Lynch mobs and
W HAT IS represented by
the attacks on Arabs after 14 Israelis were killed in the bus attack?
First of all, I should make the point that this incident and other such attacks on Israeli civilians by Arabs have been the actions of individuals. But the attacks on Arabs have been organized by groups such as the organization of Rabbi Kahane.
OMAR SAKHNINI, a Palestinian member of the Revolutionary
Moreover, they have had some links with the state apparatus.
Communist League, the section of the Fourth International in the Israeli state, gave the following interview to Gerry Foley in
• What sort of links?
Paris in mid-July. This was during the wave of attacks on
Although the Kahane group is not represented in the Knesset, a similar one, Mole-
Palestinians that followed the deaths of 14 Israelis on a bus det [Fatherland], founded by this general forced off the road by a Palestinian youth.
who calls for the "transfer" of the Arabs, is. Both groups are officially recognized
Since this time also there has been more a more talk about a in Israel.
breakup of the broad coalition government and new elections.
There are also the Jewish settlers who have the right to carry arms. And they use these weapons in attacks on Arab people.
• How widespead among the Israeli population were violent reactions to the bus incident?
It's obvious that there is a widespread reaction, especially through the Zionist press. But it is ultraightist groups that exploit such incidents. They act not only against Arabs in the occupied territories but also against Arabs in the pre-1967 borders.
The fact is that those who perpetrate such attacks are never punished. When they are caught, they just get a couple of days in jail. For example, take the case of
Rabbi Levinger, an ultra-rightist among the settlers. When he was brought before a court, they addressed him as "reverend,"
and asked him what day it suited him to appear.
• What's the attitude of the Zionist establishment to these attacks?
The establishment is behind these attacks in a certain way. You can see that in their attitude toward those who commit the acts. A group of Zionist terrorists got political prisoner status and a third of their time off for good behavior. But the only accusation against Derech ha-Nitzotz [a
Jewish far left group] was political, that they were linked to the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. And they got no amnesty and were put in with common-law prisoners.
There is collusion between the rightists and the establishment. There is no difference in this respect between the Likud and the Maarakh [Labor Party]. The general who founded Moledet came from Maarakh. This collusion is a sort of incitment to terrorist acts against Arab people.
from the
• It looked, however, attacks on Peres [the Maarakh leader] at the funeral of the bus incident that the ultra-right was trying to use the reaction to the attack against
Maarakh.
The Zionist establishment is in the position of being an sorcerer's apprentice. The Gush Emunim [Bloc of the Faithful, the organization supporting the Jewish settlements] and the Nahalim [Pioneers, the guard in the settlements] were created by the establishment. And there are all sorts of laws that open the way for the acts that are being committed.
Although the establishment won't call officially for pogroms or officially encourage lynch mobs, all the Zionist institutions and laws are an incitement to such actions. • Which party do you think will win if there are elections now?
Likud. They might even get an absolute majority, and not have to accept a coalition. If Likud falls a bit short of a majority, getting around 50 seats, it would definitely rather have a coaliton with the which always demands major posts in the government. What has been happening is that Maarakh has been doing the dirty work for Likud on both security and economic questions.
As regards the last coalition, if Likud went into a coalition with Maarakh, it wasn't because Likud could not accept the conditions of the religious parties but because Maarakh had accepted their conditions. So, they preferred a broader coali• So why do they want to drop the coalition with Maarah now?
In the last period, Maarakh has been declining more and more. And if Likud gets the chance to govern alone, with Maarakh, which is its main competitor, won't pass it up. They are more aggressive now because the intifada is no longer on the rise. It is continuing, but it is
The Likud has the advantage over Maarakh that it has a relatively clear position on the future of the territories, while Maarakh has very deep internal contradictions over this question. So, Likud has a historical opportunity to establish itself as the main Zionist party. • What would the consequences of a Likud victory be for the Palestinian resistance?
In peace-time conditions, there is not much possibility for cracking down harder than they are now. Any further step would go beyond the limits of international acceptability. • To what extent has the rise of Islamic fundamentalism divided the intifada?
The division has existed from the outset between the left Palestinian groups and the fundamentalists. But this is now leading to different signals being given, different dates for strikes and so on. The fundamentalist current is more and more presenting itself as an alternative to the PLO groups.
At the mass level, this polarization is deepening. One result of this is that when the Unified Leadership calls for a general strike, there is a general strike. When the fundamentalists call for a general strike, there is also a general strike. • What are the issues involved in this polarization?
There are many levels. One is religion and the place of religion. That goes from general ideology to everyday life. And there are political issues, mainly after the PLO's acceptance of United Nations Resolution 242, which is rejected by the Palestinian people. • That is, what's attractive about the fundamentalists is that they seem to be the most intransigent?
That and religion. The fundamentalists do a lot of social welfare work. in Um El Fahem [one of the main PalesJuly 31, 1989 • #168 International Viewpoint
----- pull-quotes on this page -----
MIDDLE EAST Zionism
MIDDLE EAST tinian centers in pre-1967 Israel], they did a videotaped interview with the local chief, a former member of the CP, without telling him who they were. They asked him a lot of questions about the fundamentalists, and he said that there were just destructive. They were able to make him look foolish. They said, in effect, look at what they are saying about us and then at what we are doing. We have done much more than they have. • What does the Palestinian left fear from the fundamentalists?
