Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1987, debate at the Thirteenth Congress of the CCP
Zhao Ziyang announced a plan of economic between the "reformers" and the and political reforms - expansion of "conservatives." This discussion is far from production and free markets; factories run by having abated, and the results of the reforms plant managers rather than party leaders; and that have already been undertaken are increased openings for international central today to the political and economic life commercial exchanges and foreign of the People's Republic of China.
investments. The following article analyzes the various
A parallel could be made between the policies currents within the CCP. In our next issue we will publish the second part, which looks at intend to follow and the course taken in the the economic reforms and the administrative
Soviet Union under perestroika. cells of the Party.
This radical break with the policies pursued in A MARAVER
T HE THIRTEENTH Congress of
the Chinese Communist Party was held in Peking from October 25 to November 1, 1987. There were 1,959 delegates representing 46 million party members. The main points on the agenda were electing a new leadership in the context of a general change unprecedented in the party's history, and adopting a strategic political line of reform representing the ideological end of Maoism
The congress itself was preceded by ten months of intense factional struggles between conservatives and reformists.
In January 1987, in the midst of the student mobilizations that took place in all of the country's most important cities, an internal political crisis resulted that led to the fall of the party's general secretary, Hu Yaobang. The conservative offensive that continued until the meeting of the National People's Assembly (NPA) in April led to a radicalization of the reformers' They managed to gain dominance in the pre-congress period, after retaking the political initiative in a general counter-offensive in May.
Consolidating this dominance and assuring its continuation beyond the life-span of Deng Xiaoping was the principal objective of the Thirteenth Congress. In order to do this, it was necessary to give an overall coherence to the positions developed by the reformers over the last nine years since the Third Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee, in a strategic project for building socialism in the People's Republic of China.
At the same time a more favorable relationship of forces for the reformers developed in the leading bodies. With the retirement of the Long March generation, the reformers have seen an increase in their influence as well as in the specific role of
Deng Xiaoping as the supreme arbiter and inspiration of the party. This is an essential aspect of the situation, because the struggle in the last few months of 1987 showed that in order to consolidate its dominance and settle the problem of succession, formist faction needs take the maximum advantage of Deng's authority as long as he
Reforms being called a
"second Long March"
The political reform that was the cause of the internal mobilizations and struggles in the party over the last months of 1987 made its appearance for the first time in the general program of Chinese communists, with a series of concrete measures that are
CHINA to be put into practice over the next few years and on whose success the entire reform project depends.
In fact, the chief problem for the economic development of the country is above all social and political. It is how to re-establish the masses' confidence in the party after the Cultural Revolution; how to rekindle their enthusiasm and mobilize them behind the current changes, which are already being termed a second Long March; and how to keep the reform from losing momentum and becoming embalmed in a series of administrative decrees.
At a time when throughout the world "actually existing socialism" is at a crossroads, when we are seeing the emergence of such extensive reform projects as the Soviet perestroika, the Cuban "rectification campaign", and the relaunching of market socialism in Hungary, the Chinese leaders have made a major effort to define a project ideologically. In the economic and political fields, it is the most radical so far of these
The launching of a campaign against "bourgeois liberalism" at the January 14, 1987, meeting of the Political Bureau and the subsequent immediate resignation of Hu Yaobang signaled a general offensive by the conservative faction, which was joined by a section of the People's Liberation Army.
Using their control of the Propaganda Department, the conservatives began to circulate an overall critique of the economic and social situation. The reforms, they explained, had caused inflation and growing social inequalities by introducing a capitalist sector into the planning process. The operation of this sector was corrupting the population ideologically. 23
In order to confront this problem, it was
International Viewpoint #150 • October 31, 1988
CHINA essential to regain political control of the situation. This required repressing all street demonstrations, such as those conducted by the student movement; reinforcing the socialist sector of production and putting an end to such activities as the stock exchange and direct relations between factories and peasant markets. Finally, it meant re-imposing socialist moral values among the intellectuals and throughout society.
