Economic disaster for Spanish workers
The October 28 general elections in Spain showed a dramatic banks and the industrial companies. None of this is in the capi-
The biggest workers party, the SP, got an talists' interests, and so the budget is going to be cut.
in parliament. The only "Moreover, the Spanish balance of payments is in deficit and showed major national electoral strength was the Alianza Popu- the foreign debt is quite high (30 billion dollars) and currency lar, which has ties of sympathy with the sector of the officer reserves are low (just enough to cover three months exports)
corps that openly favors establishing a military Only a few years ago, worth twice that, and foreign credit is getting harder and harder
The following article describes in some detail the economic to get and more expensive.
situation that impelled such a class confrontation, and which in a few years shattered the bourgeois democratic center party that "The situation could get still worse, as a result, among other was designed to establish stable parliamentary rule after the things, of the capitalists' lack of confidence in an SP ment and a resulting capital flight. (We need only note that the
Although the article was written several months Mitterrand government in France has had to devalue the franc twice in a year and is studying a third devaluation)."
appeared in the special issue of the French "Inprecor" on the economy published last spring), it describes the basic done essentially by boosting unemploy- of the 1950s and the beginning of the absolute majority
Obviously very sharp confrontations loom.
Francoist dictatorship.
dictatorship.
this situation, and what they will demand from the allemmas of the Spanish economy in the context of the world economic crisis. And in this respect, nothing has changed since government also is a "stabilization plan," or an emergency aus-
The developments it describes have simply conterity program. It commented:
tinued as predicted. For example, the rate of official unemploy-
"For the workers a stabilization plan will have disastrous ment in Spain is now 16% of the economically active populaeffects in the short term. In the first place, it is going to increase tion. It was 15% when the article was written.
unemployment in two ways, by reducing state expenditures and monetary and credit restrictions. In the second place, it is going
This sort of economic situation puts the incoming Socialist to involve new losses of buying power, because the official inflagovernment very sharply on the spot. As the article below tion rate taken as a guideline for collective bargaining will conshows, there is little if any room for reformist maneuver with tinue to be less than the real one. In the third place, it involves respect to the basic ills of the Spanish economy, such as unemputting off the progressive measures included in the SP's elec-
In its November 12 issue, the second since the general elections, the central organ of the section of the Fourth Internaalthough in a limited way, unemployment insur tional for the Spanish state,
"Combate," made the following ance; lowering the age of retirement; raising of pensions; extenpoints about the economic situation facing the new SP governsion of education; etc), or higher costs for businesses (reduction of the workweek). This plan would involve a retrogression even
"The coming of the Socialists into the government coincides from the present situation, since it would require budget cuts.
with a worsening of what the economists call the basic imbal-
"These measures might be presented as short-term ones, but ances of the system, that is the national budget deficit, the they will have to be prolonged, since the basic imbalances canbalance of payments deficit, accelerating inflation, and increasnot be eliminated so easily."
ing unemployment. But for the capitalists, not all these ills have
"Combate" concluded: "The election promises that the SP an equal importance. From their standpoint, it is the first that made and the social consequences of the economic crisis, in parrequire drastic remedies because they could block the functionticular unemployment, are obstacles to the adoption of a stabiliing of the system.
zation plan, but as we have seen, this is what the capitalists
"In fact that state has a deficit of a billion pesetas (120.50 pesetas equal 1 US dollar), and it is going to be nearly impos
"We do not know how quickly such measures will be sible to keep this deficit from growing. If the deficit is financed imposed. It is probable that this will be presented as a necessity by having the Banco de Espana print more money, inflation is arising from the mess left by the outgoing Center government, going to rise. If the increase in the volume of money is restrictas the only solution given the disastrous position of the peseta.
ed, there will not be sufficient credit for the capitalists. If the
It is even possible that they will delay it for a few months...
money is obtained by issuing bonds, the national debt will grow threatooner or later we are going to have to confront this so large that it will crush the market for bonds issued by the
J. ALBARRACIN and P. MONTES
The intrinsic weakness of Spanish capitalism in unfavorable circumstances explains why unemployment is so high and the outlook for the future so gloomy.