The left's main fear is of losing its popular support. The fundamentalists are on
There is a homogeneous fundamentalist current. And on the other hand, the left is declining and divided. The other aspect is religious repression. stance, now that the fundamentalist current controls Um El Fahem, women have to be careful about the way they dress. You cannot drink anything alcoholic. • What differences are there among the fundamentalists? Are some more radical than others?
There is no form of Islamic fundamentalism that can be considered left-wing. On the surface, you cannot find differences among them on the main issues. There is no central leadership of the fundamentalists, but rather different local leaderships. There are no links with Iran, although the Islamic revolution had an impact on the upsurge of fundamentalism among the Palestinians. The fundamentalist current has no international representation. They have no representation abroad, although they have supporters.
A general difference has developed between the fundamentalists in Israel proper and in the occupied territories. In the former, the fundamentalists now have a clear political line. They call for an Islamic state in all of Palestine. In the occupied territories, the fundamentalists are still putting their emphasis on religion and avoiding taking a clear political position. • Is the leadership clerical or lay?
The religious institutions used to be dependent on the state, as is usual for Sunni Muslims. That means Jordan for the West Bank, but the Zionist state inside the pre-1967 borders. One effect of the rise of the fundamentalist movement was to emancipate the religious layer from the state.
The fundamentalist current spread mainly among the youth. And many young people became religious leaders, sheikhs, and that changed the whole situation. They cut the links with the state and started taking their salaries from the movement itself. They consider it a matter of pride that they liberated Islam from the Israeli authorities.
4. Are the economic pressures on
International Viewpoint #168 • July 31, 1989 the Palestinians - in particular the loss of wages suffered by workers from the occupied territories who used to work in Israel - having any effect on the intifada?
People understand that it is a long-term struggle. But there is no doubt that the weakest point of the intifada is economic. West Bank workers are more and more to go back to work in Israel. There is no real help from outside.
On the other hand, there is a need for the Palestinian workers in Israel. For example, the attempt in Ashkelon to oust the Palestinian workers led to a breakdown in all the municipal services. The Israelis had to give it up after a day or two. • How has the Communist Party responded to the uprising?
The position of the CP traditionally has been that it accepted the Israeli state, but defended the civil rights of the Arabs in Israel. They have not questioned the character of Israel as a Jewish state. Their first reaction to the intifada was to say that it was for the occupied territories. It is only recently that they have begun referring to the Arabs in Israel as Palestinians. The intifada deepened the contradiction in their line, and led to a disillusion of growing numbers of Palestinians with them.
Many people left them, some even going to the fundamentalists. This bitterness is well expressed by a CP member I talked to who said, "We have done as much for the intifada as the Swedish CP." That is, they have offered support and solidarity, but no more than the Swedish CP might do. They have not been a part of the • Are any of them moving to the
There is a polarization. The overwhelming majority of the party is Palestinian, but the leadership is shared equally by Jews and Palestinians. Among the Palestinians, there is a radicalization, although this has so far not taken the form of organized groups breaking away. Those radicalizing to the left are still in the party, but are raising more and more questions.
On the other hand, there is a trend to the right among the Jewish members. They are getting closer and closer to the Zionist • To what extent has the intifada overcome divisions between Palestinians in the occupied territories and in Israel proper?
At the beginning of the intifada, there was the Day of Equality, marked by demonstrations in the Palestinian communities within Israel of a sort not
1948. Those mobilizations were followed by a very harsh repression. But the CP, which is the main leadership of the Israeli Arabs, has been more effective than the repression in restoring the
• What is the basis of the CP's hold then?
It has not suffered the same sort of repression from the Israeli state as the nationalists. At the same time, it gets important support from the outside, from the Soviet Union, which enables it to maintain a large apparatus. Moreover, it has a continuity going back before the formation of the Israeli state. Also, after 1948, the Palestinians in Israel were defeated, and demoralized, and suffered a setback in consciousness.
Potential rivals of the CP on the left have made important tactical errors, such as taking an abstentionist position toward elections. The nationalists have also generally refused to accept Jewish members. • What are the main activities of the Fourth International section in the
We are trying to develop a secular democratic front to contest elections, involving Abna '1-Balad [a left nationalist organization], currents from the CP and
If such a coalition is formed, it will have the problem of the law passed before the last election that requires recognizing the Jewish character of the state in order to be allowed to run for the Knesset.
If this attempt to form a coalition fails, we will call for a vote for either the CP or the Progressive List for Peace, without making a distinction between them. We also have plans to participate in the upcoming trade-union elections in the Histradrut in order to expose this organization as not being a real trade union and to call for the formation of real trade unions. • Is there any new radicalization among Israeli youth?
About a year ago, a group appeared, mainly high school students, called "the Mole." They are working very closely with us. The main recruitment to the section is coming now in this milieu. This development has led to a major increase in membership for the first time in many years. • Are these Jewish youth?
Yes. But recently two groups of young people from Palestinian villages have also gotten in touch with them. The Mole group is decentralized, a movement. That makes it easier for such groups to affiliate. An outstanding feature of this group, besides its combativity, is that it supports the intifada totally. • So the section's main orientation is toward young people?
Yes. But we are also doing politically important work in Yesh Gul, a protest organization among reserve soldiers; and in the Women's Committee for Palestinian women prisoners. *