Rise of class conflict in Nicaragua
NICARAGUA
NA FEW MONTHS, the tenth anniversary of the July 1979 victory will be celebrated in Nicaragua. After the Cuban revolution of 1959, the Sandinista revolution marked the second deep crack in imperialist domination in the so-called backyard of the United States. The coming to power of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) as the result of a liberation war and a popular insurrection opened up a new era in Central America. In the wake of the Nicaraguan July, came the revolutionary rise in El Salvador and Guatemala.
As early as 1981, a counterattack by the United States and the reactionary forces took form, with financial boycott measures by the US and the international financial bodies, followed by the unleashing of hostilities in 1982 by contra forces set up by the CIA. Also in 1982, the revolutionary forces suffered a severe setback in Guatemala. Thousands of Indians were slaughtered, with the complicit silence of those "democrats" who were raising a hue and cry about so-called violations of human rights in Nicaragua. Back in 1981-82, the US, with the support of the European right, began mounting a political and military counter-offensive in El Salvador.
Starting in 1982, the Nicaraguan revolution was forced to adjust to this difficult regional context. At the same time, a severe economic crisis broke out in the South American continent and in the Central American isthmus. The bloodletting inflicted by the military aggression was compounded in 1985 by the embargo imposed by the United States. It paralyzed and disorganized a part of the country's economic life. Imperialism tries to isolate
Sandinista regime
Parallel to this, a disinformation campaign was orchestrated internationally about the rise of "totalitarianism" in Nicaragua. Its objectives were to isolate the Sandinista revolution, reduce the crumbs of aid it was still getting from European coun tries and legitimize the contras. This operation partially failed, but it cost the Nicaraguan people dear.
Thus, 1985 marked the beginning of the collapse of the economic and social model adopted in 1981. It was based on investing in the health and education system; subsidized prices for necessities; credits and land for the peasants; investments — sometimes not very realistic ones - in order to make the public sector the axis for changing the structure of production; and various stimuli for the private sector, which 16 were decisive for agricultural exports. This whole project depended on access to suffiInternational Viewpoint #161 • April 17, 1989
IN ITS March 10 issue, La
Brèche, the Frenchlanguage journal of the Swiss section of the Fourth
International, published the following analysis by a Nicaraguan sociologist of the role of the mass organizations in defending the interests of wage earners and small farmers. The introductory comment is by its editors. cient foreign aid and on relaunching production that would bring in export income.
A combination of factors explains the collapse of this scheme. There was the war and the blockade, a drastic reduction of grants and loans; payments on the foreign debt (it amounts to $7 billion, and interest on it is now absorbing 70% of export income); deterioration in the terms of trade (the relationship between export and import prices); and the growing imbalance between imports and exports (three to four times more imports than exports, the latter coming mainly from agriculture and without the benefit of any modern sector).
In the private sector, investment was subordinated to the question of who was going to control the state. So, private firms refused to make medium- and long-term investments and contributed to a flight of capital. There were also great difficulties in managing the state sector.
All these problems were aggravated by natural catastrophes, recently Hurricane Joan in October 1988 According to the UN Economic Commission for Latin American, the direct damage caused by this hurricane amounted to $840 million, the equivalent of four years' exports for Nicaragua. For reconstruction, Nicaragua got 95% less aid than Jamaica.
In this context, the internal and external deficits became overwhelming. Financed by printing more money, they led to galloping inflation. The poorest layers were hit the hardest, and the holders of dollars were favored. Considering its handicaps at the start and the effects of a strangulation policy, without a major injection of resources from the outside, it is hard to imagine a country like Nicaragua regaining the levels of production that existed before the 1978 79 civil war, improving the living standards of the masses and beginning to change its economic structures.
"self-centered" development focused on meeting the basic needs of the population could not be accomplished in the present economic context without an injection of resources from the outside. Without that, the limits of the various economic options, which are also obscured by the disappointments of the "planned economies," are very narrow.