In the case of Spain, the world economic crisis that began in 1975 hit a capitalist structure marked by a level of producthat, despite the considerable capital accumulation in the country in the 1960s, has remained low by comparison with that of the other industrialized to overcome the crisis in
Spain in accordance with the interests of the capitalists, and to do so in conditions of overproduction in the capitalist world in general, major efforts were necessary to raise productivity. And this has to be toral program, ment. We will analyze further on the fundamental cause for this tightening up of the job market. Here it is sufficient to note that in 1973 the productivity of Spanish capitalism was estimated at 39% of the average for members of the OECD and 45% for members of the Common
YOUTH FLOOD INTO TIGHTENING
JOB MARKET there are other factors that explain the growth of unemployment. First of all, the world economic crisis coincided with a massive influx of youth into the job market. This is the result of the baby boom that occurred at the end
1960s, combined with the steady decline in the mortality rate. The number of youth between 15 and 19 increased considerably after 1970; that of youth between 20 and 24 after 1975. Between 1975 and 1980, the working-age population grew by 290,000 persons per year.
In order to absorb this influx of labor power and maintain the existing rate of unemployment, it would have been necessary to create 150,000 jobs per year, which Spanish capitalism failed to do. The consequences of this have been particularly severe for the youth. Youth unemployment is a national calamity. Only 34% of those under 24 years of age have a job. The percentage of youth in jobs declined drastically, partly as a result
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the dollar was worth 60 pesetas; now it is "Combate" said, what the capitalists are
of the extension of education but also of the conditions existing on the job market.
THE ECONOMY FAILS TO ABSORB
FLOW OF WORKERS FROM THE LAND
Secondly, the crisis came in the context of a prolonged and rapid capitalization of agriculture, which has released large amounts of labor power from agricultural work. With the onset of the recession, this process by no means stopped but rather accelerated. Between 1974 and 1978, the number of people employed on the land fell by an annual average of 3.8%, which amounts to two million workers less in agriculture over that period. Taking only the last two years, the number of people employed in agriculture has dropped by 300,000.
Even if all of these people did not go on the labor market in the nonagricul-. tural sector (since the population in rural areas has been aging as a result of earlier migrations to the cities), it is certain that this has helped to swell the numbers of unemployed and not just those of the re-
This phenomenon is an outcome of the process of development that began at the start of the 1960s and of the corresponding rise in the living standards in the main industrial areas of the country. This gave rise to migrations and to a substantial jump in the wages of agricultural workers everywhere. In turn, the rising labor costs impelled a process of mechanization of agriculture. The result, on one hand, was big increases in productivity, releasing new quantities of labor power. At the same time, it made it impossible for a large number of small farms to survive. Their owners were lured away by the chance for better incomes and living conditions as workers in industry and the
With the economic crisis, the increases in agricultural productivity have continued (from 1975 to 1980 it rose by 8.5% per year). But the labor power released is not being absorbed any longer by other sectors. This is reflected in the development of major pockets of agricultural employment, such as in Andalusia, which have become the source of social conflicts and sharp struggles that have been difficult to control.
RETURN OF THE EMIGRANT WORKERS
However, the world economic crisis has not merely reduced the capacity of Spanish capitalism to create jobs. It has reversed the flow of Spanish emigrant workers. This is the third factor that should be highlighted. In the 1960s, emigration drained off a major part of the excess labor power in the Spanish economy. This outflow narrowed to a trickle after 1970, and all the information available now indicates that since 1975 emigration has been effectively nil. And since the start of the recession, large numbers of workers have been coming back. 16
By way of example, it is sufficient to note that the number of Spanish workers in Germany decreased by half in 1978 by comparison with the 1973 level, and the same drop must have occurred in France and Switzerland. The numbers of workers returning added considerably to unemployment figures at the start of the crisis. But the weight of this factor has gradually diminished.
### ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE
POPULATION DECLINES
In the crisis years, the growth of Nonetheless, the projections of soaring increases, which were made on the basis of employment patterns in the better years, have not materialized. The reason is that the percentage of the population in the economically active category has declined considerably, so that people who otherwise would have been considered unemployed were relegated to economically inactive population."
In 1973, the percentage of the population economically active was 52.4%; in 1981, it was 48.2% (these figures refer to persons above 16 years of age). This decline reflects in part the expansion of education we mentioned above, as well as a lowering of the retirement age, results both from the long-term historic trend and the encroachments economic crisis. On the other hand, the rapid increase in the women coming on the job market, which was stimulated by the previous expansion, has not only stopped but the trend has reversed.
