A stunning
victory for
the
Workers'
Party
IN LAST NOVEMBER's municipal elections, the Brazilian Workers' Party (PT) went from having three elected mayors to thirty-six. Among the gains was São Paulo, the largest city in South America, where a PT woman, Luiza Erundina, was elected. In the country as a whole, the PT went from having 170 municipal councillors to 2,000. How can this stunning victory be explained? GUSTAVO VASQUEZ
ANY PEOPLE, in Brazil itself have tried to minimize the PT's victory with all sorts of explanations. For instance, leaders of the Brazilian bourgeois parties counted up the number of PT councillors and mayors in the country as a whole to show that the PT has less elected representatives than they do, as if everyone did not already know it. Others are trying to put the blame on the president, José Sarney, because it was he who repressed the Volta Redonda strikers, or who refused wage
Lionel Brizola, the populist leader of the Workers' Democratic Party (PDT), attributed Luiza Erundina's triumph in São Paulo to support from his own party, no less. Well, if the PT was electorally supported by the PC, the PCdoB, and the PDT, each of these parties elected only one councillor, while the PT elected 18 (see box p.14).
If it is the case that the popular clara: 13 punished the government and its collabora-
International Viewpoint #157 • February 20, 1989
BRAZIL tors for their general policies and lack of respect for individual rights, as the PT leaders themselves say, it is equally clear that by their votes they have demonstrated that the PT is free of any taint. They have put the administration of the country's major cities in its hands.
PT led campaign for direct elections
The explanation lies in the policies advanced by the PT from the very beginning of this short-lived New Republic. When the right to elect the president directly was denied, and all the other parties together decided to hold this election within the confines of an electoral college made up of a few hundred of their members, the PT refused to participate. In fact, it was the PT that had pioneered the campaign for direct elections. The electoral college, then, went on in 1985 to elect respectively Tancredo Neves and José Sarney as president and
More recently, last October the PT refused to vote for a constitution that, while it ratified some advances in the area of workers' democratic rights, was nonetheless fundamentally reactionary. In November, when the time came to sign the social pact, the United Workers' Confederation (CUT), in which PT activists work, refused to ratify such a reactionary accord. When the workers at Volta Redonda confronted the army that had been called out by Sarney, the local union, affiliated to the CUT, fought tooth and nail, never playing a conciliationist game.
Thus, this vote by the Brazilian people did not come not out of the blue. It was not a blind choice, made without knowledge of the proposals and practice of this party. On the contrary, Brazilian workers have gone through an experience with the other parties, they have seen them in action, and they have also understood who has always defended them.
These are the "surface" reasons for the PT's results. But it is also the balance sheet of a party that has no fewer than 450,000 active members. The PT's members understood, as the PT federal deputy of São Pau-
Brazilian parties PMDB: Brazilian Democratic
Movement Party - center-right, the ruling party. PCB: Brazilian Communist Party
- pro-Soviet. PCdoB: Communist Party of Brazil - a split from the PCB, of
Maoist origins. PDT: Democratic Workers' Party
- populist. PDS: Social Democratic Party - right-wing. PTB: Brazilian Labor Party -14 right-wing.
lo Florestan Fernandes said, that "winning these elections meant not only a democratic revolution and social reforms today, but a springboard for socialism in the future.
They [the PT members] were able to spread this message in poor areas and among the working class in the cities, and in that way they radicalized the elections and dealt a series of blows to the 'invincible' parties of the established order. In the end, clergy, priests, and 'progressive' bishops made their own contribution.
"They understood these changes and endorsed a vote for the only candidates who advanced a real perspective of authentic social change. This was decisive support for the victory of those who would unfurl their banner to defend democracy, popular participation and proletarian socialism in city halls." (Folha do São Paulo, December
Thus, no conciliation, social partnership, or pact. No confidence in the deeply reactionary bourgeois institutions. No huddles behind closed doors. Reliance on direct democracy, and above all, a struggle for the rights and demands of those who have nothing. No confusion about the class struggle. No notions about conjuring away classes, whether in rhetoric or policies. The towns will be run, above all, for the benefit
As Luiza Erundina said, referring to the faveleros' (slum-dwellers) squatting on land in order to build homes, "The right to housing takes precedence over private property." Or, as Olivio Dutra, mayor of Porto Alegre and national president of the PT, said: "You can't make an omelette without breaking eggs. That is why you cannot govern a city for the benefit of the people without running up against quite clearly defined economic interests and groups. The real-estate speculators who hold tracts of land without using them, owners of mass transit, of construction and of large commercial centers will undoubtedly be the first affected."
Centers of fundamental economic importance
It is true that the PT won in the big capital cities where the population is most concentrated, but it also carried centers of a fundamental economic importance. These included São Bernardo, which has the highest industrial concentration of any city in the world, and is the trade-union bastion of the PT; Santo Andres, the dormitory city where many workers live; Santos, the major Brazilian port; Campinas, location of one of the biggest Brazilian refineries and bastion of the oil workers' union. The mayor who was just elected there is Jaco Bitar, a historic oil workers' union leader, a founding member and leader of both the PT
The PT also won in Diadema, where the incumbent mayor was re-elected. Diadema was one of the three cities where the PT won last time, and the only one where the PT's policies were really applied. The pop ulation showed its awareness of this, as it did also in a negative sense in the other two cities, where the PT lost its mayors.
In Diadema, the PT followed a policy of serving the people. They lowered the price of public transport fares, and since the private company that held this concession refused to accept that, they took the service over, buying new buses. The city council created a people's transport council that included a representative from each neighborhood, a representative from the transport workers' union and one from the city. This council was responsible for everything concerning public transport.
Council tackles social problems
The city council set up municipal services in the favelas, and started immediately to build emergency housing in the most neglected neighborhoods. The materials used were made in municipal workshops, and this in itself created jobs. The council opened new schools and extended the freemeal program for children from the poorest
It installed a waste-treatment plant, and at the beginning of the year, 50% of the people of Diadema expressed their support for the PT, an unrivalled score
But there have also been rough spots. Thus, the former mayor of Diadema got into conflict with the PT ranks, but they were able to impose their own candidate for last November's elections, and the former mayor had to pull out. In this way the population showed that it was not voting for big names, but for democratic positions, policies, a certain conception of work, and for the party that stands for them, the PT. This is what explains the November success.
Finally, the PT's triumph in the municipal elections has a significance going beyond the 36 town councils it controls, both because of the features of these cities (size. industrial concentration, population concentration, and so on) and because of the character of the PT's proposals. These are by no means moderate, but are proposals that fundamentally challenge the existing
February 20, 1989