PAUL PETITJEAN ment of the US secret services. Strong tensions express themselves regularly between the several trade-union confederations of the Philippines. European social democracy seeks to exploit these to isolate the most radical confederation, the May 1 Movement (KMU). Under Marcos, its activity was limited by the fact that the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP), the local affiliate of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU — dominated by the social democratic led confederations), was linked to the dictatorship. Today, it is orientated towards the Aquino regime, which is a good deal more presentable in the international arena.
In the Philippines, one of the principal characteristics of LIC is the organization of the civilian population into armed militias (the "vigilante" groups) which directly engage in counter-revolutionary action. The core of these militias is constituted by the paramilitary groups officially termed Civilian Armed Forces Geographic Units (CAFGU), the religious sects, the private guards of local notables or "Godfathers" former soldiers and officers, and repentant ex-guerillas (see IV 141, May 16, 1988). 1. Colonel Ismael Villareal, Deputy Commander in Chief of Operations, cited by the Institute for Popular Democracy (IPD) in "The Political and Religious Right in the Philippines". 2. Ferdinand Marcos was elected president in 1965 following an election considered to be fraudulent. He reinforced his dictatorship from 1972 onwards, with the declaration of martial law, which was not lifted until 1981. He was overthrown by the mass mobilizations that followed the massive fraud in the presidential election of February 7, 1986, when Marcos was declared to have "defeated" Cory Aquino (see /Vs 92, February 10, 1986, 93, February 24, 1986, 95, March 24, 1986). 3i. Colonel Johe Waghelstein commands the 7ch Spc 15 cial Force of the US Army.
International Viewpoint #76 • December 25, 1989
PHILIPPINES
These local organizations multiplied in the archipelago after the fall of the Marcos dictatorship; the old para-military militias
- the Civilian Home Defence Forces
(CHDF) of painful memory — were discredited and there was no longer a strong central power capable of controlling the proliferation of armed groups of every kind. The widespread emergence of the
"vigilantes" is above all a specifically Philippine phenomenon, the heritage of a past both distant (the fragmentation of state power and the strength of the great provincial families) and more recent (the politicization of the army under
Marcos and the emergence of extreme-right, religious fundamentalist currents).
The proponents of LIC understood well how to profit from this windfall.
The chief strength of LIC lies in its ability to utilize existing and deeply-rooted organizations produced by local history, rather than creating brand new counterrevolutionary organizations.
LIC benefits also from the country's colonial past. This has generated a multitude of links between
United the
States and the Philippines which facilitate considerably the multi-faceted intervention of US imperialism in the formulation and implementation of the politics of counter-insurgency.
In April 1987 President
Reagan officially authorized the CIA to operate in the Philippines. A budget of $10 million was allocated to surof the dictatorship, the US government sensed the need to widen the base of the Philippine regime among the bourgeoisie and to reinforce the organization of the population. In a document adopted in January 19855, it came out in favour of political and economic reforms to make the corridors of power more open to the Philippine elite, without however putting in question the existence of the Marcos
Other measures concerned the armed forces. The aim was first and foremost to reinforce their efficiency by improving ang KOMUNISMO!
has strengthened the formal bonds between our governments and added a human dimension which makes US-
Philippine ties a special relationship for both countries. If we are to have such special relationships among the future American and Philippine military leaders, we must invest in them now, by providing opportunities to train and associate together"
The "special relations" between the US and the Philippines are not confined to the military sphere. They concern also political movements, religious sects and private lobbies. Particularly close links have grown up between the "New Right" in the United States and the religious right in the Philippines. The activity of American far right personalities has been so flagrant that it has provoked a warning from the
Chamber of Representatives, which passed a resolution saying that such
"blatant interference in the domestic affairs" of the Philippines constituted "a threat to the development of a truly democratic and pluralist society"?.
Among the individuals involved are Ray Cline, former deputy director of the
CIA; and John Singlaub, a retired army officer who is head of the World Anti-
Communist League. During his stay in the Philippines,
Singlaub benefitted from with numerous contacts highly placed personalities, such as Teodoro Locsin, veillance and covert actions.* As for the CPP, it decided to launch direct
Demonstration in Manila: the placard reads "Death to communism" attacks on the American presence. In April 1989, an urban unit of the New People's Army (NPA — guerrilla movement led by the CPP) killed Colonel James Rowe, an American officer specializing in counterrevolutionary activity.
