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The Fourth International’s English-language review, from 1982

Namibia: The Diplomatic Maneuvering of the US and South Africa

· International Viewpoint No. 167, 10 July 1989 · pp 8-11 · 4,859 words

Africa Britain and Ireland Cuba

Threats to Namibian independence

ANGOLA

WINDHOEN

BOTSWANA

NAMIBIA

Marentar

• Raiway

EVENTS IN NAMIBIA since April 1 were an inauspicious beginning to the independence process. While the military wing of the South West Africa People's Organization

(SWAPO), the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), were preparing to hand themselves over to the non-existent

UN peacekeeping forces in the north, they were ambushed by the South African Defence Force (SADF).

The ensuing slaughter, as the SADF operated a shoot-to-kill policy against PLAN and a scorched-earth policy against the civilian population, led to over 300 PLAN and civilian deaths.

Included in this was a number of surrendering PLAN combatants who were executed. At the time of writing, South

African forces are supposedly now confined to bases and the independence process is back on course, but reports are still coming in from Namibia that some SADF are still operating freely in the Caprivi Strip.

ROS YOUNG

U

SING PLAN's presence in

Namibia as a pretext (claiming that SWAPO fighters had infiltrated" the country, the South

Africans were able to break the formal cease-fire on April 1 and launch a surprise attack on PLAN with the UN's agreement. Together with British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, the South Africans had pushed the UN special representative in Namibia, Martti Ahtissari, into sanctioning the use of South African police, and later military, against the combatants.

In what can now be seen as a carefully orchestrated attack against SWAPO, the

British, US and South African governments and the international press joined forces to denounce SWAPO as having broken the cease-fire. SWAPO was roundly blamed for contravening UN

Security Council Resolution 435 and the

Geneva Protocol and, as a result, responsible for putting the independence process in jeopardy.

The exercise was aimed at isolating

SWAPO internationally. The South Africans also seized the opportunity to see how far they could manipulate the UN peace-keeping forces (UN Transition

Assistance Group, UNTAG), and established yet again that they were going to dictate the terms of the independence process. Instead of international opinion ral-

8 lying to the side of SWAPO, the majorily

International Viewpoint #167 • July 10, 1989 swallowed South Africa's version of events. South Africa's machine skilfully turned the SADF into the victim of a fabricated SWAPO invasion, and the South Africans became the defenders of Namibia's integrity and democracy overnight. The central issue of South Africa's illegal occupation and war in Namibia was ignored.

The diplomatic rows that followed centred on the interpretations of the provisions for PLAN forces in the UN project for Namibia's independence, Resolution 435 (and its related resolutions and documents), and in the agreements reached at last year's peace talks between Angola, Cuba and South Africa.

UN fudges in the face of

South African offensive

The South Africans claimed, with no factual basis to back their assertions, that all SWAPO fighters should have been north of the 16th parallel in Angola by the time of the cease-fire. Resolution 435 does, in fact, make provision for the confinement of PLAN forces to UNTAGsupervised bases in Namibia by the time of the cease-fire. Although South Africa complained bitterly about this procedure, the decision was never reversed in the UN's Security Council. And, although SWAPO was seeking clarification up

SOUTH AFRICA until the last moment on the exact provisions, the UN did nothing but fudge and avoid the issue.!

SWAPO was also accused of breaking the Geneva Protocol of August 5, 1988 (signed by South Africa, Cuba and Angola), a secret document that they were not a signatory to. Contrary to South Africa's claims, the Geneva Protocol only deals with PLAN forces already stationed in Angola by the time of the cease-fire in Namibia and their confinement to bases north of the 16th parallel in Angola?

South Africa was also able to exploit the situation to score a few military points against PLAN. However, things didn't go all their own way. The PLAN forces (sup ported by reinforcements from their bases inside Angola) fought back bravely, to the extent that the South African military could not keep secret — as they are wont to do - their heavy casualties. While the bodies of PLAN combatants, civilians — and even Black SADF troops - were dumped unceremoniously into mass graves, white SADF corpses, amidst pomp and glory, were taken back to heroes' burials in South Africa.

