CENTRAL AMERICA
T HE AGREEMENT reached in
the Honduran Caribbean port of Tela, contains the following points:
1 - Effective implementation of the Esquipulas accords, which forbid a government to have troops on its territory intended to destabilize a neighbouring government — obviously applicable to Honduras.
2 - Reassertion of the need to implement the plan to demobilize the Contras. This plan was adopted in February 1989, and was to be carried out in 90 days, but it was torpedoed by the US Congress in March 1989.
3 - calls on the United Nations to create an international peace-keeping force to assist in the demobilization of the Contras and guard the frontier between Nicaragua and Honduras to prevent any new infiltration.
International legal case suspended
The Nicaraguan president made some limited concessions to obtain these deci-
• The conditional and provisional suspension of the case brought by Nicaragua Court of Justice in The Hague for nonaccords. The case was certain to end with a judgement against Honduras. The Sandinistas are keeping their case in reserve to use as a bargaining counter without dropping it altogether.
• An appeal by the Nicaraguan, Honduran, Costa Rican and Guatemalan presidents addressed to the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN and the Salvadoran government. The appeal calls on the FMLN to "engage in a constructive dialogue in order to obtain a just and durable peace." Symmetrically, the presidents "urge the Salvadoran to engage in a dialogue to re-integrate the members of the FMLN in peaceful life."
The concession made here is limited; since the coming into office of the Alliance for National Renewal (ARENA) government the FMLN itself has demanded the opening of a "constructive dialogue." On August 7, 1989 the commanding general of the FMLN greeted the Tela accords in the following terms: "They constitute a victory for the revolutionary, progressive, independentist and democratic forces of the region, and we applaud them for this reason....Despite 10 forces put forward the thesis of a symme the fact that the government and armed
THE FIVE Central American presidents assembled once again on August 5-7, 1989 to try to escape from the impasse of their previous accords, Esquipulas I and I| and Costa del Sol (see article by G. Buster in IV167).
### ERIC TOUSSAINT try [between the Contras and the FMLN), their arguments were not taken into
"The FMLN reaffirms its desire to continue to contribute, along with the politi-
Archbishop of San Salvador and other social forces to the realization of a dialogue and negotiations with the government....[according to the accords] it is clear that the FMLN is an indigenous force with good reasons for waging war and with whom it is necessary to negotiate peace. Nobody can demobilize the FLN, because it exists inside the country and is a national force..."
In order to assess these accords, it is necessary to recall what Bush expecting from the four presidents opposed to Nicaragua. They were meant to declare that Nicaragua had not implemented the Esquipulas and Costa del Sol accords, and had thus shown itself to be an authoritarian dictatorship.
This would have justified both the continuation of US aid to the Contras until the Nicaraguan elections of February 1990 and the failure of Honduras to apply the February 1989 accord. Furthermore, the United States expected the governments of Guatemala, Honduras and Costa Rica to join with Salvador's Cristiani and put the FMLN in the bracket as the Contra. Bush administration's failure recognized
The Bush administration has failed miserably to get its way on these questions, and this has been recognized by various American commentators. Thus, the New York Times wrote on August 8, 1989: "The importance of this accord is that, for the first time, it sets a date for the departure of the so-called Contra rebels, with the unanimous agreement of the region's leaders. Among the signatories of the accord is Honduras' Azcona, whose country is the base for 6,000 to 10,000 Contras.
"The accord, reached in the face of stiff US opposition calls on the Contras to lay down their weapons voluntarily....The five presidents rejected a proposal by President Cristiani of Salvador that the dismantling of the Contras should be tied to a similar commitment to the disarmament of the leftist guerillas in Salvador...Many people see this accord as an important diplomatic victory for the Nicaraguans."
Throughout the negotiations, Bush put constant pressure on the four presidents opposed to the Sandinistas. The special correspondent of the Mexican daily, Excelsior, wrote on August 7, 1989: "The pressure reached its height during the final night....there was a danger that the summit would come to nothing and changes were made to the final texts of the resolutions.
