US changes tack in anti-Nicaragua
Reagan policy.
The 1988 election campaign again tied the US's hands. As in 1983, the two candidates, on the advice of their campaign staffs, did all they could to keep the issue off the agenda. They had different reasons. Bush, as everybody knew, was up to his neck in Contragate. His campaign statements restricted themselves to supporting the search for peace "but not at any price". He launched an appeal for collaboration with the democracies of Latin America,
ON April 13, the US Congress approved a renewal of
"humanitarian" aid to the contras to the sum of $66.6 million.
This vote marks the end of a chapter in US foreign policy that lasted for the eight long years of the Reagan administration.
The objective was the defeat of the Sandinista revolution through military pressure by the contras and international diplomatic isolation. At the same time efforts were made to overcome the "Vietnam syndrome", and create the necessary conditions in the US itself for direct military intervention in
Nicaragua.
The Bush administration is now seeking to re-establish US political and military hegemony in the region, smash the
Sandinista regime, and reverse the situation through a
"democratic counter-revolution". This is the real reason behind US support for the Central American peace plan. The old policy of the carrot-and-stick has been re-baptized under the more subtle name of "incentives and penalties".
G. BUSTER
INCE the overthrow of the dinista revolution in July 1979.
the policy of the Reagan admin-
America - a region which receives less than 2% of US investments and foreign trade — has been centred around the definition of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)
and subsequently the Farabundo Marti
National Liberation Front (FMLN) as a strategic threat to US interests.The substance of this menace are the revolutionary processes that are challenging US dominance in its "own backyard" and the possibility that they will lead to a Soviet military presence that, as with the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, would upset the strategic nuclear balance.
At the start of the election campaign that led to Reagan's second victory, only 37% of US citizens had heard of Nicaragua, and a mere 17% expressed support for contra aid. Almost three-quarters of those interviewed feared that this policy could lead to direct US military involvement.
Given the lack of support in the country,
Reagan's Central America policy had to be carried out by subterfuge. The Contragate scandal and the trial of Colonel Oliver
North revealed the existence of a whole
• parallel structure. Congress has continued
16 to vote through "humanitarian aid" for the
International Viewpoint #167 • July 10, 1989 contras, under pressure from the blackmail of the Reagan administration concerning the unknown strategic dangers to US security represented by the Sandinistas. Events such as Ortega's journey to Moscow in June 1985 were taken as clear evidence of the danger. Contras were never a serious military threat
After eight years the balance-sheet of this policy for US imperialism is negative. The contras have never been a serious military threat to Nicaragua. The Contragate scandal put paid to whatever credibility the administration might still have had, and added a new and peculiarly virulent syndrome to the Vietnamese one.
The Central American oligarchies have drawn the conclusion that the United States is no longer able to remove the danger of revolution using the direct methods of the recent past.They were thus obliged to deal with the crisis according to their own interests, by seeking an accommodation with the Sandinistas that would allow them to avert the danger of a regionalization of the crisis and pursue a local counterinsurrection policy in the guise of a "democratic counter-revolution". The various Central American peace plans have arisen in the void created by the failure of the denounced Sandinism as a new incarnation of Marxism-Leninism and expressed his support for the contras, without ruling out the need for military aid.
Central American leaders relaunch Esquipulas II presidential candidate Dukakis promised to end contra aid, support the Esquipulas II agreement' and start a new stage in relations with Latin America, by calling a "Hemispheric Conference". But the last stage of his campaign was a game of upping the ante in the face of Bush's charges of liberalism.
The five Central American presidents decided to take the opportunity presented by the total failure of Reagan's policy, the void created by the transition between two administrations, and the problem of the need to negotiate bi-partisan agreement for the new policy, to relaunch Esquipulas II. They set out a peace plan based on the agreements of August 1987, which would, at the very least, allow them to re-negotiate their place in Washington's policy from a position of strength. If they did not do this, there was a danger that the scheduled elections in Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras in 1989 and 1990 would disrupt the network of personal relations between the presidents that was established during the complicated negotiations at Esquipulas. The United States would then put pressure on the Central American countries one-by-one, which would lead to internal radicalization and oblige the oligarchs to give their main attention to the domestic balance of forces. Furthermore the refugee problems and the remnants of the contras would impose new expenses and would lead to further destabilization.
The right moment presented itself at the end of November of last year, with the accession of the Mexican president, Salinas de Gortari. A month previously, at the United Nations General Assembly, the Honduran foreign minister, Lopez Contreras, proposed the creation of an internation1. The Esquipulas II Accords were signed on August 7-8, 1987, by the five Central American presidents (from Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Costa Rica). The accords established the principle of the legitimacy of the existing governments and the illegitimacy of the imregular forces. They called for an end to military aid, a process of national reconciliation, the re-establishment of pluralism and complete freedom of expression in all the countries concerned. All these aspects were indivisible, with precise dates and verification procedures.
