Debate over negotiations between
Solidarnosc and the regime
AFTER SEVEN, YEARS of repression and The breach had in fact already been attacks on Solidarnosc, the regime's opened by the numerous Solidarnosc announcement that the union might be organizing committees that began legalized - backed up by the beginning appearing timidly in 1987 and then of discussions with its best known leaders gathered momentum after the May and and followed by the proposal of granting August strikes last year (despite the the opposition up to 40% of the seats in a persistence of certain forms of future Polish parliament - could be interpreted as a major victory for the Even so, the possibility now for
Polish workers. organizing openly is a major gain.
POLAND
ONETHELESS, as Tygodnik Mazowsze correctly notes, "When Lech Walesa signed the Gdansk accords 101 months ago, all Poland was aware of the importance of this development. Today, Solidarosc is going to regain the right to a legal existence, but this is not being accompanied by the former euphoria and hopes."
The Walesa leadership's semi-official journal explained this situation in the following way: "The government has been forced to accept Solidarnosc, not because of a great uprising but due to pressure from the economic situation, the collapse of the system, the years of mass resistance, and by the strikes that took place several months ago — what is more in only around twenty enterprises and not in hundreds. This Solidarnosc, whose right to exist has been granted and not seized, does not have the taste of victory."
This explanation might seem plausible if, on the eve of the inaugural session of the round table, 12,000 workers, 95% of the workforce, had not begun a sit-in strike in one of Poland's big enterprises, the Belchatow open-pit lignite mine. They were demanding more equitable wages (in opposition to the contract signed by the management and the official union, the OPZZ) and a 30,000 zloty raise for all in order to compensate for the effects of the price rise.
This strike came in the wake of more than 170 strike mobilizations recorded in January 1989, and it was followed by 50 others in the first half of February.
The strike of the Belchatow workets, as well as dozens of others in which the demand for a 30,000-zloty raise for all reappeared like as a common theme, clearly 10 resulted from the drop in real wages registered in recent months. Inflation reached International Viewpoint #159 • March 20, 1989 repression).
### CYRIL SMUGA
80% in 1988, according to official estimates. It further accelerated at the beginning of this year. It would, therefore, be illusory to accept Tygodnik Mazowsze's
In fact, there were a whole series of factors that could be expected to discourage the spontaneous development of strike mobilizations: the opening of negotiations and the short-term perspective of legality for the independent union; the fear that the negotiations would fail because of displays of impatience; and finally Lech Walesa's appeal for six weeks of social peace so as not "More and more people are distrustful"
However, the precondition for such social peace is for the workers en masse to put their trust in the line pursued by their leadership and to wait for an improvement in their situation coming out of the round table. But this is not at all what is happening, and Walesa is quite aware of it.
At the meeting of Solidarnosc's national Executive Commission (KKW) on the eve of the negotiations Walesa stressed: "More and more people are mistrustful. "Too bad, we don't believe it,' they say. 'In 1980, Walesa trusted them, and what did that lead to? Today it's the same thing.'
"My answer is simple: I don't believe it either. And I say, don't trust this clever fel low Walesa, don't trust the clever people in general. Put your trust in yourself, put your trust in the structures that we are going to build. As the group that has to approach the round table, we are opening up possibilities. We said what we would do, and we are doing it....So, the KKW and Lech Walesa are going to win, and if the society is not ready, and does not take advantage of what we can manage to do, it will have no one to blame but itself....What matters is that the society seize on everything that will be gained from this round table " 3
This rather demagogic declaration was an answer to the questions of some members of the commission about fears aroused among the ranks by the opening of the negotiations themselves. Grazyna Staniszewska, one of the commission members, said: "When I left to come here, they told me, 'don't let them sell out Solidarnosc'." 4 Such fears were repeated at every level in the following few days during Lech Walesa's rallies in various big cities around the
In Lodz on February 22, the crowd even interrupted Walesa on several occasions, shouting the name of Andrzej Slowik, the historical leader of Solidarnosc in the region and a member of the Presidium of the National Commission at the time of the union's first congress in October 1981. Slowik has been pushed aside by the present leadership, and is a well-known opponent
In fact, going into 1989, Solidarnosc appears more divided than ever. Since the calling off of the strikes in May and again 1. Solidamosc's main weekly, which follows a line close to the positions of Lech Walesa and Jacek Kuron. No. 279, January 25, 1989. 2. Likewise, it is hard to accept the explanation put forward by some of Walesa's overzealous champions in Solidarosc, who are trying to present the current strikes as the result of manipulation by the official union confederation, the OPZZ. 3. Quoted in the Nowohucki Biuletyn Solidarnosci (the Solidarity bulletin in the Nowa Huta Lenin steel complex outside Cracow) 26, February 7, 1989. 4. Bulletin d' information du Bureau de coordination de Solidarité à l'étranger 211, February 22, 1989.