But the aid from the "Eastern bloc" countries is getting scarce. The good relations between Gorbachev and the Republican administration in Washington are not unrelated to this "weaning" of the Nicaraguan economy.
### Government adopts drastic austerity measures
Faced with catastrophic inflation and economic crisis, in January the Sandinista government adopted drastic austerity measures. This is a program for "economic survival." It involves accelerated devaluation, ending subsidies on basic foods, cutting back the state apparatus, reducing credits, freezing wages and ending price controls, stopping the agrarian reform, and giving concessions to agricultural exporters in the area of export controls. It is hard to imagine, over and above an overall contraction of demand, that such measures will not result in transfers of income from one social sector to another (from the poor to the rich) and in a polarization of incomes between wage earners in different
After responding victoriously to the challenge of the contras, although at a high price, the revolution now faces the extremely acute challenge of economic survival. At the same time, state intervention has been reduced, and a question mark is hanging over the "common" participation of the private sector and the masses in the "productive effort."
The presidential elections have been moved forward from November to February 1990. A new political confrontation is in the offing between the FSLN and a divided opposition with little capacity for polarizing forces on a political level.
After ten years of a revolutionary process, the role of the people's organizations and their relationship with the institutions of the state are a subject of debate in Nicaraguan society. This debate will increase in contradictions between popular expectations and economic policy are going to sharpen.
The following article by Luis Serra, a sociologist and professor at the Central American University in Managua, analyzes these various problems on the basis of a study done in 1988. It was published in the December 1988 issue of the Nicaraguan magazine Pensamiento Critico. *
NICARAGUA
Young tobaccopickers in
Nicaragua
(DR)
able to the workers and peasants, And there
The problems of maintaining mass participation
HE ABILITY of the people's organizations (POs) to respond to a series of internal factors, such as their participation in elaborating a work plan, the effectiveness of the organization itself, the available resources and the formulation and execution of a coherent strategy.
On the other hand, the participation of these organizations also depends on external factors, such as the relationship of social forces in the country, the capacity of the organizations to influence the decisions of the state and the party (the FSLN), as well as on the economic and political conditions in the country.
Internally, in general the people's organizations have been capable of expressing the demands of the social sectors that they represent. Likewise, they have suggested avenues for solving problems and have participated actively in undertaking certain approaches. Nonetheless, the subordination of the particular demands of their members to the general objectives determined by the party and the government - such as national unity, defense and production — has constantly imposed limitations on their activities.
Such subordination can, of course, be explained from the overall perspective of maintaining the Sandinista revolutionary project in the very difficult situation created by war and economic crisis. But it has not been easily accepted by the members of these organizations, who have suffered severely from these manifold problems. This contradiction has affected the legitimacy of the people's organizations, especially when the tasks imposed on them by governmental objectives have brought them into conflict with the immediate interests of their members.
Conflicts with ranks of people's organizations
An example is the layoffs involved in applying the policy of economic adjustment, which were supported by the Sandinista unions. Another is recruiting for the Patriotic Military Service for the army reserves to meet the attacks of the contras, which was supported by the Sandinista Defense Committees [CDS, the neighborhood organizations]. Still another is the sale of agricultural products at low prices to the governmental distribution agency (ENABAS), which was supported by UNAG [the Sandinista peasants' organization]. There were also the limitations placed on workers' demanding wages sufficient to support their families.
Externally, the demands of the rank and file of these organizations have often received a satisfactory response. After the revolutionary victory of July 1979, the relationship of forces was obviously favorwas a receptivity to their demands both in the state apparatus and in the FSLN.
Nonetheless, the nature of the mixed economy, which accords a considerable weight to the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie, and the reflection of this on the political level — national unity and pluralism - set a very clear limit to the demands of the masses for a more just distribution of income and resources.
