600,000 workers, who had shown their tenacity, ingenuity and combativity in the preceding weeks, fighting to recover wage levels that have halved in 10 years. Nevertheless, it is the first workers' victory after nine years of silence following the 1980
TURKEY istered electors has grown by 1,750,000 since 1987 [at 21, all Turkish citizens are automatically counted as qualified voters], the number of votes cast went down by 1,850,000. It could be claimed that the vast majority of these apolitical abstencoup d'etat.
The repression of the May 1 demonstration, which left one person dead in Istanbul, proved that the Özal governmentextremely weakened by the economic crisis and its defeat in the March 26 municipal elections - was losing control of the situation.
An early general election has now become inevitable, and with it the probable fall of the present government, which will sound the death knell of the edifice built by the generals.
FUAT ORÇUN
ACING the erosion of its popu-
F larity, Turgut Ozal's Motherland
Party (ANAP) has already called one snap election, in October
1987, in order to forestall the worst. It was the second time in the history of the republic that the government had resorted to an early election. In spite of substantial losses, the regime nevertheless succeeded in getting two-thirds of the seats in parliament with only 36% of the vote (see IV 133, January 25, 1988).
Bolstered by this relative victory, and again for the same reasons, the ANAP held a referendum in September 1988 to bring forward the date of the municipal elections scheduled for March 1989 by four months (see IV 153, December 12,
1988). After being repudiated by a 65%
"No" vote, Ozal had to resign himself to holding the municipal elections on the date initially planned.
Of course, everyone expected a setback for ANAP. But, unlike what has happened in other countries during a transition from a military dictatorship to a parliamentary regime, Turkey had never seen a real radicalization or large-scale reactions either to human rights violations or to the nine years of austerity policies. So this year's
March 26 municipal elections were a veri-
20 table earthquake (even if its scale is dis-
International Viewpoint #166 • June 26, 1989 puted) by comparison with the extremely slow evolution of the political situation since the 1980 coup. With only 21.75% of the vote, the ANAP has become the third party, far behind the Social Democratic People's Party (SHP), with 28%; and the Party of the Just Road (DYP), with 26%.
So, barely one-and-a-half years after the 1987 general election, a new early election seems to have become inevitable, this time under pressure from the electorate. The political scene reflects a real crisis of representativeness. In spite of an electoral system that favours the big parties, none of those in the running seems to be capable of forming a majority by itself. ANAP loses 4 million votes in local elections
The striking thing about the municipal elections was ANAP's decline: the party has lost four million votes (or half of its electorate) since the 1987 election. This has pushed some people to wonder if ANAP is just a conjunctural party condemned to disappear, or if it really has a historic place on the political scene.
ANAP's loss of votes can be explained technically in the following way: On the one hand, voting was not compulsory, as it was in 1987. Even if the number of regtionists had voted for the governmental party in 1987. On the other hand - and most importantly — the right wing parties that had been banned by the military after the 1980 coup d'état have resumed their place in the political arena, and have begun to win back their electorate from ANAP, which had profited from the political vacuum.
Islamic Party makes most electoral progress
The comparison of the results of the municipal elections in March with those of the legislative elections in 1977 (the last general elections before the coup) is very instructive. The SHP and the DYPI have won back nearly two-thirds of their electorate in the cities and in the countryside. But it is Erbakan's Islamic Party (RP), with 9.8%, that has made the most progress, even beating the Islamic score in 1977.2 This result is close to the 10% needed nationally to get deputies elected Consequently, at future elections, this party will be no longer handicapped by the "tactical voting" that has worked to the advantage of ANAP or the DYP. The Islamic Party exists mainly in some regions of Kurdistan (areas traditionally under Islamic influence), but it has also grown fairly rapidly in some big urban centres.
As for Colonel Türkes' fascist Nationalist Workers' Party (MCP), it "only" won 4.2% of the vote, and is still a long way from matching the score of 6.4% achieved by its predecessor, the Nationalist Action Party (MHP, the famous "Grey Wolves"). 1. The SHP is the heir of the People's Republic Party (CHP) of former premier Bulent Ecevit. The CHP got almost 41% of the vote in 1977. The DYP is the heir of the Justice Party (AP) of former premier Suleyman Demirel. The AP got 36.9% in 1977. The CHP and the AP were banned by the military in 1981. 2. The RP is the successor of Erbakan's National Salvation Party (MSP), which won 8.6% in 1977.
