The road to insurrection
B IRTH of the revolutionary
organizations in the 1970s. In 1980, they form the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). IN 1970, the Farabundo Marti People's Liberation Forces (FPL) were founded, on the basis of a split from the Salvadoran Communist Party, which had been following an electoral and stagist policy. Among the founders of the FPL were Salvador Caetano Carpio (former secretary of the Salvadoran CP) and Anna Maria, future guerrilla leader and founder of the class-struggle teachers' union, ANDES-June
In 1972, the Party of the Socialist Revolution and its armed wing, the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), were formed, coming out of radicalized Christian circles. In 1974-1975, a group split from the PRS-ERP and formed the National Resistance. Its armed wing, the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FARN), was led by Roque Dalton. Central American aspirations of revolutionaries
In 1978, the Revolutionary Party of Central American Working People (PRTC) was formed. Its aspiration was to build its organization throughout Central America. In fact, it had an affiliate in Honduras.
These four organizations declared themselves to be Marxist and took their inspiration from the lessons of the Cuban and Vietnamese revolutions. Thus, they opted for armed struggle and for linking the tasks of national liberation and those of a socialist character. They gradually went beyond focoism (an oversimplification of the Castroist strategy), as a result of the failures of the LatinAmerican guerrilla movements, both urban and rural.
These organizations defined themselves in opposition to the line followed by the Salvadoran Communist Party. With the rise of the struggles of the Salvadoran masses, each of these organizations built its own mass organization, which competed more and more with each other. Nonetheless, by 1978 these revolutionary organizations came virtually to dominate the bulk of the mass movement. October 1979 — A baptism of fire IN the aftermath of the Sandinista revolution (July 1979) and in the context of a rise of mass struggles, a
THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE of the FMLN Is the culmination of a long process, political and social as well as military. The landmarks are presented in the following chronology.
### ARNOLD BERTHU military coup was carried out against the dictatorship of General Romero. In October 1979, a civilian-military junta was set up, supported by the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), the Revolutionary National Movement (MNR) of Guillermo Ungo (present chair of of the Revolutionary Democratic Front [FDR]) and the Salvadoran Communist Party. Junta sets in motion radical reforms
This junta has the endorsement of US president Carter and a part of the employers' organization, who saw it as an alternative to a revolutionary solution of the Nicaraguan type. This junta set in motion radical reforms. The four organizations opted for intransigent opposition to the junta. They thus underwent their baptism
By spiking the reformist trap, they saved the revolutionary perspective. In January 1980, confronted by an impetuous growth of the mass movement and a rightward radicalization of the armed
EL SALVADOR forces repressing this movement, the junta went into crisis. The revolutionary upsurge strongly radicalized the Church, up to the top levels. The archbishop, Monsignor Romero, came out for the mass movement, and issued appeals to the soldiers to refuse to repress the population. In March 1980, in the middle of a sermon, Monsignor Romero was murdered by the death squads (led by Major D'Aubuisson), an integral part of the army. Repression becomes more and more massive.
In March April 1980, the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR) was formed, based on what had been a left component of the civilian-military junta represented by the MR and a split from the PDC, the Social Christian People's Movement (MPSC), led by Rubén Zamora. Revolutionary organizations overcome divisions
Progressively, the revolutionary organizations overcame their divisions, agreed to form a unified leadership (the DRU in May 1980). They finally combined their efforts, forming in October 1980 the Farabundo Marti National Liber-
The CP, for its part, made a 180-degree turn in February-March 1980 (the only CP in Latin America to do so), opting for armed struggle. In a self-criticism that was to become a landmark, its general secretary, Shaffik Handal, said in substance that the Salvadoran CP had to change its strategic perspective and define the revolution as combining the tasks of national liberation, democratic tasks and the beginning of socialist transformation. He added that this was the only way to keep the Nicaraguan experience (in which the CP was thrown in the garbage can of history) from being repeated in El Salvador. In the fall of 1980, the repression reached a peak. Many of the revolutionary cadres in the urban areas had to fall back into the guerrilla movement or go underground. In January 1981 the FMLN launched a military offensive that it regarded as the final onslaught. THE masses had participated on a large scale through 1980 in various general strikes. But they were partially disorganized by the repres sion, and were not able to rise up After managing to gain control of key certain key cities, the FMLN organized a retreat eight days after
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International Viewpoint #174 • November 27, 1989
EL SALVADOR the start of its offensive. Formation of the FDR-FMLN Alliance 1981-1984: The bourgeoisie continued to rely on massive repression (40,000 people were killed between 1979 and 1983). The country was ruled by an alliance between ARENA and the National Reconciliation Party, forces closely linked to the army, which played a key political role. During this period, the FMLN built a real revolutionary army, took control of 20% to 25% of the national territory and began to regain a foothold in the cities.
It adopted a policy combining military pressure, work to reorganize the masses and a proposal for dialogue and negotiation with the regime, while maintaining an insurrectional strategic perspective. It never envisaged laying down arms "before structural changes designed to deal with the roots of social injustice are undertak1984-1989: Recomposition of the mass movement culminating in the formation of the National Union of Salvadoran Workers (UNTS) in February 1986. THE UNTS includes a broad spectrum of mass organizations, industrial unions, service workers' unions, the peasant cooperative movement, teachers, students unemployed committees. Christian Base Communities also grew, a movement is organized for the return of the refugees to the zones controlled by the FMLN (especially after 1987).