Whole operation turns to farce

After a week of fierce fighting, SWAPO president Sam Nujoma announced on April 8 that SWAPO, in a major concession, was recalling all its combatants from Namibia to deprive South Africa of "every pretext to stop Namibia's independence process" 3

Meetings of the South African, Angolan and Cuban Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC) took place throughout April and May to reach agreements to stop the fighting and to get the independence process back on course. The meetings — observed by the USA, USSR and the United Nations — and the decisions reached at them, such as the Mount Etjo Declaration (April 9), took place without SWAPO's presence and resulted in decisions firmly 1. Background to the fighting in northern Namibia, SWAPO, London, April 3, 1989. 2. Geneva Protocol, August 5, 1988. 3. Press statement by Sam Nujoma, president of SWAPO, Luanda, April 8, 1989.

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NAMIBIA process

favouring South Africa. The Mount Etjo Declaration laid down procedures for the withdrawal of PLAN combatants from Namibia and requested that they report to UNTAG assembly points, hand in their weapons and then be escorted by UNTAG to Angola. The declaration did not implement a cease-fire to enable the combatants to do all this in safety, nor did it require the restriction of the SADF and its South West Africa Territory Force (SWATF) battalions to base.4

The whole operation turned into a farce. The assembly points were swarming with the SADF and units of the notorious Koevoet counter-insurgency unit. Rows broke out between the UN and over whether PLAN should "surrender", and whether the SADF should be allowed to "interrogate" them before being handed

"Contempt for Namibian sovereignty"

While South Africa lost those arguments, the fact that they arrogantly put them forward in the first place, together with the presence of their troops, led to SWAPO viewing the whole set-up as a trap. They instructed their combatants to proceed straight to Angola and, in fact, only five wounded fighters turned up at the assembly points.

to the National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW) in a statement released in April: "The [Mount Etjo] declaration is once again an example of how some countries have nothing but contempt and disregard for the sovereignty of the Namibian people and the reality of the liberation struggle in Namibia. The Mount Etjo talks were intended to resolve the problem of SWAPO's armed presence in Namibia. But SWAPO - a key historical actor in the entire situation - was not invited to them."

With the Mount Etjo Declaration a failure and South Africa insisting that the peace process could not go ahead until all the combatants were out of the country, a JMC meeting at Ruacana on the Namibia/ Angola border on April 20 agreed that South African troops be confined to bases for 60 hours, beginning on April 26, to enable the remaining combatants to get into Angola safely. The confinement of the SADF to bases was only the result of SWAPO's insistence on this at a secret meeting with South Africa held two days previously, also at Ruacana. Since the time period was still not long enough, a JMC meeting in Cape Town on April 28 agreed to extend the deadline to May 13. But, instead of using this opportunity to keep the SADF restricted to bases, the JMC agreed to allow them to carry out "verification" patrols to check whether all the combatants had left. This was giving South Africa carte blanche to continue its terror tactics against the local population.

The question to be asked is why would

Cuba and the USSR endorse these decisions in favour of South Africa? First, in terms of the regional conflict, their main objective is to end South African aggression against Angola. Namibia's independence is secondary, and even seen as a means to this end. It was very much feared in Angolan government circles that South Africa would use the fighting in northern Namibia as a pretext to launch another invasion of Secondly, it may also be the result of a lack of understanding on their part of the real situation in Namibia, and the extent of the devastation and war being wrought

Despite UN Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar's criticism of the JMC decision

"verification" patrols® and his appeals that the SADF be confined to bases, the UN's role overall is to help smooth the way for a settlement in Namibia agreeable to the imperialist powers. UNTAG has been widely castigated for its unpreparedness and incompetency in dealing with the fighting. The responsibility for UNTAG's disarray lies with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (USA, USSR, Britain, China and France) who agreed to a reduction in UNTAG's forces from 7,500 to 4,650, and a reduction in Moreover, South Africa was able to dictate that Sweden, seen as pro-SWAPO, could not participate in UNTAG.