US Congress blocks aid to
Honduras
The five presidents had originally agreed to a limit of 45 days for the disbanding of the Contras, but this was elimfrom the final version [and replaced by a limit of 90 days]"
The failure of the Bush administration is clearly not final. US imperialism retains important means of pressure for torpedoing the accord and will certainly use them. Thus, on August 16, Bush froze half of the aid voted by Congress to Honduras ($90m were blocked). A few days previously, Honduras had deployed its troops around the Contras' camps....
The regimes in power in Costa Rica and Guatemala are essentially allies of the United States, but this does not mean that they are inclined to do whatever Washington tells them. In recent years, they have adopted an attitude of "active neutrality", as the Guatemalan president put it.
He refused to enter into the binding alliance with Honduras and Salvador urged by the US after 1984. Costa Rica, meanwhile, expelled the Contras' armed forces from its territory in 1986 and 1987. Both these countries, whose bourgeoisies are the strongest in the region, aspire to play a leading role in Central America, which leads them to adopt a certain autonomy vis-a-vis Washington.
The presidents of Costa Rica and Guatemala, Arias and Cerezo, are virulently anti-Sandinista, but they do not want to support an attempt to crush Nicaragua
October 16, 1989 • #171 International Viewpoint militarily, since this would increase US control in the region and the internal tensions stimulated by a prolonged resistance by the Nicaraguan people.
This resistance would sharpen the internal social contradictions in Guatemala and Costa Rica at a time when the Guatemalan guerilla movement is regaining strength and the popular movements in the two countries have undergone a significant revival.
A few days before the signing of the accords, Arias was faced with a general strike, while in July, Cerezo had to deal with a massive teachers' and civil servants' strike. It is developments such as these throughout the region, combined with the social entrenchment of the Sandinista regime, that makes
Anas and
Cerezo take their distance from the United States.
The defeat of Salvador's Cristiani at
Tela clearwas cut. The FMLN has been undertaking a high level of military activity for over a year and shows no signs of slackening.
Its ability to operate in the cities seems to be on the increase.
(December 1989), they will still have Lost all their legitimacy in the region and at the international level.
This will be an important argument in the elections. To obtain this, the Sandinisias have had to make concessions to the right-wing opposition, to the Church and to the employers in spite of the fact that concessions had been made during previous negotiations. Most of the concessions took place in two stages.
The first, in September 1987, involved the reopening of the daily paper La Prensa and the Catholic Radio, and the adoption of the reactionary Archbishop Obado y Bravo as a mediator. The second stage was in February 1989, when the calling of the February 1990 elections was
CENTRAL AMERICA
Western European countries after Ortega's European tour in April.
To win the elections, the Sandinistas have decided that their candidates will appeal directly to the masses. There are several thousand candidates, since presidential, legislative and municipal elections are taking place at the same time.
The selection process is very open. Each
Sandinista organization discusses extensively the candidates that they are putting forward, as well as those put forward by other Sandinista
Every organizations.
candidate then has to get the go ahead at the local level.
Furthermore, over recent months, the
Sandinista government has begun to reorientate its economic policies. It is its own social base that has far
SO borne the brunt of the austerity measures initiated in 1988.
Nonetheless, the risks of an electoral victory for the right should not be overlooked.
The danger is all the greater in that the United States has managed to convince the majority of the opposition parties to put for-
However, there are no signs of an insurrectional situation.
The relationship of forces has not News item: 15% of adult Americans cannot locate the United States on a map. changed decisively in favour of the revolution, and the Soviet Union has used this to try to convince the FMLN to reach a negotiated settlement.
However, the latter has shown considerable independence from Moscow. The dialogue between the FMLN and the government which began on September 12 in Mexico, can by no means be considered as a sign of softening by the FMLN. This dialogue is a sign above all of the weakness of the Cristiani government.