US imperialism prevented the reelection of ARENA by giving massive support to the Christian Democratic Party. It thus followed a policy of low-intensity warfare, creating a limited democratic space and promising to undertake the second phase of the agrarian reform decreed by the junta in October 1979. At the same time, it pursued the war against the FMLN, while carrying out selective repression of the mass
The Duarte-US project rapidly eroded. The reforms were not carried out. A part of the social Christian organizations withdrew their support from the PDC. Poverty grew. The UNTS gained ground. The FMLN stepped up its military activities perceptibly, and regained an impressive base in the cities. This was the context in which ARENA won the legislative elections in March 1988 and the presidential
The vote for ARENA was above all a vote against the PDC. The FMLN boycotted the elections. But the FDR participated in the March 1989 elections through a left electoral alliance, Convergencia Democratica. (Its exiled leaders, Guillermo Ungo of the MNR and Rubén Zamora of the MPSC returned to El Salvador at the end of 1987 thanks to the military strength 4 The alliance get a small percentage of the of the FMLN, as they themselves say. )
votes (about 4%).
These discordant positions temporarily gave rise to some teethbut the FDR-FMLN alliance held up. Moreover, the rate of participation in the election was the lowest since 1984. The FMLN's boycott had made an impact. After June 1989, ARENA held all the levers of power, and finally got the support of the Bush administration. The FMLN systematically used the weapon of dialogue-negotiation, first with the PDC but also with ARENA
Space for political action restored
The fight for dialogue restored a space for political action by the masses and their organizations. Thousands of people went into the streets to demand that the government negotiate with the FMLN, which enabled them indirectly to affirm that the FMLN was a legitimate force that could not be gotten around. A novel dual-power situation arose as a result of the FMLN's strong military position. Two opposing powers confronted each other, and not only in the countryside.
Several factors stood in the way of a resolution of this dualFirst, there was the threat of direct US military intervention if the regime started to fall. Secondly, the mass movement had not reached the 1979-1980 level of self-activity. The memory of the massive repression of that period continueed to weigh heavily. This memory was kept fresh by a repression that, while selective remained murder-
As a result, the decision several times considered to launch a general military offensive coinciding with a popular uprising, was on each occasion put off to a more favorable conjuncture. The masses wanted to be sure that the FMLN would be able to inflict decisive blows on the army. For its part, the FMLN wanted the maximum assurance that the general milnot fail to be accompanied by an uprising of the popu-
Thirdly, the Salvadoran army had been considerably reinforced since 1980. It had grown from 13,000 to 52,000 men, and no cracks appeared in it, despite the very heavy casualties inflicted by the FMLN (an average of about 500 a month in 1987-1989). US aid was enormous — more than a million and a half dollars a day (3 billion dollars since 1981).
Fourthly, the progress of the ReaganGorbachev and subsequently BushGorbachev negotiations on both global and regional questions represented major difficulty for the FMLN, even if it loudly declared that the détente did not mean that new revolution-
-JamaicaHONDURA Santa Ama EL SALVAR SAN SALVADOI Km ary victories could not be won in Central America and particularly in El Salvador.
On the other hand, the agreements between the five Central-American presidents had not up until then represented a real obstacle to the FMLN's strategy. The difficulty lay above all in the Soviet pressures on the Cubans and Sandinistas to limit tensions in the region. Fortunately, the Cubans and Sandinistas did not stop
FMLN shows great tactical flexibility
In its nine years of existence, the FMLN has confronted a series of major challenges, sometimes in very unfavorable circumstances. It has, nonetheless, been able to show tactical flexibility, exploiting every weakness of the enemy in order to gain the initiative militarily, socio-politically and diplomatically.
Every important initiative has involved an approach to the masses to increase their confidence in themselves, to advance their organization, to encourage them to arm themselves and posing the question of the seizure of power. The FMLN's tactical flexibility has not undermined its strategic
What is more, the FMLN has shown that it is possible to build a pluralist vanguard, not striving at any price to unite the various revolutionary forces under the dominance of whichever of them is considered to be the most Leninist. The rivalries among the components of the FMLN have at times created major tensions, but despite that they have not impaired unity in action at the decisive moments. * 1. "It would be absurd to consider the Salvadoran conflict as an integral part of the East-West conflict that could thus be resolved by an agreement between the USSR and the USA. The revolutions will not wait. They represent an inevitable social process. In the Sal vadoran case, the level of the crisis afflicting the system points to a social explosion as a result of the strength gathered by the revolutionary movement....A détente at the Central American level would be possible only if the structural problems of the region found a solution." Villalobos in the magazine Universidad, University of El Salvador, April 1989, p. 10.
The political revolution
- and the dangers
EAST GERMANY The end of socialism? IMPRESSIONISM, a tendency to take appearances for reality, an inability to understand the underlying movements of history, even when they are glaringly obvious, has always characthat threaten it terized the ideology of the ruling class. At unexpected turning points, this does not fail to put a strong pressure on the workers' movement, including its revolutionary wing.
THE POLITICAL REVOLUTION in East Germany is also a spectacular rebirth of workers' democracy and excited and exciting debates about the perspectives for the revolution and for socialism. At the beginning of November, our comrade
Ernest Mandel was invited by the Humboldt University to give two lectures. The opposition took advantage of this to organize a public discussion on social democracy between
Mandel and several representatives of the East German
Communist Party (SED). In these debates, Mandel spoke as a representative of the Fourth International and was able to present the general program of our current. He also had the opportunity to attend the mass demonstrations that preceded the fall of the Berlin Wall.
ERNEST MANDEL