Still, these mitigating factors have not kept the official unemployment figures from climbing to 1,878,000 persons, or 15.8% of the economically active popula-
DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS POINT
TO NEW RISE IN UNEMPLOYMENT
Worse still, the factors that up until now have held back the growth of unemployment are going to accelerate it in the future, a fact that highlights what the trend is. Indeed, the expansion of education will promote an increase in the percentage of the population going into the economically active category (this is especially true of women, given their previous low level of education).
Moreover, this expansion of education has only delayed the entry of the youth concerned onto the job market. delay has already ended, and the baby boom generations are now starting to come on the job market.
What is more, the lowering of the retirement age is tending to stop as busiinto effect their plans for reducing their workforce.
All these considerations are aggravated by the fact that Spanish capitalism continues to lag far behind its competitors, which indicates that the future prospects for employment are rather bleak. The this can have deserve special attention. Spanish capitalism created an average of 142,000 jobs per year. During years, which were also a period of rapid growth of the GNP (6.4% average annual increase), employment in agriculture declined moderately from 1965 to 1969 (50,000 persons per year); and then in the following five years, the drop sharpened to 150,000 persons per year.
These numbers were easily absorbed by industry and services, which created 161,000 new jobs annually between 1965 and 1969, and 285,000 annually in the following five-year period.
The moderate growth of the economically active population in the first five years (108,000 persons annually) was the result of a high rate of emigration and a decline in the percentage of the population economically active. The demand for jobs that it created was more than met, to the extent that unemployment dropped by 31,000 persons per year. Joblessness reached its lowest point at the end of 1969, 1.1% of the economically active population (and this was in a context in which there was a big increase in women coming on the job market and a slackening of migratory movements). After this, it began to rise again. given the capacity of industries and ser vices to absorb the growing demand for jobs, unemployment rose only moderately (64,000 persons per year). By the end of 1974, it had reached only 3.3% of the economically active population. See
Thus, the years preceding the onset of the worldwide economic crisis were marked in Spain by a massive shift of labor from agriculture towards industry and the services. At the same time, there was an appreciable growth of the economically active population, owing to the natural increase of the population and the growing numbers of women coming on the labor market. This represented a long-term historic development but it was impelled by the rapid economic growth in these ten years.
THE ECONOMIC CRISIS HITS
After the onset of the economic crisis, the pattern of economic development became profoundly altered. Since 1975, the overall number of people in work has dropped steadily by an average of 260,000 per year. This period has to be divided into two subperiods in accordance with the steepness of the decline and the social layers affected. From 1975 to 1977, the average annual loss of jobs reached 154,000.
The drop in agricultural employment accelerated as a result of the capitalization that had taken place in the preceding years and in response to the higher level of wages, which had been pushed up by the economic growth. But the creation of jobs in industry and the services was very sluggish. Nonetheless, there was an annual increase of 84,000 wage workers,
while the category of nonwage workers dropped by 36,000 a year, showing the effects of the crisis on the petty bour-
In these years, the economically active population did not increase, despite the arrival of the baby boom generation on the labor market and despite the return of the emigrant workers. During the three years from 1975 to 1977, it declined by 9,000 persons per year. This is reflected in a decline in the percentage of the population economically active, in particular among youth and women. At the same time, there was a continuing decline in the percentage of the economically active among adult males, which went hand in hand with gradual lowering of the retirement age.
The result of all these trends was a sharp increase in unemployment over the three years from 1975 to 1977, although the increase did not exceed an annual average of 145,000 persons. By the end of 1977, the unemployment rate had reached 6.3%.
DEEPENING OF THE CRISIS
After 1978, we saw a resumption of these pernicious trends. But this time the weight of unemployment fell squarely on the wage earning population. One reason for the continuation of this evolution was the persistence of the economic slump. Moreover, the economic projections were becoming gloomier and gloomier, owing to acceptance of the fact that a resolution of the crisis required a deepgoing reconversion of the productive plant.
However, parallel to this, we have to look at the changes that occurred in the relationship of class forces detrimental to the workers, changes that can be dated from the signing of the Moncloa Pact on October 27, 1977. This inaugurated a period of class collaboration and capitulation by the reformist leaderships for which it is difficult to find an equivalent in history. It was marked by such deals as the Interconfederation Guidelines Agreement (AMI) signed by the Union General de los Trabajadores (UGT - General Workers Union, the SP-dominated confederation) and the National Agreement on Employment (ANE) signed jointly by the UGT and the CCOO (Comisiones Obreras, Workers Commissions, the CP-controlled union federation), the government, and the bosses in June 1981. These documents embodied a policy that left the workers disarmed and sacrificed them to the voracious logic of capitalism.
