Interview with Guillermo Ungo, CD
An ambiguous succeeded more modestly, with major inadequacies because of the context of repression and fear. We succeeded in overcoming the fear, but not completely. Perhaps our major failure was in realizing our organizational potential nationally. But we managed to gain a capacity for mobilization that, while still insufficient, was considerable in places where the people had not been mobilized, and we were able to take our own national initiatives.
We were able to develop our common positions with the FMLN. For better or
THE ELECTIONS in El Salvador on March 19 had a special importance for two reasons. They marked the end of the reform experiment presided over by the Christian
Democrats. The ultra-right regained total control of the government. Secondly, they were the focus of a new political/tactical line of the radical mass movement led by the FMLN/FDR [Farabundo Marti National Liberation
Front/Revolutionary Democratic Front], and some differences appeared between these two allied organizations.
In the following interview, abridged from the April issue of Alai, published in Ecuador, Guillermo Ungo, former presidential candidate of Convergencia Democrática
(CD) and chair of the FDR, gives his assessment of the election results and the differences between the FDR and the FMN. The CD is a legal party organization supported by the FDR and the FMLN.
W
HAT IS YOUR assessment of the electoral process?
It was ambiguous. For a decade, elections have been a major political component insurgency strategy. They helped to institutionalize the counter-insurgency system, but they have also lost some of their effec-
The elections in 1988 and this year had a negative effect, in the sense that the US government was the biggest loser.
In a way, the victories for ARENA
[National Republic Alliance, an extremeright party] were stumbling blocks to the
• How do you interpret the election results and especially those for
Convergencia Democrática?
There was no big surprise in the results.
Everyone recognized that ARENA was the leading political force, and that it had a considerable lead over the Christian Democrats. The surprise was that it won in the first round. But this was expected more and more as the date of the elections approached, with the problem of the transport boycott. Three or four days before the election, there was almost a consensus -
ARENA could win finally with a vote of less than a million.
As regards Convergencia, we had a
22 i number of modest but important objec-
International Viewpoint #164 • May 29, 1989 tives. The election result and the date of the vote were not the essential thing. The bulk of our objectives were in the election campaign itself. In the first place, our aim was to build a base as a people's and peace alternative at the national level. Secondly, we wanted to play an educational role. We think we achieved that, even though there were still weaknesses. We wanted to establish ourselves as an important force nationally. We think we achieved that in political terms.
the political agenda from that of the previous elections. We also sought to create the conditions for a political solution. We think that we achieved that. Even without the FMLN's proposal [see following article], we had managed to get various formations to take up the theme of peace and a political solution. The FMLN's proposal meant that we had elections with dialogue, discussion, negotiation, elections that began to be posed in terms of a political solution and not as a counter-insurgency schema.
We think we contributed to this, because the FMLN's proposal itself would not have had any meaning without Convergencia, because it is an electoral proposal that involves Convergencia. And the precondition for this was CD's existing presence and national potential.
We also sought to organize ourselves and mobilize the country better. There, we worse, we continue to be identified with the FMLN. But we asserted our own identity, thanks to a process of differentiation among certain sectors of our own supporters. All this was insufficient, but it had not been possible for many years.
Finally, we did not get the number of votes we hoped for. In this antidemocratic, repressive situation marked by fear, our influence cannot be measured by votes, nor even perhaps by mobilization. We won thousands of votes, and thousands of others were stolen from us.
But even so the percentage remains low. According to our calculations we got 6% to 7%, and not 3.8% [given as the official figure]. • Do you think that CD was affected by the military actions that the FMLN carried out during the electoral period?
Obviously it was, when you consider the transport strikes, the boycott, the stepping up of military activity aimed at getting a big percentage of abstentions. The FMLN succeeded in that. It managed to show that it is a national political force, both military and political, but more a military force than anything.
We think that this was a tactical mistake. We also disagree with them over the way that they recognized the importance of the elections and that there would be a high level of participation, while saying that people should not vote. This helped to achieve some correct objectives, but also objectives that were not ours, such as the strong victory for ARENA
We think that the FMLN acted in a negative way and caused us to lose votes. • To what extent has this affected the relations between the FMLN and the FDR?
In the first place, we accepted the elections on the basis of an assessment different from the FMLN's. There are differences here. In the second place, even if votes don't mean a lot to us, they still count more for us than for the FMLN. That is another difference. This was also a conjunctural situation, and conjunctures count less for the FMLN than for us. That is also a difference. Getting a cease-fire declared was more important for us than for the FMLN.
These are differences, but they are conjunctural and temporary. Basically, we
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EL SALVADOR election
have to look at something else - how far our convergences and our differences go. I don't think that we can yet define them clearly. • What are Convergencia's perspectives. Is it possible, for example, to envisage new alliances?
I think that there are possibilities for creating a whole national consensus. To be sure, I am not optimistic about certain kinds of alliances. But in a tactical and temporary form they should not be exclud-
We are in a sense like an iceberg. We thought that a larger part of the iceberg would emerge, and that did not happen. But you have to take into account what is under the water. All you need to do is create the conditions for it to emerge.
In this sense, Convergencia is trying to transform itself — alone if necessary, but with other forces if possible — into a popular alternative with which many sectors would converge. *