A critique of the rural reform in
China after 1978
AT THE END of the 1970s and beginning of The following article, from the September and this decade, the Chinese leadership launched October issues of the Hong Kong journal a sweeping plan of economic reforms, the October Review, looks at the contradictions new economic policy (see IV 113). Central to that have appeared at the heart of the 197 any reform is, of course, the question of agricultural reform and their impact or agriculture: according to 1985 figures, China's economy and development.
Chinese peasants make up over 63% of a total population of over 1,000 million. XIAO DIAN
S INCE the launching of the rural
reform at the end of 1978, major changes have taken place in China's countryside. Official figures gave an extraordinary 9.48% average annual increase in total agricultural output from 1979 to 1984, and 17.1% in 1984. Nonagricultural enterprises began to develop in the countryside after 1979, reaching a climax in 1984-85. The average annual increase of the output value of rural enterprises was 40%-50%. In 1985, reform of the unified purchase of subsidiary products spurred the production of meat, aquatic products and vegetables, along with a high rate of price increases.
However, after 1985 the rate of growth in the rural economy gradually slowed down, marking the end of the previous period of rapid growth. The rate of growth was 1.6% for 1985, 3.5% for 1986, and 4.7% for 1987. Yet the strong impact of the rural economy on the country's economy has not weakened; the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been forced to carry out more radical reforms in industry and prices, which has triggered off an acute social crisis.
Low incentive for production
It is therefore necessary to analyze the changes in rural economy since 1978.
In 1978, after two decades of damage caused by the fickle rural policy of the Mao Zedong period, the rural economy was stagnant. The per capita net income of peasants was 134 yuan a year, or around 40 cents a day. Compared with the 73 yuan a year in 1957, the average annual increase was only 2.9%. The peasant household had on average 32 yuan in savings, 30 catties of reserved grain, and less than 500 yuan in housing value. About 200 million peasants were below the poverty line.
There are several reasons for this phenomenon, but the basic problem is the very low incentive for production among peasants. The fact that peasant productivity on collective land was only one-fifth to oneseventh of productivity on their own piece of land speaks the question.
Peasant incentive was low mainly because of the egalitarianism of the people's commune policy. The collectivism imposed on peasants went beyond the subjective cognition of peasants and the objective level of agricultural productivity. In addition, party bureaucrats were arbitrary and repressive, causing peasants to feel divorced from the land, means of production and produce.
Another reason is the CCP's Stalinist policy of stressing heavy industry and ignoring light industry and agriculture. This contrasts with the Leninist and Trotskyist proposition of evenly developing industry and agriculture. The CCP, because of the scissor-like difference between agricultural and industrial prices, maintained low wages and low raw materials' costs for big industries, hence obtaining funds for heavy industry construction. For long periods, agriculture lacked funds for reinvestment.
To maintain this policy, the CCP carried out a series of measures. In production, it made land collectively owned, banned land transactions and tied peasants to the land via household registration. In distribution, it maintained low purchase prices and supplied low-cost agricultural means of production. In circulation, it imposed state monopoly and closed down markets, restricted inter-regional trade and controlled prices.
The result of these measures was the bondage of 800 million peasants to the land, with per capita farm land being only 0.5 hectares. It was a waste of labour resources and an obstacle to mechanization and effective management. Peasants did not have the right to leave the land or to decide what they grew. When the rural econand transport produced by industry could not be brought into play.
At the end of 1978, the ruling CCP faction headed by Deng promoted a rural re-
CHINA form. With the household as a unit, collectively-owned land was contracted to peasant households; collectively-owned animals and machinery were either sold or allocated to peasant households; communally-run enterprises were either contracted to the enterprise collective or manager, or distributed to peasants in the form of shares. Almost all peasants responded in favour of changing the system of the people's commune.
