SOUTH AFRICA
N EW POLITICAL and strategic
challenges have appeared, and the mass movement has found itself without a political perspective. Major bourgeois liberal sectors have shown that their search for a soft way out of apartheid fitted in quite well with the new, more repressive labor laws that the government adopted at the start of 1989. The perspective of a large-scale crisis of the system, helped along by a rise of the liberal opposition and stronger international pressures, has gradually faded.
To the contrary, despite the international crisis rocking the National Party over who is to succeed the president, Pieter Botha's government regained the political initiative and repressed the mass movement, while at the same time proposing structural reforms. The uneasy liberal voters looking for a moderate solution increasingly cast their ballots for Botha's party, while a section of Afrikaner voters slid towards the extreme right.
The mass movement did not approach this situation in the best of shape. Notably, it failed to achieve unity in the stormy years from 1984 to 1986. The trade-union movement, represented mainly by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), showed a certain capacity to centralize struggles and resist the repression. But the community movement, represented mainly by the United Democratic Front (UDF), experienced growing difficulties.
The UDF's weakening is undoubtedly a result of the repression. The regime went after the UDF in the conviction that it was the ANC's main instrument in the country. But other elements also contributed to this movement's difficulties. First of all, the UDF proved to be a vague project, combining the features of a rank-and-file mass movement with a tendency for the leading personalities to become independent.
### Making the country
"ungovernable"
Over the entire period of 1985-86, there was a very strong radicalization in the townships, especially among the youth. This movement took its inspiration largely from the ANC's slogans, and gradually became imbued with the idea of a victory in the short-term. The central slogan was to make the country "ungovernable." But very quickly some claimed that this was already the case, and the ANC's propaganda then focused on the emergence of "dual power."
The first signs of uneasiness appeared when a way had to be found to end the schools boycott. In the ranks of the UDF itself, and certainly among the parents, the need began to be felt to bring to a close a movement whose objectives seemed unobtainable. Then, it became clear little by 14 little that despite the fantastic breadth of • the popular mobilizations, the real relationInternational Viewpoint #164 • May 29, 1989 ship of forces did not make it possible to pose the question of power. The means available at the time were insufficient to resolve the new strategic problems posed — workers' control in the factories, the question of revolutionary mass violence, the monolithism of the repressive apparatus and so on.
With hindsight, it is easier to understand what the ANC's strategy was. The Congress had a combined project — to push the mass movement as far as possible and link it up with a growing pressure from the liberal opposition. It was expected that the result of this would be a crisis of the regime, which would facilitate a reorganization of the entire system, with the help of various sorts of foreign intervention. So, the leading lights of the UDF were used mainly to build a bridge to liberal and Western circles. This strategy did not work, inasmuch as the center of white liberalism in South Africa is not made up of petty-bourgeois democrats but of real capitalists. Moreover, the mass movement appeared so powerful that these circles feared an uncontrollable social dynamic.
Question of unity and tactical alliances
The second problem that arose was unity. Two questions were posed simultaneously in the country. The first was unity of the working class and the disinherited masses. The second was tactical alliances with Black or white bourgeois and petty-bourgeois sectors. But the policy followed by the UDF, and therefore by the ANC, was not that. In reality, the Freedom Charter [ANC's political program] was used as a rallying symbol by the ANC for a very specific sort of "unity" policy. It's purpose was not to assemble the bulk of the working class and, alongside this, to pose the question of alliances with other social sectors. It was rather to cut off a section of the proletariat vertically in order to include it in a broader Chartist front.
Such a tactic did not contribute to unity of the trade-union movement. To the contrary, as more sections of the workers' movement formally adopted the Charter, the more it became divided. The ANC's objective was mainly to hitch the union movement to its strategy. So the debate over the content of the Charter itself could not be conducted calmly. For the ANC, the important question was rallying forces around this reference point. The symbolic function of the document took precedence over its precise content. On the other hand, other sections of the trade-union movement wanted to discuss the bases of this program, which was drawn up more than 30 years before the emergence of the present South African workers' movement.
In 1985, when COSATU was founded, a section of the trade-union movement coming from the Black Consciousness current remained outside the unification process,
Apartheid,
and the ma
THE OUTLINES of a new p gradually taken form over re turn had been foreshadowe movement had not been ab and was unable to po This slow evolution was mar the failure of the miners' str not mean that the average k
The three national days of involving 3 million strikers, militanc
Even if a number of townst prevented from function disappeared, the trade-unio better against the state o els PETER BLUN and later formed the National Congress of Trade Unions (NACTU). At the time, COSATU was the product of a very unusual de facto united front between the Chartist current and the trade-union left coming out of the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) in particular.
