A mass, democratic
EDITORIAL • ALGERIA
ONLY a few days had passed since the end of the campaign nationwide popular uprising of young people. With many of the 500 new shahada (martyrs in Arabic) as yet unburied,
ITH THIS Issue of International Viewpoint and thousands of demonstrators still tending their wounds we are inaugurating a or rotting in crowded prisons, the regime announced a regular column to folnational referendum for November 3, 1988.
low the momentum of the circulation drive we announced in our
The Algerian people were called upon to approve an initial
150th Issue.
reorganization of the executive branch. After this was
We plan to keep our readers up to date on the progress of the completed, the prime minister, chosen by the president, campaign, and most importantly to would form a goverment "excluding no one" that would be keep the subject of IV circulation in responsible to the National Assembly.
a spotlight of sorts; to focus our readers' attention on ways to extend distribution of the magazine and ways to convince those intrigued but reluctant potential subscribers encountered to invest in this journal.
Since issue 150 we have received a very substantial donation from a reader in the US, and we would like to take this opportunity to express our thanks
Perhaps those who are in a position to do so might consider that the approaching commercially-packaged Season of Goodwill
(and Conspicuous Consumption)
would be an opportune time to donate funds to a valiantly struggling magazine like IV.
Money we receive is often used to improve equipment or to start special projects. Over the last year we have used resources from our readers to pay for a new campaign of advertising in left journals and this has had very positive results. We have received requests for sample copies from countries as diverse as Mexico,
India and Zimbabwe, not to mention Canada, Quebec, Britain and the States. We would like to continue expanding our advertising campaign, and in this way introducing /V to new layers of revolutionaries and activists.
One of best ways our regular readers and subscribers can help is by convincing bookstores to take bundles; another is by showing the magazine off to the largest possible periphery. We are proud of the utility of our special coverage and analysis and we think that the magazine will speak for itself given a new and expanding audience.*
SAID AKLI
UCH A REFORM without imme-
S
diate concrete consequences seems pathetic indeed in view of the price paid in blood by young people hungering for democracy, dignity and social justice.
But the presidential communique of October 12 implies that this is just an appetizer, and that the main dish on this menu of political reforms is yet to come, as Chadli must first submit it to the FLN's Congress in mid-December.
The announcement of this symbolic referendum was accompanied by the traditional attempt to provision the markets, the "carrot" that is offered after the repression of every demonstration. It also came in tandem with the release of radicals and activists who had been arbitrarily arrested and of all minors detained, as a sign of lessening of tensions.
With this combination of measures the Chadli regime is trying to cleanse itself in the eyes of the people after massacring hundreds of their children. The people are not falling for it. But, on the eve of the thirty-fourth anniversary of November 1 (the beginning of the Algerian War of Independence) they sense that a page in their history has just been turned. Despite the tragic consequences of the uprising, it is not being taken as a defeat. To the contrary, there is great hope that the bloodshed will bring about thorough-going political changes in Algerian society.
In March 1976, as Boumedienne was just beginning to institutionalize the power he won in the military coup of June 19, 1965, four political personalities of the bourgeois opposition in Algiers put out a call for democracy. This initiative on the part of
Spain Mediterranean Sea
Atlantic
Ocean Oran ALGIERS Tunisia
Morocco ALGERIA Libya Mali Niger bourgeois currents excluded from power after independence converged with the challenge from within the regime itself to the extreme concentration of power. The political convergence took place around the same desire for a redistribution of power among the different factions of the Algerian bourgeoisie that believed they had matured enough to free themselves from stifling Bonapartist administrative supervision.