### Expansion of market mechanisms
The state recognized the right of peasants to own property and accumulate private wealth. The state also allowed peasants the right to engage in different economic activities, thus peasants had the freedom to change their social status. The status of brigade-run and privately-run enterprises was confirmed, the right to use land could be transferred, peasants could go to the city, the market was reopened and the monopoly of trade by state-owned enterprises was ended. These laid the basis for the restoration and expansion of the market
In 1979 and 1980, the CCP also increased the purchase prices of agricultural produce, and peasants had better incomes that enabled them some primitive accumulation and increased consumption. This helped stimulate peasant incentive for production.
Under the slogan of giving aid to specialized households so that those getting rich first could aid the rest, the state provided loans and technical help for specialized and able households and prioritized purchasing their products. Regions originally better off, such as the coastal provinces, benefitted from this policy and produced quite a number of 10,000-yuan households.
The CCP also encouraged, especially through loans, the growth of rural industries in the form of cooperative or private enterprises. This led to a rapid growth in ru 23 ral industry, commerce and services.
International Viewpoint #153 • December 12, 1988
CHINA
Extensive changes in the countryside resulted from the reform. From 1979 to 1984, the average annual increase in agricultural output was 9.48%, higher than the 8.96% of total social output. Grain output increased by an annual 4.95%, though grain farming areas decreased by a total of 6.4%. From 1978 to 1986, per capita peasant income increased from 134 yuan to 424 yuan, a 320% increase. Though this was still only half of the income of workers, the difference had diminished. It was estimated that in 1985 peasant households on average owned fixed assets, cash, savings and reserved grain totalling over 3,800 yuan. However, due to discrepancies in peasant income, the gap between the income of the 10-15% low-income peasants (about 100 million people) and the rest had widened.
A major achievement of the reform was the transformation of a larger sector of the rural economy from small-peasant to commodity economy, bringing it into the social division of labour, thus laying the basis for raising agricultural productivity. In 1985, total purchases of subsidiary foods doubled over that of 1979, the commodity rate of rural products was 64%, and on average cash constituted 65% of peasant income. Peasants had over 50% of the total purchasing power of society, and 60% of commod(compared to 52% in 1978).
Major changes had also occurred in the rural labour force. Between 1979 and 1985, nearly 46 million rural labourers had changed to non-agricultural activities. Urban population increased by a net 127 million people, and, in addition, over a million mobile workers stayed in the cities to find a living. Every year, six million people left the countryside for temporary sum, about one-fifth of the rural labour force had changed their work, residence or
Present leadership supported Mao's line
The CCP's unequivocal support of rural enterprises in 1984 spurred their rapid development. The output value of rural enterprises constituted 44% of total rural output value and 17% of total national output value. They provided 64 million jobs and helped free 17.3% rural labourers from the land.
How were the achievements of the reform brought about? Are they positive gains from the Deng policy? Or are they a negation of the policy of the Mao Zedong period? It must not be forgotten that the present leadership also supported and implemented the Mao Zedong line, and cannot shirk their responsibility for the situation caused by the previous policy. To look at the question more profoundly, has the political system that facilitated the implementation of the past (and present) poli24 cies changed because of Deng's reforms?
The Dengist faction discarded the people's commune system and directly linked peasants to the fruit of their labour through the household responsibility system. This helped raise peasant incentive for production and caused labour intensity to rise. This is the primary reason for the growth in agricultural production. From the negative side this confirms that compulsion of, and forced appropriation from, the peasants can only lead to passive resistance, stagnation in rural productivity, and a heavy cost paid by the whole of society. The forced collectivization in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and the communalization in China in the 1950s had brought extremely serious consequences. CCP theorists only recognize the truth today, that the transformation of peasants cannot be forced.
### Growth of rural enterprises
The rise in prices for agricultural products allows capital accumulation by peasants and development towards industry, commerce and subsidiary farming. With some peasants freed from the land, land began to be concentrated and mechanization was possible. Productivity per hectare was raised.