March 20, 1989 • #159 Intemational Viewpoint in August 1988, Lech Walesa's decision has been widely criticized. For example, when the decision to halt the mobilization reached Stalowa Wola, one of the bastions of the strike, "there were 5,000 to 6,000 strikers, the strike was growing, people did not want to end it." 5
In the Gdansk shipyards "it became evident that he [Walesa] called a halt to the strikes without consulting the strikers. Someone asked the question: Is this a bad joke?" 6 In the Manifest Lipcowy mine in Jastrzebie, the seat of the Inter-enterprise Strike Committee (MKS), "the discussion between Lech, the MKS and the [local] strike committee turned into a stormy altercation....He called for stopping the strike. 'We are not leaving here, " he was told, •without guarantees of personal security and without a date being set for negotiations on our demands'." 7
Gap between leadership and young workers
A gap has opened up between the Solidarosc leaders committed to seeking compromise, which they consider the only possible solution; and the young workers in the forefront of the fight in the recent strike waves. It was further widened by Lech Walesa's reaction to the announcement of the closing of the Lenin shipyard in Gdansk last November.
A reporter from the clandestine press present described the general assembly held at the time as follows: speech was awaited in a tense atmosphere because he had previously announced his intention to call for starting preparations for a strike. But, to the surprise of a section of the workers, especially the youth, the chair of Solidarnosc said that 'the government has to be given a few days more,' and also that he was 'waiting for the country's
Then he called on people to
A strike had just begun at the nearby naval repair yard in solidarity with the workers at the threatened Lenin shipyard. "Walesa admitted that he had not given any information about this, since, along with Szablewski [Solidarnosc chair at the Lenin yard], he had previously called on the strikers to go no further. When he was asked what the strike was about, if it was a 'youth revolt,' he said that it was insubord-
These tensions were further aggravated during the strikes at the beginning of 1989 In Belchatow, Alojzy Pietrzyk, a Solidarnosc leader participating in the round table "thanks to his rhetorical ability and the workers' fatigue finally managed to get them to agree to an interim payment of 21,000 zlotys, somewhat less than the management had been ready to offer. "This was after he had to "answer telephone calls from the Solidarnosc team in Warsaw, worried that the strike had been provoked by party officials keen to torpedo the round
After what many saw as treason, the strikers at the Laznia steelworks in Upper Silesia, a region that he represents in the union leadership, along with others, refused to allow him into their plant. So, even before the debates over the round table entered their decisive phase, General Jaruzelski's regime had gained an initial victory. The positions taken by Solidarnosc leaders spread disarray in the mass movement, divided it and helped to disarm it.
