While the UNOC leadership for the first time, under the pressure of its rank and file, joined with UNTS, it nonetheless continued to support the PDC's official candidate, Fidel Chavez Mena. For their part, the Christian Base Communities, which organize major sections of the masses through the parishes, were preparing the people for action. "Our people are preparing the decisive blow"
In a long communiqué published in the daily El Mundo of February 9, the Christian Communities draw a parallel between the Biblical past and the present that did not beat around the bush2. "Moses Ithe vanguard] did consciousness-raising and organizational work....A verbal confrontation took place with the pharaoh. The people put forward their demands, and they were rejected. Repression increased....A section of the people hesitated, the majority remained determined....In the face of the pharaoh's refusal, the people resorted to violence in its most painful form. Through this violence, the people attacked sections of the regime....The people undertook the march toward the promised land.....The pharaoh took the road of defeat.
"Our people are passing through the same process. Today, our people...are preparing to strike the decisive blow. The God of the poor has been and will be victorious.
"Against the people's struggle, the regime is hardening its position....This hardening is the result of fear of losing all the labor it exploits. It is making the regime act in a blind and irrational way and take he road leading to its defeat...
"The Salvadoran regime is taking a harder line. It is resorting constantly to more repression, and it is less and less inclined to honest negotiation....The importance of what is emerging here exceeds the Salvadoran framework. This is a confrontation with the American empire.
"It will mean not only our victory but that of many Latin-American peoples and of the poor in general."
By its radicalism, this message broke from the official line of the Catholic hierarchy, which is holding to a temporizing position far behind that taken by Monsignor Romero, who was assassinated nine years ago, in March 1980. In such a polarized situation, this sort of language is striking a greater and greater chord.
The FMLN's proposal not only exposed the impasse of the PDC, which is supported by the US, but also that of ARENA, which had to maneuver to reject the
EL SALVADOR FMLN's offer while trying to show that it was well disposed to dialogue.
The way in which the proposal was formulated could not help but attract the support of the masses and create big problems for the regime and the US. Subsequently, at the time of the meeting in Mexico, the FMLN posed a new condition, a purge of the government's armed forces and a drastic reduction in their numbers (from 60,000 to 12,000). This proposal got an enthusiastic reception in the popular camp, and put the army in a tight comer.
The FMLN made its proposal from a position of strength. Militarily, it is continuing to increase its firepower. This is shown by its tighter control over more than 30 percent of national territory, and the range of its action, which includes the entire country (the cities as well as the
On Monday, February 21, when the dialogue began in Mexico, launched attacks in all 14 departments of the country and managed to cut off the electoral supply to 60 per cent of the territory. Over and above this military aspect, what is essential is the FMLN's capacity to appear in the eyes of the masses to be the lever for achieving peace and deepgoing social changes.
### Removing remaining obstacles to struggle
The refusal of the regime and of the United States to offer a positive response to the FLN's proposal and their inability to make counter-proposals that could appear credible to the people are improving the conditions for unleashing an insurrection.
Nonetheless, neither the FMLN's military strength nor the extent of organization and consciousness of the working-class sectors of the masses nor the impasse of the regime are sufficient to convince the masses to throw themselves into an insurrection. The great firepower of the government's armed forces continues to be a substantial obstacle to a mass uprising.
The memory of the massacres of 197982, still present in everyone's mind, and selective repression (several hundred political murders a year, to say nothing of the casualties caused by the army's attacks in areas controlled or disputed by the guerrillas), make the masses think carefully before openly taking sides with the FMLN.
The strategy followed by the FMLN is removing the remaining obstacles to a decisive struggle one by one. The rest is a matter of time. * 1. Such "tranquility" may not be shared by all the US congressmen. They may question US aid to El Salvador. It is in fact greater than the income of the Salvadoran state itself, which is in third position (after Israe] and Egypt) in the hit parade of countries getting the most US "aid" (in absolute figures). 2. Quotations from the Book of Exodus, chapters 4, 5, 12 and 14.