Another factor for the active rural economy is the growth of individual and family enterprises and rural enterprises. The previous policy neglected the consumption needs of the rural and urban population, and so there was a strong potential demand for agricultural and subsidiary products, consumer goods and various services. Shortages of consumer goods and services had caused society to accumulate a lot of purchasing power. When the administrative constraints were lifted, the demand and purchasing power propelled a rapid development of economic activity.
Some household industries took off from a very primitive basis, making use of waste materials for production. Despite the low quality, they could meet the low-standard demand in the countryside. Later, they improved on technology and mechanization, raising their productivity. Thus, potential or wasted social material and technology were used to help rural industries develop quickly from a very low level. Improvements in agriculture were partly the result of putting the emphasis on and employing agricultural technology, knowledge and
The three decades of industrial and technological development in China have provided the necessary material conditions for the development of rural industries (such as medium and small tractors, raw materials for industrial production, insecticide, chemical fertilizers and so on). Without these objective conditions, the rural economy could not have developed at such a
To sum up, the Dengist rural reform rectified the extremely irrational pre-1978 rural policy, and to a certain extent lifted past constraints on peasant incentive. Propelled by a massive social demand and unused purchasing power, relying on a free market and coordination by existing but not yet rationally used social material conditions, technology and potential for production, compensatory rapid development of the rural economy was given a boost. This is the secret behind the initial success of the Dengist reform. The rapid rural development cannot be credited to the Dengist policy.
The rise in agricultural production in 1979-84 was basically due to the increase in productivity, and on the other hand it made up for the big gap left by previous wrong policies. Thus, in 1984, when the peasant's labour intensity reached its peak, when grain production reached the highest level in history and a temporary overproduction of grain appeared causing grain prices to drop drastically, peasants found difficulty in selling grain and some of them were attracted to other subsidiary farming and non-agricultural activities. Cultivated land was reduced along with the number of labour hours devoted to agriculture. This led to a reversal in grain production after
From 1978 to 1984, per hectare grain production increased every year, offsetting the reduction in cultivated land. In 1985, per hectare grain production decreased, and with a rapid reduction in cultivated land, total output decreased by 7%. Total grain output in the next two years did not rise to the 1984 level. The instability in grain production cannot be settled easily.
Fragility of the CCP's policy
The 1984 good grain harvest caused the price to drop by 12.5% in the free market, lower than the state purchasing price. The state's unified purchase became a serious subsidy and a heavy burden. It also caused a storage crisis. Under such circumstances, the CCP announced in 1985 that unified purchase by the state would be cancelled, and it would be replaced by the contract
This policy soon met with difficulties. Due to reduced grain production, the grain price in the free market rose higher than the contract price, and peasants were unwilling to sign contracts. Faced with this crisis, the CCP resorted to administrative measures, and announced that contract purchase was under the category of command planning, and peasants had to fulfill the quota despite their reluctance. At the same time, in some regions the free market was restricted, and inter-regional trade of grain was forbidden. This led to peasant grievances. This shows the CCP's arbitrariness in policy changes, and also the fragility of the policy.
The rural reform causes the rural economy to produce anarchically for the market. Often, a whole village turns to produce a certain crop or product, and production suf-
December 12, 1988 • #153 International Viewpoint fers from the fickleness of the market. The bureaucrats cannot provide guidance. On the contrary, they encourage peasants and enterprises in anarchic production. As a result, there is serious overproduction of certain products and serious underproduction of others. The peasants become the main victims. This is just the opposite to the CCP's original intention of having the peasants respond in a timely way to demand through market mechanisms. Reform aimed to promote specialization
Another aim of the reform was to promote specialization in the countryside, so that the able could help raise productivity. However, rural specialization reached the highest level of 2% in 1984 (the percentage of specialized households among peasant households), but fell to 1.7% in 1985, showing a reverse trend. This might be due to the greater risks of vacillations in the market, hence peasants feeling that it was
Another phenomenon contrary to Dengist expectation is that though the amount of subsidiary foods and consumer goods has increased, their prices have not dropped. One reason is that circulation and transport facilities are insufficient, hence monopolistic super-profits can be earned in the transport and retail sectors. There are still shortages of quite a number of products, so there is hoarding and speculation. Another main reason is that various levels of bureaucrats arbitrarily demand fees and taxes, obstructing the links of production and circulation on various pretexts, in order to increase government revenue and personal income. Regionalism flourishes, and the direct and indirect losses caused by custom duties and retention of goods leads to a big difference between the market prices of goods and the selling prices obtained by the peasants. Both peasants and consumers are
The reform cannot fulfill initial expectations, and some negative effects and underlying crises have developed.