The UN's failure to get the SADF and its local battalions into bases, and its failure to stop attacks on civilians, has left many in Namibia cynical about their ability by the time of the elections to stop further South African attacks. Other UN agencies, such as UNICEF, the World Health Organization and so on, will be involved in the independence process -particularly in relation to the repatriation of the refugees — and no doubt the South Africans will exploit the differences that exist among them in relation to their attitude to SWAPO.

SWAPO forced to go along with "massive compromise"

It has taken over a decade since UN Security Council Resolution 435 was passed to set the process in motion, and few believed that this year would see its implementation. SWAPO has long said that Resolution 435 was a massive compromise that they were forced to go along with. Had they not, they would have been accused of trying to hold up the implementation of Namibia's independence.

This resolution is, in fact, a watereddown version of an earlier one, Security Council Resolution 385, passed two years earlier in 1976. Resolution 435 was drafted by the now-defunct Western Contact Group, together with South Africa, in an attempt to side-step the UN and set out terms favouring South Africa. For example, Resolution 435 relegated the UN's

NAMIBIA role to one of monitoring the elections, with South Africa's colonial Administrator General in Namibia, Louis Pienaar, organizing them.

Furthermore, SWAPO has not been party to any of the peace negotiations since July/August 1982! Since then the South Africans, backed by Reagan and Thatcher, have consistently argued that they would not sit at the negotiating table with SWAPO. This situation continued last year with SWAPO's notable absence from the peace talks between Angola, Cuba and South Africa over Namibia's

Despite all the setbacks in the last few months, it is still likely that the independence process will go ahead because of the convergence of conflicting events and interests that have occurred in the last couple of years. First, and an often ignored factor, is the struggle being waged by SWAPO itself and the growing militancy and strength of the mass movements of students and workers inside

Mass mobilizations of workers and students

The relaunch of the National Union of Namibian Workers in 1986, together with the formation since that time of six national trade unions affiliated to it, plus the growth of the Namibia National Student Organization (NANSO), has meant that South Africa and its Western backers were faced with two choices: either to escalate the war, exploitation and repression and face a revolutionary situation in the not too distant future; or agree to implement the UN project while preparing plans to try to ensure that very little will change after independence.

Both the trade-union and student movements are staunchly pro-SWAPO and see the election of a SWAPO government as the only serious alternative to South African occupation. Mass mobilizations of both movements have been continuing since April 1 in protest at South Africa's continuing presence in Namibia and their attempts to sabotage the elections.

On May 18, over 19,000 school students walked out of classes to begin a schools' boycott in protest at the intimidation and harassment of civilians by Koevoet. At the time of writing, this boycott - now involving over 250 schools, mainly in northern Namibia — is continuing and the students are threatening to take it nationwide. Similarly, the NUNW led a 20,000strong demonstration on April 1 in protest at South Africa's moves to nationalize 4. Mount Etjo Declaration, Namibia, April 9, 1989. The South West Africa Territory Force (SWATF), instead of being disbanded under the terms of Resolution 435, were demobbed on full pay. 5. Namibian workers call for solidarity, situation report from the NUNW, Namibia, April 1989. sultations of the Security Council, May 4, 1989. July 10, 1989 • #167 International Viewpoint

NAMIBIA most of Namibia's public services. And in the Kavango region, both the teachers' and public workers' unions (NANTU and

NAPWU) have come out on strike in support of the students and to protest against the sacking of teachers.

Massive support from rural population

Secondly, SWAPO's military wing has been scoring increasing successes against the SADF, despite the fact that they have been up against the largest and bestequipped army in Africa. One only has to look at the massive increase in SADF personnel and hardware in northern Namibia in the last ten years to realize that the SADE's periodic pronouncements that they have wiped out PLAN are wishful thinking. PLAN forces have been engaged in countless acts of sabotage, in particular against military and economic targets. While SWAPO has not established "liberated zones", they would not have been able to keep the armed struggle going for so long without massive support from the rural population (mostly women), especially in the north, in terms of feeding and hiding the combatants who, after all, are the sons, daughters, wives and husbands of many of them. South Africa's escalation of the war in northern Namibia and the daily acts of brutality meted out to civilians have been aimed at breaking PLAN's civilian support.