In deciding to undertake these negotiations, despite fierce opposition from a not inconsiderable part of the Polish Communist Party's Central Committee and no doubt still more extensive opposition from its intermediate apparatus, the team headed by Premier Mieczyslaw Rakowski and General Jaruzelski are first of all seeking to rebuild a measure of legitimacy for the bureaucratic regime in Poland
In an article published in the form of an editorial in the weekly Polityka'° just after the decisions adopted by Tenth Plenum of the Central Committee of the PZPR (Polish United Workers' Party, the CP), one of the CC members, Zdzislaw Cackowski, wrote: "We are not safe from social revolt....Most people... think that the party is necessary for Poland, but this is more tolerance than active support. And, what is worse, the party does not have the support of great masses of its members, who are tired from difficult experiences, fearful, used to administrative actions and to the idea that power has been given to the party once and for all....The danger of the party losing
"Opposition is a fact, and it exists in two forms. One is constructive, constitutional opposition, ready for dialogue. The other is extremist, anti-system opposition. The first is already legal for all practical purposes. The second type of opposition is dangerous. There are two preconditions for accomplishing the necessary task of undermining it — improving the socio-economic situation and collaborating with the constructive opposition. "This constructive opposition is indispensable in the long run, both for Poland
POLAND and for the party. In the short run, it is necessary as a continuing critical alternative to the government."
Thus, legalization of Solidarnosc has been made conditional on a section of its leaders accepting a cynical liberalization project ("40% democratic elections" and the establishment of an all powerful presi dency, for which Jaruzelski is a candidate) and the institution of a market-economy
The latter is supposed to open the way for restructuring industry by the closing or sale to foreign capital of a series of enterprises and the development of a private sector. A statute on the functioning of the economy drafted by the government notably puts private and public enterprises on an equal footing as regards taxes and access to producers' goods. It also abolishes restrictions on employment in the private sector, as well as those concerning prior authorization for trading abroad.
In fact, this is only a formal equality. Another law concerning financing of public enterprises provides for their paying large dividends to the state on their capital. They will therefore be subjected to still more onerous taxation than today (65% of capital gains), much higher than the private sector.
Moreover, the economic reform is also designed to meet the exactions of the International Monetary Fund, which, according • to Polish finance minister Andrzej Wroblewski, is demanding a 10% cut in the population's living standards." Discussion about how far compromise can go
For several months, the Solidarnosc leaders have been discussing how far the compromise can go. In November 1988, Jacek Kuron wrote: "If eliminating the nomenklatura is to mean that these people will lose everything, there is no way to accomplish such democratic changes in a peaceful way. But I think that the question is not, or at least should not be, posed in those terms.
"To be a manager, you need at least a minimum of organizational experience. However, for the moment, only members of the nomenklatura have been able to gain such experience. This is why, contrary to what is generally accepted, I think that a lot of them - in favorable conditions - have good chances for creating private enterprises and private companies, for winning competitions and being elected in the framework of self-management.... Likewise, the top of the nomenklatura can — again in favorable conditions — hold on to a good part of the political power for a long 5. Tygodnik Mazowsze 282, September 7, 1988. 7. Ibid 8. Tygodnik Mazowsse 270, November 9, 1988. 9. Feature by Christopher Bobinski, Financial Times, February 10, 1989. 10. No. 4, January 28, 1989 damosc) 3, January 20, 1989.
POLAND time.
"Such favorable conditions will exist if the reforms are carried out with the participation of the PZPR. All this obviously involves a great risk from the standpoint of the nomenklatura. But turning their backs on the reforms and continuing to ruin the country increases the real danger that they will end up losing everything." 12
Policies created open crisis in the union
Also in November, the KKW declared, shortly after the announcement of the closing of the Gdansk shipyard, "We agree that if a real economic reform were undertaken, it could lead to closing down enterprises. But it is the laws of the market that should decide this, alongside the principles of economic accounting, and not arbitrary politi-
The adoption of such positions have provoked an open crisis in the union. One of the leaders of Solidarnosc's InterEnterprise Committee in Warsaw wrote: "1) The PZPR has a nomenklatura that knows better. Solidarnosc has a nomenklatura that knows better. 2) The PZPR's nomenklatura has concentrated a political power in its hands that it is jealously guarding. Solidarosc's nomenklatura has also. 3) The PZPR nomenklatura has a monopoly of information and propaganda. The Solidarnosc nomenklatura is an excellent
"The PZPR and the Solidarnosc nomenklaturas know that Poland is heading toward a revolution, and they fear that above all, because this revolution will sweep away both nomenklaturas." 14
For its part, the Working Group of the National Commission of Solidarnosc, made up of about thirty historic leaders of the union pushed to the sidelines by the Walesa wing, demanded again in December that a meeting of the union leadership be called in Solidarnosc's statutes. Lech Walesa categorically refused.