From 1978 to 1980, the annual loss of jobs was 366,000, or about 3% per year of the economically active population. The fall of agricultural employment was slowed, but there was a drastic turnaround in the job market for industry and the services, with an average annual decline of 240,000 in jobs. Unemployment rose by less than the number of jobs lost (which was 291,000 a year). That is because during this period there was again a decline in the economically active population. The drop was rather steep (72,000 persons per year), despite the growth of the population and the return of the emi-
To sum it up, during the six years between 1975 and 1980, the drop in the total number employed was 1,560,000, representing 12.2 % of the number employed in 1975.
In agriculture, the decline in the number employed was 1,017,000, representing 34% of the 1975 figure. In other sectors, the drop was 543,000 or 5.5%. Of this, 468,000 was in the wage earning
However, in the last three years the trend has worsened. From 1978 to 1980, the number of non-agricultural wage workers fell by 720,000, that is, 9% less the figure at the start of 1978.
This steady narrowing of the job mar. ket in quantitative terms has been accompanied by growing effects on the best organized and most combative sections of the working class. This has happened as the economic crisis has hit the key sectors and plants and to the extent that the political conditions existed for striking blows to employment levels in the working-class bastions. In 1981, the tendencies that took form in the three previous years continued. It seems safe to say that the time has arrived for a major confrontation, since massive layoffs in the big plants are on the order of the day.
According to a recent publication of the OECD, among the members of this international organization, only Turkey has a higher level of unemployment than the Spanish state. In general, it can be said that the decline in employment that has occurred since the Moncloa Pact is without parallel with what has happened in the other industrial countries. The policy of pacts and consensus followed by the leaderships of the SP and CP have made this possible. But the ultimate cause has to be sought in the weakness of Spanish capitalism and the need it has to raise a low level of organic composition of capital to increase productivity, to even out the balance with the other industrial countries, and therefore to become more competitive.
THE HISTORIC LAG OF SPANISH CAPITALISM
In order to understand the present situation of Spanish capitalism, you have to remember that because of Franco's policy of seeking economic self-sufficiency and because of the isolation in which the country found itself in the 1950s, Spain entered the third age of capitalist growth only belatedly and on the basis of a very low organic composition of capital.(1) The years of rapid growth it experienced have not enabled it to seriously reduce this imbalance.
So, when the economic crisis set in, its effects have been graver and the requirements for overcoming it more drastic. This explains why, with the assistance of the parliamentary left leaders, the Spanish capitalists have cut back employ-
POPULATION (Average annual variation)
(in thousands of persons)
Before Crisis
1965-69
1=2+3 Economically
+108
Active Population
2. Total Employment
+139
Agriculture
-50
Nonwage workers
+28 in industry and services
After Onset of Crisis 1970-74 1975-77 1978-80
+208 -9 -72
+144 -154 -366
-150 -201 -138
+9 -36 +11 ment so sharply and moved to restructure the productive plant in such drastic and intense ways.
Today, going into 1982, the reorganization of the productive plant has not yet been carried far enough to meet the needs of capitalism. The restructurations and reconversions of the sectors in crisis that are now hitting the big bastions of the workers movement are encountering strong resistance from the workers at a time when the process has been only half
In fact, because of the policy of economic self-sufficiency and the prolonged, excessive protection granted to
Wage workers in
+161 services and industry
3. Jobless
-31
Sources: For pre-1977 figures, Mo. Economia "Poblacion, Empleo y Paro, de 1964 a 1978." Post-1977, Instituto Nacional de Estadistica,
Activa" (for those above 14 years of age).
+285
+84
-240
+64
+145
+291
"Encuesta de Poblacion
Spanish industry in the early years of the dictatorship, capitalism in this country (1). The organic composition of capital refers to the ratio of capital and labor, or workers and machines, etc. The organic composition is high if there is a high ratio of capital to labor, as is typical of industrialized countries. IV.
17
TABLE 2
PRODUCTIVITY TRENDS IN SPANISH CAPITALISM
Reduction of got into step with the international development only with the 1959 stabilization plan, and it joined the race only in unfavorable conditions.