(Research by Dr. Süleyman Özmucar, Cumhiriyet, April 14, 1989.)
The fascists are strongest in those areas where there are sharp confrontations of an ethnic/religious, Turk/Kurdish or Shi'ite/ Sunni Muslim character.
And finally, the Party of the Democratic Left (DSP), led by former prime minister Bulent Ecevit, won 9% of the vote and thus also came close to the 10% barrier. The DSP made progress in some regions (notably some working-class towns) where Ecevit's charisma still has a hold, but it lost ground in the rest of the country. This party's future depends on developments in the electoral system, because it is banking on a lowering of the 10% barrier and on forming a "left" coalition with the SHP. Possibility of future coalition government
So the electoral balance of forces is more or less the same as in 1977, which demonstrates that the pre-coup electoral scene was not accidental but had a real political and social basis that remains val-
The election results have therefore destroyed the political edifice built out of the coup d'état...but have put nothing in its place. It is probable that early elections will only exacerbate this confused situation. A coalition seems to be on the cards. Demirel is in the best position in parliament, with the possibility of going in either with the ANAP, or with the Islamists and fascists (as he did before in
As for the possibility of a coalition between the SHP and the DYP, even if this is the best solution on paper from the bourgeoisie's point of view, there is little chance of it happening. Even further electoral losses by the ANAP will not profit the SHP, but will help the DYP, which could easily narrow the gap of 3% that separates the two parties. The fact that the left is in the lead, as a result of the division on the right, is only accidental. In particular, the DYP is playing a much more active role on the ground as an opposition party than the SHP.
The fact is that some political parties, whose histories are tied up with that of the republic, have managed to keep going despite a military coup every 10 years since the second world war aimed at neutralizing or dissolving them. It is therefore clear that there is no question of reorganizing society without having first succeeded in superceding these parties.
The political current embodied today by the DYP, which has been banned many times, has successfully restructured itself under different names and maintained its own tradition. The Islamic current has also successfully reappeared in a stronger form, in spite of — or even perhaps thanks to - a series of restrictions (written into the penal code and the constitution) aimed at wiping it from the political scene. In a country that is not as Western as all that, an openly fascist organization has managed to hang onto most of its positions in spite of heavy military repres-
The SHP, a party belonging to the Socialist International but dominated more by "nationalist/populist" features than by social-democratic ones, has not managed to become anything other than a state party (moreover, it was the SHP's predecessor, the CHP, that was the founder of the present Turkish state).
The political structure imposed by the military coup d'état has been piece by piece dismantled through the ballot box. In addition, both at the time of the coup and during the transition to a civilian regime, no mass political action took place. Given all these factors, it has to be admitted that Turkey has a very wellestablished and particular political tradi-
Tendency for original political patterns to reemerge
Since 1977, the political situation has developed without explosions or major upheavals, and in the framework of the electoral process. Even if the coup d'état jumbled the points of reference for some time because of the banning of the traditional parties, the general tendency is towards a re-emergence of the original
Until recently, the effects of austerity policies on workers' buying power had been studied by comparing new figures
TURKEY with those of January 1980. The austerity programme was begun in 1980 and already directed by Turgut Özal, who at that time was an "expert" in Demirel's cabinet. But the fall of workers' real income has been so rapid that even a comparison of the figures for recent years is revealing (see table).
Fall in real wages despite industrial growth
It should be added that industrial production has risen somewhat in recent years (2.1% in 1988). Turkey is one of the rare countries to have had a fall in real wages in the midst of a period of growth production. However, it would be wrong to assume a real process of industrialization in the 1980s. It was primarily sectors of food production, alcohol, tobacco and textiles that increased their contributions to total production. Furthermore, even though agriculture's share of the Gross National Product (GNP) decreased, the number of workers stable. Consequently, all that can be said is that during the past few years, there have been some investments in the infrastructure. In addition, even the most optimistic bosses consider the 1980s to have been a "preparatory" period for a real industrialization effort.