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CENTRAL AMERICA campaign
al peace force that would disarm, repatriate or redeploy the contras out of Honduras. This initiative, coming from the Central American country most deeply implicated in Reagan's policy, was a sign of how scared the local oligarchies had become. On, November 30, with the agreement of the five presidents, the Central American foreign ministers sent a letter to UN secretary-general, Pérez de Cuéllar, asking him to coordinate the creation of an inspection machinery for the points regarding security and non-interference set out in Esquipulas.
The third front was calling a summit of Latin American presidents. This would put the Central American leaders under all kinds of internal pressure, and all of them together the pressure of the United States. It finally took place on February 13-14, 1989, at Playa del Tesoro in Salvador, helped along by a message of support from the European Community (EC) and thanks to the good offices of the Group of Eight of Caracas?, offered when the new Ven-
Carlos Andres
The Playa del Tesoro accords laid the foundations demanded by Pérez de Cuéllar. On the one hand, they preserve the Esquipulas II compromises on internal democratization — generally applied unilaterally against Nicaragua. These envisage the holding of elections in February 1990 and the opening of negotiations with the civilian opposition to reform the electoral laws. Duarte of Salvador made it a condition of his support for the summit that no mention be made of the FMLN proposals on elections in Salvador [see /V 164]. From the other side, a 90-day time limit was set for a technical commission to work out a plan for the work of the Inspection Commission and for verification, demobilization and removal of the contras stationed in Honduras.
The comprehensive nature of the accords took the Bush administration by surprise. But the diplomatic momentum was maintained with the support of the
EC and the Group of Eight at the meeting at San Pedro de Sula on February 27. This support was backed up by an injection of
$420m for food, development of an intercommercial network and capitalization of the Central American
The first US reaction to the Playa del
Tesoro accords came after weeks of daily accusations in the press, reflecting three main themes. The first was that it was necessary to put pressure on Honduras to prevent the demobilization of the contras and the dismantling of their bases. Any massive transfer of contras to the US was ruled out, sometimes by the use of racist arguments. Given the grave difficulties presented by any attempt to resettle them in other countries in the region, the only other alternative open was to send them back to Nicaragua. (This applied, course, only to the contras' peasant base. The leaders have been sunning themselves in Miami for some time.) In spite of the sale of arms on the black market — to the profit of the FMLN and also, to some extent, of drug racketeers — and the social danger that the contras pose for Honduras, Baker's envoys, Busby and Kimmitt, descended on Tegucigalpa to force on President Azcona the maintenance of the contras, alleging that this was
CENTRALLAMERICA the only reliable way of putting pressure on the FSLN to keep its promise of elections in 1990.
"A cover for Nicaraguan aid to the FLN"
The second idea was to cast doubt on the effectiveness of the Inspection Commission on the grounds that it lacked the necessary means to keep watch on all the frontiers. It was said that it was no more than a cover for Nicaraguan aid to the
FMLN, which was in the process of rearming - according to the CIA, with a whole arsenal of AK47s (in no way the same as the Chinese ones supplied to the contras by the US!). Washington demanded to be a part of the negotiations over the technical plan, called for the number of personnel to be increased, and for control to be extended not only over the Gulf of
Fonseca but over all the territorial waters
Thirdly, it was considered necessary to
CENTRAL AMERICA reaffirm the idea that the accords did not involve direct negotiations between the US and Nicaragua. Managua must negotiate not only with the civilian opposition, but with the contras. Cuba was also excluded — its role in the zone was to be negotiated directly with the USSR, according to the timetable for the settlement of regional disputes.
Although it retained some of these points, the first reaction opened the way for a total revision of US policy towards Central America, which took priority over the strategic negotiations with the Soviet Union. This was the moment to negotiate with the US Congress bipartisan accords offered to Bush three days after his victory by the Democrat leader, Jim Wright. Throughout March, Aronson held talks with all the senators and representatives who might be in any way interested in Central America. The last of these meetings took place on March 24 at the White House between President Bush and the Democrat and Republican leaders of Congress. Agreement was announced the same morning. The basic points were: • The US supports the efforts towards peace and democratization of Esquipulas II. • As for Nicaragua, the US will put pressure on the Sandinista government by diplomatic and economic, but not military means, to keep its promises regarding democratization aid to the FMLN. Baker pledged in writing to Congress that the contras would not undertake any military action before February 1990. • The contras will get $66.6m in humanitarian aid (double the previous sum) until February 1990, but prolongation after November 30 will be subject to the unanimous approval of the leaders of Congress.