After this, Spanish capitalism was able Difference (%) to develop by adopting the advances made in the third technological revolution. There was a shift of workers from the countryside into generally more productive jobs in industry and the services. Following this, it was necessary to mechanize agriculture, which resulted in rapid increases in productivity in this sector, reaching an average of 5% annually between 1974 and 1975. Employment in industry and the services increased every year and productivity increased sharply by 7.2% annually between 1974 and
However, the acceleration of this pro-
### Productivity
Difference in 1963 (in %) 1963-1973 U.S 83,5 -7.3 Japan 14.3 +372 Germany 64.7 -3.9 France 64.7 -3.9 Britain 56.1 -13.0 Italy 47.0 -1.4 Canada 80.2 -7.4 The Big 7 71.0 -5.8 Spain
% of Wage Increase Above Productivity Increases 1974-1980 1963-1973 1974-1980 -7.5 -0.7 -0.5 - 7 +0.8 -0.4 -2.5 +1.7 0.7 -3.6 +0.4 0.5 -15.9 +0.4 0.6 -8.4 +1.8 1.5 -8.6 +1.3 0.7 -5.0
0.5 1.1 cess of development not enable Spanish capitalism to seriously reduce its
Note: The difference in productivity has been defined as the percentage that indicates disadvantage relative to the other indus- to what extent Spanish productivity (defined as the GNP by employed person at 1970 trialized countries. The productivity of prices and exchange rates) is lower than each country listed. The sources are OECD labor and the organic composition "National Account" and "Labour Force Statistics," and for recent years, OECD capital did increase. But that also happened in the other industrialized countries.
LABOR INTENSIVE VS. CAPITAL
INTENSIVE DEVELOPMENT?
The SP and CP economists have a tendency to say that the process of develop. ment was marked by an intensity of investment and economy in the use of labor. They see the cause of the high unemployment that exists now in the introduction of labor saving technology. The solutions that they propose call for using techniques that involve a less intensive utilization of capital and more use of labor power. They fail to recognize, however, that these solutions are in contradiction to the features of the third technological revolution and to the interests of replace workers with machines.
What is more, this explanation does not answer the main question, which is not whether the process has been characterized by an intensive utilization of capital invested but why this intensity has not been sufficient to reduce the lag in pro-
There can be no doubt that during the years of rapid development, the organic composition of capital failed to rise sufficiently. By way of example, we need only note that while in manufacturing in the OECD as a whole 62 wage workers were needed in 1975 to produce the equivalent of a million (1970) dollars and in the EEC this was 71 workers, the Spanish capitalists needed 112 workers to produce the same amount. In this respect, Spain was trailed only by Britain, with 128 workers needed to produce that amount, and Portugal, where it was 161. Moreover, this situation is not a coincidence. It is explained primarily by the fact that the Spanish ruling class has had less means for capitalization.
If we assess the intensity of the process of capitalization by examining the average annual investment per wage earner in 1964-75 (excluding the building industry, where the figures include the construction of housing) Spanish capitalism stands in one of the last places in the OECD. The figure in Spain was 1,300 (1970) dollars per wage earner. In the U.S., it was 3,900 dollars, in France 2,900, in Italy, 1,700, and in Greece 2,400. A second factor in the low capitalization is that the Spanish capitalists had an abundance of cheap labor and favorable political conditions for super-
In fact, if you look at Table 2, you see that in the years preceding the worldwise economic crisis the rise of wages relative to growth in productivity was less in Spain than in the rest of the industrialized countries, aside from Britain. The intensive growth of production made possible an increase in real wages along with a major increase in total surplus value.(2) Spanish workers have continued to be relatively cheap, which explains why there was no incentive to increase further the organic composition of capiin particular, it, as was the case,
SPANISH CAPITALISM DRIVEN
INTO A CORNER
With the onset of the economic crisis, and the stepup in competition flowing from it, the historical disadvantages capitalism have become evident. Spanish capitalism had to increase its productivity, but it was obliged to do so in bad conditions created by the economic crisis and by the upsurge of the workers movement in the final years of the dicta-
While in the other industrialized countries, employment began dropping sharp ly in 1975, this process only began in Spain with the Moncloa Pact. For a long time, the capitalist concerns continued operating with workforces larger than what they needed to restore their rate of profit and the restructurations of the crisis-hit sectors which were spaced out in
DROP BEGINS IN REAL WAGES
Since 1978, two phenomena have been striking. First, the organic composition of capital has been increased by cutting back workforces and the disappearance of the least profitable companies. Secondly, real wages have been cut in order to make it possible to restore the
Since 1977, workers in nonagricultural sectors have lost almost 10% of their buying power, and in the last two years wage raises have been far outstripped by productivity increases (1.5% in 1979, and 2% for 1980). Nonetheless, these gains for the bourgeoisie were clearly inadequate to meet the needs of capitalism in the context of the interimperialist crisis and in view of the Spanish bourgeoisie's preparations for joining the Common Market. The productivity lag was lessened somewhat (by 5 points between 1974 and 1980). And while the organic composition of capital did increase, there are still many key sectors where this is not the
At the end of 1981, there were eleven industries in crisis, including steel, shipbuilding, automobiles, textiles, footwear, producers goods, and so forth. In these restructuration, and drastic cutbacks in the workforces are on the agenda.