The trade-union left justified this unity for a number of reasons. The first was a recognition of the strength and impact of the ANC in the Black townships, where the union left itself had little or no organization. The second was the prognosis that in time the other political and trade-union currents besides the Chartists and the union left were going to gradually disappear. It was therefore necessary to focus on practical, immediate unity with the only "real" force?
For the ANC current, this unity represented an important change in direction. After several years of denouncing the trade-union left, it decided for uneasy coexistence with it inside COSATU. This special "united
erestroika
movement
al and social situation have months in South Africa. This ra long time, since the mass breach the repressive force he question of power. by several events, notably by n August 1987. But this does of consciousness has fallen. on on June 6, 7 and 8, 1987, wed the immense reserve of at exists. ivic associations have been by the repression or have ovement overall has held up ergency. The problem lies ere. & TONY ROUX front" subsequently led to the trade-union left adopting the Freedom Charter for tactical purposes, as a program of basic demands, and accepting a UDPCOSATU axis for the big mass campaigns. What happened next, however, was unforeseen. First of all, there were quite sharp conflicts among the allies, especially over questions involving internal democracy. Secondly, the trade-union left, focusing on its relations with the Chartist current, made no attempt to discuss with, or offer proposals to, all the other forces, notably the small organizations of the political left and the minority trade-union currents grouped in NACTU. At the end of the day, the "united front" achieved in the top echelons of COSATU appeared outside the confederation to be sectarian 3 In this way, a space was left for all those who did not accept the rules of this game. Thus, NACTU grew in some industries and, far from disappearing, the political left continued to exist and to intervene. The UDF-COSATU axis did not manage to unite the entire mass movement under its banner. And, above all, it did not succeed in bringing together the whole of the van-
But this political choice by the trade-union left was made in the name of a non-sectarian project. In any case, it had to address itself to the major sector of the liberation movement and find a modus vivendi with the ANC. But from this priority, it sometimes derived a rather one-sided view of the tasks of the moment.
International context has changed
In particular, if such unity was possible*, it was because of a specific situation - not only because of the breadth and militancy of the mass movement, but also the trade-union left's lack of a base in the townships at a time when the Chartist current was still weak in the big battalions of the trade-union movement. This period was marked by a rise of class conflicts. The stakes were considerable and forced the two major components of the mass movement to adopt a certain realpolitik.
Today, however, it is clear that this whole state of affairs has gone seriously out of kilter. Not only has there been an ebb in the mass movement and a deterioration of the relationship of forces, but the international context has also changed. Perestroika, the pressures for negotiation and the debates inside the ANC itself are going to substantially change the conditions that governed this special sort of "united front." In this less favorable context, when the trade-union movement is standing out as the hard core of Black resistance, the pressure from the union ranks is for greater working-class unity. The ANC and the South African CP themselves say that the Freedom Charter is no longer a decisive criterion for trade-union unity. In their recent writings, they have opened up to the perspective of discussions with NACTU.
A "workers' summit" proposed by a section of COSATU a few months ago was held in March this year. Originally called to draw up a trade-union strategy against the new labor legislation and begin building a foundation for unity between COSATU and NACTU, the "summit" brought together 700 workers' delegates representing 40 unions with a total of more than a million members.
The meeting was conceived as a conference of rank-and-file leaders, without officials. It testified to a profound desire for working-class unity, but also for unity of the workers' vanguard, and it initiated a discussion on the question of a political program for the working class. But it was not all clear sailing, either in the preparation of the "summit" or in the meeting itself. The stakes were considerable and represented a test for all the currents working in the trade-union movement.
While the NACTU leadership was very
SOUTH AFRICA much on the offensive early on in the preparations for the meeting, it later committed a series of errors that illustrated the problems it has in handling all the complexities of a united-front policy. Ultimately, NACTU as such did not participate in the summit," although eleven of its most representative industrial unions did.
Despite these vicissitudes, the "summit" was a positive test. A plan of action against the legal rules restricting the right to strike was adopted, with a possibility for a broad national action in the second half of the year. But the "summit" also revealed a considerable lag in the process of unifying the workers. The intervening period of a special "united front" at the top of COSATU has deepened resentments and distrust. Far from clarifying the political lay of the land, it has made it more confused.