US policy in the Philippines is not without its contradictions. Diverse governmental agencies and numerous private pressure groups are involved, and their actions are sometimes difficult to homogenize. Genuine conflicts of orientation divided the US administration following the assassination of opposition politician Benigno Aquino in 1983. But this diversity also permits Washington to maintain contacts with a wide spectrum of political forces in the Philippines, from moderate to extreme right, from the government to dissident elements in the army.
The growth of the NPA led Washington to re-evaluate its priorities in the area of 16 its non-military aspect. Faced by the crisis counter-insurgency, putting the accent on
(DR) the quality of "counter-propaganda" and the civic actions presented as "a necessary adjunct to military action". Aid should be directed above all to improving the mobility of the government forces, their firepower and their communications. Rather than ultra-modern F16 planes, the Pentagon offered trucks, armored vehicles, helicopter parts and radio material. Finally, Washington wished to reinforce its control over the Philippine army and thereformation and training.
One of the most important members of the Defense Department unambiguously spelled out the implications of this last measure: "Most importantly, the prowith the younger AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) officers who will be its future leaders. The special friendship among American and Philippine military personnel which was forged during World War II adviser to President Aquino; Fidel Ramos, the defense minister; Juan Ponce Enrile, a former defense minister and today one of the strong men of the right; and General Luis Villareal who was, at the time, head of the information services.
The fundamentalist sects, largely Protestant, are experiencing "a phenomenal growth" today. From the doctrinal point of view they are characterized "by a visible sanctification, conservative pietism, aggressive proselytism and the intensity of their community-centred links"8 Their attraction lies in their appeal to the religious conscience, in that they offer easy 4. Nayan Chanda, "Here Come The Spies", New York Times, April 9, 1987. 5. National Security Study Directive (NSSD), prepared by an "Inter-Agencies Group" set up after the assassination of Aquino. See Walden Bello, "Creating the Third Force: US Sponsored Low-Intensity Conflict in the Philippines", Philippine edition, 1987, pp.57-59. 6. The formula "Move, Shut, Communicate" summarized the priorities concerning US aid in military mateniel, in 1987. Walden Bello, op. cit. p.94. 7. Resolution 0284, House of Representatives, cited in IPD, op. cit. p.1.
December 25, 1989 • answers, a feeling of belonging, a genuine community support in a time of crisis. Today they constitute a special culture medium for the most virulent anti-
So the Philippine extreme right comprises a wide spectrum of political organizations, religious sects, armed militias and paramilitary groups. For the first time, 60 of these movements have formed a broad
Alliance for Democracy. General Ramos, defense minister and aspirant for the Presidency of the Republic, has sponsored the formation of movement. At the inaugural meeting of the Alliance, he invited the fundamentalist sects to incorporate themselves directly into the counter-insurgency strategy: "You have to show the rest of the country that the citizenry can be organized and motivated [so as to participate in the anti-Communist struggle]. You are part of the people's war for democracy"9. Rightist leader aims to smash
The far-right organizations operate in the countryside as well as in the capital, Manila. They do not conceal their objec-
"Bantay Bayan" (Guardians of the People) offers its services to firms wishing to bring their workers into line. Its leader, Ernie Camino, has stated that his ambition is to "educate the workers on the torments and dangers of the red trade unions" and to "smash these unions which are only Communist fronts". In March 1989, 34 private enterprises — amongst them the multinational Nestlé 10
— had already made use of the good offices of Camino's organization.
Camino also collaborates with the military and the provincial governors. He gives courses in anti-communism to villagers, under the protection of teams spefor psychological warfare, the SOT (Special Operations
Teams). To this end, he uses the instruction manual of Causa International (Confederation of Associations for the Unity of the Societies of America) - 264 pages of great polemical clarity on glossy paper. In the politics of pacification in the Philippines, the cooperation between SOT and
Causa is a long story.
Causa is the political arm of the Unification Church, better known as the "Moonie" sect. This religious cult, founded in 1954, has been sustained by Korean, Taiwanese and Japanese funding. Established in 1980, Causa's original objective was to offer an anti-Communist ideology to the Latin American countries. Causa International is now present in Europe, the United States and in Africa. Its president, Bo Hi Pak, is a former liaison officer between the Korean and US secret services.