Deng Xiaoping's direct intervention, through the reprinting of a 1962 article of his in the People's Daily mid-February, liberalism" be kept out of the economy and the army, and that in practice it be restricted to the party's internal life. Already at this time, the damage done to the reform project was quite considerable. In particular, a general lack of confidence had been created among the intelligentsia and factory managers about the future of the reforms, reviving the traumas of the Cultural
The conservative faction found itself in an insoluble dilemma. It needed to take advantage of the campaign against "bourgeois liberalism" in order to propagate its positions in the run-up to the next congress, and so win a broader social base of support. This would enable it to bring in a younger generation without affecting the balance of forces established at the February 14 meeting of the Political Bureau.
But, at the same time, any move toward breaking the consensus and expanding the campaign entailed a risk of being accused of factionalism and above all of bringing back political instability — in flagrant contradiction to its program of "order and
Foreign investors rooting for the reforms
By openly siding with the reform camp, the international press increased these dangers and reduced the room for maneuver, since it would portray any new conservative mobilization as a personal challenge to Deng. This would have grave repercussions on the confidence of foreign investors, who already had significant material interests in the reforms!
The fifth session of the Sixth National People's Assembly on April 11, 1987, gave 24 platform For ive campaina anise public- the conservative faction a unique public geois liberalism," thanks to the political weight of Peng Zhen, president of the body and principal spokesman of the conservatives in the January crises. The discussion of the report on the government's work that
Zhao Ziyang was to
Perfectly aware stepped the trap
Zhao's report took up the full range of the conservative's criticisms, making explicit references to the political basis of the consensus arrived at in January, which level the government's work was characterized as "readjustment...to reinforce and continually improve macro-economic control." The budgetary fought with by an austerity policy compensated for by price and wage controls. The government had paid particular attention to reducing spendthrift consumption by certain bodies and factories "greedy for comforts, luxury, pomp and ostentatiousness
...creating distortion in the circulation of currency and draining public funds."
servatives' key critiin building infratories owned by all the people rose only
7.3%, a percentage far lower than the
44.6% of 1985. Today, the principal problem is due to the fact that the expansion of investments in fixed assets outside the plan has not always been effectively controlled." 2
This all seems like an echo of Chen
Yun's speeches during the last rough patch, to the effect that high inflation (officially
10% but in reality close to 20%3) and the appearance of social differences (notably excessive consumption and bureaucratic corruption), were the fundamental causes of the the growing social instability.
But the government's main objectives in
1987, according to Zhao, were "the reform of the mechanisms operating in the factories and of the system of management in each of them. This is to be done by promoting horizontal economic association, accelerating banking reform to the appropriate degree, by a further expansion of the producers' goods market, by transforming and gradually perfecting the organization of work and wages in factories through methods of controlling investment in fixed assets." This was to be accomplished "while actively preparing the ground for the next phase of complementary reforms."
Separating political and technical management
The first of these measures, reform of the management system in the factories, has already been submitted by the government to the NPA in the form of bill for a "law on state industrial enterprises." It would separate political and technical leadership, and increase the autonomy and responsibility of managers. It would distinguish ownership from management forms by introducing some types of leasing and subcontracting. But the active opposition of the conservatives blocked its adoption.
In the ideological sphere, according to the report, the student mobilizations "were essentially the product of an overflowing of the bourgeois liberalization current...that is why we say that the struggle against bourgeois liberalism is fundamental for the success or failure of socialist modernization and the nation's destiny." But this was the final concession that the reformers would make. "Here," continued Zhao, "I would solemnly reiterate the following point: "Throughout the struggle against bourgeois liberalism, the general pattern of putting the stress on advancing the productive social forces and giving impetus to the development of socialist civilization in the material and spiritual spheres, around a 1. In 1986, foreign investments dropped by 47.8%, to $3.3 billion, from $6.3 billion in 1985. 2. Report on the government's work submitted to the Fifth Session of the Sixth NPA. Beijing Informa 16, April 21, 1987. [The Spanish-language edition of Peking Review.] 3. Li Rongxia, in "Reform of the price system in Guandong," Beijing Informa 37, September 15, 1987, notes that "in 1986, the cost of living index dropped from 22.5%, a historic record, to 3.4%, the lowest among the big cities." 4. According to People's Daily, in the last two years the new companies, associations and enterprises have bought nearly 200,000 cars, and spent 7 to 8 million yuan on gas and maintenance in addition to the cost of buying these vehicles." Beijing Informa 35, September 1, 1987.