As for the ANC, the strategic problems mentioned above have now led to a public debate. Over and above the obvious question of perestroika, undoing the falsifications of history and the growing pressure from Moscow for a negotiated compromise, the Congress is today in the throes of a public debate over an assessment of the "armed struggle" and even over its strategic objectives. Carried along by the momentum of the illusions created in 1985 and 1986, some cadres of the movement seem to be making a theory out of a more or less "insurrectionist" orientation and criticizing the armed struggle for having been no more than armed propaganda.
Overemphasis of the military factor
One prominent person supporting this position is none other than Ronnie Kasrils (often designated by the initials MK), a leader of Umkhonto we Sizwe, the armed wing of the ANC, and a member of the
ANC leadership. In an article in the ANC journal Sechaba, Kasrils stresses the need for really making the seizure of power the objective of the armed struggle, and for reinforcing the movement's underground work in order to form a "revolutionary army." On the other hand, some participants in the debate reproach him - not without some justification, it seems - for neglecting the concrete forms of expression of the mass movement and overemphasizing the military factor.
However, the counter positions go to the opposite extreme, strongly playing up the
1. The popular slogan among the high school students was "no education before liberation.
2. These debates led, however, to a split in one of
COSATU's biggest unions, the retail workers' organization CCAWUSA (see IV 141, May 16, 1988).
3. There is always the problem of who does and who does not get invitations to participate in "unity" initiatives. The most recent one was the anti-apartheid conference scheduled for October 1988, finally banned by the govemment.
4. The AN and the Communist Party continued to denounce all the "workerists" who they claimed had a perspective of an immediate socialist revolution. 15
5. Sixteen independent unions were also there. May 29, 1989 • #164 International Viewpoint
SOUTH AFRICA possibility or the need for reaching a compromise on "post-apartheid" institutions in view of the present impasse and the deterioration in the relationship of forces. The article that goes furthest in this direction is the one published in the January 1989 issue of Sechaba under the pseudonym "Theresa." Here, for the first time, the question is taken up of what such a compromise might involve. The author explains that it may be necessary to accept an intermediate stage of continuing the struggle peacefully. Negotiations are presented as a way of broadening out the democratic possibilities.
Complex nature of the national question
The article concludes as follows: "A decentralized approach would also...reflect more adequately the complex nature of the national question in South Africa. Such a conception propagated by the national liberation movement headed by the ANC, would serve to isolate the most reactionary sections among the White population, as well as the most corrupt elements in the Black communities. A compromise along these lines would represent a kind of transitional phase in the framework of the national liberation struggle. It would lay a favourable basis for further progress along peaceful lines. " 6
For his part, Joe Slovo, general secretary of the Communist Party, has produced a long article on the South African revolution that has been widely translated and distributed around the world. In this document, he openly criticizes the positions taken in 1986 by some Africa specialists at the Soviet Academy of Sciences that oriented toward a compromise acceptable to the white regime. Notably, they envisaged the possibility of offering the whites guarantees of a role in the government and a right of veto on the basis of race.
Joe Slovo, on the other hand, put forward an orientation halfway between the classical schema of revolution in stages and proletarian revolution. This gave the appearance of a renewal of the CP's traditional theses without putting into question its choice of alliances and immediate strat-
So it seems that several cross debates are going on at the moment within the ANCCP current. Undoubtedly the Soviet position poses a problem and is disorienting some of the cadres.
All these discussions are going on against the background of the Soviet regime's evolution. The era of perestroika has altered the USSR's orientation in the region in two areas - its relations with its friends in the "progressive" African camp (Ethiopia, Angola and so on) and its attitude toward Pretoria. Seeing some of its African allies mired in costly wars, the 16 to these conficts in order to reduce its own USSR is looking for a negotiated solution International Viewpoint #164 • May 29, 1989 burdens. It is also doing this partly in the name of new international relations with the United States and the Western world.
In the medium-term, the USSR is trying to modify its relations with South Africa. Already high-level secret contacts have been made between representatives of both countries, although diplomatic relations have been broken off since 1956. The tripartite agreement on Namibia has to be seen as a testing ground for Gorbachevite diplomacy in the region, a first stage in settling the South Africa conflict itself.?
It is not sufficiently stressed in general that peace in Namibia and the perspective of independence for this territory (legitimate but difficult objectives) have been placed in a regional and international context unfavorable to the South African Blacks. The first indication of this was the obligation on the ANC to remove its military bases from Angola. But, over a longer term, the accord reflects the beginning of a big "deal" for all of southern Africa, in which the South African Black movement can quickly become the loser.