It is in these industries fundamentally of the workers movement are located. And the struggles going on there indicate that these restructurations will not be easy and that they will not produce as good results as the capitalists want. In any case, the workers
Surplus value means the value created by workers for which they are not paid. When the volume of surplus value goes up in general it means an increase in the rate of exploitation.
movement has a great deal at stake in this new stage of the bourgeoisie's policy for overcoming the crisis.
The conclusion that follows from all this is obvious. In order to get out of the crisis, Spanish capitalism has to make substantial new reductions in the level of employment and allow a considerable buildup of the pool of the jobless. It is also obvious that unemployment is a permanent cause of social tension. bourgeoisie has no policy options open for holding back the rise of unemployment, because that could collide with the objective needs of capital.
When the bourgeois and reformist economists talk above lowering real wages in order to reduce labor costs and stimulate the demand for labor power, what they are doing in essence is playing along with the readjustments the capitalists need to make. They demobilize the workers and thus make it possible for the capitalists to carry out their restructura-
NO ROOM FOR REFORMISM
No cut in wages is going to keep unemployment from going up. Instead this would stimulate a sharper drop in employment by the effects it would have on consumption and the level of economic activity. At least on this point, there is no room for reformism. Either you aid the process of capitalist readjustment and you permit the growth of unemployment, or you oppose this logic and resist the attacks of capital. There is no third way.
The National Agreement on Employment signed in June 1981 specifies that in order to just keep unemployment at the level it was when this accord was reached until the end of 1982 it will be necessary to create 350,000 jobs. It was obvious that was not going to be done.
The national budget adopted at the end of 1981 did not permit that sort of job creation. The bosses were not interested in doing that, and could not do it. In fact, the fact that it is said that so many Jobs would have to be created to keep employment at the present level indicates that quite a different sort of operation was being prepared. By signing this accord, the unions accepted the fact that there were going to continue to be
Over the first nine months of 1981, the number of people employed dropped by 196,000, and this figure was expected to decline by another 100,000 in the fourth quarter. The eleven sectors in crisis and which are now undergoing restructuration employ 700,000 workers. Even supposing that this restructuration cuts workforces by only 10% (which is minimal by comparison with the plans of the bourgeoisie), this would represent, for a start, a loss of 70,000 jobs.
In addition, you have to take into consideration the continual failures of small and medium businesses that are doomed inexorably to disappearance by the reconversion of these industries. As we have seen earlier, the only way that Spanish capitalism can increase its productivity is by shedding excess workers and replacing machines, that is through increasing unemployment.
However, if the workers fail to stem this process, unemployment will continue to rise steeply. It has to be taken into account, moreover, that there is going to be a continuing flow of workers out of agriculture (temporary factors such as the drought may speed this up). Likewise, it cannot be forgotten that highly educated youth, both male and female, are coming onto the job market.
During the first nine months of 1981, for the first time since the Moncloa Pact, the number of unemployed increased by more than the number of jobs lost. That is, the number of unemployed went up by 258,000 while the number of jobs lost was 196,000. And the number of unemployed looking for their first job (131,000) was greater than that of those who lost their jobs (127,000).