These developments coincided with a flagging South African economy due to the drop in the gold price and the effects of sanctions. They can no longer afford to continue their occupation of Namibia and their costly and disastrous war in Angola. However, it was their military defeat in Angola last year at the hands of the combined forces of FAPLA, the Cuban internationalist forces, and PLAN at Cuito Cuanavale, plus their loss of air superiority to the Angolans, that finally pushed them to the negotiating table (see IV 158).

From a position of military weakness in Angola, the South Africans, backed by the USA and Britain, were nevertheless able to reassert the upper-hand in the peace negotiations with Angola and Cuba. Both the USA and the South Africans were able to secure the deal they have long been lobbying for - Cuban withdrawal from Angola in return for Namibian independence.

This has been enthusiastically supported by Thatcher, who wants to hold up Namibia's independence as proof of the correctness of her "diplomacy without sanctions" policy. An independent Namibia will increasingly be used to argue that sanctions should now be dropped and the apartheid state brought back fully into the international capitalist fold. In fact, South Africa is already using Namibia's impending independence to secure new 10 hand, the USSR — as part of its rap- international bank loans. On the other International Viewpoint #167 • July 10, 1989 prochement with the West and in order to drastically reduce its financial and military support in southern Africa, particularly in Angola - is behind concessions Angola and Cuba are being forced to make to the South Africans.

Namibia is being used as a pawn in this game, and South Africa is up against little opposition in its delaying tactics over Resolution 435. These tactics include their terrorizing of the civilian population, preparations to rig the elections, massive financial support for pro-apartheid groupings and so on.?

One of the worst aspects of Resolution 435 is that it does not insist that Walvis Bay or the off-shore islands are an integral part of Namibia. As a result, South Africa has been able to hold on to the area and is refusing to recognize it as part of Namibia. Walvis Bay is the country's only deep-water port and the sole alternative to the rail route through South Africa. It handles roughly 86% of Namibia's exports, namely uranium, diamonds, copper and other minerals. And the country's only fish-processing and packing factories are situated there. Walvis Bay was annexed by South Africa in 1977 (using 19th century British colonial treaties!), together with several off-shore islands. South Africa says it will negotiate the future of Walvis Bay and the islands with a "friendly" government.

Strategic importance of

Walvis Bay

The residents of Walvis Bay (around 20,000 people) will be excluded from the elections, but Black voters — who make up half the population there, the majority of whom are pro-SWAPO - will almost certainly travel into Namibia to vote. By holding on to Walvis Bay until after formal independence, the South Africans plan to use it to strangle Namibia's economy if a future SWAPO government acts against its interests.

Walvis Bay is also the site of major SADF military installations, and there are fears that the SADF will station many of its forces there instead of withdrawing completely from Namibia in line with the UN proposals. It has been reported that they are now spending 22 million rand on upgrading and expanding their military installations in the enclave. South Africa has already staked out a 200-mile zone around the coast of Walvis Bay and the islands, thereby cutting into Namibia's

A separate Security Resolution in 1978(432) declared the area an integral part of Namibia and called for its reintegration with the rest of the country. But no-one has acted on this since, and Britain and the USA have kept particularly quiet on the issue. They receive intelligence on sea and air traffic movements in the south Atlantic and Indian oceans from South Africa's "Advocaat" naval communications radar sub-station in Walvis Bay. And Walvis

Bay was used as a supply station by Britain during the Malvinas war.

Another major issue is that of Koevoet, a counter-insurgency unit numbering around 3,000. It was set up in 1979 by General Hans Dreyer at the instigation of General Magnus Malan, now South Africa's defence minister, ostensibly to hunt out PLAN combatants. In reality their job is to terrorize the civilian population in the north to stop them supporting SWAPO. Over the years their catalogue of torture, rape, murder and destruction of villages has grown. Some of their more well-known exploits include the parading of dead SWAPO fighters strapped to army vehicles, the Oshikuku massacre, dressing up as SWAPO combatants and going on killing sprees, and so on.?