There is no doubt that the Soviets are now putting considerable pressure on the ANC and on its internal discussions. But pressure is also coming from all the social-democratic and religious components of
Pretoria is obviously taking full advantage of this new cutting of the cards. "International detente" is much talked about when it comes to putting the heat on the ANC, to calling for it to end the "armed struggle." The episode of the "Mandela Football Club," set up by Winnie Mandela (see IV 159), was an opportunity for the government to play up what it portrays as a contrast between the violence of ANC "terrorists" and the new international climate. The press itself recognizes the new terms of the problem. For example, The Argus, a Johannesburg daily, ran the following headline on February 8, 1989: "SA's relations with Soviets begin to thaw."
Moscow does not have a free hand
Moscow, however, does not have a free hand. The Soviet policy has its own objective. But it also needs the means for putting pressure on the imperialists. Gorbachev will get nothing in southern Africa if the ANC abruptly splits and becomes marginalized. Thus, in Les Nouvelles de Moscow of April 16, 1989, a page was devoted to the question of diplomatic relations with Pretoria. There you can find, among other things, the following paradox:
"The South African political experts who are discussing the prospects for establishing diplomatic relations between the USSR and the Republic of South Africa before considerable changes have occurred in that country fail to see that this would distinctly compromise our country in the eyes of the majority of their Black compatriots." It went on to declare that such relations "could be considered a move leading toward a recognition of the apartheid system, as a betrayal." Moscow is walking on
In March, ANC leader Oliver Tambo visited Moscow. When he mentioned the need for stepping up the armed struggle, he was directly contradicted by Yuri Yukalov, head of the South African department of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "We would prefer a political settlement and want apartheid to be dealt with by political
Any solution through military means will be short-lived. We do not want to emphasize the need to enlarge the armed struggle. South Africa should not be
In this context, the South African regime has been able for some time to couple a change in the forms of repression with reform initiatives. In particular, the amendments to the Labour Law restricting the right to strike are a serious obstacle to the activity of the union leaders. They are combined with a vast economic plan of privatization and of eliminating apartheid's formal rules that has charmed liberal busi-
Divisions in regime over extent of reforms
The present crisis of the regime, prompted by President P.W. Botha's illness and the opening of the race to succeed him, reflects a debate over the scope and the speed of the reforms. It is symptomatic that in the internal elections for the chair of the National Party, from which Pieter Botha resigned, the camp of the military "securocrats" was, to all intents and purposes, out of the picture.
The new National Party leader, Frederick Willem De Klerk, got himself elected by adopting the image of a man of the "cenand then by opting to satisfy the expectations of the most pro-reform wing of the party. A representative of that wing, Finance Minister Barend Du Plessis, came second in the vote. Over and above the question of personalities, the conflict between F.W. De Klerk and President Botha testifies to the sharpness of the debates over the extent of the proposed
Weakened by illness, Botha can no longer hope to direct South African policy. After being forced to give up the leadership 6. A meeting was held, for example, in Bermuda. Another meeting was held in London between the Soviets and South Africans, presided over by John KilLick, former British representative in Moscow. The Soviet deputy minister of foreign affairs, Anatoli Adamishin, went secretly to South Africa at the end of March. 7. It was interesting that on the way back from his trip to Cuba, Gorbachev stopped off to meet Thatcher. She is now playing a key role in the negotiations conceming southem Africa. This has led to her to make a trip to Namibia and to "abstain" from going to South Africa!
of the National Party, he is going to have to yield the presidency in the next elections, which are expected in September. De Klerk's line will undoubtedly be to continue, or even speed up, the reform program and in particular to exploit the new international conditions that now affect the South African
Has the country changed? It is unquestionable that the pressure of the South African capitalists has brought about substantial changes. An elimination of formal segregation rules is now well underway, but at every step this process produces new contradictions and risks for the ruling class: What to do with Bantustans? How to resolve the problem of the education system? How to liberalize the housing segregation rules? and so on. A correspondent for the London Guardian recognized the problem in his own way:
"South Africa has had a kind of revolution. Historians may well record that the black uprising of 1984-86 finally destroyed all the white community's options except the one of reform. One by one South Africa's problems are being deracialized. Increasingly, the nature of the problem is being changed from race to class. This of course does not make the problems any more tractable. But at least the problem will have been modernized." 8
Despite this journalist's optimism, South Africa remains a country of racial segregation. A study by the Johannesburg Star published on February 13 showed that in a certain number of Transvaal municipalities run by the National Party, desegregation of public places was hardly more advanced than in those controlled by the extreme rightist Conservative Party. Racial segregation and class exploitation tend to overlap.