THE SOCIAL REPERCUSSIONS OF UNEMPLOYMENT
The devastating effect of this unemployment leads us to examine its social repercussions. In this respect, what strikes you first is the relative lack of conflicts engendered by a problem of such scope. A few years ago, when Marxists envisaged such an unfavorable evolution of the jobs situation, they always expected this to go hand in hand with a period of social and political convulsions directly produced by unemployment. Nonetheless, the events have been much less stormy than predicted. That does not mean that major tensions and conflicts have not arisen (as in the case of the Andalusian day laborers for instance) or that the social and political instability that exists is not the by-product, to an extent, of unemployment. And it does not mean that there will not be more conflicts in the future.
WHO ARE THE JOBLESS?
Among the reasons for the relative social calm that has persisted up till now is the fact that the impact of unemployment has been cushioned by its composition. Thus, 58% of the jobless are youth under the age of 24, and 60% are not heads of families but dependents of heads of families.*There is no doubt that the fact that youth make up such a large percentage of unemployment has attenuated noted also that women account for 33% of the unemployed, while they represent 24% of the economically active population. Thus, the adult population has not been as hard hit by unemployment as the statistics would suggest. In fact, only 28% of those unemployed are heads of families. Only 19% of the unemployed belong to families where there is no breadwinner, and among these a large proportion are drawing unemploy-
It has to be noted, moreover, that while 40% of the jobless have never drawn unemployment benefits, this percentage is only 26% for those over 40, who are thus better protected by unemployment insurance. The result of all this is relative and not absolute poverty for the unemployed. A recent study showed that most of them have a refrigerator, a washing machine, and a black-and-white television set. What is more, over half have a car and their own accommodation. And with all this, their level of indebtedness is not much greater than that of employed workers.
Thus, a series of social mechanisms have helped to provide a cushion against the conflicts that could have arisen from such a high level of unemployment.
It has also to be taken into consideration the way unemployment has grown. We have already indicated how large a number of youth are looking for their first job. But if you look at the workers who have lost their work, you see that the hardest hit are those with the lowest level of education (79% of the unemployed have at best a primary education). So, in general, the skilled workers, the back bone of the industrial proletariat in the strict sense of the term, have been much less affected than temporary workers and laborers, who make up, by themselves, an important proportion of the total unem-
Moreover, only 40% of those unemployed after leaving jobs have been laid off (20% have quit and in the case of the other 40%, their work ended). And in general, the layoffs have not hit the major bastions of the working class.
In fact, of those laid off, 55% lost their jobs because of the failure or closing of plants and businesses. But closures have not yet hit the big plants. And only 23% of those laid off were working in plants with more than fifty workers. Finally, more than 60% of laid-off workers have been compensated for their job loss.
UNEMPLOYMENT STARTS TO HIT
STRONGEST SECTIONS OF THE
WORKING CLASS
Nonetheless, if the bastions of the workers movement have not yet contributed in a big way to the unemployment figures, things are beginning to change, as we said. According to the study cited above, the rate of unemployment is 3.5% higher than the official figures, that is, 18% of the economically active population, the sort of statistic typical of the underdeveloped world. What is more, long-term unemployment is increasing. Some 33% of the unemployed have been looking in vain for work for a year.
This unemployment is having major effects on the morale of the workers. Some 77% think that they are not going to find work in the coming months; 50% would accept work in another province; 83% would accept a less skilled job than the one they had; 80% would accept work at the minimum wage.
19
The fear of losing jobs has spread even among those who still have work. Some 33% of the population think that unemployment is the problem that touches them most personally, and 24% say that losing their jobs. Finally, unemployment is beginning to better categories of jobs better paid layers more than in the pre-
This means that unemployment is undermining the fighting potential of working class (which is reflected also in the demands and in the contracts) and is giving a defensive character to its struggles. But it also has opposite effects.
The workers are convinced that unem-
Bombay
textile workers strike
On October 20, 1981, workers from several textile factories in Bombay, India, went into struggle over
The following January 18 they an indefinite general strike, involving 250,000 workers in 60 different factories (International Viewpoint, Issue No 17, November 15, 1982). After 10 months this strike can already be considered one of the most important in the history of the workers movement.
The Bombay textile workers are demanding wage increases, paid holidays, better conditions of work, the abolition of the very reactionary Bombay Industrial Relations Act, and recognition of their trade organisation, Maharashtra Girni Kamgar Union.