As for SOT, it consists of teams which have been recently constituted to lead local counter-insurgency operations with the aim of neutralizing the activity of the guerillas and undermining their popular base. According to a military document, "SOT operations will concentrate on the destruction of Communist political cells in the urban areas as well as in the countryside, aimed to isolate the insurgents from their respective mass bases. psyops [psychological operations], therefore, carry a major role in this operation"!!. In concentrating their attack on the political structure of the insurgent movement, the SOTs are supposed to "submerge themselves" in the villages and neighbourhoods. They must help the population, offering free health care or help to sink wells. In short, they must beat the guerillas on their own terrain, that of mass implementation.
Selective attacks on CPP
Obviously there is a darker side to counter-insurgency. It is also about attacking selectively the cadres of the CPP, even if it means multiplying summary executions. The intelligence tasks remain essential. It is reminiscent of Operation Phoenix, implemented by the Americans in Vietnam, which cost the lives of around 40,000 "suspects", killed and often tor-
For Alfred McCoy, the doctrine of LIC runs a strong risk of initiating "a campaign of civilian liquidations" through "promoting a pacification policy that may ultimately encourage death squad activity". For McCoy, the Philippines are on the threshold "of a savage civil war" — a veritable "downward spiral of kill and coun
The field of ideology is the preferred terrain for Causa International. For Unifileader Reverend Sun Myung Moon, "Communism cannot be eliminated unless a superior ideology or vision of the world is opposed to it. This vision of the world must start from the idea of God"13. Causa's instruction manual is premised from beginning to end on the opposition between religion and Marxism. Distributed in the army, it is used by the SOT in the "counter-propaganda" seminars it organizes in the localities 4.
The Reverend Moon has been found guilty of fraud by the American courts, but this has not prevented his organization from basing its international operations from the United States. His religious sect would be laughable were it not for its numerical, financial and political strength. Moon and his wife are known to their dis-
"True Parents" and run their church in a thoroughly autocratic fashion. Moon claims modestly to be the new Messiah. He has "been chosen by God to iniway of fighting
Reverend Moon's anti-Communist crusade is conducted under the banner of freedom. His idea of democracy, however, is somewhat unusual: "When it comes
PHILIPPINES to our age, we must have an automatic theocracy to rule the world. So we cannot separate the political field from the relig ious...Separation between religion and politics is what Satan likes more"16. Causa İnternational presents a civilized version of the Moon doctrine. But this organization has established firm relations with a number of fascist organizations around the world, notably the French National Front of Jean-Marie Le Pen.
### Manipulation of popular beliefs and superstitions
Religion, then, is systematically manipends. The manipulation of popular beliefs and superstitions by American and Philippine experts is nothing new. For example, during the 1950s government forces utilized the fear of vampires. They would drain the body of a captured militant of blood through incisions in the neck and leave it to be found, enough to put to flight the bravest of guerrilla units!? chological warfare" is also conducted on a more strictly political plane.
The creation of suspicion is one of the tasks prioritized by the SOTs. The intervention of the special counter-insurgency forces operates in several phases — the organization and training of the SOT first, then intelligence work and, finally, the psychological operations which accompany the "submergence" of the military unit in the locality 18. The SOT first spreads the rumour that the soldiers "know everything" about the local Communist infrastructure and then announces militants have only a few days in which to give themselves up. Once a certain amount of information is gathered, the SOT has recourse to the "magic box".
The military document on the SOTs sets out in detailed fashion the role of this box, "made of plywood, one foot square with a 8. Thomas Marti, "Fundamentalist Sects and the Political Right", SPI series special issue number 3, Socio Pastoral Institute, Quezon City, 1987. Pro-Mundi Vita number 100, Brussels, 1985/1. See also Rev. Thomas
Fundamentalist Religion, SPI series D3-88, 9. Cited by Sheila S. Coronel, The Globe, March 29, 10. See Alain Marc, Le Journal de Genève, March 2, 11. "Subject: SOT", typed military document dated December 1,1987. See also "Special Operation Team (SOT) Concept", published in Victor Corpus, War", VNC Enterprise, Quezon City, 1989. 12. Alfred W. McCoy, "Demystifying LIC", Kasarinian, vol. 4 number 3, first quarter 1989, p.40.