On the national level, though the number of tractors had increased substantially, they were basically medium and small tractors. Tractor-ploughed areas had decreased, reflecting the decreased usage of large tractors. There were also the visible and invisible social costs of machinery depreciation, fuel, insecticide and air pollution — thus the overall efficiency of mechanized farming was reduced. When the peasants were still enthusiastic about production, this deficiency could still be offset. But when their enthusiasm waned due to the development of market production and other non-agricultural activities, the consequences and long-term effects of this regression were to be more pronounced.
Irrigation work had not developed because the state had reduced investments and the peasants were unwilling to provide uncompensated labour. Long-term negligence and desertification would seriously affect China's capacity to resist natural disasters and cause unimaginable losses. This is a question deserving a lot of attention since the climate on this planet is changing drastically and droughts, floods and storms are much more frequent. Lately, the droughts and floods emphasized by the Chinese authorities were not unrelated to the drop in the efficiency of irrigation works.
Another underlying long-term crisis is the question of protecting the fertility of land and water, soil and forest resources. Peasants who contract land and forests tried to obtain the maximum profits during the period of contract. In the long run, this would gravely affect the productivity of land and forest resources. For this reason, the CCP gradually extended the period of contract to over 15 years, and hoped that the peasants would consciously protect the land and forest resources, but this is by no means a positive solution. The peasants were wary of the fickleness of CCP policies, and would still try to squeeze the maximum profits in the short term.
A more direct consequence of the rural reform was that caused by rural industries. Initially, rural industries filled the gaps of demand for consumer goods and so developed rapidly. However, they were mostly low in productivity and substandard in quality. Their massive development quickly seized the raw material, transport capacity and energy required by big industries of high efficacy. This caused soaring prices and extensive speculation. In addition, regionalism was flaring, and barriers were erected by local governments. This affected the normal production of big industries in advanced regions. The overall efficacy of production was seriously affected, and confusion was the order of the day.
Another consequence of the reform was the prevalence of the concept in society that there was no point in studying. In the countryside, there were many withdrawals
CHINA from the schools. Though individual specialized households turned to pursue more specialized knowledge, this could not compensate for the general negligence of education. Faced with the soaring prices, teachers were compelled to take up part-time jobs and this affected the quality of teaching. The crisis of the education system was aggravated.
Besides, the cooperative sectors of production in the countryside, such as forest preservation departments, veterinary surgeries, irrigation works departments and supply and sale cooperatives were in a state of paralysis or disintegration due to the rapid development of the responsibility system, whereby members of staff were drained away, capital was deficient and management was in disorder. Before new cooperative organizations could be extensively set up, the blow was serious.
