Despite all these obstacles, the Sandinistas seem set to win the elections. The cause of their likely success: the desire of the majority of the Nicaraguan people to continue their revolution that was established here ten years ago by a massive and sustained popular uprising led by the Sandinista Front for National Liberation
In the latest opinion polls, the FSLN received a little more than 50% support, while UNO gathered less than 25% of voting intentions. Extreme polarization of main parties
During the last few months, the FLN has noticeably increased its advantage over the UNO. The polarization between the two parties is extreme, and all the other parties together received only 5% support. The percentage of those who have decided to vote, without having made a definitive choice, has risen to 20%. It is these floating voters who are the main target of the parties' campaigns. According to the journal of the Nicaraguan Jesuits takes a critical Sandinista line, there are, despite the FSLN-UNO polarization, four basic strategic choices on offer,: "Besides the two basic options, that of the ultra-right UNO who say: "liquidate the revolution' and the FSLN who say: "consolidate the revolution, there are two other main electoral options: that represented by the centre parties, among them the Christian Social Party that says: 'reform the revolution' and that of the three ultraleft parties (the
MAP-MD, the MUR and the PRT) who say: 'radicalize the revolution". (Envio,
November 1989)
Let us look at these four options in tum.
The UNO: The UNO consists of a range of parties from the hard right who have supported and even helped to organize the Contras, to two small "historic communist formations" the PSN and the
PCdN. The UNO is supported by the employers' organization, the COSEP. The candidates for president and vice- president, chosen after strong internal tensions, are without doubt the most presentable pro-American choices:
The choices facing
NICARAGUA ly dependent on the USA coming to power.
The Sandinistas, despite the economic sabotage orchestrated by a significant part of the private capitalist sector, have decided to maintain a mixed economy, and have decided to follow a policy of limited
Nicaragua but real concessions to the bosses of industry and the agro-export sector. The Sandinistas give several reasons for these policies: rejection of a state and bureaucratized socialism (they use these terms repeatedly); the desire not to cut them-
ON THE EVE of the Nicaraguan elections on February 23, life is certainly not easy for the Nicaraguan people. Inflation was 1,600% in 1989 and wages have not kept up; some 700 people were assassinated in 1989 by the Contras, who, despite their difficulties remain able to strike out murderously, thanks to US ald; American imperialism is becoming more and more aggressive in the region — with the invasion of Panama, continuation of massive aid to the extreme right in El Salvador, support for the Contras, new provocations against Nicaragua, such as the Irruption of US soldiers into the house of Nicaragua's ambassador to
Panama and the attack by a US warship on a Cuban cargo vessel on February 1.
ERIC TOUSSAINT
Chamorro and Vigilio Godoy were members of the Government Junta with the
Sandinistas, the former until April 1980, the second until Spring 1984. The UNO programme is for the liquidation of the revolution through the eviction of the
Sandinistas from all positions of power and the "dismantling of the army" (sic)
To win the population to its side, the
UNO puts itself forward as the representative of the interests of the masses pauperized by the policies of the Sandinistas. Its formulations on reversing the agrarian reform are cautious — "We will reconsider the expropriations case by case and will distribute state lands to peasants who need it."
The UNO is capable of mobilizing thousands, perhaps tens of thousands of supporters in several regions of the country, often in forms that recall the far rightwing demonstrations in Chile in the
1970s: demonstrations with empty cook ing pots. But it has managed to pull behind it only a minority of the population and its crowds are smaller than those drawn by the FSLN. Furthermore the
UNO is handicapped by the tensions between the 11 parties that make it up.
