Prospects after the Soviet military withdrawal
OW CAN you explain the Soviet bureaucracy's decision to intervene militarily in Afghanistan?
The regime set up by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA-) after the April 1978 putsch provoked an extension of a counter-revolution, which was in part a continuation of a struggle that developed after the overthrow of the monarchy in 1973. After 1978, the civil war widened considerably. The PDPA regime was accused of being Communist and atheist, and it drew the fire of a reactionary opposition relying on "feudal," tribal and religious bases in one of the most backward societies on earth. As far back as 1979, the future of the PDPA regime seemed very uncertain.
The overthrow of the Kabul regime by the counter-revolution seemed more and more probable, especially since the so-called Islamic revolution had occurred in Iran in February 1979. Fundamentalism had the wind in its sails throughout the region. Suddenly, the fundamentalist tendencies in the Afghan counter-revolution gained strength.
All this pointed to an overthrow of the Kabul regime by a force raising the standard of Islamic fundamentalism and lining up on this basis with Iran. For the Soviet bureaucracy, this was a grave danger. The fact that the regime that might succeed the PDPA was likely to be under fundamentalist domination posed an extremely grave problem for the Soviet bureaucracy - a
SINCE the Soviet soldiers have left Afghanistan, the divisions among the Mujahideen have paralyzed the work of the "Shura."
Despite the the Soviet proposal for a cease-fire and a halt to deliveries of arms by all countries to any of the forces involved, the United States has continued to aid the Afghan resistance. In the following interview,
Salah Jaber sums up the terms of the situation now. possible extension of this fundamentalist wave into the USSR itself, into the republics inhabited by historically Muslim peoples. • Once the intervention was decided on, what policy did the Kremlin follow in Afghanistan?
Panic stricken, the Soviet bureaucracy decided in December 1979 on a massive military intervention. The political corner-
AFGHANISTAN stone of this was setting up a more moderate regime headed by Babrak Karmal to replace that of the hard-line wing of the PDPA, the Khalq faction, which was denounced as ultra-leftist by Moscow. This aspect of things is often forgotten. The idea that the goal of the Soviet intervention was to transform the structures of the country along the East European model was totally out of line with the reality.
Moscow's objective was to stabilize a government subordinate to the USSR but adapted to the backwardness of Afghan society. Among the first measures of the Karmal regime were a retreat on the agrarian reform, political liberalization and a widening of the possibilities for free enterprise, and a rehabilitation of religion. All these measures went against those taken by the hard-line wing of the PDPA. • What has been Gorbachev's specific contribution?
Measures favoring liberalization and free enterprise have increased still more under Gorbachev. He could not fail to push in this direction, given his general policy orientation. In 1986, Karmal was replaced by the present president, Najibullah, a champion of the policy of "national reconciliation," which the Kremlin wanted to make a model for Central America, Africa, the Middle East and so on - a universal 1. People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, a pettybourgi ory with socialist populist tendencies and a 3 putschist orientation.
DANZIGR
The Christian Science Monitor
AFGHANISTAN model for which Afghanistan was to be the labThis "national reconciliation" policy involved going still further in liquidating
Mazar-i among the large Sunni majority of the population,
China whose headquarters are in
Pakistan. The Islamic Alliance of the Mujahideen includes seven organizations,
Kushka the previous radical measures in the areas of agrarian reform, private enterprise olslamabad and religion. This has gone so far that the Kabul regime figures as a bourgeois moderate regime less radical than other bourgeois experi-
Despite such concessions and an attempt by the regime to out-Islam the resistance, which has at times bordered on the grotesque, the search for "national reconciliation" ended in failure. On the one hand, it was rejected by the Mujahideen. On the other, it did not really change the relationship of popular forces throughout the country.
It is true that the liberalization and profree enterprise policy made it possible to neutralize certain layers in the cities that had tended to oppose the regime, such as the bazaar merchants. It also facilitated the collaboration with the regime of certain tribalist forces, who switched alliances in return for generous aid in arms and money. But this did not really change the overall relationship of forces among • Why did this policy of national reconciliation fail so totally?
Because it is the national question that has played the decisive role in the Afghan war since 1980. The "puppet" character of the regime installed by the Soviet intervention was an almost insurmountable obstacle. This aggravated the original weakness of the regime owing to the bureaucratic dictatorial methods that it used to try to
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HEIGHT 4/6000metres toward a figure who represents stability by contrast with the nightmare of a ten-yearlong war that has caused massive slaughter and destruction in an already very poor country. The Soviet intervention enabled what was at the start a Vendée-type uprising to assume, after 1979, the aspect of a national resistance movement. • Exactly what are the divisions in this "national resistance" movement?
The Soviet intervention produced the opposite of what was intended. Instead of eliminating the counter-revolution, it enabled the reactionary forces to increase their popularity considerably by waving the flag of national resistance to the Soviet invader. On the other hand, as regards the nature of these organizations, what is quite widely pointed up in all the press is their extreme heterogeneity.
On one side, there are eight Shi'ite organizations operating in the minority. On the other are the organizations working of which four have Islamic fundamentalist programs and arose under the king, before the republican coup d'état in 1973, and well before the time of the PDPA. These fundamentalist organizations opposed the king, accusing him of being an
INDIA atheist and in the pay of
Moscow. The other three organizations offer a program of reaction, of restoration, in the strict sense. They are generally called "traditionalist," and aspire to restore the state of affairs that existed under the monarchy. Thus, there are deepgoing differences among these seven organizations. This is why they have been unable to set up any credible united govemment.