One other underlying crisis was the question of overall agricultural investments. One aim of the Dengist reform was to reduce state investments in agriculture and rely more on spontaneous investments by peasants. The proportion of state investment in agriculture to total capital investment had been falling - from 11.1% in 1979 to 3.4% in 1985. As for the peasants, while their income had risen, their productive investment had declined. In 1983, the proportion of productive investment in total peasant expenditure reached a high of 5.7%, and then dropped to 3.8% in 1985, and it was particularly significant in the cultivation sector. This was particularly worrying since this sector depended a lot on
Since the CCP gave active support to "competent" and specialized households, a lot of land, resources and means of production were accumulated in the hands of a small number of people through contracting, and in a mere few years, they earned an income of several ten thousand yuan. Quite a number of individual businesses and small enterprises exploited the immense 25 unevenness in circulation and sales, and
International Viewpoint #153 • December 12, 1988
CHINA gained considerable incomes. Peasants who did not make use of opportunities to enrich themselves became poorer in relation to the rich peasants, and the standard of living for some even deteriorated due to price inflation. Some peasants became wage labourers. Generally speaking, social and class differentiation among the peasants had intensified.
Differentiations between rich and poor grow
On the other hand, coastal regions and provinces obtained advantages from the reform, and, with the effect of the market law on investment, these coastal regions obtained more capital and could develop at a quicker pace. The development of the backward regions and provinces was relatively slower, and, because of the further tightening of the flow of resources, the gap between regions widened. Another phenomenon was that within rich regions, the difference between the rich and poor was much bigger than in the poorer ones. In the former, there was a 100 times difference in income between rich and poor households. In sum, far from what Dengist propaganda described as those getting rich first aiding others to get rich later, social differentiation was increased. The income and riches of a small number of people increased at an astounding rate, including bureaucrats and cadres who got rich by means of power, corruption and speculation.
Quite a number of bureaucrats, besides being corrupt, made use of the shortage of raw materials and consumer goods to engage in hoarding and speculation. They interrupted the normal supply of resources, caused many man-made shortages, and on this basis accumulated wealth.
The CCP had not taken active measures to restrain such developments. It proposed a 35% flat profit tax for enterprises, and 40% flat income tax for enterprise investors. It did not apply a sliding tax structure on individuals or enterprises making huge profits. More important still, serious loopholes existed in the tax system, and in practice the tax system was arbitrary and irregular. It provided one more channel for bureaucratic corruption. This again demonstrated that under a dictatorial bureaucratic system, where social control is absent, even the best system can be used by bureaucrats as a means of securing power, wealth and privileges.
The intensification of income and social differentiations, and the instability of income due to market competition aggravated contradictions in the countryside. The discontent and envy of peasants was frequently expressed in mutual attacks and sabotage, such as poisoning other people's fishponds. In July 1988, 20,000 peasants in the Henan Province seized tons of watermelons worth 2 million yuan from 200 26 the scramble. households, and dozens were wounded in
Peasant grievances against bureaucratic corruption and incompetence, and the market confusion, developed in some cases into peasant riots. In May 1987, peasants in Shandong Province participated in a mass riot involving 30,000 to 40,000 people. The government had encouraged peasants to grow garlic, but when the harvest turned out to be very good the government stopped buying it, and the peasants rioted and attacked the county government offices. This unprecedented resistance to the CCP regime was a concrete manifestation of peasant discontent and a changing attitude towards the regime. It was also an indication of the grave consequences of a combination of bureaucratism and blind production in the commodity market.
The credibility of the regime was quickly declining. While the market economy increased social differentiations, the CCP itself took the lead in corruption, privileges and speculation. Since the reform relaxed the regime's control over peasant residence and grain allocation, the peasants were not longer bound or afraid, and there were incidence of mass robbery, riots, and even the beating-up of tax collectors and security
Under the influence of "get rich quick" and "money first" ideologies, previous social ideologies and moral standards were disintegrating. The CCP's own decay intensified its crisis in the countryside. The Dengist intention of basing itself on rich peasants eventually caused it to lose more support among poor and middle peasants.
