What will the United Left do with its electoral victory?
THE RESULTS of the Spanish state general election of
October 29 provided a shock for Socialist prime minister
PART from the fact that the
SPANISH STATE
A socialists (PSOE) kept their majority
- something in which it appears fraud played a
Felipe Gonzalez - after some initial confusion and disputed role — the most important fact about the votes it now appears that the Socialists have lost their overall elections was, without doubt, the results majority in parliament (see box). The parties of the right made of the United Left (Izquierda Unida - 10, the Communist Party dominated coalino progress on their share of the vote at the last elections in tion). This is the opinion of most of the
1986, and the main beneficiaries of the disillusionment with media, and is generally accepted by public
Gonzalez were the Communist-dominated United Left opinion. In this case appearance and reality coincide. The general election results coalition, who gained almost exactly the 4.5% of the vote that saw a reinforcement of IU, not only of its the Socialists lost. We print below an editorial commentary on parliamentary representation but also of the election results from Combate, the weekly paper of the its political project. This will have an
Liga Comunista Revolucionaria (LCR, section of the Fourth impact on the overall political situation, and will create new and serious problems
International in the Spanish state).
for the radical left. It is important that we approach these problems cautiously and without haste, allowing time for practical experience to supply essential and reliable facts since no magic solution exists, either an organizational formula or a political idea, that will allow us to resolve problems just like that. Nonetheless, it is possible now to take a look at the likely consequences of the position won by the
IU on October 29.
United Left makes spectacular gains
In order to arrive at a balanced assessment of the importance of the election results it is is necessary look at things from several angles. In comparison with the 1986 general elections the picture is clear enough. The IU has made a spectacular advance; its vote rose evenly throughout the Spanish state. IU's vote doubled in every voting district, making particular progress in those areas that have traditionally voted for the left, in spectacular contrast with the PSOE. On the other hand we should remember the scores that used to be won by the Spanish Communist Party (PCE). In 1979 there were 2,300,000 fewer voters than in 1989, but the PCE obtained 100,000 more votes then than the IU now. The degree of recovery with respect to the position of the PCE is thus modest. And with its 9% then, the PCE was in the tail of the important European CPs on the electoral terrain. Finally, the idea defended by the IU that its electoral results are a "deferred payment" for the general strike of December last year is a double-edged sword. One bright commentator on the PSOE's "civilian plot" hastened to express his agreement with this idea, concluding that it is thus proved that the whole social support for the general strike adds up to the 900,000 extra votes for the IU.
COMBATE
If the total price paid by the system for a general strike of 10 million workers was really such a vote shift, we should be talking not about a "deferred payment" but a bargain, especially when we remember that the big loser in the strike came back to win in the ballot boxes. In our previous editorial, we stated that the election result was not basically the product of the general strike, but of the truce that followed it. All these facts are needed to enable us to establish the real dimensions of the IU's success, although they should not be allowed to conceal that a success is what it was.
How can the PSOE be politically weakened?
What consequences can we expect? Our analytical starting point is the IU's positions with regard to the problems that have, above all after the general strike,
Election Results (1986 FIGURES IN BRACKETS) PSOE (Socialists) Partido Popular (rightist) IU (CP led coalition) CDS (rightist) CiU (Catalan nationalist) PNV (Basque nationalist) Herri Batasuna (Basque revolutionary nationalist) Other nationalists
Seats % of vote 175(184) 39.5(44.3) 106(105) 25.8(26.1)
9.05(4.6) 18(7) 14(19). 7.9(9.1) 18(18) 5.04(5.0) 5(6) 1.24(1.5) 4(5) 1.06(1.1) 10(5) 3.52(1.8)
been the central concerns of the left: how can the PSOE be politically weakened — a necessary condition for the establishment of a government favourable to the workers? And how to carry forward the recomposition and reinforcement of the social movements? These are, of course questions of different kinds, but they are also inter-related.
The success of the IU in the elections affects the first question above all. Anguita has effectively managed to establish himself as a rising leader, something that has great importance in the personality cult conditions of our political system, which prevail also in the CP tradition. Furthermore, the IU appears as a force, something that will probably be confirmed in regional elections. More et, the ou 17 next municipal and
International Viewpoint #174 • November 27, 1989
SPANISH STATE / SWITZERLAND appears as a force that is gaining by taking support from the PSOE. The attraction of this for socialist personalities and especially the surprising implicit support from the leader of the UGT, the trade union federation linked to the PSOE, Redondo
(although perhaps given with a heavy
Finally there is the hope that Anguita might have learned from the disastrous electoral experiences of his predecessors, and will try to make more intelligent use of his 18 deputies.