However, what is new is that in two documents that came out of the NC meeting, Andrzej Gwiazda, the former vice-chair of Solidarnosc, and three leaders from the Lodz region respectively tried to offer an alternative line for leading the union.
In the document proposed by Gwiazda, it says: "Thanks to the support of the US State Department, the policy of an understanding and reform got the upper hand. This policy is entering into a period of success and implementation. This has to be an understanding by means of which the group prepared for compromise — that is, the so-called constructive opposition -will get political concessions in exchange for guaranteeing the system's economic
"This means a commitment from a section of the opposition groups to keep the i society from rebelling against the drop in International Viewpoint #159 • March 20, 1989 its standard of living, against increased exploitation. The economic reform, as can already be seen, means turning state enterprises into stock companies formed by organizations and private individuals. Obviously, this will not be done by buying out these assets."
Therefore, he called on Solidarnosc activists to fight for wage increases everywhere, to organize trade-union groups in the stock companies and in the private sector and "not to waste time or money to make a show of participating in religious assemblies. " 15
The Lodz leaders, for their part, wrote that "no real union anywhere in the world can accept concessions that would mean: a) a drop in the standard of living of the workers, retirees and others living on pen-
Mb) working conditions threaten the workers' health and lives; c) unemployment as a means of tightening labor discipline; d) lengthening the work-day by whatever means and reducing the right to rest; e) dismantling or cutting the system of social security.... We declare that if the union is to remain true to itself, it cannot turn into a political party nor recog nize the leading role of any party."
The adoption of such positions, as well as the strike mobilizations, led the national leadership of Solidarnose to put forward demands at the round table that were previously regarded as excessive, or even utopian. They demanded for example, at least for a transitional period of a year, establishing a sliding scale of wages and reducing the military budget by 20%.
Explaining that "the essential precondition for the success of the accord and carrying out its decisions is a broad acceptance of the concessions that we will have to make," the editors of Tygodnik Mazowsze (Solidarnosc's central journal) said that "the basic question will be to limit inflation and unemployment" (which the Solidarnosc leadership seems to accept), 16
Voices raised against anti-strike agreement
Likewise, at the January 20-21 meeting of the KKW, voices were raised against accepting an anti-strike agreement. Jacek Kuron said: "It is an aberration to say that there will be no strikes. We can say that we are not going to start them, that they are harmful and even that we are going to hold them back, but that is all. In fact, the pressure for strikes will be enormous." 17
The opposition among the ranks and the voices raised here or there affect the way that leadership around Lech Walesa negotiates and puts forward its point of view. But its general strategy continues to be designed to impose a market economy reform and gain legalization of the union through a deal with the regime.
One of the features of the present situation, moreover, is that the strikes continue to be isolated, even though the demands are often similar. The lack of coordination in struggles, which has been a tradition of the Polish working class since 1980, shows how weak and fragmented opposition to the KKW remains.
In order to combat this, the Polish Socialist Party-"Democratic Revolution" (PPS-RD) took the initiative of organizing a national congress of those opposed to a pact with the regime. It appealed to "all those who want to shape the country's future in a fight for full democracy and sovereignty not through another deal with the ruling elite" to coordinate their activity and sup port "the new waves of social protest."
Held February 25 in Jastrzebie, this congress was attended by 58 delegates representing the Independent Student Union (NZS), the Fighting Solidarnosc Organization (OSW), the Solidarnosc InterEnterprise Workers' Committee, the Peace and Freedom movement (WiP), the Independent Poland Confederation (KPN), as well as Solidarnose groups from various enterprises in Upper Silesia and Wroclaw. Some 120 other delegates were arrested by the police as they tried to go to the meeting.
