect the constitution — a constitution cut to measure for him and approved by a fraudulent referendum in March 1980. According to this document, the "transition" between military rule and the passing of power to a civilian government will stick to the following calender:
• From now until November 1989, everything will continue as before. Pinochet and the junta are to be reconfirmed in their respective functions from March 11, 1989, until March 11, 1990.
• On November 14, 1989, the presidential campaign will open. The constitution states that the current president of the republic- Pinochet — cannot run.
• December 11, 1989, presidential and congress elections will be called.
• December 14, 1989, will see the first round of the presidential election.
• February 10, 1990, a second round will be held if necessary.
• March 11, 1990, Pinochet will step down for the new
That is what is planned. But today March 1990, or even December 1989, seem a long way off to many Chileans. A lot could happen before then, nothing is fixed for all time, and some things could be negotiated between reasonable people.
Pinochet's defeat was a personal slap in the face for the dictator, who honestly thought he could extend his rule into the twenty-first century, thus continuing the "movement begun on September 11,
Many regime partisans lukewarm about Pinochet
But many of the regime's partisans — civilians and soldiers alike - were lukewarm, even hostile, to his candidacy. Certainly not out of humanism, but because they thought that Pinochet was the most likely to become the focus of all of the hate engendered by 15 years of dictatorship. And that is exactly what happened.
A year ago, the opposition was on the defensive, divided. The popular movement that had taken to the streets from the first protestas in 1983 up until July 1986 was expectant, then generally disgusted with the shilly-shallyings of an opposition that had shown itself incapable of going forward or striking a telling blow against a regime in difficulties. The harsh repression following the failed attempt on Pinochet's life (claimed by the Manuel Rodriguez Patriot-
CHILE ic Front (FPMR), a breakaway from the Chilean CP) did the rest: the dictatorship was in fine fettle, the price of copper soared on the international market, the economic growth rate registered new highs, and the opposition retreated into contemplation of its internal affairs. It was in this context that Pinochet decided to push his advantage, putting himself forward as the only candidate of the plebiscite.
He campaigned for more than a year, making numerous trips, speeches, announcing tax cuts, house building and other clientelist measures designed to make it look as though his candidacy was the "natural"
Keeping this in mind, he was going to reshuffle the government, putting his henchmen - those forming what is known as the "bunker" — into key posts
His campaign played on some simple themes. In the political and ideological arena, there was God and the Devil; Good and Evil; Me, or Communist chaos. In the economic sphere, the choice was between a regime which brought Chile out of underdevelopment and the anarchy of the Popular Unity (UP).
It has already been stated that other supporters of the regime were less enthusiastic about the general's chances, knowing it would be easier to bring the transition to a successful conclusion with someone less historically burdened than Pinochet. 3
For its part, the United States was quick
SO MUCH FOR THE PLEBISCITE. WE'LL MANAGE THE GENERAL ELECTION MORE CAREFULLY.
International Viewpoint #150 • October 31, 1988
CHILE to understand the situation, and given the role played by this country in setting up the military junta in 1973, its opinion, predictably, carries a lot of weight. While reinforcing their links with the military - the real political masters of the country — the
Americans subsidized the respectable parties of the opposition, notably the Christian
Democracy (DC), knowing that within their ranks would be found those civilians suitable for a future normalization. This is a transitional process already undertaken by other countries in the souther cone like
Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. It should be clear that the doctrine dear to Jeanne
Kirkpatrick's heart, that of "totalitarian enemies" versus "totalitarian friends," has not been abandoned by a Republican administration suddenly touched by democratic grace - it has merely become more sophisticated.
### United States revises policy for Latin America The spread of revolutionary insurrections in Central America, the resurgence of large scale guerilla warfare in many of those countries, and, more generally, the chronic political instability and explosive economic situation of the sub-continent, have led to a reformulation of national security doctrine. US foreign policy for Latin America now entails the setting up of civilian regimes under a high level of military surveillance (the new Brazilian constitution is the most recent example, and strengthening low-intensity warfare.
This reformulation is clearly apparent in the paper put together by the famous Santa
Fe group for George Bush's presidential campaign.
But dictators have a certain autonomy. And General Pinochet was not too pleased to see himself shoved aside for higher po-
PINOCHET WHEN THE GENEKAL SAYS " GENEKAL ELECION HE MEANS JUST THAT litical considerations after so many years of loyal service. After all the years of being accustomed to hearing his inflammatory tirades against the Soviet Union and Cuba, it is not a little piquant to hear him inveigh against the "foreign interference" of the United States.
### Claim that Pinochet
"really won" the plebiscite
The day after the vote, those civilians who made up part of Pinochet's support were swift in drawing the lessons of his defeat in order to plan their futures.