All this gives IU its principal political axis: to present itself as the only real pos-
Sibility for a leftward shift in the parliamentary left. The fact that the Greens are still far from getting deputies, and that radical left has no weight on the electoralinstitutional left (with the very specific exception of Herri Batasuna) also contribute to making the IU the only candidate for this position.
The second problem is more complicated. It would be a serious error to believe that the problem of the recomposition of the social movements is of no interest to
IU or is irrelevant to its electoral results. It is likely that the IU or rather the PCE, which is what counts in this sphere, is going to use its victory in the elections in order to carry out what we might call a
"normalization" of the situation in the social movements. That is, to create a situation where the PCE controls or holds dominant positions in the most important
Radical left strong in social
The idea would be to finally put an end to the "abnormal" situation that existed from the beginning of the 1980s until the defeat in the anti-NATO referendum, a situation in which the radical left was stronger than the PCE in the social movements, especially in the peace movement. At the same time the splits in the PCE led to a weakening of its hold on the Workers' Commissions (CCOO).
The IU will use its parliamentary position to achieve this objective. An idea of how they are going to work, as well as the total lack of scruples in carrying out their plan, was given by the statements of Sartorius, when he announced that the issue of the GAL (murder gangs recruited by the Spanish police to assassinate Basque militants) would be one of their first initiatives. "IU has always taken the lead on the GAL issue, and has at times found itself somewhat isolated. From now on, we hope to no longer be so isolated." (EL Mundo November 4, 1989)
In reality, it will try to use its deputies to "stand alone" on issues with popular appeal or which reflect the aspirations of the movements, seeking to displace people who have put much time into fighting for these objectives. But the profit that IU can draw in this respect from its deputies and its role as a "political alternative"
should not be underestimated when the most important battles take place on the ground in the movements and in its organ-
The programmatic battles are not to be feared. Despite Anguita's obsessions on the subject, the IU programme says nothing of any significance, and in any case played no role in its electoral rise. It should not be forgotten that there is a crisis in the PCE that current events in the
East will aggravate. To refer to the "consistent implementation" of the Declaration of Human Rights, the Spanish
Constitution and the European Single Act as the basis for a "left policy" is pure hot air, and represents an alternative neither to the PSOE or anything else.
In reality, IU will continue pragmatically to seek the themes that will benefit it at the given moment, in the context of its basic interests, which are to strengthen or keep control over the most important organizations of the social movements.
This will involve a battle with the radical left that it will conduct with all the means at its disposal. This is the reason for the first signs of a resumption of bureaucratic attacks on the trade-union left in the
CCOO immediately after the elections.
Radical left must use its positions well
Fortunately, things are different in other movements. The overall evolution of the situation, that is to say, whether the relatively low level of social mobilization continues will, in the last analysis, determine how far IU gets with its plans. But, in any case, as far as movements and mobilizations are concerned, the radical left continues to hold important positions in its hands. What is needed is for us to be able to use these positions well and, if
We said at the start that it was necessary to consider the problems posed by IU's victory carefully and without haste. It is particularly important to think critically about the following question: IU has put itself forward as the fundamental reference point for all those to the left of PSOE who believe, for various reasons, that it is important to strengthen an alternative of
On the other hand, all those that are definitely to the left of the IU and believe that the essential task at the moment to strengthen the radical left lack, not a common reference - the creation of which would be in any case too ambitious and beyond particular mobilizations or strug costly - but points of contact going gles. And this lack weighs on us, and in a negative sense. Because it is above all necessary to strengthen the movements, especially in the light of our own weakness. For in political intervention and in the common effort that is required, there is still a lot of work to do. *
N SEPTEMBER 1980, two young socialists from Basel hit on the idea of proposing a campaign for the abolition of the army. The previous year the Swiss Young Socialists, an organization with an anti-militarist tradition, chose
"the politics of peace" as the subject of their annual campaign. From the start of the 1980s pacifist demonstrations of thousands of people took place!. Under impact of these mobilizations, in March 1981, the
Young Socialists decided to add a simple question to their annual theme: "Does
Switzerland need an army?" Thinking developed rapidly along these lines and the idea of launching a popular initiative on this question began to take shape?.
The Young Socialists did not, however, get the support they had hoped for from the Swiss Socialist Party (PSS). The latter was rather embarrassed by the anti- militarist fervour which threatened to spoil the party's image of trustworthiness and respect for institutions. The Confederation is, in fact, ruled by a governmental college of seven ministers from the Radical Party, the Christian Democratic Party, the Democratic Centre Union and the
Socialist Party, the so-called "Magic formula".