October 31, 1988 • #150 International Viewpoint common axis of economic modernization, will not change. The orientation of reform across the board will not change."
Finally in the arena of political reform, Zhao picked up the conservative gauntlet and reported on a study designed to formulate a series of concrete measures for the Thirteenth Congress. However, he declared that "the question of democracy will never be downgraded under the pretext of fighting bourgeois liberalization."
The success of this tactic by the reformers forced Peng Zhen to make a wrenching readjustment to defend the conservative faction in a press conference with journalists from Hong Kong and Macao.S In the first place, in response to the veiled charge of factionalism in the NPA for blocking the law on state industrial enterprises, Peng took the credit for having been the first to propose the system of personal responsibility of factory managers. But he claimed that at the time, with Zhao Ziyang's agreement, this had been sidetracked because there were still divergences and gaps with regard to certain articles of the
Denying the differences in the party leadership
Likewise, Peng denied the the differences in the party leadership between reformists and conservatives: "We are all Marxists... comrade Deng Xiaoping has said the principles, I am a conservative'" 6
Peng disclosed that in 1982, in order to consolidate the social support of the conserrades" had suggested that he had refused because of his age, since he recognized the need to rejuvenate the CCP leadership, and other conservative leaders retiring. But he was explicitly in favor of keeping Deng
This was definitely a retreat and an acceptance of the bases of the January 14 consensus. Once again the initiative for preparing the Thirteenth Congress was left in the hands of the reformers. The conservative offensive had taken one step forward and two steps back. signalled by Zhao Ziyang's May 13 speech to leaders of the Propaganda Department, the press, party schools and research institutes. In a tone different from that used in front of the NPA, Zhao criticized "those people who call for stepping up the fight against bourgeois liberalism in the economic sphere. They are irresponsible, they are politically wrong and they are violating organizational discipline." He then went on to refute one by one the conservatives' arguments.
The economic situation, he said, was not only not bad but trial management tive ownership of the means of production.
One could not counterpose a "pure"
planned socialist sector to a "corrupted"
capitalist sector. The campaign against bourgeois liberalism could never be a substitute for political reform, and so on.
Finally, Zhao defined the situation that the party had to confront. "If we do not persevere in the Four Principles, we will inevitably fall into bourgeois liberalism. But if the reform is not carried through, conditions will inevitably favor that. This is because only reform can develop the initiative and creative capacity of the people and advance the productive forces, thereby makpossible for strate its superiority...
countries, and without way out of their difficulties."
The second scenario offensive was the
May 26 meeting of the Commission for the Rectification and
Consolidation of the Party. In his speech,
Zhao Ziyang repeated his earlier arguments and demanded that the only criterion for promoting cadres should be their positive contributions to the reform.
Bo Yibo, vice-chair of the commission, said that the unevennesses registered in carrying out the campaign were the result of "formalism" and fear of criticism on the part of many members who lacked confidence in the political stability of the reform. But he stressed that the leaders would not appeal again for any "mass
CHINA movement," as the factional struggle methods of the Cultural Revolution are termed, and that the campaign would be limited to criticism and self-criticism. In a party of 46 million members, the Rectification Campaign has led to only 33,896 expulsions. This figure speaks for The gigantic Hinggan forest fire in Manchuria gave the entire villages went up in flames, while the Ministry of Water and Forests exhibited a glaring inefficiency and bureaucratism. The minister and his deputies were dismissed in the midst of a flood of editorials calling for a law in the framework of the political reform that would clearly define responsibilities at the various levels of the state and party administration and put an end to overcentralization and bureaucratization. On July 1, the People's Daily reprinted Deng Xiaoping's speech, "Reform of the leadership system in the Party and state," which opened the debate on political reform in June 1980 in the Political Bureau.
