Mandela free but apartheid remains
WHY was Nelson Mandela Imprisoned for 27 years? The question is all the more worth asking at a time when a euphoric consensus is developing on the return of South
Africa to the family of democratic nations.
Nelson Mandela did not spend 27 years of his life in prison because he was for the armed struggle or because his movement worked with the Communist Party. He was locked up for such a long time for something both much simpler and much more dangerous for the system — he symbolised the demand of all black people to be considered as full South
African citizens and to benefit from universal suffrage.
PETER BLUMER
F SUCH a simple demand led the
South African regime to imprison
Mandela for such a long time it is not because it is composed of complete idiots, unable to understand all the advantages that parliamentary democracy could bring for the South African economy.
Apartheid is not a simple dictatorial aberration lasting from 1948 to today. It is the legacy of the preceding period of colonization of the country and has constituted a particular mode of capitalist development, simultaneously structuring the relations between "races" and the relations between classes. The principal peculiarity of South Africa is not apartheid but a specific socio-economic history, which produced this racial segregation.
It is obviously necessary to incorporate into this analysis secondary factors like the colonial heritage and the reactionary stupidity of the Afrikaaner settlers. But none of this can explain the totality of the system and its persistence over decades.
That is why it is still necessary to refer to these socio-economic facts to understand what is happening now and assess what is being referred to today as the dismantling of apartheid.
authors have characterized apartheid as "racial capitalism" in order to illustrate the manner in which the system intermingles racial and class criteria. The existence of a large black petit bourgeoisie under late apartheid does not alter the fundamental fact that the system has been maintained and reproduced in order to provide cheap labour.
This mode of social regulation was shot through with all kinds of contradictions. But these only began to truly destabilize the system when, in the course of the capitalist development of the country, it was necessary to expand the internal market and increase the supply of skilled labour. The era of reforms began when it was necessary to amend and then get rid of the basic rules which reserved a whole range of jobs for white workers alone.
With this change, beginning in the late 70s and early 80s, the coherence of the system brutally collapsed. But it was far from easy for the system to reform itself, for the social antagonisms had reached such a degree that each breach threatened to stimulate new levels of audacity from the black mass movement. There was a general strike in Natal in 1973 and a youth uprising in the towns of the Transvaal in 1976, then in the Cape in 1979.
A period of large-scale confrontations
After 1982 a qualitative new stage was reached, and the country entered a period of confrontations of great breadth. Thus in the course of the 1980s the economic and political elements of the crisis of apartheid became entangled. But to understand what is currently happening it is necessary to bear in mind this double constraint for the South African bourgeoisie — the new needs of capitalism and the revolutionary upsurge of the masses and not to think that it has been pushed towards change solely by the pressure of
To believe this would be to underestimate the reserves which the ruling class disposes of in entering into negotiations and to misjudge the present relationship of forces. In his speech of February 2, De Klerk clearly explained that "a changed dispensation implies far more than political and constitutional issues. It cannot be
SOUTH AFRICA PLANTE pursued successfully in isolation from problems in other spheres of life which demand practical solutions. Poverty, unemployment, housing shortage, inadequate education and training, illiteracy, health needs... " This speech closes the years of debate at the summit of the state on the "deregulation" of apartheid and the need for socio-economic reforms.
Certain bourgeois liberal circles have been calling for these reforms for some years, but it is very significant that now it National Party who is saying and doing it. Thus, any idea that De Klerk is dragging his feet under constraint would be erroneous. On the contrary, we must expect important changes in South African socie-
But this does not mean that we should join in the chorus of those who are already celebrating the dawning of an era of reconciliation and consensus. There will be reforms, certainly, but South African society is obviously going to remain a class society.
The democratic liberation movement has never confined itself to calling for a few institutional measures. All the political currents, whatever they are, have advanced, along with their democratic demands, more or less radical social demands. A society without apartheid cannot be reduced simply to the adoption of universal suffrage. All the institutions 1. Amongst recent studies, see in particular Fuad Cassim, "Growth, Crisis and Change in the South African Economy" in "After Apartheid", Centre for South Afri-. can Studies, University of York, London 1988.
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International Viewpoint #179 • February 26, 1990
SOUTH AFRICA have to be definitively racialised, that is to say that references to "race" would have to be removed from all institutions?. Rights would have to be exactly the same for everybody, which would mean no more discrimination in the right to property, that the Bantustans would be abolished....and so beyond these obvious points; what would the general philosophy of equality mean in a capitalist society?
