Kohl's plan for "re-unification"
THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT chancellor
Helmut Kohl presented his famous ten-point plan to the West German parliament on
International Viewpoint #76 • December 25, 1989
EAST GERMANY native to West Germany in the
NLY the Greens expressed some
November 28. The scheme aimed at a criticisms, defending in a more or less reunification of the two Germanies, more clear way the right to selfconcretely at a takeover of the East German determination of East German territory and economy by West German citizens. It was only some days later that some SPD leaders
Imperialism. The liberal partner in the called for recognition of the right-wing coalition government, the FDP, frontier with Poland and for and also the SPD (social democrats)
drawing conclusions from the new situation as regards arma-
Immediately Indicated their agreement in ment. But there was still an agreement in principle, even if the rhetoric invoking "reunification" was rejected, for example by Willy Brandt, who prefers to talk about a "new unification"
(Neuvereinigung) to avoid allusions to the
Third Reich.
The following are the ten points of the
Kohl Plan:
1. Immediate financial aid for medical and humanitarian purposes. In the relatively near future, abolition of "welcome money" (Begrüssungsgeld) in favor of joint financing by East and West Germany of currency for East Germans visiting
West Germany.
2. Intensification of economic and technical cooperation, starting with public transport; greater cooperation in the ecological sphere.
Creation of market conditions demanded
3. Free elections, "irreversible" political and economic reform and abolition of
"bureaucratic planning" as conditions for massive aid, because people want economic freedom, " opening up East Germany to investment from the
West and creation of "market conditions."
4. "A contractual community" of East and West Germany (as proposed by Modrow, the new East German head of gomyriad of vernment), reflecting a agreements and joint commissions (on economic affairs, transport, science, medical care, ecology and so on).
5. A "confederal structure" leading to a federation of the two Germanies, and therefore to a unitary state along federal lines (as West Germany is now). The precondition for this was free elections in reunification
East Germany. German would not be carried out in one stroke.
6. Integration of German reunification in the process of economic, political and ultural reunification of Europe and in th
14 context of overall East-West relation principle.
### MANUEL KELLNER
7. Association of East Germany with the capitalist EEC through a trade and cooperation treaty, including involvement in "the 1992 perspective" [the Single Act].
8. Intensification of the process begun in Helsinki in building institutions to organize mutual relations in the economic, ecological and cultural spheres between the Eastern and Western European countries.
9. "Supporting" the negotiations for disarmament in line with the world situation by negotiating with East Germany (i.e., nothing concrete as regards West German disarmament).
10.. An overall policy, with an awareness of the problems that it can run into at each stage, aimed at the fulfillment of the right of the German people to national self-determination.
East German intellectuals oppose Kohl plan
In opposition to this, a group of left intellectuals in East Gemany issued a public appeal on November 26, whose main passages were aimed at defending the sovereignty of East Germany and the historic opportunity to build a credible socialist alternative: "Either we stress the independence of East Germany as a state and try with all our strength...to build a society of solidarity in our country, in which peace, social justice, individual freedom, freedom to travel and the protection of the environment are guaranteed. Or else, we give in to the brutal and unacceptable economic pressures posed by the influential economic and political circles as conditions for aid to East Germany and...sooner or later East Germany will be taken over by West Germany.
" Let us take the first road. We still have an opportunity to develop a socialist alterframework of equal and respectful relations with all states in Europe. We can still hark back to the antifascist and humanist ideals that were our starting point.." We cannot harbor any illusions about the mood and consciousness among the population in East Germany. It is true that opposition groups have come out against "reunification," as well as the SED (a few days before he lost his job as secretary general, Krenz did his best to discredit the appeal mentioned above by signing it). In vain, because the people of East Germany are familiar with the political and moral difference between "socialists" like Krenz and socialists like Stefan Heym and Christa Wolf, who were in the group that issued the appeal. Slogans for a united German homeland
However, the majority of opposition groups and also in the SED are for some sort of confederation, or simply for unification without calling it "reunification." And in the great mass demonstrations, especially in Leipzig, slogans for "a united German homeland" have become very popular. Some speakers have even gotten hoots and whistles when they have pointed to the dangers of being gobbled up by West German capital and by the powerful West German state.
In recent days, there has been a very clear differentiation in the positions in the mass demonstrations, with some calling for a united Germany and others waving banners or placards with slogans such as "We do not want to become a cabbage [Kohl] plantation."
Nonetheless, unlike the first weeks of the mass upsurge in East Germany, revanchist and reactionary restorationist plans can base themselves on feelings expressed by a section of the masses. Of course, these plans aim at a restoration of capitalism in a form dominated by the big West German trusts, and thus also at the abolition of all remaining gains of the non-capitalist economy, especially in terms of social benefits and work tempos.
If these plans begin to be carried out concretely, the workers will probably be able to see more concretely that they are the ones who will have to pay. *
Counter-insurgency, terror and democracy
Davao
T HE PRINCIPLES of counter-
insurrection, being preached today in both Manila and Washington, are not really new. They include ideas which had already been put into practice in the Philippines in the 1950s, when the government succeeded in defeating the Huk peasant rebellion, which was based in the centre of Luzon island.
But today's doctrine of "Low Intensity
PHILIPPINES
"THE KEY to the counter-revolution is counter-mobilization
Conflict" (LIC) is conspicuously different and counter-organization". Since the fall of the Marcos from the dominant orientation during the dictatorship?, US and Philippine military leaders have decade 1965-1975 — that of military escalation in reaction to the development of an rediscovered the importance of politics, psychological armed revolutionary movement. This reoperations and the local organization of the population in the evaluation of the politics of counterinsurgency follows a double failure: the struggle against the Communist movement. In the long term, defeat of the American army in Vietnam the implementation of this new doctrine risks posing more and the inability of the Marcos regime to problems than it will solve. But, in the short term, it has halt the expansion of the guerrilla moveenabled the government on several occasions to score some ment in the Philippines.
What then does LIC entail? The accent is successes, in placing the Communist Party of the Philippines no longer put on big and costly military
(CPP) and the guerrillas on the defensive politically.
operations, which often prove politically counter-productive, inasmuch as they carry the risk of "unfortunate mistakes" with regard to the civilian population. Nonetheless, as Colonel John Waghelstein notes?, this doctrine does not only advocate limited engagement.
What LIC means, in fact, is "political, economic and psychological warfare, with the military being a distant fourth in many cases". In a chilling formula, Waghelstein explains that Low Intensity Conflict is
"total war at the grassroots level."