Reforms sabotaged by extreme right
For a Black family, living in a slum may no longer be the result of an explicitly racist law, but they will still live there because they are Black. The reformers, moreover, are not yet in the clear. No sooner did they try to legalize "grey zones," multi-racial residential areas, than the extreme right groups went on the rampage and mounted a campaign of intimidation to force non-white families to move out. This happened notably in Mayfair, a Johannesburg neighborhood where Indian families live.
The political limits of the government's project were explained quite clearly in the January 30 Newsweek by the minister of foreign affairs, Pik Botha. With regard to the US administration, he said: "They have been pressuring us all along. It doesn't matter what goes wrong here, your ambassador is at my door and your Congress is up in arms. If I should have done all the things in the space of time demanded of me, this government would not be in power, it would be [Conservative Party leader Andries] Treurnicht." In order to carry out reforms, you have to maintain power, and apparently the government itself has no hope of converting a section of its voters.
In the meantime, the whole parliamentary game is being used to advance the reform. The system of housing segregation - even recently portrayed by Botha as one of the untouchable pillars of "separate development" — has now been partially called into question for certain urban zones. In order to make this change the government will have to revise the definition of racial groups. This will no longer be a rule applied to everyone on the basis of the color of their skin but, in the government's words, an individual choice: "Groups must be formed Thereafter it is indeed the state's responsibility to protect groups." 9
In order words, those who would like to live alongside whites will have to define themselves as such and demand assignment to a residential area on that basis. This new, totally scandalous notion for a society where it is the whites who oppress the others shows quite well how the regime is trying to get around the more racist elements in the name of "freedom of choice." On this question, it is worth quoting De Klerk himself at some length:
"I want to state unequivocally that the National Party is against domination of any one group by another. White domination, in so far as it still exists, must go.... In the same breath, the National Party rejects domination in any other form. Domination by a majority is as unacceptable as domination by a minority....The NP is not ideologically obsessed with the group concept as has been suggested by many critics. Our strong emphasis on group rights, alongside individual rights, is based on the reality of South Africa and not on ideological obsession or racial prejudice.... However, my party strives for a non-racialistic country, a country free of racialism, racial hatred and negative discrimination on the basis of тace." 10
The Guardian journalist quoted previously was wrong to attribute all the trans-
SOUTH AFRICA formations underway to the social mobilizations of recent years. The pressure of the mass movement was essential, if only to convince sections of the bourgeoisie that without reforms the country would head for revolution. But it should be clearly understood how completely obsolete the apartheid system now is for the new profit needs of capital in this country. That is why the social evolution is not so simple or one-sided as the press suggests.
It is true that a layer of black yuppies is now appearing, a sort of new layer of white-collar workers and a symbol of the definitive desegregation of some service jobs. But at the other end of the line, poverty is growing among the proletarian and semiproletarian masses, who are Black!
A crucial time for the political movement
All this is not coming to pass without posing new problems for the political and trade-union forces. Some sections of workers have had wage increases in recent years that put them well ahead of others. On average, the independent unions negotiated raises in the order of 20% during the first half of 1988. This is higher than increases in 1987, and in particular above the official inflation rate of 13%. The stronger and better organized the unions are, the more they will be called on to offer services to their members.
The question of "cooperatives" is raising new problems. In particular, in some enterprises, the bosses' offer of incentives to the workers or to give them stocks in the company is involving the union leaderships in new contradictions."
The extent to which four years of intense struggles have changed the socio-political, national and international conditions affecting South Africa is evident. It is also useful to point out that there is no indication of the country getting out of its economic difficulties. The gold market remains marked by a tendency to overproduction, and the competitors of the South African mines are becoming more aggressive. Gold does not seem to be able to break out of its swing between $360 and $450 an ounce, and all the South African companies have just announced sharp drops in their quarterly profits.
The political movement is therefore going through a crucial time. Everyone is turnirg to the recent past and trying to assess these experiences in order to understand what was lacking. This is a time of readjustments and recomposition. It is another watershed. *
8. Stanley Uys in The Guardian Weekly, March 26,
1989.
9. Chris Heunis, minister of constitutional development and planning. The Natal Mercury, February 10, 1989.
10. Cape Times, February 9, 1989. 17
11. Employee Share Ownership Plans (ESOPs). May 29, 1989 • #164 International Viewpoint