At the constitutional level firstly, the negotiations will deal with the question of universal suffrage. Until organizations of the liberation movement have demanded a system of "one person, one vote". Taken literally this would mean that there would no longer be an electorate subdivided according to race, that the "Africans" would vote like the others (including the population of the Bantustans), that anybody could be a candidate and be elected in any election and in any constituency. Such an institutional reform would end up immediately and de facto in a Parliament with a black majori-
Replacement of system of racial groups
On this point, the negotiations will be about some kind of juridical compromise. Already for two years the government has explained that it is necessary to replace the system of racial groups by that of groups freely entered into (for housing or schools, for example. In his speech of February 2 De Klerk said "it is clear that a system for the protection of the rights of individual, minorities and national entities has to form a well-rounded and balanced whole". What he is referring to is not elementary democratic rights such as the free practice of culture or language or religion, but the search for some kind of constitutional means which offers the white minority a particular right of con
The objective of the white leaders will be to find a constitutional formula recognizing formally the principle of "one person, one vote" but resulting, thanks to certain mechanisms (constituencies or rights of veto or a double chamber) in a specific guarantee for the white electo-
The other major stake in the negotiations will be the future of the Group Area Act, and, as a consequence, segregation in education. Here also, there will undoubtedly be spectacular reforms. In this sphere objective reality has, in any case, already changed irreversibly — some entire urban zones have been officially opened to the black population for lack of power to change what was already a reality. On the other hand, nothing indicates that the envisaged reforms are going to make the black ghettos disappear and modify the 4 of land not in any case constitute another town planning of apartheid. Will the price means of segregation?
There will undoubtedly be an increase in wages and an extension of the black petit bourgeoisie. But this will generate an aggravation of social differentiation within the black communities. There will be a new land ownership law but this will culminate, amongst other things, in the accelerated capitalization of small black agriculture with dramatic consequences for the great majority of the poor in the rural zones. Finally, none of this will amount to a "non-racial" South Africa. The system will be reformed, not revolu-
There remain other unknown factors. First there are the Bantustans which the negotiations must sooner or later deal with. A genuine "homelands" will mean nothing less than the end of the long history of the "reserves". Some 20 million people are classified as "citizens" of the ten Bantustans and 13.8 million live there permanently. To get rid of them as socioeconomic entities would necessitate a radical agrarian reform which would elimiduality between the capitalist agriculture of the white areas and the subsistence micro-agriculture in the. Bantuwould allow reaching redistribution of land. It would be necessary also to get rid of all the particular political systems which have given birth to these social formations and their specific public administrations*. It would be necessary again to dismantle their armed forces and police. What upheavals might be envisaged in the short term as a result of this? How can these changes be brought about whilst avoiding popular explosions due to impatience and the upsurge of revolutionary demands?
Integration of armed forces not to be expected
There is also the question of the armed
— a unitary non-racial South Africa would necessitate a non-racial army at every level of the hierarchy...Moreover, unlike what happened in Zimbabwe, the massive integration into the existing army of the military wings of the ANC and
Further problems could be listed. All aspects of the South African state. For example, Nelson Mandela, in his first speech in Cape Town, reaffirmed the objective (contained in the Freedom Charter) of the nationalization of the mines and other key sectors. Subsequent events will show how this demand evolves in a country where more than 70% of the economy is in the hands of the monopolies. But nationalizations in themselves raise the problem of the nature of the institutions and the rupture with the state. The Bantustans, the nature and composition of the forces of repression, the different items of legisla-
De Klerk in the "new international climate"
"THE dynamic developments in international politics have created new opportunities for South Africa as well. Important advances have been made, among other things, in our contacts abroad, especially where these were precluded previideological considera-
"These developments will entail unpredictable
Europe but they will also be of decisive importance to Africa. The indications are that the countries of
Eastern and Central Europe will receive greater attention while it will decline in the case of Africa....
"The collapse, particularly of the
Europe, also serves as a warning....
Those who seek to force this failure of a system on South Africa should engage in a total revision of their point of view. It should be clear to all that it is not the answer here
"The government is prepared to enter into discussions with other
Southern African countries with the aim of formulating a realistic development plan. The government believes that the obstacles in the way of a conference of Southern
African states have now been removed sufficiently."
(South African Prime Minister
De Klerk to SA parliament on February 2, 1990) tion, the financial system, land rents and so on will reveal the depth or the superficiality of the reforms.
In Transkei, 80% of the rural population live below the household subsistence level, and one child in seven dies before the age of five. Less than 20% of the house2. This is why the majority of organizations raise the demand for a "non-racial" rather than "multi-racial" South Africa. 3. Unhappily the phrase of Nelson Mandela according to which the ANC must "address white demands for structural guarantees to prevent black domination", is a concession made to the project of the National Party. The formula is repeated on several occasions and echoes De Klerk's worries about preserving the rights of "minorities". Obviously nobody proposes a racist domination of black over white, but Mandela's formula is serious because in the South African context it implies also opposition to any upheaval in social relations. 4. Four of these Bantustans have been declared "independent". As a proof of the new climate, General Holomisa, the new leader of Transkei, authorized the activities of the UDF before De Klerk and has demanded that the "reintegration" of Transkei into South Africa be considered. 5. Race Relations Survey, p. 190, Johannesburg, 1989. 6. Ibid. (without the Transkei), page 270.