Fight for control of
Propaganda Department
However, the fight over control of the Propaganda Department was the most important test of strength that the reformers had to win. It was not by chance that it was from this strategic position that the conservatives, led by Deng Liqun, had launched their campaigns against "spiritual pollution" and "bourgeois liberalism." À few months before, they had blocked an attempt to put a new team led by Zhu Houze in charge of the department.
Experience had shown that any consensus reached by the party leadership immediately opened a fight over how to interpret it, first of all in the press and the media. For that reason, it was essential for both factions to reinforce their respective weights in the propaganda apparatus in advance of
The meeting of provincial propaganda chiefs was held in Peking on October 9-12, 5. "Peng Zhen with Hong Kong and Macao journalists," Beijing Informa 17, April 28, 1987. 6. The Four Principles are the following: To maintain the socialist road; to defend the people's democratic dictatorship; to defend the leadership of the Commuand Marxism-Leninism/Mao Zedong 7. "Zhao: Reform and opposition to bourgeois liberali- 25 zation." Beijing Informa 29, July 21, 1987.
International Viewpoint #150 • October 31, 1988
CHINA and was the best indicator of the relationship of forces on the eve of the congress. The main reporter was Hu Qili, who was Hu Yaobang's right-hand man up until the latter was ousted and the most liberal leader in the leadership. He called for "democratic dialogue," using the media not only to propagate the new reform policy but also to collect opinions, criticisms and news about the spontaneous initiatives of the people. Without such input, he stressed, it was impossible for the party to move forward politically. Normalizing relations with
Moscow
Four days later, on October 16, the People's Daily printed his speech. At the same time, it was reported that Deng Liqun was leaving the Propaganda Department. This move was preparation for his retirement and election at the congress to the Central Consultative Commission.
The reform faction's final effort was to avoid leaving any weak point in its foreign policy. Zhao Ziyang made a grand tour of Eastern Europe in June, reestablishing party-to-party relations with the reformer bureaucracies in the region and putting his own program in a broader historical perspective. At the same time, he took a step forward in normalizing relations with Moscow.
Shortly afterward, the Hungarian Janos Kadar and the Yugoslav Stefan Kerosec went to Peking as special guests and confidents of Deng Xiaoping. Shortly afterward, in a gesture to the conservative section of the army, Yang Shangkun left for the United States. His mission was both to reaffirm the policy of peaceful reunification with Taiwan and criticize US interference, as well as to discuss the program of buying arms to modernize the army.
In order to guide this reformer counter-offensive ideologically and capitalize on it, in June Deng Xiaoping published a compilation of his recent speeches under the title Fundamental Questions in China Today. For him, the debate between conservatives and reformers over the Four Principles, his condemnation of the student movement, his support of "creative freedom" for intellectuals and his criticisms of the economic functioning of the Special Zones fitted into a broader reform program, culminating in the problem of political reform.
The book ended with his dialogue with a member of the Presidium of the League of Yugoslav Communists, Stefan Kerosec, entitled, "The reform must be speeded up." It was an impassioned defense of his political program for the Thirteenth Congress, not only as the principal living party leader but also as a responsible international-class statesman in an age of historic changes.
As a solution to the problem of the reform faction, which is seeking to develop 26 • connections between its social base and the population in general, throughout the summer the press began to publish the first results of opinion polls carried out by the recently created institutes of social research. The People's Daily left no room for doubt on August 17, when it reported that 93.8 percent of people questioned were in favor of the reform.
With "mass movements" ruled out and autonomous mobilization banned after the student movement got out of hand, the need to demonstrate social support for the reformers' program was met with a classical resort to political marketing gimmicks,
When the Seventh Plenum of the Twelfth Central Committee met on October 20, the results of the spring counteroffensive were clear. There were no great debates over the draft of the report that Zhao Ziyang was to present to the congress in the name of the Central Committee. Likewise approved was a document by Deng Xiaoping, eral ideas on reforming the political structure," which was to follow up Zhao's report with the first concrete measures for applying the political reform.