"Causa Lecture Manual", Causa Institute, New 14. see Alain Marc, op. cit. 15. "Causa Lecture Manual", op. cit. p.111. 16. "Master Speaks", cited by Fred Clarkson, Causa Kingdom", SPI series special issue 2, SocioPastoral Institute, Quezon City, 1987. 18. Victor Corpus, op. cit. The four subsequent phases are the neutralization of the Communist movement, the mobilization of the population, the implementation of mergram of village defense and economic develop 17
International Viewpoint #76 • December 25, 1989
PHILIPPINES small drop hole and a padlock". During a public meeting, termed a "dialogue", the inhabitants are enjoined to put in this sinister box ballot papers on which they have written the names of Communist activists they know. The SOTs leave nothing to chance. Fearing that the inhabitants will not give satisfactory information, and "to ensure that there will be personalities identified, it is necessary to have a ready name of a personality based from collected information, and let someone drop said name in the magic box', or place it in the box prior to the dialogue". Thus to benefit from the general confusion when the ballots are gone through in public and the name of the militant is revealed.
A mixture of psychological action, information work, and political operation, the affair of the "Deep Penetration Agents" (DPAs) - nicknamed "Zombies", has not ceased to pose grave problems for the CPP (see IV 102, June 30, 1986).
Army plants agents in guerrilla ranks
For a long time, the army has sought to penetrate the ranks of the guerrillas by "planting" agents in advance in where the NPA is expected soon to recruit. This tactic was notably successful in the southern island of Mindanao where the Communist movement grew very rapidly during the last years of the Marcos regime. It succeeded also in leading the Communist leadership to believe that the infiltration was much more extensive than was actually the case2. The ensuing panic led to a massive purge being launched in several provinces of the island in the ranks of the CPP, the NPA and the National Democratic Front. Dozens of militants were killed, most of whom were innocent.
Torture has been used more than once in the Communist ranks, and has served only to worsen things, generating an infernal spiral of confessions and forced denunciations - after having confessed to crimes which they had never committed, militants have been ordered to name their fictitious accomplices. Subsequently other militants have been implicated and condemned.
A document in Tagalog drawing a balance-sheet of these purges, drawn up by a leadership body of the CPP (perhaps regional) and dated January 4 1989, was seized by the military and published last June. It is both damning in terms of revealing what happened, and essential because of the questions that it raises and the measures it proposes. It recognizes that there is still a lot to learn about how to conduct "judicial/criminal procedures party and the [national democratic] move-
In view of recent experience, this circular enjoins party leaders not to condemn solely on the basis of "circumstantial evidence such as weaknesses in action, asso18 ciation with suspected enemies or personal weaknesses", all things which happened"
during the recent anti-DPA purges.
The proof of guilt must not be, for the main part, put together during the interrogation but during the enquiry which precedes the laying of charges. Confessions obtained during interrogation are dubious, especially if obtained by torture -"it can be expected that a person being tortured can make up a story for the torture to be stopped". In general, "the use of torture is strictly forbidden". Suspects should be given a real opportunity to defend themselves and the investigators must be wary of taking a one-sided
Two further cases of murderous purges are known, in the provinces of Quezon and of Laguna (on Luzon island) - two cases still graver in that they happened after the disastrous experience of Mindanao. According to the testimony of survivors, the national leadership of the CPP intervened to stop the summary liquidations (as seems also to have been the case at Mindanao). Former NPA members tell of
Two former members of the NPA surrendered to the authorities and have given interviews on the wave of executions which struck members of their units during the second half of 1988. Themselves suspects, although innocent, they were going to be killed by their own comrades. It was the arrival on the scene of Satur Ocampo and Bobbie Malay, two leaders of the CPP 22, which saved them in extremis — they brought an order, dated November 15 1988, according to which "all executions of DPA should be
To our knowledge, such paranoid purges occurred only in a relatively small number of provinces, and not the entire party. One can nonetheless affirm that the damage they inflicted on the CPP was far greater than that provoked by the infiltration the purges were intended to combat. Besides the loss of irreplaceable human lives, the moral credit of the movement has been hard hit, a number of militants have lost confidence in their own organization, and it is feared that internal political debate has become sterilized. For how can anybody dare to formulate a criticism, if another cadre could see in it a proof of guilt, inasmuch as the task of agents is precisely to foment division?