Koevoet's intimidation and thuggery

These thugs are made up of white South African officers, local Black Namibians (mainly from Ovambo and Kavango) and Angolans, ex-members of UNITA and the FNLA.1° Under the terms of the UN plan, Koevoet was to be disbanded. Instead, they were incorporated into South Africa's local police force, SWAPOL, on the pretext that they were police not army, and it was better that they were usefully employed rather than unemployed and arms against SWAPO during campaign a sentiment echoed by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

There is now the frightening and bizarre situation where Koevoet, as part of SWAPOL, are responsible for keeping "law and order" during the election campaign. No pressure has been brought to bear on South Africa, or its Namibian agent, Louis Pienaar, to disband Koevoet, and the UN peace-keeping forces are pathetically ineffectual in dealing with the hundreds of additional cases of intimidation by Koevoet and the South African military since April 1.

It is still unclear how the elections are going to be run. On April 24, Pienaar issued a draft proclamation setting out the voting procedures. At first glance, this looks quite reasonable: a minimum voting age of 18; the requirement that voters were born in Namibia, or are the natural child of someone born in Namibia, or 7. South African control of the mass media in Namibia is being used to promote pro-apartheid groupings, particularly the DTA, and to slander SWAPO. aspects of South Africa's attempts to disrupt independence is their creation of an assassination squad, set up to murder SWAPO leaders; infiltration of SADF personnel into the ranks of UNTAG; instructing Koevoet and other SADF/SWATF Black conscripted troops to attack UNTAG while disguised as civilians dressed in SWAPO colours. (South Africa's secret agenda, Namibian Press Agency, Luanda, June 3, 1989.) 8. "Walvis Bay threat to SWAPO", Alternet, May 26, 9. "Dreaded Koevoet to help with UN plan?" Action on Namibia, Spring 1989.

were resident in the country for four years prior to registration; and a 21-day appeal procedure against non-registration or con-

But the omissions are alarming. draft proclamation does not stipulate that the voter registration list alphabetically, a basic requirement for any serious election. There would be no way of knowing who has been omitted, who is on the list more than once and so on. Recently, SADF personnel have been spotted in graveyards writing down names of deceased, for what purpose one can only guess. Proof of identity is also left vague and there appears to be no requirement that registration officers keep proper records.

If this proclamation goes ahead without being challenged the election will not be "free and fair".!! South Africa is almost certainly preparing more dirty tricks for the actual election itself. For example, their civil servants may be looking after the ballot boxes and counting the votes (and probably adding on a few thousand here and there to pro-South African coalition totals). The UN Special Representative has yet to approve Pienaar's election proposals, but on past performance he may well go along with whatever the South Africans have in mind.

Meanwhile, South Africa is trying to get as many non-Namibians as possible to register as residents. This includes UNITA bandits from Angola, who have been registering as Namibians for some time now, as well as South African troops.

The continuing terror in Namibia and South Africa's refusal to disband Koevoet has meant that the repatriation of Namibian exiles (the majority of whom are SWAPO members), which is due to start on May 15, has been postponed indefinitely by the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). The longer this is delayed, the better for South Africa. When SWAPO's external leadership, headed by its president Sam Nujoma, enter the country it will give an enormous boost to the mass of the people. Meanwhile, 40,000 exiled Namibians have applied to the UNHCR for repatriation, and SWAPO's provisional headquarters in Luanda have reported that they are now ready to be airlifted into the country.!2

Refusal to repeal racist and oppressive laws

Repatriation centres have been established inside the country by the Council of Churches in Namibia (as the UNHCR's partner) to receive the returnees. It will be the largest airlifting of refugees that the UNHCR has organized in Africa. Strong reservations are being voiced about security for the returnees in these centres due to the activities of Koevoet.