On the one hand, the people's organizations defend the revolutionary government against the counter-revolution and the opposition. On the other, they criticize its bureaucratic deformations and fight to get a larger share of state resources relative to the other social sectors. There are many state authorities in which these organizations participate in the working out of policy and projects concerning the sectors that they represent. Nonetheless, such participation is generally only of a consultative nature, and they are in a minority with respect to the government's delegates.
Dependence on governmental institutions
The high degree of dependence of some of the POs' base organizations on governmental institutions has led some analysts to describe them as para-state. One example discussed is the agricultural cooperatives that are regarded by UNAG as one of its constituent parts. But these cooperatives get considerable direct technical assistance controlled by state institutions and the FSLN, especially the so-called priority cooperatives. This obviously limits their autonomy and he character of their mem- 17 bership in UNAG.
Membership of the people's organizations
THE STUDY concerns the Sandinista Workers' Confederation (CST); the
National Union of Farmers and Stock Raisers (UNAG), which has quite a hete-
NICARAGUA
Direct participation by representatives of the POs in the legislative branch, as it existed in the Council of State until 1984, was modified by the system of representation on the basis of party affiliation introduced in the election of the National Assembly.
rogeneous membership of small and middle producers; the Association of
From this change it flows that the particular
Rural Workers (ATC); and the Sandinista Defense Committees (CDS).
interests of social sectors are subordinated
The statutes of the people's organizations provide for voluntary membership to the strength of political parties.
regardless of sex, religion or political ideology, except for those who were
Of course, the FLN made it possible to linked to the Somoza regime. This openness has been reduced in practice by legalize certain features fundamental for an ambiguous interpretation of the last point, and there have been cases in the society through the adoption of legislawhich disagreement with the FSLN has been considered as grounds for tion permitting the existence of parties, municipal governments and legislative it is estimated that between 40% and 50% of the population are formal membodies. Nonetheless, it left aside deeply felt bers of these organizations, varying according to the different social sectors.
sectoral demands, such as the workers'
UNAG claims 125,000 members, out of a total of 280,000 peasants. The CST demand for reforming the labor code or the claims 120,000 members out of a total of 214,000 industrial and agri-industrial demand by the peasant producers for severworkers. The ATC is supposed to have 50,000 members out of a total of 70,000 al penalties against misuse or violation of permanent agricultural workers and 70,000 temporary workers. In practice, the laws.
only about 40% to 50% of the total membership of these organizations, actually
It is estimated that there are 16,000 women in UNAG, out of a total of
Channels for public
125,000. In the rural cooperative sector, in 1986, only 7.3% of the 60,000 cooperative members were women, and very few of those held leadership posts. A discussion study of the existing organizations in three rural regions showed that women
In a parallel way, new mechanisms for represented 37% of the members and only 19% of the leaderships. Their parparticipation by, or communication among, ticipation was concentrated in educational, cultural and religious organizations.
the social sectors and the POs were put in
It is estimated that 30% of the membership of the AT are women and that place. They are an essential instrument for there is a similar percentage of women leaders. At the AT's third national creating direct liaison between the governassembly, important advances were highlighted in the areas of equal wages mental authorities and the popular strata.
and pre- and post-natal benefits, and setting production norms that fix the work-
These attempts at direct communication day at 8-10 hours. The most strongly felt problems were low wages, lack of include various channels, such as direct TV child-care, lack of health and hygiene facilities on the job, as well as a lack of or radio talks with the president of the technical training and sexual education. * republic. Such programs have been called
De Cara al Pueblo [Facing the Public],
Cabildos abiertos [Open Meetings] and
Linea directa.
The assemblies are another form of public discussion establishing an exchange between the authorities and the masses. But they serve more as a means of education and expression than as an instrument for solving collective problems. The essential weakness of these assemblies lies in the fact that there is no follow-up on agreements and promises, and especially in their inability to solve the real causes of the problems brought before them. Moreover, you have to add to this the inefficiency of the intermediate officials, bureaucracy and a very low degree of self-managemer.t, as well as the economic crisis and the war.