The use of torture, has besides, profoundly shocked a number of militants and cadres of the party or nationaldemocratic movement. They have fought it on grounds of principle when it has been employed by the military. Now, CP leaders, at least at a provincial level, have defended the recourse to torture under the pretext of efficacy 24. All information gathered by this method is however very uncertain, as is shown anew by the recent experience of the anti-DPA purges. There are other more profound reasons for forbidding the use of such methods.
Torture cannot be, like a gun, turned against the bourgeois state. A negation of the very humanity of both tortured and torturer, it morally corrupts the organization which practices it. It is to be hoped that the forbidding of any recourse to torture, as mentioned in the circulars of the CPP, will henceforth be applied to the whole of Philippine territory.
### Process of savage militarization
Behind the question of the anti-DPA purges, it is the organizational quality of the CPP and the NPA which has been put in doubt — as has their capacity to respect the most elementary human rights even in times of war and in their own camp. The "massacre of Digos" put in doubt their ability to protect the civilian population, in a country subjected to an increasingly savage process of militarization.
The multiplication of vigilante groups and other CAFGUs has extremely dangerous regime tends to blur the distinction between civil and military, implicating the population in its counter-insurgency operations. The government army has been "errors", with innocent inhabitants being killed in the course of military operations. The far-right militias and private armies often exert local reigns of terror. But, recently, the NPA itself has been accused of violations in Digos, a small village in
In the remote village of Digos, a Protestant sect had set up an armed antiCommunist militia. On June 25 1989, when the population was gathered at a religious service, an NPA unit which had approached for a "dialogue" became involved in a military confrontation with the "vigilantes". In the ensuing conflict, 37 villagers died, including many women and children, unarmed and taking refuge in a building. In control of the area, the guerrilla unit provided health care. before it withdrew, two corpses were
The national Protestant representative body, the Unified Council of Churches of the Philippines (UCCP), has warned the government, noting how much the creation of vigilante groups provokes a new 19. Document: SOT" op. cit. pp. 6-7. See also Kim Gordon Bates, Politis number 53, March 1989. 21. Letter and document dated January 4, 1989, in: "The New Killing Fields", Civil Relations Forces, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Quezon City, June 22. They were both arrested in July 1989, and are now 23. Cited in an article of Pauline Sycam, The Manila Chronicle, May 31, 1989. 24. This has been recognized by several ex-members of the NDF or of the CPP, on the occasion of diverse political discussions - all affiming their complete disagreement with such a practice.
A "vigilante" aggravation of the militarization of the country. But it holds the guerillas responsible for this disaster. It has demanded that the NPA admit its errors, punish the guilty and compensate the families of the victims. Nothing in the course of the events could justify the gravity of the losses suffered by the civilian population - the guerrilla unit was in control of the situation. In the national-democratic milieux (favourable to the NPA) emotions again ran very high.
The leadership of the National Democratic Front (NDF) has set up its own commission of enquiry, which presented its report on August 12, 1989. On August 21, the National Council of the NDF published a declaration in which it accepted the conclusions of the commission of enquiry, namely: the arraignment and trial of the NPA unit involved in the events; the arraignment and trial of the two guerillas who admitted having decapitated corpses; the compensation of the victims' families; the intensification of the political education campaigns inside the NPA. The regional command of Davao del Sur (Mindanao) must, in addition, draw a serious balance-sheet of what happened, to determine the best way to deal with the problem of the vigilante groups.
With the anti-DPA purges and the "Digos massacre", it is the revolutionary movement which, for once, has found itself on the bench of the accused. The government has accordingly taken the opportunity to present itself as a moderate force, claiming that a "current of the centre" has emerged since the fall of the dictatorship in 1986.
Aquino being menaced as much by the extreme right as by the extreme left, continues to regroup behind her the elements frightened by the dynamic of militarization in the country - those elements which reject violence, from whatever source it comes. It is a very important factor of the situation in the
Philippines. It is vital for any counter-insurgency doctrine which seeks to put the accent on the political situation of the revolutionary movement, and which accords such importance to the ideological front.