But it is above all its total dependance on the US and the most reactionary bosses, along with its links with the Contras, that restrict its ability to profit from the social discontent, despite the campaigns of its daily La Prensa. The support of their principal spokespersons for the US intervention in Panama was a terrible blow to their credibility in the eyes of many who had previously been hesitating
Although unlikely, a UNO victory would deal a heavy blow to the revolution. Nonetheless, it is not quite certain that the Sandinistas would accept the dismantling of the state established in June 1979, starting with the Sandinista army. According to Le Monde (February 9, 1990), the Interior Minister Tomas Borge, one of the nine commandants, has declared that "the army would refuse to obey again if there was a UNO victory. A success for the opposition would mean a return of the dictatorship and the army 'would relaunch the armed struggle against Somozism'." In the case of a UNO defeat, it is equally improbable that the USA would abandon their aggressive attitude to the Sandinistas. Rather, the US would demand of the Sandinistas that they themselves unravel the revolution. Even then, the US would not abandon their intention to overthrow the regime established in 1979.
Despite real popular dissatisfaction over some aspects of the economic realities in Nicaragua, and over some of the economic and social choices made by the Sandinista authorities in the past two years, the majority of the population is probably aware that only a new victory for the FLN can prevent politicians totalselves off from the EEC countries, and from the social democratic governments in Europe and Latin America; and the attempt to get the USA to lift the economic blockade.
Degree of administrative bureaucratization
However these concessions, combined with a definite degree of bureaucratism that has developed in the Sandinista administration (without reaching the situation in the so-called socialist countries, such as the Soviet Union or China) sometimes lead to criticisms from the regime's rank-and-file support. An example is this statement from a rank-and-file Sandinista:
"The gringos, the yankees? They will never change. I see that the Contras are continuing their attacks, killing people. Wasn't Bush Reagan's second-in-command? Now, he is getting the CIA involved in the elections....I am a Sandinista, but I think that there has not been enough firmness here, notably with those who, although born Nicaraguans, have their hearts with the gringos. Listen to me: the Contras killed a son and the two smallest are often poorly, not because of any disease, but for lack of food, because I don't earn enough. The plan of the government economists is no good....
"It is true that the war is the main cause of the problems, but it does not explain everything. Some are spending the equivalent of three salaries, and live like millionaires, when I cannot buy batteries for my radio. We need more equality, I say, because the revolution ought to make us more equal. Am I wrong? I say to my wife: it wouldn't take much for us to see here some wives of government members go out well dressed up, get together with the wives of the bourgeoisie, and organize bingo and poker sessions to raise money for charity for us." (Felix Lopez, textile worker, interviewed by Envio, July 1989)
This worker, without any doubt is going to vote Sandinista. But, like so many others, he is not ready to give a blank cheque to the authorities.
The FSLN: Daniel Ortega and Sergio Ramirez hold one or two meetings every day, often apart, in order to make sure that they have met the population even in the most remote parts of the country. There is 27 a high level of popular participation at
International Viewpoint #179 • February 26, 1990
NICARAGUA these meetings.
Until the start of December 1989, the offensive of the FMLN in El Salvador was at the centre of Daniel Ortega's discourse.
He enthusiastically envisaged the extension of the Central American revolution. The Bush-Gorbachev meeting in Malta and the summit of the five Central American presidents at San Isidro in Costa Rica on December 11 and 12 have led to the Sandinista leadership's adopting an essentially diplomatic attitude, even if solidarity with the FMLN is systematically affirmed. This turn, made under international pressure, has not been made without creating a certain unease, reinforced by the US intervention in Panama. Nonetheless the Sandinista leaders affirm the desire to pursue their socialist orientation within the framework of a mixed economy, non-alignment and political pluralism. They systematically present this last aspect as the anticipation by the Sandinista revolution of what they call the process of democratization in Eastern Europe and the USSR. Orlando Nunez has declared in the Barricada of December 23, 1989; "The fall of the Berlin Wall has no significance for the Nicaraguan revolution, for we were born without a "wall". On July 19, 1979, we overthrew simultaneously the Somozist wall and the Berlin Wall because we were born out of a democratic, pluralist revolution. The Sandinista revolution appears as the most advanced expression of what is considered as the renewal of the socialist world. The difference is that we have done this from the beginning and we have had no need of a process of rectification".