Until the recent elections, the government were demanding that industrialists decrease production. Since March, they have asked them to get ready to increase their productive capacity. But the industrialists do not seem to have taken seriously this appeal, whose aim was to revive the internal market. This was on the one hand because of the government's weak position, and on the other because until now industry has been neglected in favour of financial and commercial sectors. In addition, the government proposed no con-
On top of this, the external debt of Turkey - which is one of the countries that pay up to the last penny - amounts to $37.6 billion (62.4% of GNP). For 1989, interest on the debt is over $7 billion. In other words, it will be increasingly difficult (and politically costly) to find new sources of finance. The higher interest rates on the debt will lead to a relative
Change in distribution of GNP
(% of GNP)
Agriculture
Year
1981
23.07
1982
21.87
1983
20.52
1984
20.44
1985
19.08
1986
18.09
1987
17.06
1988
14.00
Wages
Profits, Interest
& income
24.57
52.36
24.62
53.55
24.78
54.69
21.57
57.99
18.84
62.08
17.70
64.20
17.00
65.04
15.80
70.20 decrease in investments. Inflation has reached 80% (by official figures), and it will not come down in spite of the pleadings of the prime minister. In this situation, the expected progress in the rate of growth of the GNP (3.6% in 1988) will not happen. The country is not in a position to pursue an expansionist economic policy, and all the indicators show that the economic situation is in its most critical state since the coup d'état.
3. Ecevit, the CHP's charismatic leader, broke with the party's cadres (which regrouped in Inönt"s SHIP after 22 1 the coup d'état, and founded a rival party, the DSP.
TURKEY
During the military regime, workers did not have the channels necessary for expressing their discontent: the coup d'état had destroyed accumulated union strength.4 On the eve of the 1983 legislative elections that brought Ozal to power, the legal restrictions contained in the new constitution and trade-union laws prevented workers from being able to conduct meaningful negotiations.
The attitude of the main trade-union federation, Türk-Is, was an important factor. Spared by the military, it took a conciliatory position vis-à-vis the junta (its general secretary was even a minister in the military government), and it has always made backroom deals with successive governments. The right dominated the union movement, with the exception of a social-democratic minority inside Turk-Is and some small independent unions.
But under Özal's rule, for the first time Türk-Is's traditional policies of class collaboration and "being above the parties" found itself up against a brick wall: the government no longer took it seriously. In spite of the permanent falls in income of workers in the public sector, where Türk-Is is strongest, the federation was unable to win the slightest concession.
Starting in 198788, after the strikes led by the left of Türk-Is achieved some — albeit partial - successes, the ranks began to put pressure on the federation. Centres began to organize themselves in some branches. It is also important to note that a good number of DISK members had had to join Türk-Is after their union was dissolved (see note 4).
The union bureaucracy felt increasingly squeezed between its grumbling ranks and an indifferent government. Türk-Is therefore had to oppose the government for the first time in its history. It called on people not to vote for the ANAP in the 1987 referendum' and in the recent elections. It even adopted an action programme to put pressure on the government, although that remained on paper with the exception of a few demonstrations and rallies. But, during the previous year, workers' protest actions beat all the records: 2.5 million workers participated in various actions of passive resistance. Fear of repression was cancelled out by the threat of hunger. 22 well-worked our a carcentali a As if they were carrying out a vast, camInternational Viewpoint #166 • June 26, 1989 paign plan, groups of workers from different cities organized unusual actions that succeeded in getting around the restrictions on union rights and the right to strike. In some factories, they all decided to shave their heads; in others, that everyone would grow beards. In one sector, thousands of workers decided to all fall ill the same day and go collectively to the company doctors (who also supported them). In other factories, workers boycotted the canteen or the company buses, turning the walk to work into spontaneous demonstrations that left the police powerless. Recently, 1,500 workers decided to start divorce proceedings, explaining that their wages were inadequate for feeding their families, and that therefore they were no longer worthy to be "heads of families".
Coordination and communication bet-
-F: ween the centres of action did not go through the unions. The workers created their own network of informal communication. Here and there solidarity strikes even broke out, and workers held regular protest actions during worktime
Workers no longer trust their trade union, and even less the government or even the opposition parties. One of the most popular slogans is: "Türk-Is can no longer betray us!". Local union offices are regularly occupied by angry workers. While this crisis of confidence regarding the established structures and institutions has become all pervasive, the workers on the other hand have regained confidence in themselves, and undoubtedly this will be the most important gain for this move-
It is important to stress that neither the bosses nor the government have dared to directly confront the movement, which enjoys widespread legitimacy and recognition among the public at large. While at the outset the argument that wage rises aggravate inflation was used to reject the wage demands, some representatives of the bosses - and even of the government
— have now begun to challenge this argu-
This was the context to the build up to May Day, with workers adding on to their wage claims the demand that celebrations of the international festival be authorized. In Turkey, May 1 is traditionally the scene for actions and confrontations reflecting the balance of class forces.