As Walden Bello already noted in
1987, "the NDF and the NPA were in the unprecedented situation of being the political defensive while maintaining the military initiative"25.
The balance-sheet of the past three years is certainly not unequivocal, but a succession of "affairs" have regularly thrown the nationaldemocratic movement on the political and moral defensive. The stakes here are considerable. The Aquino presidency seeks to cut the far-left off from "intermediary forces" and to use the flag of democracy for her own purposes. Democratic slogans used by anti-democratic forces
In the Philippines, the democratic terrain is clearly an essential field of struggle for revolutionaries. Joel Rocamora raises the importance of this question, in an interview published in the Philippines in February 1989: "The left in several third-world countries needs some self-criticism. We have a situation where antidemocratic forces...have been able to grab the banner of democracy for their own anti-democratic needs. The forces of the left must begin to reflect very seriously what it is about their ideology, their past practices, their internal situations that has made it difficult for them to grab the banner of democracy"26. The doctrine of LIC has however an Achilles Heel... and a big one. It affects to implement a revolutionary policy thanks to the good of a profoundly conservative Ingenuously, General Honesto Isleta has explained that, "it's about using the techniques employed by the Communists ourselves, except that we will be more successful than them because we have more resources...."2. As if it was simply an affair of technicians and mon-
The big provincial families - the social base of the Aquino regime - are past masters in the art of emptying the successive laws on agrarian reform of their official content. The industrial and financial bourgeoisie has not been able to make a common front, faced with the IMF, to relieve the economy of a part of the weight of the debt - at which point the planning minister, Solita Monsod, although a disciple of the free market, ended up resigning from the government in protest. The military have not changed. Their support for the government remains
PHILIPPINES remains torn by factional struggles; it is the future of the police (integrated or not into the army which now raises the most passions. Today, the governheightened ment has not succeeded any more than it did in the past in imposing unity and effective control on the armed forces.
The theorists of LIC hope that the government will be able to repeat the success of the 1950s campaign against the HuKS. They hoped that the guerillas would rapidly fall apart after the fall of the Marcos dictatorship. They have learnt otherwise to their cost. The situation has changed so much in 30 years that the politics of conter-insurgency come up against new structural obstacles.
The revolutionary movement has learnt a great deal from the defeat of the preceding generation — even if there remains certainly a lot to learn from the very rich experience of the 1980s. The CPP and the NPA are organizations implanted at a national level, and in all the popular strata. The Huk insurrection was limited to the centre of the island of Luzon, which made its suppression much easier.
Philippine society itself has undergone deep changes. In the 1950s, the Philippines had one of the highest growth rates in the region. Today, the country is a tail-ender in development terms, compared to its neighbours in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The peasantry could believe the promises concerning agrarian reform made by the president of the time, Magsaysay. It is no longer the case since that first bitter experience. Numerous Christian colonists were able to leave the overpopulated countryside of Luzon in the north of the archipelago and of Vizayas in the centre, to set up in Mindanao, depriving the local Muslims of their land. This safety-valve is now closed. The workers' movement was still in its infancy. While still very much a minority, it is now more hardened. The army was, at that time, a professional army, subject to the orders of the civilian government. Today it represents a political force and a constant men-
The situation which is opening up could be difficult for President Aquino. The negotiation of new accords on the presence of American bases in the archipelago, in 1991, stirs up the opposition of nationalist elements. It occurs at a time when the preparation of the general elections of 1992 will bring to a head the tensions inside the dominant classes. If the left can develop responses adapted to the current situation and can regain the political initiative, the run-up to 1992 could see a further deepening of the crisis of the regime. *
25. Walden Bello, op. cit. p. 75. 26. Joel Rocamora, "Burdens of a Client State", interview, Midweek, February 15, 1989, p.45. 29. 198d by Alain Mare, Le Journal de Genève, July 19
29, 1988.
Coup reveals fragility of Aquino
THE COUP D'ETAT against the Aquino regime
International Viewpoint #76 • December 25, 1989
T coup took place in
August 1987. A precarious equilibrium was in the Philippines, which began at the end of then negotiated between the
November, has been defeated. But it has been civil administration and the the most serious of the six attempted putsches military. It lasted 27 months, but it did not hold up against in the country since the fall of the Marcos the erosion of Aquino's popudictatorship in February 1986. The larity and the approach of the consequences of the recent events will be grave elections scheduled for 1992.
and lasting. This instability is undermining the
The President's decision to set up a strong police force inauthority of the President at a time when a new dependent of the army probtreaty on the presence of US bases is to be ably precipitated the crisis. But
Signed in 1991 and when general elections are above all it is the very nature of the regime itself which is being challenged.