Confident of popular support against his bourgeois critics, Boumedienne reacted by authorizing the first public debate since 1965, putting his made to order Constitution and National Charter up to a plebiscite and being triumphally elected. The internal debate of the bourgeoisie however was seized upon by the mass of people and transformed into an expression of their own democratic and social aspirations. This popular appropriation of unaccustomed free speech was to thaw a political climate frozen for years by an obsessive fear of the Military Security (SM), and to bring in a new political period in Algeria. Student struggles flourished, and a big strike wave forced he reame to concede sane win 3 rises and liberalization on the trade union
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EDITORIAL A good start for our circulation uprising
International Viewpoint #151 • November 14, 1988
ALGERIA front. In April of 1978, the Fifth Congress of the General Union of Algerian Workers
(UGTA) confirmed and gave a new impetus to this renewal of the labor movement, marked by the democratic aspirations of workers.
Boumedienne's death in December of
1978 encouraged the blossoming of this new democratic climate through breaches opened by the struggles over who was to succeed him. After having assembled behind the banners of either Yahyaoui, the Boumedienist; or Bouteflika, the free enterpriser, the different public debate between the central organ of the FLN and Algérie-Actualités, a weekly paper expressing the positions of liberals fighting "officialese."
Infitah supporters' wish for democratic credibility encouraged better news coverage of politics, despite regular attacks against the opposition. But the brutal repCOME ON, WHAT DOES IT SAY?
was kept isolated from these democratic impulses by the FLN bureaucrats. Despite their avowed fear of the infitah, these bureaucrats continued to throttle the desire for democracy clearly expressed in the union
This rapid overview of the advance of democratic demands shows how, during the last few years, the internal conflicts of a bourgeoisie expressing its political growing pains have combined with the growing desire of the masses for a democracy from which they have been excluded.
wings of the bourgeoisie ERR.... reached a compromise under DEMOCRACY!! the authority of the army. They installed a collective government in order to fill up cracks which would be dangerous to the regime's stability. The shadow of the infitah ("'opening" in Arabic, the name given to the policy of economic liberalization) would extend from then onwards over the whole transi-
The relaxation of state control over society aided the development of popular struggles. In spite of all of its limitations, the UGTA appeared more and more to be the most significant political force in the country. School students got an introduction to democracy, and soon, the Kabylia uprising highlighted the government's political weakness. Appalled, the different bourgeois factions abandoned their democratic pretensions: the army's representatives in the Central Committee of the FLN forced it to bestow full power on Chadli in
Political control over society was further strengthened by repressive means and the reinforcement of the para-police role of the FLN itself. In 1981, the FLN launched an offensive on several fronts which consolidated its total political monopoly over all cultural or political activity in factories, neighborhoods, high schools or universities. But popular discontent expressed itself in even more explosive ways in the streets, in the form of mass demonstrations around basic social needs (housing, water and so on), ending frequently in clashes with the police.
In 1985, democratic demands reemerged, this time in a new guise: the formation of a Human Rights League, several leaders of which were soon thereafter imprisoned The national and international solidarity campaign aroused by this seriously annoyed the government, which was worried about preserving its image. The timidly conducted internal debate in the FLN's structures around the project of revising the National Charter got out of hand, despite all of the precautions taken. i were the focus for the first time ever of Thus, internal divisions in the regime ression of the youth demonstrations in Constantine and Setif in November 1986 was a reminder of the regime's real nature. Hundreds of young people were quickly tried and received stiff sentences while oppositionists from varying currents were arbitrarily arrested and deported without trial to the vast southern region of the country. A solidarity campaign against repression grew, involving much of the intelligentsia. The democratic movement spread to include the periphery of the Socialist Vanguard Party (PAGS, the Algerian CP), thereby acquiring a whole new political
Legacy of the student struggles
The liberals reacted with the creation of another Human Rights League, recognized by Chadli who proclaimed that he wanted to establish a state of laws. To lend this initiative some credibility, those under house arrest were freed, and some young demonstrators were pardoned. This momentum led to the proposal of a law on the right to of association. But it ran up against the resistance of the FLN apparatus, which was anxious to block any weakening of its political monopoly on society. Chadli managed nevertheless to get this bill passed, after having given the deputies the
The development of big student struggles in 1987-88 produced many forms of selforganization, capped by a national coordinating body, which was tolerated by the powers that be despite its declared intention of building a democratic and independent student union. As for the working class, it for a redistribution of power with a project of democratizing the regime, the supporters of the infitah found themselves bogged down in the contradiction between their free enterprise credo and the myth of unity in thought proclaimed by the PLN from 1980-81. Paradoxically, it was with Chadli and his economic opening that the FLN's political monopoly over society acquired the most institutionalized para-police power.