"There are indications
EL SALVADOR
The main political forces FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front), the main revolutionary organization. It Includes five political military organizations - the Revoluinsurrectional tionary Socialist Party (PRS)
and Its military arm; the People's Revolutionary Army
(ERP); the People"s Liberation Forces (FPL); the National Resistance (RN), and Its armed wing, the Armed Forces of National Resistance
(FARN); the Salvadoran Com-
HUMBERTO CENTERO is one of the main leaders of the munist Party (PCS), which commands the Liberation
National Union of Salvadoran Workers (UNTS), in which
Armed Forces (FAL); the Cenhe represents the telecommunication workers' union tral American Revolutionary
Workers' Party (PRTC).
(ASTEL). Arrested several times, jailed and tortured for long periods, he has been released on every occasion as
FDR (Revolutionary Democratic
Front) Is the legal civilian a result of protest actions in El Salvador and political ally of the FMLN. It
Includes the Social Christian
People's Movement (MPSC, a
On February 24, 1989, he was publicly sentenced to split from the PDC at the death by the People's Counter-revolutionary Army beginning of the 1980s) led by Ruben Zamora; and the
(ECRP), one of the sinister death squads. A reporter for
National Revolutionary Move-
International Viewpoint did the following interview with ment, led by Guillermo Ungo
(which Is linked to the Sechim in February in San Salvador.
ond International).
Convergencia Democratica, an alliance of the FDR and the
Democratic Soclalist Party.
Its candidate In the March 19 election, Gulllermo Ungo, got only 4% of the vote. It was prevented by repression from waging a real campalgn. It also suffered from the boycott.
PDC (Christian Democratic Party) of outgoing president
Napoleon Duarte. It held an absolute majority In parliament from 1984 to 1988. It was one of the key players In
US strategy, but Its candldate, Chavez Mena, got only
30%.
ARENA (Alllance for National
Renewal) was In power in the early 1980s, until the US opted for the PDC. It has had a majority in parliament since
1988. Its candidate, Cristiani, won the presidential election with 54% of the vote.
PCN (National Reconciliation
Party), the former party of the oligarchy and the army, won only 1.8%.
MAC (Authentic Christian Movement), led by Rey Prendes, a former minister under Duarte.
8
It got 0.3%. *
International Viewpoint #160 • April 3, 1989
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of a quasi- situation" internationally.
W HAT WERE the reac-
tions of the ruling-class parties to the FMLN's proposal to postpone the presidential elections to September 1989?
The FMLN's proposal was a bold one. This is the first time that the Front has taken such an attitude to elections since the start of the war nine years ago. The initial reaction of the Christian Democratic president Duarte was negative. In fact, he is living in the past. He reacts as if he were still under the Reagan administration and that all he has to do is reject every proposal by the FMLN.
ARENA, for its part, dragged out its moth-eaten so-called "peace and freedom" proposal, which it formulated after it won the legislative and municipal elections of March 1988. It proposed a temporary amnesty, which would permit five FLN commanders to present their proposals to the Legislative Assembly.
But when the general commander of the FMLN declared that he was ready to go to the capital to speak to the Assembly, ARENA balked at putting this proposal to a
After maintaining a total silence in the first few days, the general staff of the armed forces reacted by saying that it was up to the civilian government to decide. Subsequently, the chief of the general staff, Colonel Emilio Ponce,
"If the army FMLN's proposal, it would split. If we reject it, we will look bad in the eyes of the population. That is why it is up to the civilian authorities to make the decision."
Anyhow, a few days later, other military chiefs said that if the elections were postponed, that would be a violation of the constitution, and then they would be obliged to stage a coup d'état.
Finally, all the parties of the right met for three days, and at the end of interminable discussions, they agreed to say that they were going to meet with the FMLN, but in a foreign capital. That is why a dialogue between the FMLN and the rightwing parties has just taken place in Mexico. Convergencia Democratica also took part in it. If the right-wing parties went to Mexico, it is because they are afraid to show the people that they reject dialogue. • What is the relationship of forces in the electoral arena?