After a 50-year ban, May 1 was celebrated for the first time in 1976 in Istanbul, on the initiative of the DISK. It was a real demonstration of workers' strength, with a massive rally of more than 100,000 that was well-organized and inclusive of all the groups and sections of the left. The following year, participation was just as impressive, but the demonstration ended in a blood-bath. The pro-Moscow group (close to the Turkish Communist Party) that had taken over the leadership of the exclude the Maoist groups from the demonstration. In this fraught atmosphere, following a police provocation that has never really been cleared up, plain-clothes police hidden in surrounding buildings and in the demonstration fired on the crowd, causing generalized panic and a shootout (some extremeleft groups had come armed). The result: 37 dead and hundreds wounded. Since this event, successive governments and the right wing have used the deaths of May 1, 1977, to try to ban new demonstrations. In 1979, Ecevit's "social-democratic" government decreed a curfew to prevent the May Day demonstration. On May 1, 1980, four months before the coup d'état, the army was already parading in the streets of Istanbul, and DISK leaders were arrested as a "preventive" measure. After the coup, the junta decreed that May 1 was no longer even a holiday (officially, it had been the "spring holiday") and that, of course, in the future all demonstrations were banned.
After the failure of some vague attempts to hold rallies in 1988, it was due to the initiative taken by workers in struggle that the May Day celebration was put back on the agenda this year, even before any of 4. The Confederation of Progressive Unions of Turkey (DISK), which had 400,000 members, was banned after the coup. DISK had led most of the union struggles. It was led by a left bureaucracy close to the Turkish Communist Party (TKP) up until 1977 and after that by the team of Abdullah Bastürk, which was close to the CHP. Left and far-left currents coexisted within it. See IV 143, December 26, 1983. 5. See TV 124, July 13,1987. 6. See IV 153, December 12, 1988.
the unions launched an appeal. In the days running up to May 1, nearly all the press was unanimous in stressing the legitimacy of such a demand. Government chooses brutal confrontation over May Day
Even Demirel — who was prime minister at the time of the bloody May Day of 1977! — declared that he did not oppose the celebration of this "workers' festival". Some industrialists and right-wing politicians went one better, emphasizing that from the viewpoint of their interests it might even be harmful to persist in opposing it. Their argument was that the workers' struggle was limited to the economic arena and was developing around "passive" actions, so it would be pointless to provoke a radicalization around this issue.
But the government chose the path of brutal confrontation, and began to make threats. Some of these were aimed at the SHP, whose leaders had declared that they would support and participate in a May Day demonstration. Intoxicated by its electoral success, and busy with pleading with the government and trying to convince it to go for early "peaceful" elections, the SHP was caught up short by the scale of the workers' actions. Rather than supporting the workers' demands, the SHP preferred to put itself to the fore on this May 1, which promised to reflect a
However, all that the government had to do to get the doughty social democrats to retreat was to raise the tone of its voice. The SHP's turnaround caused a similar retreat by left trade unionists inside TürkIs and the independent unions. The "Organizing Committee" that they had set up for this event and which, truth to tell, had not organized very much, decided the very morning of the demonstration to call everything off.
Thus, those who had come to demonstrate on May 1 found themselves alone facing the repressive forces. Two contingents of around 3,000 people were formed. composed mainly of students and sympathizers of extreme-left groups. The police were determined to prevent any movement towards Taksim Square (baptized "May 1 Square" by workers 1976). For the first time they used "Israeli
, murderous weapons used by the Israelis in the occupied territories. In certain places, the police opened fire on unarmed demonstrators, killing one 18people and following this up with 500
The results could certainly have been much worse and turned into a massacre. However, regardless of the figures, it is the meaning that this repression has taken on that is significant. This state terror was carried out directly against the workers' movement, if not the entire opposition. The government's aim was to terrorize the population by raising the spectre of the terror that reigned before the coup d'état so as to be able to pose as the sole guaranor of stability and order. This theme also came up in Ozal's speeches. He accused the press of "exaggerating these incidents which, after all, had only left one dead", and referred to secret plots aimed at liquidating him and his government.?