Claiming to be the
"legitimate heirs of Mao"
The necessary changes were made in the statutes to allow Deng to continue to chair the Military Commission, despite his departure from the Standing Committee and the Political Bureau. This spared him from being replaced by a younger leader, a fate that had befallen the most prominent conservatives. It was another recognition of his role as arbiter in the party and a reinforcement of the balance between the two factions that the Thirteenth Congress was to confirm. The stage for the congress was
The first part of the report under the headings "Our historical successes and the tasks of the present congress" and the "First stage of socialism and the fundamental line of the Party," and the final summary entitled "For a new victory of Marxism in China," sought to lay down the methodological foundation for the reform program, and, on the basis of this new perspective, to explain the history of the Chinese Commu-
The Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in June 1981 had already tried to do this in its "Resolution on certain problems in the history of the CCP." Its objective was, after the defeat of the Gang of the Four, to claim to be Mao's legitimate heirs. But the heterogeneity of the alliance of tendencies and factions that made up the leadership at that time did not allow it to develop a program that went any further than condemning the Cultural Revolution or to claim a legitimacy of its own.
Zhao's report, to the contrary, makes the Third Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee the beginning of a new stage in the history of the CCP under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. It is the concrete results of this new stage in building socialism that are the basis of the party's new legitimacy. Mao's legacy is reduced to his leadership of the struggle against the Japanese and founding the People's Republic. Thus, Mao Zedong thought has to be developed in the context of a new creative impetus of Marxism, which is summed up in the formula of "building socialism with special Chinese features.
So as to leave no doubt, a list was given of the concrete results, both practical and ideological, achieved by the reform faction. They were the following:
A sustained economic growth that had made it possible to double the GNP in nine years. The preservation of political unity and stability on the basis of a consensus, whose two basic elements were the reform policy and the Four Principles. An analysis of the stages in building socialism in China and the need for promoting and building a planned market economy in the first stage. The development of socialist democracy and of a legal system that laid down the bases for a new state apparatus, separate from the party, in the formation of a new model of socialist society. The cultural and ideological enrichment of the country in the framework of the principle of "creative freedom," designed to build a new socialist spiritual civilization. The elaboration of a new military strategy for defending the country and the reorganization of the People's Liberation Army. Progress in the process of national reunification through the policy of "one country, two systems," which opened the way for the agreements with Great Britain and Portugal respectively for the recovery of Hong Kong and Macao, and the radical reformulation of a perspective of negotiating with Taiwan. And, finally, the reintegration of China into the concert of nations, with an independent foreign policy for peace and the development of the third world.
Rediscussing the revolution
The central task of the Thirteenth Congress was to deepen and accelerate the reform, recognizing the time that had been lost because of the weakness of the initial economic base and the political errors that had been committed. The time factor was having its effect on the speed of the technological revolution, the fight for markets and the restructuring of the international economic system.
However, the internal timetable of the reform would be determined by China's level of development and its internal contributions, that is by the stage of building socialism in which it was carried out. In order to define this, Zhao went back to the debate on the nature of the Chinese revolution in the 1920s, both in the Communist International 8. "First organization of public opinion polls," Beijing Informa 36, September 8, 1987.
October 31, 1988 • #150 International Viewpoint and the CCP.
"We had an immense semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. After repeated strug gles among the various political forces over more than 100 years, starting in the middle of the last century, after the many failures of the old democratic revolution and the final victory of the new democratic revolution, it was shown that China could not pass through capitalism and that the only way out was, under the leadership of the Communist Party, to overthrow the reactionary domination of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism and take the socialist road.
"Now, the fact that our society has emerged from the entrails of a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society, and that the level of productive forces is well below that of the developed capitalist countries, poses the need for going through a very prolonged first stage in order to make industrialization a reality, as well as to achieve the development of the market, the socialization and modernization of production accomplished in other countries under the conditions of capitalism." 9 this first stage of socialism was not, however, deduced from an a priori general schema but from an analysis of the concrete conditions of the Chinese revolution. It was differentiated both (according to the Maoist terminology) was established, in which the bases for a socialist economy did not yet exist, and from the following stage in which socialist modemi-
"The main contradiction we have to confront in the present stage is between the growing material and cultural needs of the people, on the one hand, and backward social production on the other. The class struggle will persist for a long time within predetermined limits, but it is no longer the main contradiction."