But the "bunker" stubbornly hangs on. Fernandez, the Minister of the Interior, has been explaining that Pinochet was the real winner of the plebiscite, since he alone drew 43% of the total vote, while the opposition had to enter 16 candidates (the number of parties making up the Command for No, not including the CP) in order to get 54%. Associated with right-wing extremist parties like Patria et Libertad (Freedom and Homeland), those faithful to the regime are demanding a revision of the constitution allowing Pinochet to stand in the 1989
"Absolutely not," was the response of the two major right-wing parties, the Union of Independents for Democracy (UDI) and the Party of National Renovation (PRN), who hope to step into the vacuum left by
In any case, civilian parties count for very little as far as political decisions are concerned. These are the preserve of the military, which makes no bones about showing its contempt for "politicos".
All of the military hierarchy's policies are guided by two fundamental principles: first, to maintain the unity of the armed forces in the face of any tactical splits which might occur, and, second, to ensure the uninterrupted continuation of the regime — of which they are the keystone -in the post-Pinochet period
These two objectives are inseparable, the second being unthinkable without the first. This is why, despite the real or feigned reservations expressed by some about Pinochet's candidacy, the junta did finally decide on the General. None of the other three military chiefs [the junta is made up of the heads of the four branches of the military: the navy, airforce, carabineros, or military police and the army] could take the responsibility for a possible split within the armed forces, all the more so as the army, led by Pinochet, would be too difficult to
Are these reservations sincere or false? As a matter of fact, for the last year it seems that every two-bit military chief has let slip hints of their "ideal candidate," who bore no resemblance to Pinochet. General Matthei particularly specialized in the consummate art of intimating now an opening, now its withdrawal.
These declarations no doubt reflected the closed-door discussions in the ranks of the military hierarchy, but they also intentionally served to leave the question open as long as possible. The opposition was forced to deal with the possibility of a consensus candidate, and ended up making even more concessions. If a balance sheet is drawn, it is clear this tactic paid off: neither the junta nor the regime backed down one iota. They followed the schedule laid down by the constitution to the letter and they forced the opposition to accept the framework of the plebiscite, all without the slightest let up in the repression. Amnesty International has even estimated that the situation has worsened, due to the appearance of ultra rightwing paramilitary squads. Unquestionably the tactic that worked so well in the months before the plebiscite will be applied more than ever in this new period.
### Military has total constitutional control
The 1980 Constitution, which will serve as the basis for the post-Pinochet period, governs political rights and institutional functions as with any constitution. But this one is especially embellished.
"Any act of a person or group aiming to attack the institution of the family, propagate violence, or conceiving of society, the state, or the political order as totalitarian or founded on class struggle, is illicit and against the interests of the republic."
This is the famous Article 8 which places the entire left outside of the law. But its application is at the military's discretion, and they are the only judges. In this way, the Humanist Party and the National Democratic Party — both of which had asked for legal status and submitted to all of the conditions required by the law on political parties (among other things, collecting 30,000 names) - found themselves refused on
But the most important thing was without doubt the creation of a National Security Council (CNS). It is made up, like the junta, of commanders from the four branches of the military, plus the president of the republic, the president of the Supreme Court and the president of the higher chamber of the Congress. Even in purely mathematical terms, the military predominates, but its pre-eminence goes far beyond numbers.
This body has unlimited powers. They extend from advising the president to beginning an enquiry on any official with any relationship whatsoever to matters of internal security (an infinitely expansive concept if ever there was one) or to external danger to the state. The constitution in fact envisions a sort of "co-government", an unequal distribution of powers between the president and the CNS. In contrast, the two chambers of the Congress are reduced to whatever part remains to be played in terms of political decision-making.
Christian Democracy and the opposition
Two parties dominate the regime's opposition. On the right, the Christian Democracy, whose president Patricio Aylwyn leads the Command for No; and, on the left, the Communist Party. The center is occupied by the nebulous socialist parties (Almeyda, Nunez and so on) and others.
The Christian Democracy is unanimously in support of the transitional process. It is conscious of the strength it has as a result of the support of the United States, the confidence in it expressed by the business sector, and the easily obtained ear of a favorable military hierarchy. It has had a popular base, notably among the unions. But with the perspective of negotiations with military figures, the current leadership of the party has cut all those who were linked to the labor movement and thus subject to popular pressures out of the decision-making process.
In terms of the economy, the Christian Democracy is now reassuring business circles that they believe a return to the nationalizations of the Popular Unity period to be out of the question. The Chilean economic "success" will be continued.