The rebel officers kept quiet for a long time, but finally made known their demands - the resignation of Aquino and the government, the formation of a military junta, including politicians and civilian experts.
Over and above the intense factional struggles inside the military, however, and its differences over timing and means, a growing section of the armed forces seems to aspire to outright conquest of power.
Mutineers hold positions for more than a week
Several thousand soldiers and officers participated actively in the recent attempted coup, amongst them elite units such as the Marines, who were well armed with light tanks, mortars and heavy machine guns. For more than a week, the mutineers held positions in the business district of Makati, in the capital, as well as the Mactan air base in the centre of the archipelago. According to the press, they enjoyed "widespread support from various military units throughout the country".2 On Cebu, an island in the centre of the archipelago, and in the province of Cagayan, in the north of the country, this support was expressed very openly.
We are no longer dealing with putsches intended to put pressure on the government, "shots across the bow" like that of
July 1986. What has happened now is "a veritable insurrection of a part of the army". It seems an established fact that the rebel troops would have been victorious were it not for the intervention of US forces — US fighter planes provided air cover for the regime on Wednesday 1
December when the government air force
20 was paralyzed and the presidential palace scheduled for 1992. PAUL PETITJEAN had been attacked. The situation was so serious that Aquino had even asked Washington to bombard the positions held by the mutineers - which Bush refused to order*.
The intervention of the American forces constitutes a very dangerous precedent which could help Washington to justify a growing interference in the political life of the archipelago. It places the Aquino presidency in a position of great weakness at the moment when negotiations on a new treaty on the presence of US bases are due to begin. The various mass organizations of the Philippine left have sharply denounced this resorting to foreign interventio, when the population was not actively mobilized to combat the coup.
For their part, the rebel officers played on populist and nationalist sentiments. They denounced both the American intervention and the incompetence of the regime, and called for an "honest" military junta. They frequently claimed to be the heirs of the RAM - the Movement for Reform of the Armed Forces of the Philippines — that prepared the 1985 coup against Marcos and in 1986 took part in overthrowing the old regime. Since 1987 they have been attacking Aquino. They echo the discontent of the officers by denouncing government corruption.
"Was it for this that soldiers died?' asks RAM.
The situation has deteriorated. The journalist Philippe
Pons has noted that "some intellectuals, whose support for democratic values is not open to doubt, are now saying that they would support a junta if it were able to put a the current breakstop to down."5
Nonetheless the Philippine left has violently denounced the putsch, and unambiguously rejects any kind of military regime.
A vast coalition was formed under the name "Kilos" to fight against the coup d'etat; the socialist organization Bisig and the Volunteers for Popular Democracy are a part of this coalition. Kilos, along with sectors of the Church, took the initiative of calling on the population to demonstrate at EDSA, the highway where the uprising against Marcos took place in
1986. Corazon Aquino "co-opted" this initiative, turning it into a demonstration of support for her presidency that attracted over 100,000 people.
State of emergency opposed by lett
The political independence of the popular organizations has however been clearly affirmed. In particular, Kilos ® has opposed
Aquino's declaration of a state of emergency. The restrictions on democratic rights entailed by this measure could very easily be turned against the mass movement. The clandestine organizations like the National Democratic Front have also condemned both the attempted coup and the declaration of the state of emergency.
The Aquino presidency has been weakened still further by this experience.
Before the 1992 election campaign has even begun, the Philippines have been shown to be more unstable than at any time since the fall of Marcos. *
1. See TV 126, September 28, 1987.
2.
Keith
Richburg,
International Herald Tribune,
December 9-10, 1989.
3. Philippe Pons, Le Monde, December 8, 1989.
4. International Herald Tribune, December 4, 1989.
5. Le Monde, December 7, 1989.
6. Kilos
- Kilusan Laban sa Kudeta (Anti-Coup
Movement).
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PHILIPPINES HE LAST attempted regime
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