Anti-labor model of economic reform
Except for the representatives of the KPN, all the other delegates adopted the following position: "The congress of the anti-system opposition is a political movement whose goal is to abolish the PZPR's monopoly of power and achieve complete political and economic democracy, including free elections. To this end, the opposition activists in the congress see the need for supporting politically and organizationally the social mobilizations that are developing, especially the strikes...
"In the present situation, there are no political or economic reasons that would justify the attempts to convince the workers to abandon the fight for their interests. The main cause of inflation is not raises in starvation wages but the zealous repayment of the foreign debt through exports. We will support the round table discussions only on condition that they are not used to hold back the workers' protests. The anti-labor model of economic reform adopted by the round table negotiators is unacceptable, and serves only to legitimize and maintain the totalitarian regime of the People's Republic of Poland." 18 * 12. Tygodnik Mazowsze 272, November 23, 1988. 13. Tygodnik Mazowsze 270, November 9, 1988. 14. Article by Edward Mizikowski in CDN-Glos Wolnego Robotnika 250, November 28, 1988 15. These documents were widely commented upon in the underground press. This is something new, because until now a blackout was in force against the positions of the Working Group. They were also reprinted in an official weekly, Polityka, No. 2, January 14, 1989. 16. Tygodnik Mazowsze 279, January 25, 1989. 17. Ibid 18. The text was transmitted by telephone by the Wro claw regional bureau of the PPS
The new
Polish
left
AT THE BEGINNING of this year, International Viewpoint reporters met Jozef Pinior of the Polish Socialist Party-Democratic Revolution (PPS-RD). He gave the following description of his party's development. JOZEF PINIOR
T HE FORMATION of the Polish
Socialist Party corresponds to a particular moment in the evolution of Polish society and the contradictions maturing within it.
The Stalinists' seizure of power at the outcome of the war had a genuinely revoLutionary progressive aspect, reflected by the elimination of capitalist privileges and feudal vestiges, which led to large-scale social mobility. On the other hand, the entire society was immediately placed under the tutelage of the nomenklatura, backed up by a Soviet political and military presence.
The anti-capitalist changes were not simply the product of manipulation from above. They corresponded to the aspirations of the Polish masses, aspirations that were expressed notably in the anti-Nazi resistance. Because of this, a section of the society was able to identify with the new system. But, since the regime dismantled the civil society, the traditional divisions between the progressive left and conservative right lost their relevance. In an atomized society, the only means of identification is where you stand toward the existing authority.
Through episodes of working-class activity - in 1956, 1970, 1976 and 1980 — an anti-bureaucratic consciousness took shape. This involved the civil society becoming aware of its existence as such, separate from the state. The high-point of this process of becoming conscious was in 1980, when Solidarnos appeared. It was a trade union, but also an overall movement of the society against totalitarianism. At that time, the PZPR lost all legitimacy, and came to
WE AGREED TO HAVE A ROUND TABLE!!
DON'T START MAKING TROUBLE be seen as a party for exercising power.
With the 1981 coup d'état, the bureaucracy tried to solve the problem by force. But it very quickly became conscious that it was indispensable to use political levers to control the society. The society won two historical successes on the way to achieving its emancipation, which are irreversible without reverting to a repression on the scale of that employed by
Classical mechanism of capitalization
It broke the nomenklatura's monopoly over information and organization. Then a new form of public life began to take shape. It became clear that there are different interests within the society in the course of emancipating itself. In this way, the right-left division reappeared within Polish politics, although its new content has not yet been clearly defined.
The leadership of the nomenklatura became aware that it had to make changes in order to render the economy more efficient and preserve its power. In our opinion, they are trying to reinforce their political domination over the means of production by relying on the classical mechanism of capitalization. So, we are seeing a process of bourgeoisification of the nomenklatura.
They want to use capital in its classical form to bolster their power. In this framework, the Polish bureaucracy is putting forward an authoritarian model of social development. In order to be able to succeed, it absolutely needs some legitimacy. The liberalization underway represents an attempt to gain it. From this standpoint, the latest position adopted by the PZPR Central Committee is characteristic. It involves political and trade-union pluralism but not political democracy. It is the schema of an unenlightened monarch granting concessions to the people.