The POs recognize the FSLN as a vanguard inasmuch as it has played a decisive role in the fight against the Somoza dictatorship and imperialism. The FLN has had a threefold objective in giving impetus to the POs — to promote mass participation in solving the problems facing each social sector, to develop a training ground for leaders and to mobilize the population in defense of the revolutionary project.
This relationship presents aspects that are more than problematic simply because a large section of the leadership of the POs are full or candidate members of the FLN.
This situation involves twofold responsibilities. They are easily distinguishable in theory, but much less so in practice. An
18 analysis of what most of these leaders say reveals a confusion between the role of par-
International Viewpoint #161 • April 17, 1989 ty members and leaders of social sectors. This affects the development and pluralism of the POs, as well as their ability to attract the non-Sandinista sectors.
Problem of autonomy of mass organizations
The centralism and verticalism [leadership from the top down] recognized by the FSLN are necessarily reflected in the people's organizations, and link indissolubly the problem of participating in both types of body (the FSLN and the POs). Moreover, the party's hierarchy and discipline prevails over the role of the POs. Thus, the specific tasks and orientations of party cadres take precedence over those that they
In many cases, the FSLN committees in the POs take on the role of discussion and decision-making that theoretically belongs to the POs' bodies, and thereby reduce the latter's possibility for development. On the other hand, you frequently see a transfer of FSLN members working in the POs to other tasks, without taking into consideration the opinions of the members of the base organizations and the way that this can
The problem of autonomy for the POs comes up openly when a conflict arises between the specific demands of a social sector and the general orientation of the FSLN, if only because it is not always possible to harmonize a sectoral demand with a national orientation. On several occasions, clashes have occurred between working-class demands for better income or working conditions and the FLN's decisions not to aggravate social, class conflicts and to
In 1988, when the new economic measures gave priority to the profitability of enterprises and left all other freedoms to the law of supply and demand in a context of galloping inflation, the unions had to take a more militant line in order to defend jobs and wage levels.
The CST unsuccessfully proposed automatic cost-of-living increases and wages that would cover 50 per cent of the essential expenses of families (calculated on the base of 27 products), assuming that every family had an average of two wage earners. The ATC distinguished itself by fighting for wages sufficient to meet the basic needs of families for five essential products. To this end, the ATC built mobilizations. On the other hand, the entrepreneurs tried to use the workers' demands to get an increase in the bank credit facilities extended to them. Some FLN leaders openly opposed the ATC. But the struggle has continued, and criticisms of the FLN's positions have grown until it is being accused of "trying to conciliate antagonistic classes."
In this situation, Commandant Luis Carrión, member of the National Leadership of the FSLN and economics minister, declared that a union's role "should not be that of
April 17, 1989 • #161 International Viewpoint defender of immediate demands because they cloud workers' consciousness and separate them from their collective identity."
This leader, thus, considers that the primary task of the unions is to get the workers to understand the reality of their enterprise and to make them conscious of the special way that they can participate in its development "in the great effort to defend the economy."
The situation of prolonged war acquired its own logic, involving a special definition of social relationships and the symbolic world. In this way, in practice it perceptibly modified the democratic and socialist project, quite over and above the political will of the leadership.
The armed forces are growing rapidly in a society that is living through a war situation. This means the organization of a large part of the population is acquiring a "military structure, " which is everywhere characterized by a hierarchical nature.
The repercussions of this can be seen in the POs, inasmuch as the war situation gives priority to military tasks over defending the interests of their members. Organizational methods become impregnated with a military logic. The use of resources for the war means likewise an inability to meet adequately the material needs of the population, most particularly those of the lowestincome sections.
scarcity exertions demanded on the job and leads to an attitude of rejecting the military conflict.
Then, a conflict takes form between the need to get the POs to support the war effort and that of maintaining their nature as voluntary organizations, or still more their role as an instrument for responding to the immediate needs of their members.