But this time it backfired. The workers' actions had won such a level of legitimacy that in spite of the small number of demonstrators on May 1, and despite the fact that it was an "illegal" event, public opinion overwhelmingly laid the responsibility for what happened at the door of the government and the police. It was they who had broken the law. during the funeral of the young worker, notably the beating up of journalists by the police, aroused unanimous indignation. The next day, 500 journalists demonstrated against police and government brutality.
### Bourgeoisie loses confidence in the regime
After the political crisis and the workers' challenge, the only additional thing that was needed to demonstrate the government's incapacity to rule the country was the revival of street actions. Built up on the basis of the political vacuum created by the coup d'état, in a context where the entire opposition - both bourgeois and working class - was muzzled, the ANAP imagined that everything would go on forever as it wished. The return to the scene of the traditional bourgeois parties had already disturbed its peace, but then the streets were calm, and everything was confined to the parliamentary arena.
After the May Day events, it became clear that even the bourgeoisie no longer had confidence in such a government, which was incapable of managing the smallest conflict without putting question the stability of the whole system. Ozal's imperialist promoters, notably the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, also began to consider the question of an alternative.
It can be said that, finally, the working class that failed to put up any resistance to the 1980 coup has put its mark on the liquidation of the vestiges of the military regime. Moreover, there have been some important changes inside the working class, trends which have accelerated during the past ten years.
working class has been largely rejuvenated: a large number of workers have been working for less than youthfulness of the population, the working class has also become younger: most of the natural leaders coming out of this recent movement have an average age of thirty. In the public sector, 60% of workers are under 40.
Another important change is that the
TURKEY level of education has risen. Nearly 30% of workers have gone to high school or university. In the public sector, only 2% to 3% of employees have not gone to school. Around 40% of workers are "second generation" - that is, their parents were also wage earners. In addition, 95% of them have no other income and no longer have any links with the countryside and the peasantry. This is an important point, because the number of landless peasants has also grown. Wage earners now make up 47% of the active population compared to 14% in 1955! — and this figure rises to 67% in the cities. (Ekonomik Panorama, May 7, 1989.)
Workers' families are also changing.
way of maintaining family income, even at a level of simply eating to survive, is for everyone in the family to go out to work. Men look for second jobs, while women find temporary work as maids, for example. Even the children do all sorts of odd jobs that can bring in a few
One of the results of these developments is a change of mentality, and an evolution in activities and propaganda. For example, workers use more and more sarcasm and irony to express their discontent. To have a go at the "American-style" politics introduced by Özal and to emphasize his collusion with imperialism, workers stick up slogans in English saying, "We are hungry!" or "We want ekmek [bread]!" To protest against censorship, they decided to have a "silent strike" — not speaking for a whole day in the workplaces. To show that wages are unfair, they have worked with just one arm. To show that they do not have enough money to buy shoes, they have gone to work barefooted.
Radicalization expressed in the trade unions
The most recent actions have been concentrated in the public sector, where strikes were rare up until now. Türk-Is, which dominated this sector, made deals with the government to avoid conflicts. Now the workers are no longer accepting this system, and no longer want to let the union leadership handle things. The union congresses that are going to take place at the end of the year will be stormy. Leadership changes and reorganizations are likely.
The movement's greatest weakness and limitation has been the fact that it has been confined to economic demands, failing to put forward political slogans other than general protests against the government. However, it has attacked basic problems that the Turkish union movement has faced since 1940s without solving.
DISK is always portrayed as an alternative model to Türk-Is. To be sure, DISK had a more militant profile. It broke from Türk-Is in 1967, on the basis of positions
23
7. Ozal survived an assassination attempt in 1988. June 26, 1989 • #166 International Viewpoint
TURKEY further to the left. However, in terms of its structures and functioning, it never did anything more than copy Türk-Is's bureaucratic conceptions. It was also unable to put up any resistance to the military coups in 1971 and 1980. And, after it was banned, it has not even been able to exert any influence in raising the consciousness of workers. Its conception of a rhetorical sort of trade-unionism confining itself to getting better wage contracts and getting the workers to vote for the CHP is not unconnected to the passivity of the workers after the coup d'état. Continuing recomposition in socialist movement
The president of DISK, Abdullah Bastürk, and its general secretary, Hassan Fehmi Isiklar, are now SHP deputies. The former leaders of DISK sometimes meet together, participate in international trade-union forums and issue statements. But the discussions going on about relegalizing DISK or fusing it with Türk-Is have tended to be bypassed by developments.