February 26, 1990• #179 International Viewpoint drinkable water and the women spend two hours a day collecting it. Official estimates concerning housing in South Africa in the year 2000 envisage, in today's conditions, a shortfall of 3.2 million houses for the black population and 181,000 for
In 1988 the rate of success in the matriculation examinations was 96.1% for white students, 95.1% for Indian, 67.8% for Colored, and 57.9% for black. The latter figure has fallen to 42% for the 1989 examinations.
In 1987, according to the government, a black industrial or service worker (outside of mining) would earn, on average, 593 Rands', a Colored 738 Rands, an Indian 1061 Rand, and a white 1,956 Rand.
All these figures show perfectly the nature of apartheid — class divisions and racial classification are intermixed. In a capitalist society which had formally abolished all racial laws, it would require decades before such a heritage would disappear.8
But even if the South African bourgeoisie has the intention of carrying through reforms, it will be very careful not to cut off the branch on which it is sitting!
It is necessary then to have no illusions about the political process underway. Certainly the government has drawn the lessons of the uprisings of 1984-87. It has also made a balance sheet of its setbacks when it sought constitutional reform outside of negotiations including the ANC®.
it also wants social peace to encourage a revival of investment in the country.
But the South African bourgeoisie is not for all
"driven" to that being make the reforms - it has understood for a long time now the need to change its system of domination. It is not in a position where it must make dramatic concessions to save the market economy and it maintains the initiative on the terrain of negotiations. That is why the constitutional reforms will not imply major socio-economic upheavals.
The question of compromise is thus posed.
Already articles can be seen in the international press explaining that both
De Klerk and the ANC have to guard against
"extremists"....To their equation make an fascist between the insufficiency of the reforms is in itself a scandal. But it is even worse to identify the end of racial oppression with De
Klerk's project to reform the system. Is it
"to fall into extremism" to demand that there are no specific constitutional rights for the white population? Is it irresponsibility to demand the complete dismantling of the Bantustans and a radical agrarian reform? Is it reckless to think that the oppression of the black population will remain inasmuch as the great mass of the exploited will also be overwhelmingly black?
The negotiations then are going to be a very decisive phase for the mass movement and all the political movements.
The factors which have led the ANC to the negotiating table are well known - a new world situation marked by the new
Soviet policy and the strategic impasse after the great movement of the years
1983-87. But this does not mean that the
ANCis monolithic and approaches the new situation in a homogeneous manner.
Moreover, its hegemony over the majority of the mass movement does not mean there are not other genuinely representative forces in the liberation movement'°.
It must, furthermore, contend also with the existence of reactionary movements like Inkatha, the Zulu organization of
Buthelezi, president of the Kwazulu ban-
SOUTH AFRICA
The mass movement remains vigorous, if considerably weakened in relation to 1984-87. But the negotiations will not be taking place in a revolutionary situation. For the great mass of militants the problem can no longer be "negotiation or revolution". The political situation and the relationship of forces has changed. Consequently, the key question will rather be knowing how to use the new situation to preserve the mass movement and give the vanguard the means to get a second wind
The negotiations are moreover going to be very long. Presented under the form of a round table seeking, by common consent, to "change" South Africa, they will inevitably take the form of a long transition during which each organization will be tested on its capacity to discipline its members and sympathizers.
It is extremely important that the negotiations are not secret, that the mass movement and all the organizations have the means of knowing what is said and what is done. And it is important that the workmovement involves itself in these debates and advances its own immediate programme, which should include the fol-
• A constituent assembly elected on the basis of "one person, one vote". All democratic freedoms immediately. Immediate abolition of all racist laws and all fetters on trade union rights. Abrogation of current labour legislation (LRA).
• total destruction of the Bantustans.
• nationalization of the mines and the big capitalist firms, with trade union organizations having the right of veto on their management. Redistribution of land and agrarian reform.
• dismantling of all repressive forces. Immediate disarmament of fascist groups.
• unity and independence of the trade union movement in relation to all political movements
• rejection of all international pressures on the progressive organizations, whether from Washington, London or Moscow. * 7. 1 rand = £0.25/$0.40 8. It is very pertinent in this respect to see the situation of black and Chicano people in the United States today, despite formal equality. 9. This is notably the case with the tri-cameral system with white, Colored and Indian chambers, which has done nothing to defuse the crisis. 10.This was evident at the Conference for a Democratic Future last December where an important part of the delegates and the audience represented independent left forces and were very restive about the negotiations process and the "Harare Plan" (Weekly Mail, Johannesburg, December 15, 1989). The past period has also seen a considerable strengthening of the Pan Africanist Congress. 11. A situation of civil war between Inkatha and the militants adhering to the progressive organizations (notably the ANC) has existed for several years in the Natal region. There are now dozens of deaths every week. Everyone is agreed that Nelson Mandela can play a decisive role in the negotiated setlement of this 5