This new conception is directly opposed to Mao Zedong's theory of uninterrupted revolution. This holds that the contradictions between the structure and superstructure in a backward socialist country like China are reflected in the periodic appearance of privileged social strata with their own interests both inside and outside the Communist Party, which "follow the capitalist road" and may even go so far as seizing the leadership
It was only possible then, to go forward in the process of building socialism by taking the class struggle as the main contradiction, by exposing and destroying these pro- capitalist strata through great mass mobilizations taking the form of cultural revolutions. The history of the Chinese Communist Party was interpreted as a suc cession of factional struggles between "two lines," the socialist one, represented by Mao, and various pro-capitalist, reformist variants.
The "left and right" errors, according to Zhao's report, are not the result of a "twoline struggle," but of a misunderstanding of the nature of the Chinese revolution. "In the specific historical conditions of modern China, to deny that the Chinese people can take the socialist road before capitalism has fully developed is a mechanistic position...a source of 'rightist' errors. On the other hand, the opinion that the first stage of socialism can be jumped over without a development of the productive forces is a utopian attitude....a source of 'leftist' errors." Against the first type of error, the report proposes the defense of the Four Principles; against the second, the reform
The only valid criterion is seeking the true facts, because, as the report stresses, "building socialism in an oriental country as large as China is something new in the history of the development of Marxism." The vision and horizons of Marxism had to be broadened to take in the new realities of our time. Marxism had to be free of short-sighted dogmatism and utopian tendencies, in line with the theoretical work of Marx and Engels, who established scientific socialism on the basis of their critique of
Zhao summed up the kernel of the new reform method against Mao in stressing that "Marxist historical materialism has always considered that in the last analysis it is the productive forces that determine all social development. The productive relations and the superstructure can only contribute to the development of the productive forces when they adjust them-
CHINA selves to the state of the latter."
If the productive forces are characterized by their backwardness in this first stage of socialism in China, the relations of production are marked by the uneven and combined character of their development. Although the socially-owned sector represents 50 per cent of the economy, it is put into question by the low level of the socialization of production, and should, according to Zhao, be reduced to 30 per cent.'° The domestic market and the market economy are poorly developed. The natural economy and semi-natural economy have a considerable weight in the GNP.
In the superstructural sphere, the report again poses the reformers' determinist thesis that the weakness of the socialist economic system" brings on an acute insufficiency of a whole series of economic and cultural conditions necessary for the formation of a highly developed socialist democracy." It advances the gradualist view that when these inadequacies are overcome, it will be possible to institute more extensive democratic forms, even if a new model of socialism is made an ideal for the future. Having reached this point, Zhao Ziyang's report posed the classical question: What is to be done? Above all, he answered, it is necessary to concentrate on developing the productive forces and modernization through a general application of the reform in all areas. This is the mechanism that will make it possible to resolve the contradictions between the relations of production and the superstructure in a socialist society without going through cultural revolutions. This is what will make it possible to reintegrate the Chinese economy into the world economy, so that it can prosper thanks to the policy of open doors for the scientific-technological revolution. This is to be paralleled by the development of a "planned market economy" in which the dominant role will be played by the publicly-owned sector.
In the political sphere, what is projected is building socialist democracy step by step, in a coordinated way and on the basis of unity and stability. In the cultural and ideological sphere, this is to be reflected by the emergence "of a spiritually socialist civilization" with a high moral content. * 9. The quotations from the Zhao Ziyang's report are taken from the Spanish version published in Beijing Informa 45, November 10, 1987. 10. People's Daily, October 3, 1987. Meeting between Zhao and Arthur Dunkel, director general of GATT 27 (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).
ternational
VIEWPOINT situation in many countries of the world may not appear particularly hopeful, the undercurrents and changes taking place
Red the world over!
NEWPOINT
International Viewpoint #150 • October 31, 1988
EDITORIAL now will have a big impact in the future:
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