• The repatriation or transfer of the contras must be voluntary as soon as conditions of security and democracy exist, although the possibility of using the support funds to finance the return of individual contras to Nicaragua is also left open.
• Responsibility for the application of this policy and the definition of the national interest rests with the executive which must set down a time-table for the implementation of the Sandinistas' undertakings. After evaluation by Washington, the
Sandinistas will get their reward or punishment, piously described as "stimulation and dissuasion".
It soon became clear that this mechanism of pressure and constant harassment of Managua, in which the collaboration of
2. The Group of Eight: consists of both Mexico,
Venezuela and Panama whose leaders launched the Contadora plan in September 1984; and Group, Armia, Peru and Unguay, who, as the 17/
Group of Lima, supported the Contadora plan. July 10, 1989 • #167 International Viewpoint
CENTRAL AMERICA the Latin American and European allies is demanded, is not the beginning of a move in the direction of the political line supported by the liberal Democrats in Congress. Rather it represents the outer limit of the concessions that the Republican executive is ready to make. The first proof of this came on April 25, a date on which the presidential decree on the blockade of Nicaragua coincided with the announcement of the approval of the new electoral law in Nicaragua and the start of Ortega's visit to Europe in search of political and economic support. In order to "pass the test", the FSLN must negotiate the electoral law with the civilian opposition.
Most democratic electoral law in Central America
This was the start of a whole process of wearing down launched by the Us, which, if carried through would call into question Bush's promise to respect the Esquipulas II accords. For Washington, the 1990 elections in Nicaragua only make sense if the Sandinistas lose them, or at least, are so seriously weakened that their hegemony is called into question.
The opposition inside Nicaragua, the "Group of 14", took up a petition campaign for changes in the proposed electoral law, raising the stakes every time the Sandinistas make a concession. But on April 22, two days before the approval of the most democratic electoral law in Central America, on the pretext that the Sandinistas had not given enough to the internal opposition, Bush reaffirmed the blockade.
Bush's charges reveal once again the bias of imperialism:
• "The electoral council will be under Sandinista control". Ortega explained before leaving for Europe that the council would comprise two Sandinistas, two representatives of the opposition and a "person of good will" chosen by consensus. It seems to have escaped Washington's notice that during the "democratic" elections in Salvador, only ARENA was represented on the electoral council.
• "The "exiles" would not be able to
Nicaragua". No Central American electoral law allows this. The most liberal position, that laid down at Esquipulas, was for an amnesty to accompany the electoral process.
• "Foreign finance". The FSLN finally agreed that imperialism could finance its supporters, while reserving 50% of the sums allocated for fair distribution by the electoral council. Apparently this is contrary to electoral democracy, but only in Nicaragua, for in the US itself the law strictly prohibits all financial support to
• "Lack of press freedom". Ortega also explained that the national television channels would give 30 minutes each day 18 to each party, and the parties would be able to buy additional time. International Viewpoint #167 • July 10, 1989
The electioneering began on April 25. Ortega went off to Europe, where he got the explicit support of Mitterrand, Felipe Gonzalez and the European social democracies as a whole for the economic and political programme of the FSLN. The civilian opposition meanwhile was in Washington to defend, in the shadow of the Bush administration, its project of "national reconstruction". But this opposition has neither a common programme nor a candidate and may well turn out to be just as useless from the point of view of imperialist policy as the contras' mili-
For the FSLN, international solidarity, in the form of economic support, which this year amounted to $250m (as opposed to $66.6m for the contras), is indispensable to cushion the social costs of the austerity policy and reconstruct the economic basis of the country after the war. That is why the social-democratic government of has called a conference in Stockholm to coordinate the aid. Washington's financial support provides imperialist "carrots" to the civilian opposition to assist it in its task of building a social base out of the discontent of sectors of the population, itself caused by the misery created by the blockade and the war.
The incentives - partial lifting of the blockade and normalization of the funcrespective Embassies Washington are poisoned fruits that will be employed to weaken the FSLN. On the other hand, the penalties would seem to be of doubtful efficacity, once it becomes practically impossible to resurrect the contras' military campaign. Only the international isolation of Nicaragua could make them real.
But after Ortega's visit to Europe, Washington has to face up to the loss of credibility of its Central America policy in the eyes of its Western allies. And this lessens its ability to apply pressure on Venezuela and Mexico. US foreign policy outflanked by Soviet initiatives
When Bush arrived in the White House, he found US foreign policy outflanked by the Soviet peace initiatives. He brought back with him much of the team of advis-
Kissinger era (Scowcroft, Eagleburger), who are convinced of the renegotiate respective zones of influence with the Soviet Union. To do this, however, the first requirement is to lessen the impact of Gorbachev's diplomatic offensive, and therefore his credibility in Europe. This is the underlying reason for the wide-ranging "revision" of