The delay in the repatriation process is also due to Pienaar's refusal to repeal all racist and oppressive laws as agreed under Resolution 435, with the excuse that only those specifically related to voting procedure need be abolished. For example, he has refused to repeal AG8, which deals with school segregation and administrations. Protection of Fundamental Rights Act is to be rewritten to give SWAPOL wide powers of arrest during the election campaign and it is feared that it will be used to prosecute anyone accused of lobbying people to vote for SWAPO. This is despite the fact that the Act was effectively scrapped as a result of a court judge-

At the time of writing, the repeal of racist and repressive laws is on the verge of being signed in Pretoria and an amnesty is about to be enforced for all those SWAPO members who could have been arrested on their repatriation to the coun try. It has taken the South Africans two months of prevarications (in contravention of the UN plan) to finally implement

- a critical delay for SWAPO's external wing and almost certainly engineered by Pretoria to ensure that SWAPO is not sufficiently prepared for the start of the election campaign in July.13 Up to 50 parties competing in elections

Since South Africa concedes that SWAPO will win a landslide victory if the elections are "free and fair", it is attempting to reduce its majority. The elections will be run on a proportional representation basis and a two-thirds majority is needed in the Constituent Assembly in order to pass each clause in the future constitution.14 If SWAPO gains slightly less than two-thirds it will be at the mercy of some of the small pro-South African parties who will have a veto on SWAPO's proposals. The whole process of deciding on the constitution leading to the declaration of independence may then take considerably longer than envisaged in the UN plan. That is, if South Africa does not then step in to re-invade Namibia or instigate a major destabilization operation Koevoet and SWATF forces in what may turn out to be a similar scenario to the fate of Angola or Mozambique.

There are between 40 and 50 parties competing in the elections, either independently or as part of an alliance, an incredible number for a country of only around 1.5 million people. The majority of these parties are small, ethnicallybased, and have little support. Louis Pienaar urged all these small political groups in August 1988 to form common fronts against SWAPO in the elections.

SWAPO's main challenger is the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), not because of their support (which is very small) but because of the millions of rand South Africa is pumping into their election campaign. It is a virulently pro-South

NAMIBIA African grouping, supported actively by the SADF and Koevoet, and is campaigning for the retention of "group rights" — a euphemism for white privilege. In 1978, the South Africans installed them in a "government" (that quickly collapsed) after sham elections, which were boycotted by SWAPO.

South African attempts at economic sabotage

Financial support is also being sent to the DTA from their right-wing supporters in West Germany. The DTA's tactics include violence against SWAPO supportthe formation force", and handing out bribes at its rallies (T-shirts and food). Koevoet and the SADF/SWATF troops are parading in DTA T-shirts and beating and shooting anyone who refuses to return their DTA

Much of Namibia's economy is controlled by foreign interests, mainly British and South African. Before it resigned in March, South Africa's puppet ment recommended sweeping privatization of public services including health, post and telecommunications, water and transport. The union federation, NUNW, rightly claimed that this proposal was aimed at sabotaging the independence process, and launched a campaign oppos ing privatization in March. threatened a general strike if this policy is

If everything is privatized by the time of the elections, the pro-South African capitalists in Namibia will easily be able to sabotage essential services. If services are re-nationalized, financial compensation will no doubt be demanded from the future SWAPO government.

The election campaign is set to officially start on July 1, and the fight is clearly between SWAPO and South Africa. Although the South Africans have had a head start (through the campaigning propaganda of the DTA, SADF and their pseudo-cultural organizations, Ezuva Etango), their strategy is to try to reduce a SWAPO majority, knowing full well that 10. UNITA — National Union for the Total Independence of Angola; FNLA — National Liberation Front of Angola. Reactionary nationalist factions, backed in particular by the USA and South Africa (see /V 158) 11. International Newsbriefing on Namibia, London, May 1989. The draft proclamation was challenged by SWAPO, the NUNW, the Namibian Council of Churches and the Legal Assistance Centre, but the outcome to date is not known. 12. The repatriation finally got underway on June 12. Under pressure from South Africa, the UNHCR are refusing to allow Namibian church officials to meet the returnees at the five entry points. 13. On June 6 the amnesty was declared and finally 36 laws were repealed and ten others amended, out of a total of 59 repressive and racist laws. AG8 was not among those repealed 14. There are a number of different proportional representation systems and it is still not know which will be used.

55. "embia's election line-up", Action on Namibia, 11

Summer 1989. July 10, 1989 • #167 International Viewpoint

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