The bourgeoisie needed to institute free enterprise and gain a liberal image in the eyes of its imperialist guides. But its fear, as a propertied class facing more and more violent and powerful popular mobilizations unveiled the cracks in its liberal mask. This increased the weight of the petty-minded apparatchiks who were hostile to all tentative moves towards free thought.
Every time, it has been the popular mobilizations that have disrupted bourgeois projects of a democracy reserved for the wealthy. Current acceptance of democratic demands was imposed by the broad masses on a regime whose liberal pretensions did not prevent police repression on a scale unseen since independence.
The height of this contradiction has just been reached with the promises of political democratization, intended to wipe out the memories of a savage military repression more murderous than that of certain dictatorships commonly denounced by the offi-
Moreover, promises of democracy have done nothing to stop the repression. The government itself admits to having put 4,000 youth on trial, legal parodies chuming out sentences of up to ten years. The minors recently released tell of the tortures they underwent, and medical testimony confirms their statements.
Even more than after the demonstrations in Constantine and Setif, anger over this new repression is mobilizing large numbers of intellectuals. A general assembly of doctors in Algiers adopted a motion of support to the parents of victims and has set up a provisional office. Teachers from the Universities of Algiers, Blida, and Tizi-Ouzou got together at Bab Ezzouar to denounce
November 14, 1988 • #151 International Viewpoint the repression and torture. Journalists, who had been active for several months around their own demands, have reacted to the role they were forced to play during the events with the announcement that they are going to form an independent organization free of FLN tutelage.
### Lawyers denounce farcical trials
On October 19, a meeting of the Presidents of the Bar of the Order of Algerian Lawyers denounced the farcical trials and demanded an independent judicial branch. On October 20, after Chadli had promised to punish any infringements of the law, the official Human Rights League formed a commission of inquiry into the attacks on human rights and the rights of legal defense.
The referendum announced for November 3 is a direct result of the popular uprising. But, apart from its symbolic value as a demonstration of how quickly the government can react to popular aspirations, its political content is far less than its pretensions. The constitutional changes proposed only concern the executive branch. The constitution drawn up to legitimize Boumedienne's power in 1976 had already been amended in the time of collective government in 1979. These amendments offered the head of state the possibility of appointing more than one vice-president, and made the designation of a prime minister- charged with assisting the president in his coordination of governmental action —obligatory.
The November 3 changes do not even raise the possibility of choosing vicepresidents, which had never actually been put into practice. On the other hand, the power of the prime minister is strengthened. Until now all ministers have been named by the president and have been responsible directly to him. The new text provides that the prime minister as a head of government "will engage in broad consultations and present the members of govemment he has chosen to the president of the republic who will appoint them". The government thus constituted would have to present its program to the National Assembly for approval. If the program is rejected by the National Assembly, the government must resign. But to ensure that the the National Assembly does not abuse its new power, article 114-4 provides for its dissolution if it refuses a government's program twice in a row.
In this way, the prime minister and the National Assembly have been given greater powers. It is between them that the content of government action and of new laws will be decided. This will no longer be the sole prerogative of the president.
In view of this, the president would no longer be directly responsible for the daily management of the state, above the fray and perfectly capable of tossing the govemment to the lions of popular discontent. This arbiter's role is so reinforced that the draft states that the President "can resort directly to the people's will" through a
There are other aspects of these proposed constitutional changes that have received less press coverage, but which nevertheless could have a significant effect on the future. The president would symbolize the unity of the nation and no longer the unity of the party and the state. In the same way, his right to preside in all joint meetings of party organs and the state is no longer mentioned in the new text.