The working class has clearly demonstrated its desire to control and orient its organizations itself. The new workers' leaders who have come out of the mobilizations, who are influential at the plant, industry and regional levels and have proved themselves in action, will not let themselves be manipulated so easily. Henceforth, it is they who will be able to claim to represent the ranks.
As for the socialist movement, it is been in the midst of recomposition for three years. This new process, however, is a laborious one and far from being crystallized. Paradoxically, the two main groups (out of the 80 into which the Turkish and Kurdish left was divided before 1980), that is, Dev Yol [Revolutionary Path] and Halkin Kurtulusu [People's Liberation] have been the last to reorganize. However, despite the very hard blows and splits that they have suffered, these two organizations have expanded their influence relatively rapidly since they reappeared on the political scene, basing themselves on nothing but their past gains.
It is hard to chart and classify the far-left groups in Turkey, not because of the large number of them but because of their present weakness and political confusion. The developments in the USSR and the all-embracing criticism of Stalinism have opened up new horizons. Some movements are experiencing real shake-ups and splits purely on the basis of such discussions. Aside from some unreconstructed Stalinists (some ultra-left Maoist or pro-Albanian currents), none of these groups seems to be hanging on firmly to its old programmatic identity.
Eurocommunism made little impact in Turkey before 1980. But the United Communist Party of Turkey (TBKP), which arose out of a recent fusion of the Turkish International Viewpoint #166 • June 26, 1989 the Workers'
CP and
Party of Turkey (TIP), finally lined up with this current. At the same time, it came up with a theoretical innovation calling for a third stage before the democratic and the socialist revolutions. The leaders of the
TBKP were invited to the recent Italian CP where they congress, declared that the Italcourse"
ians'
"new seemed to them to be an interesting model (see
IV 163).
Unfortunately for this party, there is no social- democratic party in Turkey (like the Italian SP)
with which it could hope to fuse! After the return of the TBKP's main leaders from exile and the publicity around imprisonment®, this party gained greater prestige in the eyes of its sympathizers. Today, it is putting its bets above all on the government being good enough to grant it legal status, and it is proclaiming its readiness to pay the price for that.
The pro-Chinese current, survivors of the Turkish Workers' and Peasants' Party
(TIKP), have founded a legal party, the
Socialist Party, claiming to have changed their line totally. It is true that in the past this current carried the theory of "three worlds" to the point of absurdity, arguing that it was necessary to reinforce the
Turkish state and national unity against the Soviet threat. This position made them outcasts from the far left.
Despite a limited media breakthrough and the appeals they issued for the entire left to unite in the SP, they have not managed to go beyond the circle of their former sympathizers. Moreover, they have recently suffered a split, notably as a result of an internal debate over Stalinism.
Programmatic discussion in the far left
The revolutionary currents (such as the forces around Dev Yol and the successive splits it has suffered) have largely broken with Stalinism. However, they have had a hard time defining a political identity.
The all-embracing programmatic cussions that have been going on in recent years have produced many changes and advances that would have been unimaginable in the 1970s. Only a fear of being the others of becoming
"Trotskyists" has limited wrenching reassessments. Despite everything, the evolution that these currents are experiencing is very encouraging for the possibility of developing independent socialist politics.
In recent years revolutionary Marxists have been able to acquire an audience far greater than their organizational strength, benefitting from the slowness of the main currents of the far left to restructure themselves and make a comeback onto the political scene. As at the time of the 1987 parliamentary elections and the 1988 referendum, on the occasion of the latest elections they participated in forming common platforms of various far-left groups and in developing a joint campaign and candidacies.
Major changes and recompositions underway
Discussions are continuing on the need for building a united socialist party. But they are still far from fruition. The socialist movement has enjoyed a certain upturn in activity, but its scope should not be exaggerated. The low level of politicization of the recent workers' mobilizations also indicates the weakness of the far left's base in the workers' movement.
Moreover, neither the common election campaign waged by nine far-left currents (culminating in a demonstration of 1,500 people) nor the May Day actions offer a sufficient basis for expecting a rapid growth of the socialist movement.
Major changes and recompositions are certainly in the making and some steps forward have been taken. But the road 8. At the time of the 1987 legislative elections, Haydar Kutlu and Nihat Sargin, the two main leaders of the TBKP, decided to come back and accept imprisonment in Turkey in order to force the hand of the govemment, which had been promising to legalize the CP. They are still in prison!