Today, now that the Soviet withdrawal has been completed, what these organizations can propose in the positive sense become the important element, while this was relatively secondary when the objective was ending what was seen as a foreign occupation. • Can you be more specific about the nature of foreign intervention by other forces than the Soviet Union?
The fact is that even before the Soviet intervention the counter-revolution was already receiving direct aid, essentially from the United States, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The USSR took this as a pretext, calling it interference in Afghanistan's affairs, to justify its intervention. This obviously
NOW THAT THE RUSSIANS change Afghan society, even ARE GONE, MUHAMMAD, though the objective was to change it in a progressive
Because of its bureaucratic and dictatorial character, the PDPA regime alienated the masses from the outset, and has been unable to undertake the tasks of changing the society from below, with all that this involves in terms of patient educational work. The result is that the political force, or symbol, that holds by far the greatest popularity in Afghanistan — as confirmed by all the sources - is the former king.
In fact, inasmuch as the society is being returned to a state of things not radically different from the former re- gime, the masses are turning International Viewpoint #159 • March 20, 1989
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March 20, 1989 • #159 International Viewpoint was not a very convincing justification, inasmuch as the massive intervention of Soviet troops was out of all proportion to the aid given to the counter-revolution by the countries mentioned.
What is more, before its massive intervention, the Soviet Union was also providing a large amount of aid and had 5,000 "military advisors" on Afghan soil. Worldwide reaction's aid to the Mujahideen increased considerably in the 1980, until, of all the centers of armed counter-revolution in the world, they are getting the largest amount of aid. And this aid is continuing after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. • What role can the king play in a gees who chose to go to Kabul and not to
Being in the encircled city already represents a choice. Nothing forced these people to go there. Moreover, the PDPA regime, like any state, has a social clientele, tens of thousands of functionaries, people whose fates are bound up with that of the regime. Facing a counter-revolution that gives no quarter, they are fighting with their backs to the wall, and this can be expected to increase their deter-
The Mujahideen are aware of the military relationship of forces, especially since they have very little capacity for uniting their forces in a coordinated offensive.
AFGHANISTAN within.
In a foreseeable future, a coalition with the king can come to the fore, against the background of "Lebanization" of the country, that is, its division into zones controlled by different forces. And in Afghanistan, there is a more multicolored mosaic of tribes, ethnic groups and religions than there is in Lebanon.
Moreover, even if the Kabul regime fell, the possibility of the Mujahideen agreeing on a single government is very slight. The PDPA could maintain itself in the regions bordering the USSR. Afghanistan is coming apart, in particular because of the withdrawal of Soviet army army, which represented a unifying factor both for the political solution?
Under Gorbachev, as far back as 1986, advances were made to the king, reflecting an attitude similar to that taken toward Sinternationa hanouk in regard to Cambodia, in the
MEWPOINT framework of the universal "national reconciliation" advocated by Gorbachev.
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The king has been careful not to make any positive response. He is well aware that
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own role if he returned.
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uation, insoluble for a PDPA unable to gover alone, but also with a counterrevolution too fragmented to be able to create a real central government. The king is emerging more and more as the only
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Notebooks for Study and alternative to the general fragmentation of the Afghan situation. • Will Kabul fall quickly?
Now that the withdrawal has been completed, the question is, What is going to
Research
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Institute for Research and Education happen? The Western press has been Number 10: Marxism andLiberation Theology, claiming generally, and sometimes in a by Michael Löwy categorical way, that the Kabul regime is going to collapse - that this is a matter of The emergence of revolutionary Christianity and liberation theology in Latin days or weeks. What is the truth of the America opens a new chapter and poses exciting new questions which matter? First of all, on the Kabul regime's cannot be answered without a renewal of the Marxist analysis of religion. chances for surviving: This regime con- Michael Löwy attempts to begin the process in this notebook which reviews trols the country's big cities, while in the traditional and recent Marxist views on the subject and focuses on the provinces and on the outskirts of the cities, experiences of Brazil, Nicaragua and El Salvador. Appendix by Frei Betto. there are zones controlled by the Mujahi-
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On the strictly military level, the rela- N°1 - The Place of Marxism in History, by Ernest Mandel. 20FF, £2, tionship of forces does not point to a rapid $3.50. Nº2 & 3 - The Chinese Revolution, by Pierre Rousset. Respectively fall of Kabul, inasmuch as not only are the 20FF, £2, $3.50 and 25FF, £2.50, $4.00. Nº4 - Revolutionary Strategy forces concentrated in Kabul larger than Today, by Daniel Bensaid - 20FF, £2, $3.50. Nº5 - Class Struggle and .those surrounding the city but Kabul also Technological Change in Japan since 1945, by Muto Ichyio. 48 pp., 25FF, has heavy weapons, including airplanes £2.50, $4. Nº6 - Populism in Latin America, by Michael Lowy, Adolfo Gilly, and tanks, which the Mujahideen do not et al. 40 pp. 20FF, £2, $3.50. N°7/8 - Plan, Market and Democracy: The
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Everything will depend on the cohesion 64pp, 40FF, £3, $5. N°9 The Formative Years of the Fourth International of the forces on both sides. If dissension 1933-1938, by Daniel Bensaïd. 48 pp. 25FF, £2.50, $4. breaks out in the PDPA, or if the infiltra- Subscribe to NSR (5 issues): 100FF, £10 $16; air mail add 20%. Please tion by the Mujahideen is as exterisive as indicate with which issue subscription begins (you may include back issues). Western sources claim, then Kabul will Payments to P. Rousset. Preferred: French francs payable in a bank located fall. However, it must not be forgotten that an estimated 3 million people are concentrated in Kabul, or about a third of the population living today on Afghan soil. Among these 3 million are 2 million refu-
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