From the point of view of the society, the line of cleavage runs as follows. On the one side are those who call for turning away from the totalitarian system toward a social authoritarian model. On the other are those who are demanding a radical political
Besides the Catholic hierarchy, a part of the opposition commonly called the "shad-
POLAND ow establishment" is willing to legitimize this authoritarian road. This involves Solidarnosc's most influential intellectual advisors and some highly reputed union leaders, such as Walesa, Bujak and
These people think that there is no other solution because of geopolitical limitations, and therefore we should be satisfied with what is possible. What is more, they are convinced that free-enterprise is the most efficient economic model, and therefore are ready to accept its social logic. This group completely forgotten management alternative that was so clearly expressed during the period when Solidarnosc was legal. From them, it is a utopia.
Another part of the opposition rejects the authoritarian model, and proposes a model of social emancipation from below, of direct democracy. This is where many factory structures of Solidarnos stand. They aspire to a legal trade-union organization, but not at the price of submission to the regime. It is on this level that the most elementary form of spontaneous self-management con-
Various left currents reappearing in Poland
In this same current is the new left, grouped primarily in our party, the Polish Socialist Party-Democratic Revolution And here we find also currents reappearing in Polish political life - the anarchists (who demonstrated in October against the intervention in Central America) and the radical pacifists.
Finally, in this current of the opposition, there are also groups that do not define themselves as left but have in common with the left the demand for radical political democracy. This is the case, for example, of Fighting Solidarnosc. From the standpoint of its ideology, it is neither left nor right, and it does not want to define itself. But when you discuss with them what should be done when the nomenklatura shuts down the factories, they answer "an active strike." This shows that, in practice, such groups are our allies.
The birth of the Polish Socialist Party is the result of the awareness of the stakes bound up with the bureaucracy's project. : 13 This consciousness has appeared inde-
POLAND pendently in various structures of the Polish opposition. In the summer of 1987, some Solidarnosc and WiP structures in Wroclaw came into contact with the group publishing the journal Robotnik in Warsaw. It proved that we held a similar assessment of the situation, and we came to the conclusion that it was necessary to begin to build a left alternative for the young generation of the Polish opposition.
We then had a choice. Either to create a left current within Solidarnosc or create a left political structure outside of it. We reached the conclusion that the second choice was better, because no one can have an ideological monopoly in Solidarnosc. The left alternative could not define itself in the trade-union framework. We have not, however, abandoned the arena of
We work inside Solidarnose as union members for a real trade-union struggle, for trade-union structures that are real instruments for defending the workers.
As the PPS-RD, we are not forming an anti-Walesa leadership. This is a process in Solidarnosc itself, in which our members and the proposals they can make have an influence. But it is trade-union and not party members who are taking up this
So, our idea was clear. It was necessary to create a clearly defined political alternative outside Solidarnosc, and inside to work in the enterprise structures for a union that would be a real tool for defending the workers. Since up until then in Poland there had been no force that clearly defined itself as left, we wanted the platform to be as broad as possible, so that it could include all those who stood on the left, from social democrats to the revolutionary left to
A wide-ranging left regroupment
Our aim was to form at the outset a wide-ranging left regroupment. We did not see that such a vague political grouping was artificial, that it would break up under the pressure of divergent interests within it. That was an error.
We had put a lot of hope - which later proved to be only illusions - in what we called "the old left." This is the group linked to Jacek Kuron, Adam Michnik and Jan Jozef Lipski. For a long time, I was very close to Kuron's positions. For me, he was still the author of the Open Letter to the PZPR [a critique of Stalinism from the left that came out of the experience of the 1950s]. Jan Jozef Lipski's adherence to the Socialist Party's project was very important in our eyes. But it very quickly became clear that there were fundamental differences among us.
This emerged at the founding of the PPS in November 1987, in the PPS's first po14 litical statement. In this document, there were passages unacceptable to the Wroclaw International Viewpoint #159 • March 20, 1989 group and to the Robotnik group in Warsaw. There was its vague character, the unfortunate statement that Jean-Paul Il's social teaching was closer to us than Marxism, its general nature that gave no indications for the party's activity.