Sandinista leaders walk a tightrope
In other respects, the Sandinista leaders walk a tightrope insofar as the dilemma between deepening a socialist orientation and more important concessions to the minority capitalist sector is concerned. Jaime Wheelock (Minister of Agrarian Reform) says that "not a single square centimetre of land from the agrarian reform will be transferred to the capitalist sector". Luis Carrion, Minister of the Economy, affirms in substance that the big social reforms have in the main been completed (during a meeting with Costa Rican private entrepreneurs in November 1989).
The Centre is constituted essentially by the Social Christian Party (PS) which, after boycotting the 1984 elections, and participating in the founding of the UNO (the group of 14), finally withdrew, reproaching the UNO for its wish to eliminate Sandinism and its total dependence on the USA (these criticisms have led La Prensa, the UNO's daily, to refuse the PSC's campaign the slightest coverage in its columns). The candidate of the PSC, Erick Ramirez, is supported by the Social Christian Popular Party (PPSC), which
Luchamos
has also left the UNO (the PPSC had 6 deputies in the outgoing national assembly). Steedman Fagoth and Brooklyn Rivera — "Miskito leaders" at first allied to the Sandinistas, who passed over to the camp of the Contras before returning to Nicaragua to benefit from the amnesty — are backing the PSC.
Finally, also supporting the PSC is Eden Pastora, ex-Sandinista commandant, and ex-leader of the Contras based in Costa Rica, the ARDE. The PSC favours an eventual governmental alliance with the FSLN, under certain conditions.
Far left fiercely denounces
San Isidro accords
The far left: The policies of the Sandinistas in relation to imperialism (such as the signing of the San Isidro accords on December 12, 1989) and the private sector are fiercely denounced by the three far left lists contesting the elections; the Popular Action Movement (MAP — exMaoist), the Revolutionary Party (PRT - affiliated to the Morenist International Workers' League) and the Revolutionary Unity Movement (MUR).
The MAP is the oldest of these organizations, having participated in the armed struggle against Somoza with its own specific military organization (the MILPAS).
It organizes a small trade union (Workers' Front) and has a semi-daily newspaper (The People which has appeared every two days since summer 1989). It also has two deputies in the outgoing National Assembly.
The PRT is a smaller organization but has a certain trade union and student implantation.
Both the PRT and MAP share a hostile attitude to the FSLN which they characterize as in substance a petit-bourgeois party in the process of reconstructing the para vencer bourgeois state destroyed by the masses in July 1979. The MUR, formed more recently, (little more than a year ago, by former militants of the FLN and other left parties including the PCdN) adopts a more nuanced attitude than the other two parties. Whilst declaring themselves in favour of a radicalization of the revolution, and criticizing the bureaucratic deformations of the FSLN, it does not rule out an alliance with them to constitute a working majority if necessary.
Criticisms and proposals of
Given the extreme polarization of the vote on February 25, it is highly unlikely that these three formations will obtain a high percentage of the vote (the polls give
2% of those intending to vote), but it is not impossible that one or two of them will have a deputy elected to the new Assembly. In any case, whatever the result of the election, the FSLN must take account of the criticisms and propo-
The electoral process in Nicaragua is, by far, the most democratic ever to have taken place in any country of Central Ameri-
The electoral law is, in many respects, more advanced than in the so-called Western democracies; financial aid to all parties (including those who have not been elected to the outgoing assembly) from the Supreme Electoral Council, the possibility of access for all parties to the TV and radio... and at the end of the electoral process, proportional representation amended to benefit the smaller parties (each party which achieves 1% of the votes is guaranteed two deputies to the 96 member assembly!)
Twenty parties will participate in the electoral campaign and there are 10 candidates for the presidency - because the UNO consists of 11 separate parties. *