The parties that really count electorally are ARENA and the PDC. The other parties altogether, including Convergencia Democratica, cannot expect to get more than 200,000 votes. ARENA knows that participation in the elections is going to be low, barely 30% of qualified voters, who total about 2,200,000. Roughly, I think ARENA can count on 400,000 votes and
The two parties that would lose from a postponement of the elections are therefore ARENA and the PDC. I say the PDC as well because, since it is totally supported by the United States, it is not excluded that a massive electoral fraud will be organized on its behalf under Washington's • How could such an electoral fraud be pulled off when the overwhelming majority of mayors belong to
The mayors play no important role in the elections. The departmental and local election authorities are appointed by the Central Council of Elections and are made up of representatives from the parties sitting in the Legislative Assembly - that is ARENA, the PDC and the PCN. But in fact the experts in electoral fraud are the military. They have several tools for carry-
"Here, it is the army that elects and not the people"
First is the National Telecommunications Administration, whose director is the brother of the minister of defense, Colonel Casanova. Then, the military transport the ballot boxes (often by helicopter). So, fraud is easy, since you just have to have a helicopter carry 20 ballot boxes, of which 15, say are full of votes for ARENA. You stop at a base and replace those ballot boxes with ones full of votes for the PDC. Here in El Salvador, it is the army that elects and not the people. And since the army is under the thumb of the Americans, the PDC candidate could perfectly well win the elections, because he is Washing• How did Convergencia Democratica's campaign go?
Convergencia Democratica did not have a chance to win over a substantial part of the voters because of lack of time and because the army drastically limited its right of expression, especially outside the
Often participants in Convergencia rallies outside the capital were arrested by the army when they returned to their homes. This became known, and so the attendance at Convergencia's rallies was poor. The army also frequently banned Convergencia from going into localities.
In the present circumstances, therefore, Convergencia is not able to compete electorally with ARENA or the PDC. This is why, as UNTS, we are calling on our members not to take part in the March 19 elections. We are not even going to pick up our voters' cards. • Can you say something about the instance of unity that has been achieved between UNTS and the
First it should be said that the only dif-
EL SALVADOR ference was over the support the organizations linked to the PDC gave to Duarte's anti-popular government and to American policy. Aside from this point, there was already a considerable convergence.
After the PD's electoral defeat in March 1988 and the internal struggles that ravaged it, UNOC found itself in a more and more contradictory position. A minority supported the presidential candidacy of Fidel Chavez Mena, while a majority supported Rey Prendes. But finally, after various pressures, the UNOC lined up behind
After May 1988, UNTS and UNOC engaged in a dialogue in order to confront the resurgence of the death squads and the increasing power of the hardest-line elements (ARENA) in the command of the government's armed forces.
The first discussions made it possible to agree on public communiqués denouncing the repression, although they were often issued separately. It was not until after the FMLN's proposal on January 26 that, on the initiative of UNOC, our two organizations reached an agreement on February 10 and published a common statement. It welcomed the FMLN's proposal as positive, denied that the political parties had any monopoly on representing the people and declared that the constitution could not be an obstacle to dialogue. It is clear that the first two points are extremely important.
This position got a broad response from the masses, and was considered by the media as a change in the situation. In principle, we have agreed to jointly organize a march of 200,000 Salvadorans for peace. But this decision has to be confirmed.
On its side, UNOC held a march on February 14 in which 40,000 people participated. All the demonstrators' expressed concrete demands of the workers and peasants, and none supported Chavez Mena's candidacy, even if the organizers reaffirmed their support for him when they gave interviews to journalists. • What is UNOC's position as regards the agrarian reform?
UNOC is very worried at the possibility of an ARENA victory. The cooperative organizations linked to UNOC have received millions of colons from the US [5.5 colons=$1] to advance the agrarian reform. This has favored them over other cooperative organizations, without however saving them from enormous debts. If ARENA wins, there is a great danger that the lands held by cooperative members will be restored to the old landowners.
Initially, ARENA wants to divide up the lands of the cooperatives, distributing them to the member families, who will then have the problem of repaying the debt as individuals. Since they will not be able to meet the payments, they will have to sell off their family plots. The Supreme Court, which has been controlled by ARENA force 1933, has and on several occasiers 9 for returning the lands of bankrupt cooperApril 3, 1989 • #159 International Viewpoint