### Threat of capitalist restoration
More serious than the crisis of CCP rule is the threat of capitalist restoration to the gains of the Chinese revolution. The Dengist reform promoted the concentration of wealth and resources in the hands of a small minority, and strengthened the objective conditions for capitalist restoration. The capital accumulated by the specialized households or the bureaucrats could be used in now more generalized commodity production to carry out expanded capitalist production by employing more labourers and making use of the unevenness in the economic structure. The privatization of land (although it only applied to the right of use) and other means of production, and their flow into the hands of capitalists forced more people to sell their labour. The massive appearance of wage labourers is a dangerous sign. Another is the rise of loan sharks in the countryside who charged an interest rate of 100%. All these developments indicate a dangerous trend of capitalist development in China's countryside The anti-socialist market reform and the corruption of the cadres are the impetus of capitalist restoration in China.
The question facing China urgently now is as follows: When the Dengist faction had changed the previous wrong rural policy, how would it conduct reforms in the cities and big industries, stimulate workers' enthusiasm for production and raise — or at least maintain — workers' living standards?
In the past, the persistent policy of stressing industry at the expense of agriculture gave rise to a rigid price structure that covered up the unequal exchange between the two sectors, and underpinned the low efficacy, the redundancy of the bureaucratic structure and the irrationality of the industrial structure under bureaucratic command.
Bureaucrats engaged in speculation
The rural reform partially changed the suppressed prices of agricultural products and raw materials. In addition, due to bureaucratic obstacles and the high costs of circulation, market prices rose (though the producers did not benefit from this. With an already existing shortage of raw materials, this problem became more acute when rural enterprises competed for them and bureaucrats engaged in speculation. The prices of raw materials rose to an irrational level. Coupled with the problems of transport and energy, urban enterprises were severely affected, and production either dropped or stopped. So, when the crisis in the rural reform was developing, the crisis in the cities also intensified. It was estimated that 80% of the urban population were seriously hit by soaring price inflation.
The problem that agriculture faced in the past was the burden of irrational bureaucratic policy on peasant incentive and conditions of production. When this burden was by and large removed, agricultural production could carry on in a more normal way, and a compensatory leap took place in 1979-84 until the market and the bureaucracy slowed down the development in agriculture. However, the problem that industry faced could not be temporarily solved by correcting some wrong policies.
The major problem faced by industry was a low incentive for production among the workers. Industrial production is essentially different from agricultural production, and the system of responsibility cannot be applied here. Nor can incentive for production be raised by widening the income gaps among workers. To have the workers increase their efficiency in terms of production, they must either be forced to produce for their living as in the capitalist mode, or exercise their enthusiasm as real masters of society under genuine socialism. The former can be implemented only with a counter-revolution in which the present state ownership system is privatized, that is a general restoration of capitalism, but its prerequisite is a victory over the workers' defence of the state ownership system. At present, this counter-revolution has not appeared, though with the wrong Dengist policy, capitalist development in the countryside has expanded. The prerequisite for the latter is the overthrow of bureaucratic
December 12, 1988 • #153 International Viewpoint rule so that genuine workers' control can be realized. Of course, this path will not be charted by the bureaucracy, and only with the workers leading the peasants can the political revolution be carried out and genuine socialist democracy established.
The Dengist reform tries to shift the cost for the reform onto the workers and at the same time compel them to work harder: power was decentralized to factory directors and the technocrats; wage differentials were expanded and a piece-work system imposed; contract employment replaced long-term hiring, and dismissals were used to threaten workers; social security and subsidies for such things as water, electricity, housing, medical care, pensions, food and necessities were gradually cancelled.
There are now signs that the workers are passively or actively resisting these measures. Strikes have increased and general social discontent is surfacing. The official trade unions are obviously feeling this pressure and are forced to respond. Student movements have erupted in different forms. Of course, for the working class to develop from discontent to organized resistance, and even to the level of the Polish Solidarnosc workers' movement, there is still a long way to go. However, further Dengist reforms in the cities would undoubtedly result in more working class
To advance the development of China's countryside and cities in a truly persistent way, neither the Maoist policies of the people's commune and priority for heavy industry, nor the arbitrary market economy and policy that creates differentiations promoted by Deng, can work.