However, we swallowed our objections, because unity at the outset with all the left seemed more important to us than these differences. We thought that our practice would determine our program. Very quickly, it became evident that Lipski's practice and ours were going in opposite directions. The moment of truth was the application of a sharp price increase on February 1, 1988.
We responded with an immediate statement saying that the workers had the right at that point to resort to strikes. The rest of the opposition, including Lipski, thought that strikes were not in our interest.
We did not limit ourselves to words but acted to bring about strikes. Then an open conflict broke out between us and the establishment. At this point, Lipski resigned, hurling accusations at us.
Radical current of PPS active in the strikes
The split in the PPS in February 1988 could have sounded the death knell of the attempts to create a political left in Poland. Not only did Lipski and his friends break with us, but in the confusion a certain number of regional socialist groups adopted a
They did not understand what was at stake in the debate, and refused to join ei-
The situation could have seemed desperate, but then May came and the strikes. It became clear that the radical current of the PPS was in the plants and in the strikes. It was the factories and the streets once again that determined the situation in Poland. Then we reached the conclusion that it would be healthier to have two socialist parties in Poland, and we wish Lipski's party success in the arena it has chosen. For us, the mere fact that they use socialist references is important in a society where these have been totally compromised by the
Our ideology come out of our trade-union, management, anti-militarist and countercultural activity. In our opinion, the political currents characteristic of Western reality — social democrat, Trotskyist, socialist, anarchist — are in a certain way untranslatable into the language of our
If a real left alternative emerges in the East, it will have to have a new content. It will certainly be impregnated with the left thought present in the West. But, above all, it will have to be the fruit of the experience of the struggles waged here against the regime of the nomenklatura.
In 1988, the PPS-RD was in the forefront of the workers' struggles. After the strikes, we did not play at the round table. We organized big street demonstrations in Wroclaw and Warsaw. Of course, we sought unity in action with others, in Wroclaw with Fighting Solidarnosc, in Warsaw with the MRKS (the Inter-Enterprise Workers' Committee of Solidarnosc). The initiative came from us. The others joined us. "Our appeals are getting a mass response"
The December 13. showed that our appeals to the society are getting a mass response. Some 15,000 people came into the streets in Wroclaw. That is a social force.
Our practice has enabled us to work out a platform, which we have entitled "The Democratic Revolution." We are perfectly aware of the inadequacy of our references. But we think that it is very important that our program be an open-ended one, that it be able to incorporate our experience as we acquire it. This is why in our party there are programmatic fractions. An example is the Revolutionary Left Current (NLR), which identifies with classical Trotskyism. Another group, the dominant one in the party at the moment, is called the "New Left." Its bastion is Wroclaw.
Another group - I do not know what to call it - defines itself with respect to the history of pre-war Polish Socialist Party, which was always very left and wrote some outstanding pages in the history of the working-class movement.
The historic leader of this current, Puzak, died in a Stalinist prison, and the old PPS never yielded to Stalinism. The young people who identify with this tradition are very attached to preserving these symbols. But they are not social democrats, because they do not want an understanding with the nomenklatura. In this regard, they have nothing in common with Lipski. Finally, the party includes tendencies that take the counterculture as their point of departure, anarchistic currents and so on.
Today, the PPS-RD is the best implanted of all the socialist groups on a national scale. Our groups are active in the departments of Cracow, Gdansk, Katowice, Lublin, Plock, Przemysl, Szczecin, Warsaw and Wroclaw, where we are the strongest.
If the shadow establishment continues to legitimize the bourgeoisification of the nomenklatura, sooner or later the Polish society is going to look for an alternative within the opposition. Then the left opposition can be this natural alternative, because all those who refuse to let themselves be fooled are going to revolt both against the nomenklatura and the shadow establishment that legitimates it.
We are working to build such an alternative. Of course, we are still very weak. Most of the society has confidence in Walesa and the bishops. In our camp, above all, are the young workers, the university and