For their wage demands to be successful, and to launch this strike, the textile workers did, in fact, have to turn to the union recognised by the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, the Rashtriya Mill affiliated to a confederation linked with the ruling Congress Party (I), which they have previously denounced for its collaborationist attitude to the mill owners and the government. They organised themselves in a trade union led by Dr Datta Samant, a former member of the Congress Party of Indira Gandhi, which has a reputation of radical trade unionism among the young industrial workers of the town. by the reformist left, which can no longer appear as an alternative for the workers, unhappy about this competition, have criticised the 'pure economism' of Datta Samant's union, but one has to note that the workers turned towards it ployment is going to continue to increase and that workers laid off will not be able to find new jobs. They have clear ideas about those who are responsible for this situation (in the plant cited, about 80% think that the bosses and the government are responsible for unemployment, 32% think that it is the economic crisis, and only 12% that it is the workers them-
Given the existence of such attitudes, the severe attacks by the employers, especially those related to the restructuration of crisis-hit plants, have provoked militant responses from the workers. In particular, large movements of solidarity have in support of workers who to lead one of the biggest strikes in workers history.
Although this strike is the most impor tant that has happened in India, it is not the first general strike by the textile workers, a particularly combative section of the working class. This strike is a question of national importance, both because of the response to it from the working and rural population in the Bombay area because of the political dimension contained in the demand for trade union recognition, and because of the degree of workers self-organisation achieved with the real popular support that it has, the textile workers strike has become an example, and a focal eleagainst the When riots broke out on October 18, 1982, in Bombay, a police strike, the textile workers were the main target of the repressive forces, and 24 were arrested. Today these workers have a dual problem, to confront the repression and make their leaders go further in action and mobilisation.
The Communist League, tion of the Fourth International, have contributed as they are able to the solidarity actions with the textile workers. Together with another Trotskyist group, the Bolshevik-Leninist group, and two other groups of the far left they have formed a defence committee for the
They have already distributed some tens of thousands of pamphlets and leaflets, and put up thousands of support posters. They have also undertaken several public initiatives.
Solidarity is a crucial factor for the future of this workers' struggle, the outcome of which will influence the future class relationship of forces. On this subject Proletarian Politics, the bimonthly journal of the Communist League, wrote in May 1982, The most interesting aspect of this strike is the support from several sections of the toiling class in the urban and rural regions of Maharashtra state. The majority of workers have decided to stay in the villages during the strike. They have been welcomed by their friends and relatives. During the tours by strike leaders who originally come from rural regions of Maharashtra, enormous quantities of cereals of great value were given to support the strike. The striking workers
These reactions give grounds for hop ing that after the retreats of the workers over the last four years, a new stage of class struggles is opening up in the Spanish state. The pockets of unemployment in agricultural regions such as Andalusia and Estramadura are also powderkegs threatening to blow up in the faces of the Spanish capitalists.
We have not tried here to draw the political conclusions from our analysis of unemployment and the gloomy prospects for its further growth. But there is no doubt that unemployment will play an essential role in the coming political and social developments. were invited by their comrades from the country to give details on their class struggle in Bombay. From this resulted greater solidarity between the industrial and agricultural proletariats. During the month of April alone six tons of wheat were collected in the country areas of Maharastra.'
On October 2 three to four hundred thousand workers attended a solidarity rally in Bombay. Between October 11 and 13 more than one million workers in Bombay struck in support. Even the usually passive bus workers went on solidarity strike for three days.
These massive demonstrations of sup port were met with extreme brutality by
Workers were beaten up by the police in the street, and in some areas the houses of textile workers were enter ed and women and children beaten up
The 'Committee against the National Security Act, which includes the Bolshevik Leninist Group and the Communist League, have taken up these incidents, alongside the defence of textile workers arrested under the NSA, and the call for its abolition.
They called for a demonstration in front of the police headquarters on October 16, which was banned and participants forcibly driven away. missioner of Police justified all this in the name of law and order.
such brutal repression the workers struck for three days and there was much discussion of an indefinite soli-
Bombay, and possibly throughout Maharashtra.
Under the pressure of the mass mobilisation in support of the workers the government has started moves to settle the strike. The morale of the workers remains high, and their determination to win their two main demands, abolition Industrial Relations Act, and refusal to accept job losses, and for the permanent employment of the hundred thousand temporary workers, solid
These are the most important workers mobilisations in the Indian industrial centre of Bombay for a long time. Since the failure of the railway workers strike in 1974 all the big workers strikes have been defeated. Thus a victory for the textile workers would have an important effect in the country.