Revolutionary socialist reforms needed
To really push forward economic development in the countryside, the policy towards the peasants must first be correct. The mode of production must comply with the general level of productivity and the voluntary will of the peasants. Forced collectivization and even communalization can only incur passive resistance from peasants. The consequences are obvious. The workers' state must not let peasants remain at their present productive level. It should provide cheap and quality industrial goods, sufficient insecticide, fertilizer, tractors, agricultural technology, irrigation and electricity to aid peasants to raise productivity and mechanization levels. It should expand the exchange of social products between the peasantry and the working class, strengthen social divisions of labour among peasants, gradually attract peasants to engage in social production, absorb the surplus labour released from higher rural productivity into the industries, and help peasants set up supply cooperatives to avoid exploitation in selling products.
On the other hand, the state should adopt unequivocal laws to impose appropriate restrictions, including a sliding tax structure, banning loan sharks, encouraging cooperatives, imposing heavy taxes on rich peasants who employ agricultural workers and setting up a minimum wage system. All these measures should aim at preventing capitalist accumulation, concentration of land and capitalist exploitation. The state should assist production and coordination, and set up a certain level of storage of goods to offset the consequences of big vacillations in production.
The development of rural commodity production definitely carries with it a capitalist inclination. To develop China's countryside, the Maoist attempt to leap over the stage of rural commodity economic development is not feasible. This is conditioned by the petty-bourgeois nature of peasants. Yet, when tolerating or even encouraging the development of commodity economy in the countryside, the working class cannot allow it to develop arbitrarily, and must not actively promote social and class differentiations, as the Dengist policy does.
A correct rural policy is to consciously repress the capitalist inclination of the commodity economy, aid the poor peasants and recruit the support of the middle peasants. Loans should be given to the peasants according to class criteria, their taxes reduced and cooperatives formed on a voluntary basis. Poor and middle peasants should also enjoy a privileged allocation of land and supply of tractors, fertilizers, insecticide and new strains of seed. The strength of the regime in the countryside should be based on the poor and middle peasants to counter the influence of the rich ones. In the final analysis, the development of rich peasants is based on repressing other layers and impeding their productive development. The result is that, on a general social level, a bigger and bigger sector of agricultural productivity is repressed. Hence, in the interest of the development of the rural economy and the economy as a whole, the working class regime should help the poor
CHINA and middle peasants, instead of the Dengist policy of aiding the rich and the competent.
More fundamental is the selfless aid to the peasants bestowed by the working class in workers' states: peasants are not rejected or exploited because they are individual producers not integrated into the state ownership system and economic planning. Here lies the real difference in attitude towards peasants between genuine workers' states and the so-called "socialist" Stalinist bureaucracy. The working class regards peasants as their allies, helps them to raise productivity, collectivize and gradually integrate into the socialist family. The Stalinist bureaucracy strives to control and manipulate peasants, and squeeze the maximum interests from them in order to support heavy industries controlled by the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy also does not give any importance to the development of light industries, because they are mostly for consumption by the "people", whereas the products of heavy industries are controlled by the bureaucracy and can facilitate the consolidation of its power.
Though the Dengist faction proclaimed that it would give the peasants freedom in the production of commodities, in reality the bureaucracy's intervention and control was still there. The market economy opened a path for bureaucrats to seek consumer privileges, and also supplied the means and the goal of accumulating capital by using their privileges. This not only aggravates the corruption and decay of the bureaucracy, but also strengthens the objective forces for capitalist restoration.
In order that China can develop, the state ownership system be defended, the gains of the 1949 revolution be safeguarded and capitalist restoration prevented, the working class needs to be organized urgently, and to ally with and lead the poor and middle peasants. The aim must be to overthrow the CCP's bureaucratic role, advance the cialism in China and the whole world. *