These amendments to the constitution taken together mean a redistribution of power that could have had a certain political importance in itself. But in the aftermath of a national uprising and its tragic it appears quite ridiculous and politically inappropriate. It in no way responds to the desire for democracy expressed by all layers of the population.
The true democratic opening brought about by the popular uprising is not this reform that will have no immediate concrete effects. It is taking shape more through the various general meetings taking place among all sections of society. Only recognition of the right to strike, to demonstrate, freedom of speech and organization, as well as the right to form independent trade unions, can fulfill this movement.
The only truly significant constitutional reform would be the abolition of a single party system, the dissolution of the rump National Assembly and the free election of a sovereign Constituent Assembly. In such a new Constituent Assembly, representatives democratically elected by the people and not by an illegitimate FLN Congress, would decide on the new forms of social and political organization in the country.
Once more, popular mobilizations are giving a dynamic impetus to the struggle for democratic demands in Algeria. But the bourgeoisie is still trying to coopt these popular democratic aspirations, by channeling them into the the tortuous process of reorganizing its power.
Internal power struggles in the FLN
In fact, the bulk of the political reforms promised by Chadli on October 10 must first go to the FLN's Congress in mid-December, before being submitted to a referendum. So, the reform project, which was a product of the uprising, will fall within the framework of the interbourgeois conflicts that are to be settled by the FLN Congress.
Up until January 16 1986, the date the "enriched" National Charter was adopted, internal power struggles were always settled by a compromise. An analysis of these struggles has been made quite difficult by the fragmentation of the Algerian bourgeoisie into a multitude of clans and
ALGERIA factions, constantly in flux, and usually based on apolitical factors like regionalism or clientelism. It has been especially hard because, despite well manipulated rumors, the ruling class has always tried to present a facade of unanimity, immediately closing ranks when faced with popular mobilizations. However, since the middle of the 70s, the question of the infitah has been the real dividing line determining the different factions. This was particularly clear after Boumedienne's death, with the two rival candidacies that cancelled each other out.
From 1980 on, infitah partisans have continued to gain support for the measured process of economic liberalization adjusted to suit the economic conjuncture and the relationship of socio-political forces. Despite the temporary slow-down due to the youth riots in Constantine and Setif in November 1986, this process later entered its quickest period of growth just afterwards, in connection with the collapse of the international petrochemical market. The sharp reduction in export revenues and the rise in foreign debt service payments allowed the government to justify the barely disguised privatization of agricultural lands and transforming state enterprises into independent concerns subject to bankruptcy.
Confusion in the ranks of the FLN
In September 1987, even before these bills had been passed in the National Assembly, the new organization of agriculture had been put into practice and the state enterprises had been prepared for independence. This vigorous push for the infitah came directly from the president's office, breaking with the consensus approach by going over the heads of the ministries, the party and the National Assembly. One section of the deputies protested against this cavalier treatment at the hands of the president, and the National Assembly was torn between those who wanted to accelerate the process, those who would support it as it was, and those who wanted to put on the brakes. However, after pressure had been applied to the most recalcitrant of the deputies, the economic reforms passed with only
Since the acceleration of the infitah process, the populist base of the FLN has been at a loss politically, and the Stalinist leadership of the PAGS has sought new allies in government to make up a resistance front. But Messaadia - who has been the leader of the FLN since the elimination of Yahyaoui, and who was supposed to represent the Boumedienist tendency - took the opportunity of the trade-union rally of May 1, 1988, to declare in front of his potential political base that the reforms were the product of unanimous decisions of the congresses and leadership bodies of the FLN and not of some isolated group.
Nonetheless, pement standstill and 5 nomic reforms was at a standstill, and