Politically, the objective is a government somewhere between civilian and military dictatorship. It is significant that that the huge concert organized by the opposition in Santiago on October 7 was called the "Festival of Democracy and National Reconciliation". This is the catchword of the Christian Democrats: the reconciliation of the army and the people, who have moved apart during 15 years of a "misunderstanding". Obviously, a key part of this reconciliation will be total immunity for all murderers and torturers in uniform. If there was one negotiable point for the military, this was it. The Statute of Limitations enacted in Argentina risks being a model of anti-militarist subversion compared to that which will be concocted for these ends in
Last, but not least, a large part of the DC's strength is a direct result of the misgivings, about-faces, and confusion reigning in the CP. The Communist Party, because of its strength and its implantation, especially among the poblaciones, the miserable shanty towns that cover Santiago, is the only force which could contest the DC. But the CP has placed itself in an impossible position to do so. For two years, it has dogged the steps of the Christian Democrats, who have been able to consistently put it on the defensive.
Briefly, the course of events has been as follows: in 1983, the Chilean CP, one of the most opportunist and right wing of all Latin America (which is saying quite a lot) made a spectacular turn, calling for popular insurrection and forming an armed wing, the FPMR. The latter managed a series of spectacular attacks which attracted to it a good number of youth from the poblaciones who wanted a radical solution to the dictatorship and were turned off by the well-mannered politicos of the Christian Democracy. Then in September came the failed attempt on Pinochet's life. The repression took a heavy toll on the Front.
Shortly afterwards, the CP dropped its program of armed struggle, provoking a crisis in the FPMR. Then, although it had always denounced the electoral process of the plebiscite, correctly arguing the profoundly anti-democratic nature of the 1980 Constitution, the CP for the first time urged members to register on the electoral rolls "in order to prevent the electoral fraud being prepared", all the while maintaining its line on a boycott. Its position was untenable: the rest of the opposition accused it of being responsible for Pinochet's future victory, and the layers it influenced did not understand why they should register unless in order to vote. Finally, the polarization for or against Pinochet grew apace.
Confusion inside the Communist Party
At last, in June, the CP came over to the "No"s. The FPMR, which seems to have suffered a split as the CP tried to regain control, still retained a position of boycotting the plebiscite, although actually it didn't address the question directly, but called for mass mobilizations. It announced a truce as far as its armed actions went.
And now? The statements of the old Stalinist leader, Volodya Teitelbaum, recently returned from exile, leave little doubt. Asked by the Spanish daily El Pais on October 3 what he meant by a "popular democratic uprising," an expression which had caused much consternation among the bourgeois opposition, Teitelbaum answered: "I never pictured it as being an armed action, but a peaceful demonstration of the people, of the nation in the streets."
CHILE And he added:
"The provisional government which we propose is a democratic formulation, as it is neither a case of a government formed by a single party, nor by all of the left parties, but rather by all of the forces of the opposition, from the center, the right, and so on...It will have to be preceded by a series of discussions in order to arrive at an accord between all forces present. This agreement will also have to include, in one way or another, the armed forces." The quote renders any commentary on the true plans of the Communist Party unnecessary. There's no novelty here, either, as the internal leader Sanfuentes, when interviewed on June 30 for the same paper, said the same thing.
Heavy cloak of fear been lifted
As if he'd suffered a severe attack of amnesia, Teitelbaum when asked about the balance sheet of the UP could only attribute to it the responsibility for its failure: "one sector of the UP, mixing up the stages, decided to speed through them, to go quickly to socialism. This was not possible in Chile at that time, and I believe that it even helped to nourish right-wing propaganda."
What's on the cards now? As we've seen, everyone desires a hitch-free transition and friendly relations with the military. This is for their own reasons - for instance, the CP wants recognition as a legal party. There is a broad consensus on the question. But the route to be followed resembles an equation with many unknowns. One of these is the tenacity of Pinochet and of his
Another is the attitude that will be taken by the people's movement, and this could hold many surprises. As noted, since the end of August, a movement which had disappeared for two years has again taken to the streets, and the heavy cloak of fear seems to have lifted. The workers' movement is in recomposition with the refounding of the United Confederation of Workers (CUT) last August. The economic frustration of all those who live on the edge of survival and watch the newly rich beneficiaries of free enterprise display their wealth is one explosive charge; the democratic hopes and the simple desire to live of young people who have been the first to pay the high cost of repression is another. But, at the same time, the regime has left too many scars for people to easily throw themselves into adventurism. As in Argentina, the traumatic effects of repression weigh and will continue to weigh on the popular
The vision of the demonstrators on the night of the plebiscite who, carried away in their joy, threw themselves into the arms of the carabineros to embrace them, the same police who would fire on them the next day, is a sobering picture. It is an image that 5 should give rise to reflection. *