The war involves suppressing the normal, peaceful processes of struggle and negotiation between conflicting social groups. Political polarization sharpens to such a point that for sectors involved in conflict, the alternative is simplified to be
"for" or "against." Criticism of a party to the dispute is interpreted as helping to justify the enemy. In a war context, room for alternative political projects narrows.
The secondary social contradictions are relegated to the future, to be confronted when the main contradiction between the
"empire" [the US] and the nation [Nicaragua] is resolved. This can lead to weakening the attractiveness of the national independence project for those social sectors that find no answer to the problems that they consider the most pressing.
In national liberation wars, the need is seen for establishing a broad anti-imperialist front, both for internal reasons (marshalling all forces against the external enemy) and for reasons of international policy (getting solidarity and support). Nonetheless, the deterioration in the economic situation for the worst-off sectors is leading toward challenging this broad unity in the name of a more equitable distribution of the shortage of available goods. It is a very difficult challenge to avoid the objective conflicts between antagonistic classes through a political orientation that puts the priority on broad national unity.
If the pre-1979 system [the Somoza dictatorship] was based on coercion, there was also ruling class hegemony expressed through a fabric of social relations of the "patronage" type or characteristic of a paternalist system of "big landowners."
Such relationships of subordination specific to rural societies were instituted between the dominant and the dominated sectors through a series of norms regarding mutual rights and duties expressed in the exchange of material and symbolic goods.
In these relationships, domination was masked by personal ties patronage, various forms of protection, and so on - that were internalized in the traditional cultural model that prevailed in both the rural and urban sectors.
between landowners and farmers, were the relationships between entrepreneurs and workers, political authorities and citizens, adults and children, men and women, mestizos and Indians, clergy and laity, teachers and pupils.
The basis of these unequal relationships lies in differences in access to power, that is, to economic, political and symbolic resources. The essence of this relationship
NICARAGUA is the subordination of the popular masses to the profit of the ruling class minorities.
A revolution is a prolonged process in which the seizure of the state apparatus by representatives of the popular sectors is an indispensable step, but in and of itself insufficient to transform the structures of the past. Building a new social project has to be done with the existing social groups, which carry with them the old ideology and practices, well above and beyond their immediate consciousness and desires.
The old social relationships contain a deep-seated inertia that tends to lead to their reproducing themselves in new forms as long as their structural foundation is not altered. The paternalist or patronage relationships continue as long as there are different degrees of access to material, educational and political resources.
In the various milieus of political and civil society, varying from case to case, arguments are repeated about the need for such subordination. Some political leaders consider that they alone have "the revolutionary ideology" and ability to lead. Others, bourgeois or petty bourgeois, think that they alone have the ability to manage the enterprises in order to develop the coun try's productive forces. It is, of course, wrong to see the reproduction of these relationships as the conscious and planned work of the ruling groups. Such attitudes of the popular masses as passivity, laziness, "what do I know about it?" and so on, going hand in hand with an underestimation of their own capacities and a fatalistic and magical conception of social reality, are also factors reproducing such relationships of subordination.
In the first decade of the revolution, with ups and down and limitations, the POs provided important channels for democratic expression of the interests of the masses and for solving the most important problems, despite the increasingly acute problems arising in the unfavorable context imposed by the war, the economic crisis and the heritage of the past.
There is no doubt about the great advances the masses have made in participation in political life by comparison with the situa tion that existed in 1979. But it is just as evident that there is still a long way to go in order to establish social relationships at all levels characterized by equal participation of everyone in the decisions that concern 19 them. *
PT administration consolidates its
But for now, it is already evident that there is a need to restructure aspects of certain public services by defining a different approach to the problems (like, for example, adopting a social fare in urban transport).
Finally, it is necessary that the PT administration win real control over the main decision-making and executive centres of the administrative machine, and begin to define a new system of administrative functioning. Caution was the only attitude we could take, above all given the PT's inex-