The Sandinistas made very careful preparations for the Tela summit. They wanted to avoid giving the four neighbouring presidents any excuse for questhe legitimacy of the electoral process underway. Any such questioning would strengthen the international campaign being undertaken under US auspices to present the elections as a "chronicle of a fraud foretold."
This would be a new obstacle to the application of the plan to demobilize the Contras. Ortega had one trump card in his hand when he arrived: a few days previously the Sandinistas had arrived at an agreement on the electoral laws with almost all the opposition parties.
The Tela accords are a victory for the Sandinistas, since, even if the Contras are not totally disarmed by the set date announced at the Costa del Sol summit in the framework of a so-called "democratization" of Nicaragua. Discussions with the employers also began at this time.
At Tela, rather than making new concessions on the domestic front, the Sandinistas tasted the fruits of their previous diplomacy and of the consolidation of the revolution. So far, the policy of concessions to the right-wing opposition has not posed real problems for the revolutionary regime. The freedom of expression and activity allowed to the whole opposition has stimulated the activity of the Sandinista movement itself, confirming their commitment to plural-
Election challenge for Sandinistas
The February 1990 elections represent an enormous challenge for the Sandinistas. They are trying to get a new massive of show of support to the revolution in the ballot boxes, despite an extremely grave deterioration of the economy and foreign interference in the electoral campaign. The US' financial aid to the rightwing opposition is already greater than the total aid granted to Nicaragua by the ward common canro for the presidenGodoy for the vicepresidency are the best possible candidates that the right could put forward. On the other hand, its ability to mobilize seems very limited - the recent meeting in Managua to support these candidates drew 5,000 people, according to the Spanish daily El Pais.2
The Sandinistas are right to insist that the elections have to be won not only in Managua, but also in Washington and the West European capitals.
They have therefore invited a large number of international observers for the duration of the election process and are calling for international solidarity to win their election battle. * 1. Tomas Borge put it quite cleary five years ago: "The existence of critical people, oppositionists, dissi•dents, malcontents and reactionaries gives life and vigour to the revolution. Confrontation and polemics develop the ideological and political muscles of the people. It is a permanent exercise programme, an antidote to sclerosis and passivity." (Granma August 7, 1984) 2. Violeta Chamorro is the owner of the opposition daily La Prensa. She was a minister in the first coalition government immediately after the revolution. Her husband, Pedro Chamorro, was the leader of the antiStonship bore i rend was sassinated by the die. 1 1 tatorship before the revolution.
----- photo credits and running heads -----
112 E
After the elections - new coalition, same policies?
PRIME MINISTER Ruud Lubbers had an easy victory and his party, the Christian democratic party (CDA) kept Its 54 seats in parliament. This was despite the fact that discontent has been
International Viewpoint #171 • October 16, 1989
NETHERLANDS
HE elections became necessary
T when the government fell in early
May, a year before new elections were scheduled. The immediate reason for the break-down of the coalition growing during the seven years of the coalition government was a disagreement between the governbetween the CDA and the right-wing liberals (VVD). The VVD ment parties about tax-proposals for the financing of a plan against pollution. The international press wrote that this was the
The social democratic party (PvdA) did not succeed in its first time ever that a government fell over campaign to become bigger than the Christian democrats, an ecological issue. That is however only part of the truth behind the collapse of the losing votes and three seats. The new Green-Left coalition
(Groen Links) won three seats, which is less than what was
An additional factor was the persistent expected after opinion polls predicted a gain of five seats or leadership crisis in the VVD. This led to a decline in the influence of this party in the more. The three small right-wing Christian parties gained one coalition, which was more and more domiseat, the "left" liberals (D66) three and the racist Centrumparti] nated by Lubbers and his Christian demore-enters parliament with one seat.
crats. Frustration grew in the VVD, and its leaders hoped a hard stand on the tax proposal would be an opportunity to raise its profile. But many of their voters didn't understand why the VVD had broken up a government they themselves called very successful, and which they were going to recreate after the elections as if nothing had happened.